AHC: Keep Admiral Fletcher in command in late 1942

[McPherson]

I was thinking that the TTL Doolittle Raid would still be undertaken by Hornet escorted by Enterprise.

Correct. Nimitz wanted to mass in Coral Sea because FRUMEL had given him a good picture of Operation MO.

That would allow Saratoga to be present at the Coral Sea with the result that the three aircraft carriers that took part ITTL would survive undamaged because they had 50% more fighters and possibly a thicker screen of cruisers and destroyers. The Americans might loose fewer aircraft and aircrew than they did IOTL because they would be attacking and defending in greater strength which might "swamp" the Japanese. It would be a bonus if this also results in Shōkaku being sunk and Zuikaku being sunk or badly damaged plus increased losses of hard to replace aircrew.

That depends on the dive bombers and whether the two Japanese aircraft carriers actually burn down. They were historically surprisingly very hard to set afire, unlike their compeers. The torpedoes have to work to make sure they are scuttle-bait or Fletcher has to send Crace in for a surface battle with air support.

If Midway still happens Fletcher will be able to concentrate his four or five aircraft carriers in one task force (TF 16) instead of being forced to split his aircraft carriers into two task forces (because of the time it took to repair the damage done to Yorktown at the Coral Sea). Therefore, he would be able to attack the Japanese more effectively because it would be easier to coordinate the airstrikes. Furthermore, one large task force can defend itself more effectively than than two small ones.

Not US doctrine as the USN practice was to scatter the flattops so not all bird-farms could be bounced by one massed strike. At Midway, it could be three aircraft carrier task groups, Fitch, Spruance and Fletcher.

Extra numbers and more coordination might have made the torpedo bomber attack more effective. An extra squadron or two of dive bombers probably means that Hiryu doesn't survive for long enough to attack Yorktown. Except that Hiryu couldn't have attacked Yorktown because the Japanese wouldn't have found her because she would have been with TF 16 instead of operating independently.

It just means that all of the flattops are found together. USS Yorktown served her role not only as a strike platform, but as an unintended decoy away from TF 16. The logic is that USS Yorktown could have formed up with USS Enterprise and USS Hornet anyway as Fletcher had formed up with Fitch at Coral Sea after his reckless Tulagi raid. (Where is this idea that Fletcher was cautious? He was certainly not!). Fletcher had lesson learned from Coral Sea to scatter the targets as per doctrine. He had concentrated at Coral Sea and Braindead had burned him.

Furthermore, if the if the Japanese had found TF 16 ITTL in time to mount an all-out strike from their four aircraft carriers it would have had to fight four or five American aircraft carriers carrying 27 Wildcats each instead of two (Enterprise and Hornet) with 27 Wildcats each. If it had been Hiryu's aircraft attacking TF 16 unsupported like her OTL attack on Yorktown the result would have been a massacre.

Conjecture. Hiryu's planes fought the entire massed American CAP and still got through.

The OTL battle was four Japanese aircraft carriers fighting three American ships, which is a ratio of 4:3 in Japan's favour. (The Japanese thought the Americans only had two operational aircraft carriers in the Pacific (Enterprise and Hornet) which would have given them a 2:1 superiority.) ITTL they know that the Americans will have four or five ships ready for combat which means that they will be facing an equal force if it's four versus four or a slightly superior force if it's four versus five.

The IJN KB staff assumed two and when they met three, then their estimates doubled to explain how they were burned down. Their recon and battle intel was lousy. Also Combined Fleet screwed up on the Midway air garrison. The B-17s and Marauders came as a shock.

Furthermore, the number of aircraft they carried IOTL was about the same, that is 223 to 227. (I'm guessing that the Japanese expected to have a 3:2 superiority in aircraft (i.e. 225 of their own against 150 American) because they expected to fight two American aircraft carriers.) However, ITTL they know that the ratio of aircraft will be 4:3 in the Americans favour (300 American versus 225 Japanese) if they can put four aircraft carriers to sea and 5:3 in the American's favour (375 American versus 225 Japanese) if they can put all five aircraft carriers to sea.

The Americans had that 3 to 2 air superiority with the Midway air garrison added to the aircraft carrier air groups. This did not and should not have fazed the Japanese. What was the difference was that in spite of all the bad luck and fucking Miles Browning's incredible stupidity , the Americans managed to get 40 dive bombers over Nagumo's flattops and burned three of them down. If Stanhope Ring had not been misled by the incompetent Marc Mitscher and HIS imbecile air staff, there would have been another 16-20 Dauntlesses over Hiryu and Fletcher would be praised instead of Spruance for the Miracle at Midway.

Would they have gone through with the invasion of Midway knowing that they would be numerically inferior to the Americans? If they do the result will be that all four Japanese aircraft carriers will be sunk and all the American ships will survive IMHO.

Yes. Because they were that incompetent.

*** *** ***​

But as you wrote that presupposes that the IJN's high command will still attempt the invasion of Port Moresby if they know that the Americans have an extra aircraft carrier available.

They DID. They thought they were up against one. When Inoue found out about USS Lexington, he still went ahead, the yutz.

Therefore, if they do cancel the Port Moresby operation they've got six aircraft carriers at Midway instead of four, which changes the odd to 3:2 in Japan's favour if the Americans can put four aircraft carriers to sea and 6:5 if they can put five aircraft carriers to sea. The Japanese would have about 375 aircraft if Shōkaku and Zuikaku were carrying 72 aircraft each, which would give them a superiority of 5:4 if the Americans could put four aircraft carriers to sea and parity if they were able to put five to sea.

That puts Halsey in command and guarantees American defeat. He did NOT know how to handle a fleet in battle.

However, they Americans would still have all the advantages that they had IOTL plus the offensive and defensive advantages that their concentrated fleet of TTL would have over the divided force of OTL. Therefore, I still think that the result would have been a decisive victory for the Americans.

It is not about mere numbers. The effectors have to work, the recon has to be good and the staff-work for strikes and target assignments has to be up to standards, none which was true on the American side, either at Coral Sea or Midway.

The thing is, Hara's attempted dusk raid on the previous day wasted 8 torpedo bombers, leaving only 18 for the strike on TF 17. If Saratoga is present, that's only 6 TBs to attack each carrier. As it was, 14 TBs attacked Lexington (they scored two hits) and 4 TBs attacked Yorktown (they scored no hits). So what probably happens is that Lex and Sara each take one torpedo, and Yorktown is unscathed as usual. This will probably sink neither of the two big carriers, but it will hurt them and will prevent them from taking part in Midway. Thus the battle goes the same as OTL.

King Kong had been overruled and he was benched. That was all Braindead's fault.

It's also worth noting that Saratoga underwent her refit after getting torped in January. If that doesn't happen ITTL, she will still be unmodernised at Coral Sea and her AA will not be as effective.

Her fighters were the best performers in PACFLT. Counts for something if she CAPS.

What probably happens now is that Lex and Sara are out of action for three or four months, both undergoing repair and refit. By August/September 1942 they should be ready to sail, and ready for combat by October 1942 (working up and airgroup familiarisation). Before that, Fletcher will only have Enterprise, Hornet and Wasp - too few to guarantee a successful OTL Operation Watchtower in August 1942. The op is thus probably delayed, giving Fletcher more time to rest and get ready for battle.

If they are hit. Fletcher only had USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise and USS Wasp for WATCHTOWER. USS Hornet was so awful at Midway she was in remedial training. So ADD Lex to the mix and Eastern Solomons becomes VERY interesting. How does Nagumo fight 2 on 4 or 2 on 3? I guess another Midway?

Come October, the US will have five fleet carriers and can act more offensively. The IJN will have four - the Cranes and the Hawks - as well as some lights.

Not if my math is correct. At most, maybe the 2 Hiyos and one "Falcon" Dead meat.

Fletcher vs Nagumo, round 2, off Guadalcanal - probably a harder campaign though, since the IJA will have more time to dig into the island and prepare. OTOH, having five carriers may allow Fletcher to be more aggressive - which he certainly was capable of being as the Tulagi raid showed.

Nagumo= Dead Meat.

 

[McPherson]

POD is actually fairly simple. Don't bail at The 'Canal.

That permanently gave him a reputation for passivity. He was in command of the failed relief effort of Wake (it remains a subject of some debate if his decision making was designed to preserve his force at the expense of the Island). Coral Sea sort of faded from the limelight after Midway, and was seen as a draw. Spruance was always given (quite properly) the main credit for Midway. For Fletcher it came down to August 8th, 1942. He managed, simply by steaming too far away from Guadalcanal, to wind up with the blame for everything that went wrong, whether it was the failure of Turner's transports to unload in time to the Savo Island debacle, in the early day's of Watchtower and, by extension, turning what "could have been" into what it turned into, a maelstrom that ate men and ships.

Wasn't even close to fair. Still happened.

1/4 of his fighter force was gone and he knew Eastern Solomons was in the works, knew Fletcher. Blame Turner for multiple reasons; the transports, failure to support the landings at Tulagi, his idiotic battle conferences which were nothing more than ego-trips to glorify himself instead of being operationally necessary or important, Savo Island, apple polishing and his lying politics: including backstabbing Fletcher and blaming him for Turner's own derelictions, but if Turner fessed up, he would be breaking big rocks into little rocks and he could not have that, could he?

To be fair to Fletcher he pulled out because he knew something like Eastern Solomons was inevitable pretty darn soon and thus needed to replenish his airwings which had taken quite the battering

That and he had to replace dead pilots and re-ammo. His force had used a lot of bombs as well as aviators and planes

What I don't feel is fair is how some people seem to think Halsey was incompetent merely because of Taffy 3. First, one screw up doesn't make you incompetent. Halsey was as human as the next guy and making mistakes is inevitable. He was also under Nimitz's orders to try and destroy the last remaining carriers. This part seems to be ignored.

1. He failed during the Doolittle Raid by blundering blind into the trawler line, when he was warned to be on the lookout by his radio intelligence guys.
2. He failed during the return from the raid by opey-doping along when he knew speed was essential.
3. He failed up his Pearl Harbor task force layover wasting a whole valuable day; he would need for the Speed Run to Coral Sea.
4. He failed up the change of command before Midway by failing to warn Spruance that Miles Browning was a drunken incompetent idiot. Halsey knew this fact as early as the Marshals Raid and did nothing about Browning. That makes him culpable for all the problems Miles Browning caused Spruance and George D. Murray.
5. The typhoons... MURPHY the typhoons.
6. He, not Kincaid, screwed up Rennell Islands and Santa Cruz.
7. He boloed Leyte Gulf. It was handed to him on a silver psalter and he Beattyed it to hell and gone. Who saved his ass? See 7? Thomas Kincaid.

Also in the worst case scenario and Taffy 3 is destroyed along with the remaining transports it will hold up the US a few days or weeks, a month at the most. Whatever the Japanese send into the Gulf of Leyte is not coming back out. The reinforcements in the area will eat it for breakfast. One battle does not make or break a military officer and Halsey was in charge of the battle in the first place because he a damned good record .

See 1 through 7 and then read Halsey's goddamned ghostwritten book. Pack of lies.

Plausibility check:

Let's say there is a Super Coral Sea, and both sides are too damaged for a Midway-analogue on the same timeline.

Still, the US needs to Do Something. Why not retake Wake? This should be doable with a fraction of the forces assigned to Watchtower, provide a major morale victory, as well as an advanced base for submarine warfare while the USN rebuilds strength.

What am I missing?

Wake is 1000 nautical miles from Midway and BEYOND US air cover, but well in range of Japanese RIKKOs in the Gilberts. One of the things I'm working out is how to take Wake Island (*Garrison ~4500 Japanese and ~60 aircraft) WITHOUT flattop support. I think I can do it, but it still needs VLR bombers out of Midway and three flattops *(fighters) for the initial assault by Canadian 6th and US 7th Infantry divisions.

Overall? Very much so. The state of the Lant Fleet during the 2nd Happy Time was, IMO, on Stark, not King,

Absolutely. Stark is the real guy to blame for Drumbeat's success and so much else USN wrong in 1934-1937 and 1940-1942. From faulty torpedoes to the botched Two Ocean build program to faulty fleet preparations and the naked eastern sea frontier... that is all on Harold Stark.

He hated wasting his time. Sitting for hours in the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a waste of time. Having to spend much of those meeting having to keep the Air Corp and the British from screwing up, in his opinion, the whole GD war for their own goals (that they were putting ahead of winning) just made it worse.

Absolutely. ABDA results were coming in, by then, and King was furious about it and he blamed the British for a lot of it. Properly? In my opinion, probably... yes.

 

[CT7834]

"Braindead" Takagi would have attacked if there were FIVE American flattops present. It was what Nagumo tried to do at Midway, even after he had all of his bird-farms burned down, when he believed that there were five flattops against him.

Takagi got out of Coral Sea alive because of weather and defective US torpedoes and USNAS strike coordinator (as there was none) incompetence. I do not know if USS Saratoga would have been hit, (Unlikely); but it is certain that a third USN aircraft carrier means +30 more tries at Zuikaku and Shōkaku. I estimate Midway type results if the added dive bombers can only get Zuikaku dedecked as Shōkaku was.

That's assuming that in this timeline, Fletcher catches both cranes in the middle of refuelling and rearming. Along with Zuikaku being out in the open instead of hiding in a sqaull.

 

[McPherson]

That's assuming that in this timeline, Fletcher catches both cranes in the middle of refuelling and rearming. Along with Zuikaku being out in the open instead of hiding in a sqaull.

As to catching them both... it happened.

Takagi got out of Coral Sea alive because of weather and defective US torpedoes and USNAS strike coordinator (as there was none) incompetence.

Quoting Combined Fleet.com Zuikaku

8 May 1942
Carrier Battle of the Coral Sea.
- 0415 CarDiv 5 launches 7 attack planes for search; three from ZUIKAKU.
- 0620 CarDiv 5 is sighted by a scout bomber from LEXINGTON. Only two minutes later, one of the Japanese float planes sights TF-17 (YORKTOWN group). Hara received its message at 0630 and CarDiv 5 immediately responds by launching a strike at 0730 of 18 fighters, 33 bombers, and 18 torpedo planes commanded by Lt. Commander Takahashi Kakuichi of SHOKAKU. ZUIKAKU's share is 9 fighters, 14 dive-bombers, and 8 attack planes. The torpedo plane contingent of both carriers is led ZUIKAKU's by Lt.Cdr. Shimazaki Shigekazu.
- Just before 0900 the American strike closed on the southward steaming CarDiv 5. At the time ZUIKAKU was 9,000 meters ahead of SHOKAKU and by chance at that time with her screen of MYOKO and HAGURO and three destroyers found sanctuary in a rain squall, while ZUIKAKU launched 4 fighters to assist. This left SHOKAKU and her two cruisers (KINUGASA and FURUTAKA) to bear the brunt of the attack. SHOKAKU is hit by three bombs and severely damaged, but her speed is unimpaired. She is detached to head for home, while ZUIKAKU remains at the battlefield.
- In the meantime, CarDiv 5's strike had attacked the American carriers at almost exactly the same time, starting runs at 0910. Assisted by four ZUIKAKU attack planes, SHOKAKU's concentrated on LEXINGTON scoring two definite torpedo and bomb hits each and claiming more, while ZUIKAKU's went after YORKTOWN, hitting her with three bombs. Though LEXINGTON would later succumb to an unexpected series of induced av-gas vapor explosions, for ZUIKAKU's sister carrier the battle was over as well. At 1010 SHOKAKU had detached and left battle area at high speed.
- ZUIKAKU commenced recovering SHOKAKU's strike planes and her own at 1100. In all, it was a protracted process and ZUIKAKU took aboard forty-six planes from both carriers, while seven damaged ones were obliged to ditch. This was finished by 1230, after which it was planned to spot and launch a fresh attack. However, after taking inventory and finding his air strength too depleted, Takagi at 1300 cancels any further May 8 strike and at 1345 Inoue ordered Takagi to suspend attacks and retire, and at 1420 the invasion of Port Moresby was called off. Ending the Battle of the Coral Sea for ZUIKAKU too. In today's operations ZUIKAKU had lost 4 A6M2,6 D3A1, and 9 B5N2s.
9 May 1942:
Refueled from TOHO MARU during the day; then in afternoon steamed southward to attempt to renew contact.
10 May 1942:
1000 Having failed to locate any enemy other than the derelict NEOSHO drifting, Takagi breaks off any further probe and heads to off Rabaul to be in position to deliver fighters and cover the invasion of Ocean and Nauru Islands. (That venture is postponed, and ZUIKAKU ordered to Japan on May 12).That afternoon, the suspended Port Moresby invasion is officially postponed until July after the Midway operation. At battle's end heading back to Japan, ZUIKAKU has operational 13 dive-bombers, 8 torpedo planes, and 24 fighters. Non-operational were 1 fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 2 attack planes. Thus in the two days, ZUIKAKU had lost 1 fighter, 8 dive-bombers, and 14 attack planes. Of these, the crew had been lost from the fighter, 4 dive-bombers, and 9 attack planes. As a result, her own air group had suffered heavy attrition.(Note 1)

My comment as to Braindead's decision making and of that coward, Inoue?

Source:

Zuikaku Air Group​

• LT CDR Shimazaki Shigekazu
• 1 B5N2
  LT CDR Shimazaki Shigekazu
• 20 A6M2
  Down 1 plane.
  LT Okajima Kiyohuma
• 22 D3A1
  Down 8 planes.
  LT Ema Tamatsu
• 22 B5N2
  Down 14 planes.
  LT Subota Yoshiaki
• 5 A6M2
  Cargo for Tainan Air Group (at Rabaul.)

However, that flattop had landed birds from the dedecked Shōkaku Estimated about 20 aircraft

For Shōkaku, the results have to be calculated as Japanese records of birds on Zuikaku are "confused".

The losses as far as can be determined from USN and IJN records;

19 Zeroes including 3 from Shōhō were destroyed.
19 Vals were destroyed.
31 Kates were destroyed.

So we deduce 1 Zero from Zuikaku, 3 from Shōhō means 15 Zeroes from Shōkaku did not make it. What happened to the 7 that did?
So we deduce 8 Vals from Zuikaku and 11 Vals from Shōkaku did not make it. What happened to the 9 that did?
So we deduce 6 Kates went down with Shōhō, Zuikaku lost 14 Kates and that means 11 Kates from Shōkaku died. What happened to the 8 that made it? Did the heroic CAPT Joshima Takaji take those with him as he fled?

That is 24 aircraft that had to land somewhere. I can write that Shokaku's CAP had to land on Zuikaku so that accounts for 4 planes.

The Japanese list the CAW post battle for Zuikaku as

24 fighters out of 49 Zeroes total at start of battle
13 dive bombers out of 44 Vals at start of battle
8 torpedo planes operational out of 37 Kates at start of battle.

Damaged aboard Zuikaku were:

1 fighter
4 dive bombers
2 torpedo planes

Total?

25 fighters out of out of 49 Zeroes total at start of battle.
17 dive bombers out of 44 Vals at start of battle.
10 torpedo planes out of 37 Kates at start of battle.

Hunh? Shōkaku had to be carrying wrecked planes back with her to Japan. At least three Zeros and five Vals are unaccounted and maybe as many as six Kates.

So... Braindead searches around and finds nothing in front of him, so he retreats and abandons the operation?

What is wrong with that picture?

 

[Johnrankins]

1/4 of his fighter force was gone and he knew Eastern Solomons was in the works, knew Fletcher. Blame Turner for multiple reasons; the transports, failure to support the landings at Tulagi, his idiotic battle conferences which were nothing more than ego-trips to glorify himself instead of being operationally necessary or important, Savo Island, apple polishing and his lying politics: including backstabbing Fletcher and blaming him for Turner's own derelictions, but if Turner fessed up, he would be breaking big rocks into little rocks and he could not have that, could he?

That and he had to replace dead pilots and re-ammo. His force had used a lot of bombs as well as aviators and planes

1. He failed during the Doolittle Raid by blundering blind into the trawler line, when he was warned to be on the lookout by his radio intelligence guys.
2. He failed during the return from the raid by opey-doping along when he knew speed was essential.
3. He failed up his Pearl Harbor task force layover wasting a whole valuable day; he would need for the Speed Run to Coral Sea.
4. He failed up the change of command before Midway by failing to warn Spruance that Miles Browning was a drunken incompetent idiot. Halsey knew this fact as early as the Marshals Raid and did nothing about Browning. That makes him culpable for all the problems Miles Browning caused Spruance and George D. Murray.
5. The typhoons... MURPHY the typhoons.
6. He, not Kincaid, screwed up Rennell Islands and Santa Cruz.
7. He boloed Leyte Gulf. It was handed to him on a silver psalter and he Beattyed it to hell and gone. Who saved his ass? See 7? Thomas Kincaid.

See 1 through 7 and then read Halsey's goddamned ghostwritten book. Pack of lies.

Wake is 1000 nautical miles from Midway and BEYOND US air cover, but well in range of Japanese RIKKOs in the Gilberts. One of the things I'm working out is how to take Wake Island (*Garrison ~4500 Japanese and ~60 aircraft) WITHOUT flattop support. I think I can do it, but it still needs VLR bombers out of Midway and three flattops *(fighters) for the initial assault by Canadian 6th and US 7th Infantry divisions.

Absolutely. Stark is the real guy to blame for Drumbeat's success and so much else USN wrong in 1934-1937 and 1940-1942. From faulty torpedoes to the botched Two Ocean build program to faulty fleet preparations and the naked eastern sea frontier... that is all on Harold Stark.

Absolutely. ABDA results were coming in, by then, and King was furious about it and he blamed the British for a lot of it. Properly? In my opinion, probably... yes.

1 and 2 You mean the quite successful raid that caused a change in Japan's plans? It did minor damage but that is all it could do at the point. 16 Mitchel bombers are only capable of doing minor damage to a city the size of Tokyo.
3) A strategic victory for the US.
4) Who had a huge victory at Midway, and another victory at Guadalcanal . Ironically the big screwups were late war when they shouldn't have happened. He grossly underestimated how much runway a Hellcat needed and was stubborn about it. This is probably of the result of him drinking heavier either because of dealing with a sex scandal or the war getting to him or both. He was rightly sacked for this.
5) Typhoons happen
6) The biggest problem with Rannell Island is the sinking of the USS Chicago. Halsey sent 10 fighters as a CAP to protect it but some torpedo bombers got through. Things like that happen. Santa Cruz wasn't the best but it wasn't the worst either. The Japanese had a competent navy and was going to deliver a bloody nose from time to time.
7) In the greater scheme of thing Leyte Gulf was no big deal. Nimitz told him to concentrate on wiping out the last of the carriers and so that is what he did. As stated above even if Taffy 3 was wiped out to the last ship it wouldn't have meant much.

 

[McPherson]

1 and 2 You mean the quite successful raid that caused a change in Japan's plans? It did minor damage but that is all it could do at the point. 16 Mitchel bombers are only capable of doing minor damage to a city the size of Tokyo.

What change in plans? Phase II always involved Operation MI and the attempt to force "decisive battle" after the Pearl Harbor gambit failed.

3) A strategic victory for the US.

Halsey dawdled on his return trip back from the Doolittle Raid. As for the Raid, itself, it can be argued that this diversion of PACFLT assets to draw the IJN off the British was, at best, from the American point of view; "ill-timed". A better "diversion" would have been Coral Sea with the annihilation of CARDIV 5.

4) Who had a huge victory at Midway, and another victory at Guadalcanal . Ironically the big screwups were late war when they shouldn't have happened. He grossly underestimated how much runway a Hellcat needed and was stubborn about it. This is probably of the result of him drinking heavier either because of dealing with a sex scandal or the war getting to him or both. He was rightly sacked for this.

Halsey was not present at Midway and aside from recommending Spruance take over his taskforce had zero positive input or any claims of influence on the battle. Halsey made serious errors in not briefing Spruance properly during the command change for which eczema is no excuse. Further, Halsey was supposed to have handed over a trained battle staff to the new OTC TF 16 ACTUAL. What Spruance discovered to his utter horror, was a complete shambles of an air staff. It did not help that an erratic, emotionally unstable and utterly incompetent drunken idiot was chief of it.

Disagreeing with Morison, Spruance’s biographer, Thomas Buell, maintains that no persuasion was involved, as it was Spruance’s intent all along to launch at the earliest possible moment to gain surprise.10 Buell is supported by John B. Lundstrom, who has explained how Morison could easily have been misled.11 It might be fairly concluded that Spruance and Browning independently recognized it was essential to attack as soon as possible. If Browning had the additional insight that such action could catch the enemy carriers at their most vulnerable, that perception did not materially change the response.

Browning LIED. In addition, what we today would call the air tasking order for a strike package for USS Enterprise's carrier air wing (CAW) he routinely fucked up as Browning and his clown club made navigational sortie heading errors, fuel allotment miscalculations and bungled armament load outs per plane type, overestimating and mistaking ideal book performances "clean" for "combat". This idiot failed to keep USS Hornet apprised of ready to launch times or even such simple notifications as to combat air patrol hand-offs and recon plans. THAT is what kind of an imbecile, Halsey saddled Spruance and Murray with.

During the return of the American aircraft, an inexcusable communications failure occurred for which Browning, as chief of staff, must be held primarily responsible. Carrier pilots need to know “Point Option”—where they can expect to rejoin their vessels. Because the Enterprise and Hornet did not travel as fast and far as expected, Point Option changed without anyone informing the pilots. Not finding their carriers where expected and running out of gas, many returning pilots were forced to ditch or settled for any available deck, causing loss of life and precious aircraft, and impairing cohesion for later operations.12

And there would be another unforgivable lapse that day. After the fourth enemy carrier, the Hiryu, was spotted, Spruance ordered a dive-bomber attack. Although the Hornet’s dive bombers were expected to join the Enterprise’s in a coordinated attack, Browning failed to pass on Spruance’s instructions.13 Consequently, the Hornet’s planes departed a half-hour after the Enterprise’s, arriving only after the “Big E’s” fliers had left the Hiryu aflame. Throughout the three-day battle, Browning was similarly negligent in issuing instructions to the Hornet.14

As a consequence, Spruance set Browning down after that bumbler threw a temper tantrum in the middle of the 4 June afternoon alpha strike which had collapsed into a shambles forcing Spruance to order the dive bombers to proceed independently without their fighter cover and to chase after the target which had moved on them. Spruance ran his own air-ops for the remainder of the battle, thereafter upon the strike packages' return, relying heavily on the advice of his senior surviving fliers, such as Wade McClusky to do the ATOs themselves at the squadron level.

Need I remark on the shambles that Spruance would discover that was USS Hornet and that other incompetent lying son of a bitch, who is Marc Mitscher?

5) Typhoons happen

And yet Spruance dodged them and Halsey sailed into them. Why? Answer... Spruance paid attention to little things, like fleet housekeeping, and weather patterns. Spruance ran a naval-staffed fleet that performed as if William Sims or John Jellicoe was at the top and expected sober professionalism and was an admiral. Halsey ran a boy's club with frat-boys and drunks. Halsey may have been popular but he cost lives, and ships and lost battles (Rennell Islands) and missed many golden opportunities. (Bull's Runs, not one but TWO of them, one when he was late to Coral Sea because of his dawdling, and the other more famous one for which NO-ONE should ever forgive him, the extremely costly Battle of Samar.

6) The biggest problem with Rannell Island is the sinking of the USS Chicago. Halsey sent 10 fighters as a CAP to protect it but some torpedo bombers got through. Things like that happen. Santa Cruz wasn't the best but it wasn't the worst either. The Japanese had a competent navy and was going to deliver a bloody nose from time to time.

Halsey overcommitted his SAG into RIKKO country and blew the CAP plan. He did not need to fight it, the battle, at all. It was a glory hunt for him. As for Santa Cruz, he overruled Tom Kincaid who wanted to fall back upon CACTUS and lure Kondo into a RIKKO trap. Halsey's "Attack, repeat attack." may look good in the headlines and to the Halsey defenders, but as has been remarked elsewhere, sometimes one has to be "conservative" in the "correct way" and let the (Japanese) enemy BE the enemy (overcommit), so one can cut the enemy's throat.

7) In the greater scheme of thing Leyte Gulf was no big deal. Nimitz told him to concentrate on wiping out the last of the carriers and so that is what he did. As stated above even if Taffy 3 was wiped out to the last ship it wouldn't have meant much.

"Turkey Trots To Water, Where, Repeat, Where Is Task 34? The World Wonders." Nimitz sent that message. It is USN navalese to Halsey. Let me translate it into plain English. Nimitz to Halsey; "Get your goddamned junior dumbass ensign clown self down to San Bernardino Strait, like you said you were going to do, when you broadcast your intent to form that task force in the first place."^1 That "repeat" is a loaded gun directly pointed at Halsey's head, telling him to get hustling down to Samar and quit messing around near Cape Engano on another "glory hunt", like he had done before. Could not be clearer that Nimitz rebuked his fleet tactical commander for making a colossal and inordinately obvious and imbecilic mistake.

HyperWar: Campaigns of MacArthur/I (Chapter 8)
Source is Hyperwar with additional modifications by McPherson

Notice the Spruance "solution" which Raymond told the Bull was the "correct move" at the pre-Leyte battle conference.

In any other navy, Halsey would have been relieved and court martialed for cause.^2

^1 “Where is Task Force 34? The World Wonders: The Battle of ...
^2 Well; the Royal Navy did hang on to David Beatty after he got his battle cruisers she-banged and he almost cost them the Battle of Jutland with his incredible stupidity and inept ship-handling.... twice.

 

[CT7834]

Getting back on topic. One way Fletcher may be able to stay in command is a POD at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Where in addition to sinking Ryujo. Both Shokaku and Zuikaku are either sunk or mission killed. Even with the damage to Enterprise, sinking, damaging or shredding the larger carriers or their air groups at that battle may have made the earlier campaign a lot easier for the allies. Plus it means that Fletcher’s cautiousness during the campaign would have been seen as the smarter move.

 

[McPherson]

Getting back on topic. One way Fletcher may be able to stay in command is a POD at the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Where in addition to sinking Ryujo. Both Shokaku and Zuikaku are either sunk or mission killed. Even with the damage to Enterprise, sinking, damaging or shredding the larger carriers or their air groups at that battle may have made the earlier campaign a lot easier for the allies. Plus it means that Fletcher’s cautiousness during the campaign would have been seen as the smarter move.

Exactly.

Guess who fucked up Enterprise's fighter CAP reinforcement and general air-ops during that battle?

That's the guy...

Browning, unfortunately, was a man of tremendous contradictions. At his moment of triumph, in the summer of 1942, he had an affair with the wife of a fellow officer, Commander Francis Massie Hughes. That breach of the Navy's sacred code for an officer, combined with his drinking and unstable temperament, would eventually derail his career and lead later chroniclers to virtually write him out of military history. Despite this damaging personal incident, Browning resumed combat duties in October 1942, when Halsey was given command of the South Pacific theater, where Allied fortunes had turned for the worse. Browning's sage tactical advice helped Halsey to execute the command miracle in the Solomon Islands that reversed the declining situation in that war-swept region.[6]

Sage tactical advice? Hah! One should always read Morison with a jaundiced eye, now that we have modern scholarship and navy records to peruse.

One thing that could help Fletcher (and Halsey) would be to have that son of a bitch reassigned to the naval disciplinary barracks after Midway.

Who finally did him in?

Marc Mitscher was one of them. But the real Joe was Joseph J. Clark Is that not a (deserved) kick in the head?

In the spring of 1944, during a nighttime showing of a film on Hornet's hangar deck, someone discharged a CO2 canister and triggered a stampede. In the chaos, two sailors fell overboard; one of them drowned. By this time, Browning had alienated several of his superiors, including Admirals Joseph J. Clark and Marc Mitscher, who were waiting for Browning to make a misstep after numerous mistakes in ship-handling and general insubordination. He was also generally hated by his subordinates, in particular, the pilots, who held him responsible for numerous crashes as he enforced an unrealistically short take-off distance for the Curtiss SB2C Helldiver based on the theoretical claims of the manufacturer, instead of the practical experience of the pilots.[15] When Browning refused to have a boat lowered to rescue the drowning sailors, despite Admiral Clark's recommendation that he do so, a board of investigation was ordered, which criticized Browning's command. The ensuing ruin of his career, "one of the great wastes to the American prosecution of the war,"[11] resulted from nothing to do with combat. Browning was removed from command of Hornet in May 1944[16] and reassigned to the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he taught carrier battle tactics during the final months of the war. Halsey was given command of the carrier-oriented Third Fleet during 1944–1945, but with his old chief of staff tossed onto the beach, he made grave mistakes that Browning might well have been able to help prevent.[11]

Browning toured Japan in 1949, and stated that radiation damage from the atomic bombs was a "myth". He pointed to gardens and a number of tall chimneys left standing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as proof that there were no long-term effects of the blasts.[17]

Browning retired from active duty on January 1, 1947, and was retroactively promoted to rear admiral (upper half).[1] He was appointed New Hampshire's Civil Defense Director in 1950, where he devised a plan wherein 500,000 displaced residents of Boston could be housed in New Hampshire private homes in the event of disaster. Browning resigned from this post in 1952.[17]

On September 29, 1954, Browning died of systemic lupus erythematosus at Chelsea Naval Hospital in Boston. He was buried on October 6, 1954, at Arlington National Cemetery.[18]

Comment on bolded: Does that not sound familiar? The Fool at Midway remains a fool as Hornet CV12 Actual. And for much the same exact reasons. He never learned. Never.

Doing him in had everything to do with combat. It had everything to do with his incompetence and pigheadedness and refusal to lesson learn. Horrible about the two rates, but they died aboard a sloppy ill-trained ship (Captain's fault.) and it was their unnecessary ill-fated and preventable deaths that finally removed a dark stain upon the honor and efficacy of the United States Navy.

He did a lot of damage to the United States Navy. Unfortunately, Halsey protected his "frat-boy" buddy until Marc Mitscher, to save his own hide, finally tossed that chum to the sharks.

Fletcher got caught up in the scoundrel's prop-wash at Eastern Solomons because of the USS Enterprise fiasco. Man in the barrel is responsible.

History does justice in retrospect, but often too late.

 

[CT7834]

One thing that definitely had Fletcher’s finger prints was his decision to withdraw Wasp and her escorts for refuelling.

 

[McPherson]

One thing that definitely had Fletcher’s finger prints was his decision to withdraw Wasp and her escorts for refuelling.

Destroyers riding high in ballast tend to make admirals do that in battle every couple of days. Flank speed at 15 m/s (29 knots) every 100 hours is 2900 nautical miles. 6500 nm for a Gleaves at 12 knots = less than 2,500 nm tactical radius at flank. Fletcher tended to want to keep his destroyers at 40% reserve fill to keep salt water out of their fuel lines. I suppose he sent USS Wasp and her cruisers to top off from the same tanker since a CV without escorts is submarine bait.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Ah, McP - I've been expecting you...

 

[Kantai Kessen]

TF17 if I remember.

He had TF11 at Coral Sea and was OTC.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

If they are hit. Fletcher only had USS Saratoga, USS Enterprise and USS Wasp for WATCHTOWER. USS Hornet was so awful at Midway she was in remedial training. So ADD Lex to the mix and Eastern Solomons becomes VERY interesting. How does Nagumo fight 2 on 4 or 2 on 3? I guess another Midway?

Not if my math is correct. At most, maybe the 2 Hiyos and one "Falcon" Dead meat.

Nagumo= Dead Meat.

Wouldn't Lexington be undergoing a Saratoga-type refit to boost her AA (adding all the 5"/38 goodness)? I'm inclined to think she might be left behind to do that, and then train with Hornet for multi-carrier tactics.

I agree that Nagumo is doomed. Better that he died at Midway and that Hara becomes VAdm.

 

[McPherson]

Wouldn't Lexington be undergoing a Saratoga-type refit to boost her AA (adding all the 5"/38 goodness)? I'm inclined to think she might be left behind to do that, and then train with Hornet for multi-carrier tactics.

I agree that Nagumo is doomed. Better that he died at Midway and that Hara becomes VAdm.

Depends. Watchtower was laid on in a hurry because Mr. Corncob Pipe's Ruperts were actually doing good aerial reconnaissance for once and that airfield non Lunga Point had to be seized by the first week in August or things could get ugly in the Coral Sea making the recapture of New Guinea very very difficult. Four flattops is better than three. And presuming they survived the aircraft carrier battle that was a certainty, then Lexington and Saratoga would be "modernized" further.

Nagumo was beached after he lost Eastern Solomons. He was posted to Sasebo where he proved he could not command a naval base. Next he was posted to Kure to supervise cadet naval aviator training, which he promptly screwed up, too. To save his face, his buddies packed him off to Saipan to command the naval garrison there. He should have stayed beached in Kure. He would have survived the war.

The other loser, Braindead Takagi, of the Coral Sea bugout fame, was relegated to Makao in Taiwan to command the IJN naval base there where he organized the local shipping route convoy defenses. That is almost as bad as being assigned to the rinky-dink plodding oil tanker squadrons themselves in the IJN eyes. Anyway, Braindead actually turned in a credible performance. He was rewarded with a command again, the IJN 6th fleet operating out of the Marianna Islands. Saipan specifically. Incompetent results followed directly because of Braindead's inept activities. The USN had a murder fest on his I-boats. Then Spruance showed up and Takagi got to die for the emperor.

Hara and Inoue survived the war. King Kong did his part again at eastern Solomons successfully this time and for his reward was assigned to Truk to command that naval base. He sat the war out there. Gutless, once he screwed up his part of the Coral Sea battle, was sent to the Japanese Naval Academy to cool his heels. When the brown goo hit the Tokyo political screw and the IJN was IJG housecleaned, he was brought back into respectability to be an acceptable face to the Americans in the surrender government as vice minister of navy affairs. He was retired (forced out) about a month later after the formal surrender.

 

[Kantai Kessen]

One thing that definitely had Fletcher’s finger prints was his decision to withdraw Wasp and her escorts for refuelling.

Which was justified. Catching Wasp in a sticky situation like refuelling would be horrible. Look at how fragile she was.