Going back further. If Saratoga is assigned to the Coral Sea along with Lexington and Yorktown. It may mean that the Salamaua-Lae Raid maybe more effective. In the OTL only 2 thirds of the transports were destroyed and many of the IJA troops were able to make it to shore. Here, there is a greater chance that more if not all of their transports are lost. As a consequence it causes the Japanese to have less soldiers available for the Papua New Guinea campaign.
AHC: Keep Admiral Fletcher in command in late 1942
- Thread starter Kantai Kessen
- Start date
-
- Tags
- carriers guadalcanal ww2
On the other hand, that could make Operation MO even more important and thus more of the Kido Butai is assigned to cover the operation, since the IJN knows there are three American carriers in the area. I don't know whether Fletcher would have overall command in this alt-Coral Sea seeing as he is still a relatively junior rear admiral, compared to Halsey or Wilson Brown (leader of the Salamaua-Lae Raid). This may turn into a 5 v 3 (Kaga still absent due to reef damage, and Enterprise and Hornet away after Doolittle Raid).
Also, the carriers, before Saratoga's torpedoing, were organised as follows IIRC:
TF 11: Lexington
TF 14: Saratoga
TF 16: Enterprise
TF 17: Yorktown
Would assume that Fletcher still flies his flag on Yorktown since that's what he did before Sara's accident anyway. Who commands TF 14, then?
Were the task force numbers assigned to the admiral or the aircraft carrier? And do you know if there was a formal numbering system for task forces? IMHO it would have been more logical to number them from TF 11 to TF 14. All I can think of is that the Americans deliberately had gaps to make the Japanese think that they had more than 4 aircraft carriers in the Pacific.
By the time of the Battle of the Coral Sea TF 11 (Lexington) was under the command of Fitch at the Coral Sea and TF 17 (Yorktown) was under the command of Fletcher.
Last edited:
Plausibility check:
Let's say there is a Super Coral Sea, and both sides are too damaged for a Midway-analogue on the same timeline.
Still, the US needs to Do Something. Why not retake Wake? This should be doable with a fraction of the forces assigned to Watchtower, provide a major morale victory, as well as an advanced base for submarine warfare while the USN rebuilds strength.
What am I missing?
Let's say there is a Super Coral Sea, and both sides are too damaged for a Midway-analogue on the same timeline.
Still, the US needs to Do Something. Why not retake Wake? This should be doable with a fraction of the forces assigned to Watchtower, provide a major morale victory, as well as an advanced base for submarine warfare while the USN rebuilds strength.
What am I missing?
According to Saratoga's Wikipeadia article he commanded TFs 11 and 14 for periods between the outbreak of the Pacific War and the creation of TF 61. Due to the frequent changes of command it's difficult to follow, but it seems to be.
- Saratoga the was flagship of Carrier Division One commanded by Fitch at the outbreak of the Pacific War.
- She became part of TF 14 under Fletcher on 16th December 1941.
- Fletcher was relieved by RA Herbert F. Leary on 30th December 1941 and he was in command of TF 14 when Saratoga was torpedoed.
- Saratoga was part of TF 11 under Fitch when she sailed for Midway, but Fletcher took command on 8th June 1942.
- Command of TF 11 alternated between Fitch and Fletcher a few more times in June 1942.
- TF 11 and Saratoga were under the command of Fitch at the beginning of the Guadalcanal Campaign (Enterprise was in TF 16 and Wasp was in TF 18) and there were no other changes until until Task Force 61 was formed.
TF 11 was build around the Lexington when formed. It was under the command of Wilson Brown from its formation until 16th April 1942 when he was appointed commander of the amphibious forces in the Pacific (ComPhibPac). This is when Fitch took command, but as already noted command of TF 11 alternated between Fitch and Fletcher more than once. Fitch assumed command of Aircraft, South Pacific Force on 20th September 1942 a post that he held until the summer of 1944 when he became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air).
Last edited:
@GTStinger, @Kantai Kessen and @CT7834 this is a link to a website about the organisation of the forces in the Pacific War.
I don't know how accurate it is, but I'm inclined to think that it's more accurate than Wikipaeida.
I don't know how accurate it is, but I'm inclined to think that it's more accurate than Wikipaeida.
Missing?
New Guinea, specifically Port Moresby
Fiji.
American Samoa (with Pago Pago harbor)
French Polynesia
New Caledonia.
Lose them and the path to Australia is about 2,000km longer
While holding Wake early in the War would have thrown a huge monkey wrench into the Japanese timetable, and would have put the Marshalls/Gilberts under pressure, with the strong possibility of diverting IJN resources from the Darwin attacks and maybe even the IO Raid, by mid 1942 the pivot point had moved south into the SW Pacific. Watchtower was the ideal place to put a stopper into the Japanese continued line of advance.
Not have Watchtower doesn't lose the war by any stretch, but it will put more pressure on the Australians, which, in turn, will divert more U.S. resources into SW Pacific Theater in a defensive role and the additional month of round trip for convoys from the U.S. West Coast or Panama will reduce the amount of shipping available across the Pacific and even into the North Atlantic.
@CalBear which I totally get.
Let's say there is a 5 v 3 carrier battle in ATL Coral Sea. Maybe each side loses 2, plus more air wing losses for Japan.
What I'm saying is, or at least asking, is in a scenario in which Watchtower is unworkable, why not Wake?
Let's say there is a 5 v 3 carrier battle in ATL Coral Sea. Maybe each side loses 2, plus more air wing losses for Japan.
What I'm saying is, or at least asking, is in a scenario in which Watchtower is unworkable, why not Wake?
There is one knock on effect. Say in this timeline Yamamoto decides to deploy the entire Kido Butai (minus Kaga) to support Operation MO. The carriers went to Formosa first and then Truk. The provisioning time for 5 carriers would be longer than 2. Which means they may need to delay the timetable from a May 1 deployment by a day or so. This may give time for Halsey to reinforce Lexington, Saratoga and Yorktown with Enterprise and Hornet.
Last edited:
FDR decided he was the guy, same as Marshall. In 1942 when he hit mandatory retirement age King went to FDR to tell him that he was aged out. FDR is reputed to have responded with "So what?" Roosevelt was a very astute judge of talent and most of his wartime choices reflect that. Once he made up his mind on someone, it was made up.
Would you say that FDR was "astute" when he chose and stuck by King?
Overall? Very much so. The state of the Lant Fleet during the 2nd Happy Time was, IMO, on Stark, not King,
He insistence on staying engaged in the Pacific saved Allied lives since it reduced the number of islands that to be taken and gave the Japanese far less time to fortify them. He gave Nimitz the room he required and the top cover when he needed. He oversaw the Fleet from the disaster of December 7th to the most powerful naval force the world had ever seen. In the process he recreated the role of the CNO in ways that are still in effect.
Perfect man? Not even close. Fortunately FDR had Stark and Ike to deal with the British in the ETO, meaning King's plain spokeness ruffled fewer feathers than could have been the case. Right man for the job? Hell yes.
In regards to King which camp do you belong to
A) That his Anglophobia was a result of some personal incident or slight during WW1
B) Him just being a bit of a misanthrope and hating pretty much anyone he'd have to deal with?
He hated wasting his time. Sitting for hours in the Combined Chiefs of Staff was a waste of time. Having to spend much of those meeting having to keep the Air Corp and the British from screwing up, in his opinion, the whole GD war for their own goals (that they were putting ahead of winning) just made it worse.
That he pretty much had the personality of a honey badger or a wolverine just made put the cherry on top.
King made a profound change in USN policy concerning public affairs. Previous policy had catered to the idea the press must be enemy agents. The public was given the mushroom treatment. King began inviting members the Washington press corps, and some from further afield to a weeknight round of drinks and conversation. Editors and publishing managers were his target, along with the reporters. The conversations were largely off the record and the guests understood they were hearing 'sensitive' information. The benefit was two fold. The guests received valuable context for the Navy press releases and their other stories, making their writing a bit better & more accurate. The other benefit was it played to the egos of the publishers, becoming insiders, they and the others drinking Kings whiskey became a lot friendlier. Second, King bought off on the idea of letting the public understand the harsh reality of the war in the Pacific. He realized the sooner the public understood the less they would obsess over trivialities & shock over a occasional peek at blood. This was expressed at first in admitting to ships sunk, photos in the papers of damaged ships in the dry-docks, and mention of serious casualties. Eventually it led to images of dead Marines on Betios Red Beach.
Read... ...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided. Current contributor. from about page 45 forward.Rear, then Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher:
Frank Jack Fletcher - Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
Commander of American carrier forces at Coral Sea, Midway and the Eastern Solomons, he was beached in September 1942 for reported mistakes during the Guadalcanal landings (not covering Turner and thus enabling 1st Savo Island), and during the last of the aforementioned three battles where, according to our favourite CNO Ernest King, he failed to ensure a complete American victory. However, by that point he was one of the most experienced American admirals and had accounted for four fleet carriers and two light carriers. His departure meant that TF 61 in October would be commanded by Thomas C. Kinkaid, who lost Santa Cruz and the valuable Hornet, and thereby nearly the entire campaign.
Your challenge, therefore, is to keep Fletcher in command of American carrier forces during the entirety of the Guadalcanal campaign. You may use any POD you like. For bonus points, what consequences do you think there would be?
My view is quite clear there. Fletcher was not an apple polishing incompetent son of a bitch like his three chief backstabber critics and their clueless fellow traveler. The three liars and clowns who should have been relieved and sent to the naval disciplinary barracks for their incompetencies and failure to performs were John Tower, Richmond Kelly Turner, and Marc Mitscher. The Bull was just a fellow traveler in that brown goo shoe crew. I tend to give the Bull some slack here, because he was paying more attention to those three goddamned liars than to more competent men like Spruance and McCain when it came to Frank Fletcher.
Last edited:
"Braindead" Takagi would have attacked if there were FIVE American flattops present. It was what Nagumo tried to do at Midway, even after he had all of his bird-farms burned down, when he believed that there were five flattops against him.
Takagi got out of Coral Sea alive because of weather and defective US torpedoes and USNAS strike coordinator (as there was none) incompetence. I do not know if USS Saratoga would have been hit, (Unlikely); but it is certain that a third USN aircraft carrier means +30 more tries at Zuikaku and Shōkaku. I estimate Midway type results if the added dive bombers can only get Zuikaku dedecked as Shōkaku was.