AHC: Japan goes to war with Britain and not America in 1940

[Wesley_Lewt]

I thought the POD was Japan was going to war in late 1940 which means that there is no need for the RN to evacuate the eastern Med. Or are you conjecturing that Japan has a crystal ball and knows that France will collapse in mid-1940 and a whole host of other PODs to allow Japan, Germany, and Italy to sally forth in perfect harmony to crush the perfidious Albion?

My POD is that the Japanese don't plan the war. Some scrappy junior officers start it on their own initiative like Marco-Polo Bridge and the Murkden Incident. I started this thread to get opinions on when and how this would or if it could be most plausible.

I know a bit about amphibious operations.

1. If you do an amphibious assault with naval artillery support on a port, that port is not going to be receiving supplies any time soon.
2. If you do an amphibious assault on a defended city, well, there's a reason no-one does it.
3. You are proposing doing this using forces that have had zero amphibious training and have no amphibious doctrine worked out. Good luck with that.

I've a quarter of a century experience in amphibious operations. I've taken part in an amphibious operation in wartime. It is my opinion that you're talking nonsense.

Forgive me 'Naval assault on Alexandria' is shorthand for amphibious landing near Alexandria with Naval Artillery support. Then assaulting Alexandria by land with further Naval Artillery support (which takes care not to hit the port facilities).

Look, all my 'nonsense' comes from things voiced by senior actors in WW2. If you think it wouldn't work, thats fine. I know that one of the drivers of the Battle of Taranto was the British fear of some sort of Naval-Amphibious assault with the ultimate objective of taking Alexandria.

You claim military experience I lack? Fine. But what I say is based on what people with experience and senior positions in the war in question said and feared. Maybe I am (sometimes) talking nonsense because I read things in the works of professional historians that are shorthand and I fill in the gaps without the expertise that the people who would have actually planned and executed these operations would have had.

 

[ArtosStark]

Not law of thirds but... we are talking about the Nazis and the idea for my TL was to have Hitler die early 1940 putting Goering in charge.

Well, that is a whole other POD to the original. So you will need major changes in both the German and Japanese high command outlook to start to look at it.

Who cares if many pilots dont have the fuel to make it back from a single very important operation.

The High command will care if Barbarossa is at all on the menu. It may not be with Goering in charge but the relationship with the USSR is going to break down eventually. If Barbarossa is out then Goering better have an alternative.

Also the men on the ground, as you are either using 92% of your range to get there and back, leaving basically no loiter time, or you are sacrificing your capacity for air cover on the first day of operations, leaving the enemy total air superiority, and both your men and the ships attempting to supply them near helpless.

This is all important stuff, however Goering would negotiate a different treaty with Vichy. Unlike Hitler he does not get the Worst Diplomat Ever prize.

Would he? The same factors come into play here. If Germany negotiates a more lenient deal with the French they lose out on some of the opportunity for loot that helped keep them going. If they are more harsh, then the government may decide to fight on from North Africa and there is little the Germans can do about it. Either way, amphibious shipping is likely to be well down the list of things that the Germans are going to need from France.

If the RN has abandoned the Med a naval landing supported by the Big Guns of Italian Battleships is going to succeed in Malta. Malta. Then Crete. Only then Alexandria (which is why Alexandria aint happening till 1941 and longer ranged german fighters)

You still need sea lift. Unless you plan to fire the men ashore from the cannons.

Alexandria is a major port near the Suez Canal. That is why it matters. Once the city has fallen supplies can be brought in without loss. During the assault supplies can be brought in with some ships being sunk and some making it.

As has been mentioned taking a port does not mean that it can immediately be used. The allies took ports in North Africa that took them months to bring online. Likewise for Normandy.

What's more, taking Alexandria does not make the Suez canal fall at the same time. It makes it possible if the Axis can keep moving, but does not make it automatic. And the British could quite easily cause some problems in the canal before pulling out. Look at how much disruption 1 ship caused there recently.

Cities do actually have food and fuel. Yes some things like ammunition cannot be looted, however the city having food means the volume of supplies needed while the city and environs are contested is much smaller.

Not in the long term, they don't. They don't produce them, and capturing supplies intact is not assured. And the more you take from the civilian population the more problems you have keeping order in the place.

Cover by Naval Artillery gets them ashore (with some significant losses no doubt)

It is never that simple. Otherwise Gallipoli would not have been such a disaster in WW1, or Dieppe in WW2.

They were pretty veteran and pretty good at urban warfare.

The British sometimes moved forces from the Indian Army on the North-West Frontier, to Egypt and vise versa. Many of these troops had over a decade of experience (as a unit average) and had just come from a climate much more similar to Egypt than Germany. They still needed time to acclimatize before becoming combat effective. It doesn't matter how veteran you are you still need to get used to a new climate before engaging in major operations or you will be losing half your force to heat stroke, dehydration and dysentery.

The battle would happen before urban warfare is a concern. The British are unlikely to just sit and let them get established. And to be honest, I don't think there was enough urban combat in 1939 and 1940 for the entire German army to be proficient.

I know that one of the drivers of the Battle of Taranto was the British fear of some sort of Naval-Amphibious assault with the ultimate objective of taking Alexandria.

Perhaps a quote to establish this might be in order? I have certainly not read everything on the subject but I have never heard of this in what I have read.

 

[The Tai-Pan]

I know a bit about amphibious operations.

1. If you do an amphibious assault with naval artillery support on a port, that port is not going to be receiving supplies any time soon.
2. If you do an amphibious assault on a defended city, well, there's a reason no-one does it.
3. You are proposing doing this using forces that have had zero amphibious training and have no amphibious doctrine worked out. Good luck with that.

Well, just look at the grand success of Operation Jubilee. Oh wait.

 

[nbcman]

My POD is that the Japanese don't plan the war. Some scrappy junior officers start it on their own initiative like Marco-Polo Bridge and the Murkden Incident. I started this thread to get opinions on when and how this would or if it could be most plausible.

{snip}

If a scrappy junior IJ officer starts a shooting war against the UK in mid-1940, then there will be zero preparation to Strike South. This means that the Japanese wouldn't be advancing any earlier than early 1941 because scrappy officers don't plan logistics for sustained operations across the South China Sea from Formosa.

 

[David Flin]

Well, just look at the grand success of Operation Jubilee. Oh wait.

There was the Zeebrugge Raid in WWI. I guess one might count Operation Chariot as well. Both of these were raids, however, not assaults.

Operation Sledgehammer was planned, of course, but never undertaken. We might include Operation Agreement - but that didn't turn out well for the amphibious forces. Operation Slapstick, but that was with the help of the defending forces.

Then there was Operation Paraquet. That was against a foe that was basically demoralised.

 

[The Tai-Pan]

There was the Zeebrugge Raid in WWI. I guess one might count Operation Chariot as well. Both of these were raids, however, not assaults.

Operation Sledgehammer was planned, of course, but never undertaken. We might include Operation Agreement - but that didn't turn out well for the amphibious forces. Operation Slapstick, but that was with the help of the defending forces.

Then there was Operation Paraquet. That was against a foe that was basically demoralised.

This seems....unwisely named.

"Sorry ma'am, your husband/brother was lost in Operation Slapstick."

 

[David Flin]

This seems....unwisely named.

Well, better than something like: "Operation Land at Echo Beach at Dawn, 15/3/43" (to give one fictional example I just made up) or "Operation Certain Death" or "Operation What Can Possibly Go Wrong?"

 

[The Tai-Pan]

Well, better than something like: "Operation Land at Echo Beach at Dawn, 15/3/43" (to give one fictional example I just made up) or "Operation Certain Death" or "Operation What Can Possibly Go Wrong?"

Juno Beach was originally named Jelly Beach.

 

[Intosh]

Inspired by other WW2 threads.

This is what British planners described as their 'nightmare scenario'

My Suggestion was to have Hitler die during the fall of France, Goering take the reigns and mediate de-escalation of the Japanese-Soviet border, freeing up Japanese troops and reassuring the Soviets re German intentions. Maybe also making full Japanese posession of Indochina part of the peace with France in exchange for a secret agreement to join the war in a specified number of months.

But please ignore the above.

The Japanese had twitchy trigger fingers and a never-back-down mentality. Maybe there is a way to do this that doesn't require German diplomatic competence or anything different on the part of the Germans. What 'incidents' could there have been between Britain and Japan? Where the IJA or IJN start shooting and civilian politicians have to follow because... if they don't they get assassinated.

Government by assassination

Government by assassination has been used to describe the political situation in Japan in the 1930s. Most notably, it refers to the death of Inukai Tsuyoshi in the May 15 Incident of 1932, as well as the February 26 Incident of 1936, in which Saitō Makoto and Takahashi Korekiyo were killed. The...

military-history.fandom.com

A challenge with whatever and however many POD(s) you like.


Edit: here is a slightly modified clarifying reply I made down thread:

We are talking about 1940, not 1941. Before significant resources have been allocated to preparing Barbarossa. Earlier the better.

Second, I am not imagining that the Japanese Government or Senior Officers plan this. Oh no. We are talking about this happening in a manner similar to how Japan got into most of its wars with China. Junior officers acting on their own initiative and the top brass refusing to back down because... thats the type they were.

Also I am not interested in this as a 'here is how things could have gone better for Japan' rather on how this would affect Britain and events in Europe. I know Japan would fight America eventually and lose because America had like 10 times the economy they did.

The first problem of your thread is that you have two POD.

Hitler die in May/June 1940.

And Japan focussed earlier on the UK.

 

[Wesley_Lewt]

If a scrappy junior IJ officer starts a shooting war against the UK in mid-1940, then there will be zero preparation to Strike South. This means that the Japanese wouldn't be advancing any earlier than early 1941 because scrappy officers don't plan logistics for sustained operations across the South China Sea from Formosa.

Oh I quite understand that little territory will be taken in the early stage of the war. But quite a few overconfident RN ships might be sunk as they were OTL. There wouldn't swiftly be full scale invasions but there would be some pretty quick 'raids'.

Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Indian Ocean raid - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

I know a bit about amphibious operations.

1. If you do an amphibious assault with naval artillery support on a port, that port is not going to be receiving supplies any time soon.
2. If you do an amphibious assault on a defended city, well, there's a reason no-one does it.
3. You are proposing doing this using forces that have had zero amphibious training and have no amphibious doctrine worked out. Good luck with that.

I've a quarter of a century experience in amphibious operations. I've taken part in an amphibious operation in wartime. It is my opinion that you're talking nonsense.

No! Let em do it. we can set up lawn chairs, open beers and watch

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Given the USAs somewhat draconian (from a Japanese POV) reaction to the Japanese invasion of French Indochina in mid 1940 where massive crippling sanctions were imposed including the total cutting off of POL leaving Japan with only a year or so of fuel for its industry what do you think the USA would do in this scenario?

Perhaps equally as important - what does Japan think the USA would do?

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Given the USAs somewhat draconian (from a Japanese POV) reaction to the Japanese invasion of French Indochina in mid 1940 where massive crippling sanctions were imposed including the total cutting off of POL leaving Japan with only a year or so of fuel for its industry what do you think the USA would do in this scenario?

Perhaps equally as important - what does Japan think the USA would do?

Previous the US had imposed some annoying but otherwise toothless sanctions. That would be expected to continue.

A read of the US newspapers & polls in the US was interpreted as isolationism dominating US thought. & the population had in the Japanese view no stomach or ability at war.

The US was divesting itself of the Philippines. Independence was scheduled for 1946 & in the first half of 1940 the local defense was by Japanese standards neglected. All that was expected to continue.

The 1938 budget bill did increase funds for the US military 1939-1940, and the fall of France triggered a massive increase in military spending. The Japanese did not understand much of War Plan ORANGE, but all that spending looked suspiciously like it cold be used vs Japan. It did not mean much of practical import in the short term. The US military was in the Japanese view, poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly led, poorly infused with warrior spirit. So it would require massive amounts of new weapons to be a decisive threat, serious threat, but for 1940 & 1941 manageable.

My guess is the leaders thought the US would not have the will to try anything in the near term. a couple years down the line they might try something, maybe.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Previous the US had imposed some annoying but otherwise toothless sanctions. That would be expected to continue.

A read of the US newspapers & polls in the US was interpreted as isolationism dominating US thought. & the population had in the Japanese view no stomach or ability at war.

The US was divesting itself of the Philippines. Independence was scheduled for 1946 & in the first half of 1940 the local defense was by Japanese standards neglected. All that was expected to continue.

The 1938 budget bill did increase funds for the US military 1939-1940, and the fall of France triggered a massive increase in military spending. The Japanese did not understand much of War Plan ORANGE, but all that spending looked suspiciously like it cold be used vs Japan. It did not mean much of practical import in the short term. The US military was in the Japanese view, poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly led, poorly infused with warrior spirit. So it would require massive amounts of new weapons to be a decisive threat, serious threat, but for 1940 & 1941 manageable.

My guess is the leaders thought the US would not have the will to try anything in the near term. a couple years down the line they might try something, maybe.

Yes I think you are right

More is the pity.

Germany thought the same thing in 1916 when they started USW