AHC: Japan attacks British & Dutch Territories

I don't know if there have been any T/Ls. about this:

But just wondering if Japan rejected Yamamoto's advice and went for the raw material rich areas of British and Dutch Territories?

Whilst, Churchill was reassured by FDR that they would be supported, and there were some liaisons between USN & RN - but what would it be in reality? Moreover, if the USN did get in harms way guns blazing - would FDR be 'under fire' politically for getting involved in a foreign war!?

Could the USN be obliged to 'get out of the way' to avoid any 'provocation'?

How long could Japan get a free run before the US decided enough was enough? And how much more territory could Japan have secured before then?
 
I don't know if there have been any T/Ls. about this:

But just wondering if Japan rejected Yamamoto's advice and went for the raw material rich areas of British and Dutch Territories?

Whilst, Churchill was reassured by FDR that they would be supported, and there were some liaisons between USN & RN - but what would it be in reality? Moreover, if the USN did get in harms way guns blazing - would FDR be 'under fire' politically for getting involved in a foreign war!?

Could the USN be obliged to 'get out of the way' to avoid any 'provocation'?

How long could Japan get a free run before the US decided enough was enough? And how much more territory could Japan have secured before then?
This type of question has indeed been asked before, but I cannot provide you with a link.:( I do however, have an alternative question to pose for you. The Japanese got French possessions in SE Asia, without going to war, after the fall of France, right? So how about, they take the DEI in the same kind of deal, so the DEI are occupied at the same time as the French possessions are. Now ask if they really need to attack the UK at all, and if the Answer is still yes, then let us see what happens at that point.
 
This type of question has indeed been asked before, but I cannot provide you with a link.:( I do however, have an alternative question to pose for you. The Japanese got French possessions in SE Asia, without going to war, after the fall of France, right? So how about, they take the DEI in the same kind of deal, so the DEI are occupied at the same time as the French possessions are. Now ask if they really need to attack the UK at all, and if the Answer is still yes, then let us see what happens at that point.

When Imperial Japan occupied French Indochina after the Fall of France the USA Sanctioned the Shit out of them.

I cannot imagine that any further moves in that region would go un-punished

As for declaring war vs the British the USA has already hitched its trailer to the British war effort in Europe and could be considered Neutral only so far as they are not officially at war with Germany and Italy etc.

U-boats and US ships are already shooting at each other.

This act of war vs the British Empire and the Dutch could not be construed as anything less than a Casus belli as far as the US are concerned.
 

CalBear

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Asked before?

Two of the top five threads on the Forum as I type this are on the same subject.
 

raharris1973

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AHC: Japan attacks British & Dutch Territories
I don't know if there have been any T/Ls. about this:

But just wondering if Japan rejected Yamamoto's advice and went for the raw material rich areas of British and Dutch Territories?

Whilst, Churchill was reassured by FDR that they would be supported, and there were some liaisons between USN & RN - but what would it be in reality? Moreover, if the USN did get in harms way guns blazing - would FDR be 'under fire' politically for getting involved in a foreign war!?

Could the USN be obliged to 'get out of the way' to avoid any 'provocation'?

How long could Japan get a free run before the US decided enough was enough? And how much more territory could Japan have secured before then?

The Japanese could have secured Burma, Malaya, DEI, Papua, New Britain ans portions of the Gilberts before the US decided "enough was enough"

The operational situation for the Japanese is they can take all these western Pacific territories within just a few months (like OTL).

The US fleet based in Hawaii and the west coast is incapable of successfully intervening until 1943, well after the Japanese have been occupying the territories for months.

The US Asiatic fleet and USAFFE forces based within the Philippines lack the strength and range to affect Anglo-Japanese and Dutch-Japanese battles going on around them.

The British can make a long-term comeback but are not in any shape to try to reclaim territories until 1944, and they'd want US backing to really try.

Come June 1942 there's only two realistic outcomes:

a) Japan occupies it desired southern resources area and gets to fortify it at its own leisure, while being at war with Britain and the Commonwealth but not the United States. In its state of twilight/undeclared war, the US can be sending aid convoys on long-journeys to Australia and India (and the Philippines) , and occupying Pacific islands that Japan has not gotten to first (Fiji, New Caledonia, the Solomons-if lucky) but the Americans are not at liberty to invade Japanese held territories or bomb them.

The Americans can be shooting Japanese subs that venture too far south or east, or which go within 12 miles of the shores of Guam or the Philippines, on sight. But- the Japanese have no compelling reason to be sending subs those places. And if they do send subs there that end up getting attacked by the Americans, the Japanese, like the Germans in the Atlantic, only will acknowledge that fact if they believe it is in their interest.

b) The Americans between December 41 and June 1942 declare war on Japan and begin offensive operations, operations that their Asiatic and Pacific forces are too weak to carry out successfully. The Japanese occupy all the same British and Dutch territories as in option (a) but have also sunk any US Pacific task forces that tried to cross through the Japanese mandates, and destroyed any American forces based in the Philippines that have tried to intervene in the DEI. American/Filipino ground forces may be holding out longer, but US air operations and airfields in the Philippines are going to be completely neutralized within a few weeks of them initiating hostilities against the Japanese.

There is an option (c), but it is not realistic at all.

That would be the option where forces of the US Asiatic Fleet, or detachments from the US Pacific fleet, and US aircraft, travel to the DEI and Malaya and they help win battles that were lost in OTL.
 
The Japanese could have secured Burma, Malaya, DEI, Papua, New Britain ans portions of the Gilberts before the US decided "enough was enough"

The operational situation for the Japanese is they can take all these western Pacific territories within just a few months (like OTL).

The US fleet based in Hawaii and the west coast is incapable of successfully intervening until 1943, well after the Japanese have been occupying the territories for months.

The surface fleet is handicapped. The US carriers did get in some licks. Specifically would be the March 1942 interception of the convoy carrying 17th Army reinforcements to New Guinea. Only one cargo ship was sunk, but discipline evaporated and the others scattered back northwards unwilling to risk dying for the emperor. The cargos were delayed four to six weeks.

The US Asiatic fleet and USAFFE forces based within the Philippines lack the strength and range to affect Anglo-Japanese and Dutch-Japanese battles going on around them.

PI was capable of hosting near thirty submarines. Even at a 20% hit/detonation rate that means six Japanese ships holed with each thirty war patrols. Add in the B17s bombing Japanese ports & other PI based air strikes & it all adds up.


The Americans can be shooting Japanese subs that venture too far south or east, or which go within 12 miles of the shores of Guam or the Philippines, on sight. But- the Japanese have no compelling reason to be sending subs those places. And if they do send subs there that end up getting attacked by the Americans, the Japanese, like the Germans in the Atlantic, only will acknowledge that fact if they believe it is in their interest.

The US could as it did in the Atlantic is declare a extensive nuetral or exclusion zone around the Phillipines & send out patrols. In the Atlantic the USN was operating with "Shoot on Sight" orders even tho there was no declared war. With the November War Warning from Washington came a similar directive. That all Japanese ships or air craft ins sight of US warships, bases, or aircraft were to be considered hostile & were to be attacked

b) The Americans between December 41 and June 1942 declare war on Japan and begin offensive operations, operations that their Asiatic and Pacific forces are too weak to carry out successfully.

This would not happen. Neither the Rainbow plans nor Kimmels WPP-46 contemplated any major offensive action in 1942. Raids and
opportunities" were planned, but no general offensive.

The Japanese occupy all the same British and Dutch territories as in option (a) but have also sunk any US Pacific task forces that tried to cross through the Japanese mandates, and destroyed any American forces based in the Philippines that have tried to intervene in the DEI. American/Filipino ground forces may be holding out longer, but US air operations and airfields in the Philippines are going to be completely neutralized within a few weeks of them initiating hostilities against the Japanese.

In general yes that is the mostly likely course. main difference is the Japanese take heavier losses, which in the case of aircrew are critical losses.

There is an option (c), but it is not realistic at all.

That would be the option where forces of the US Asiatic Fleet, or detachments from the US Pacific fleet, and US aircraft, travel to the DEI and Malaya and they help win battles that were lost in OTL.

Hmm yes, the winter carrier raids wont save the DEI & neither will a sucessfull destroyer action or two. Have to wait until more concentrated actions can occur. That takes you to events like the march convoy intercept, the Coral Sea battle, Midway, and all the battles revolving around the Solomon islands.
 

CalBear

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The surface fleet is handicapped. The US carriers did get in some licks. Specifically would be the March 1942 interception of the convoy carrying 17th Army reinforcements to New Guinea. Only one cargo ship was sunk, but discipline evaporated and the others scattered back northwards unwilling to risk dying for the emperor. The cargos were delayed four to six weeks.



PI was capable of hosting near thirty submarines. Even at a 20% hit/detonation rate that means six Japanese ships holed with each thirty war patrols. Add in the B17s bombing Japanese ports & other PI based air strikes & it all adds up.




The US could as it did in the Atlantic is declare a extensive nuetral or exclusion zone around the Phillipines & send out patrols. In the Atlantic the USN was operating with "Shoot on Sight" orders even tho there was no declared war. With the November War Warning from Washington came a similar directive. That all Japanese ships or air craft ins sight of US warships, bases, or aircraft were to be considered hostile & were to be attacked



This would not happen. Neither the Rainbow plans nor Kimmels WPP-46 contemplated any major offensive action in 1942. Raids and
opportunities" were planned, but no general offensive.



In general yes that is the mostly likely course. main difference is the Japanese take heavier losses, which in the case of aircrew are critical losses.



Hmm yes, the winter carrier raids wont save the DEI & neither will a sucessfull destroyer action or two. Have to wait until more concentrated actions can occur. That takes you to events like the march convoy intercept, the Coral Sea battle, Midway, and all the battles revolving around the Solomon islands.

A lot of the boats in the PI were also using older, slower, but pretty much 100% reliable Mark 10. The Mark 14 was in short supply (prewar production was 1.5 torpedoes a DAY, with three shift working round the clock, even with three factories going full bore there were only 2,000 Mark 14 produced in all of 1942) so the Mark 10 was what the Asiatic Fleet had in supply.
 
Asked before?

Two of the top five threads on the Forum as I type this are on the same subject.

Hase there been one for just occupation of DEI, leaving Vichy in control of Vietnam?

After all, if some deluded folk think Oahu is doable in late 41, why not just a direct strike on the Dutch in June, 1940, leaving the US, Vichy and USA forces alone?

The few supplies the Chinese were getting thru Haiphong isn't worth the threat on the real goal, Oil.
 
Hase there been one for just occupation of DEI, leaving Vichy in control of Vietnam?

After all, if some deluded folk think Oahu is doable in late 41, why not just a direct strike on the Dutch in June, 1940, leaving the US, Vichy and USA forces alone?

The few supplies the Chinese were getting thru Haiphong isn't worth the threat on the real goal, Oil.

Well not taking Vietnam means no embargo, no embargo means no invasion of the DEI. The US put the oil and iron embargo in place after negotiations regarding Indochina fell apart. I'd be curious to see what our Pacific War experts think about the possibility Japan making peace with China in 41 (according to Wikipedia, they appeared to at least consider peace until Tojo shot the idea down and that's where my knowledge of the subject ends). Could Prince Konoye negotiate? Would Tojo need to have been removed?
 
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.... I'd be curious to see what our Pacific War experts think about the possibility Japan making peace with China in 41 (according to Wikipedia, they appeared to at least consider peace until Tojo shot the idea down and that's where my knowledge of the subject ends). Could Prince Konoye negotiate? Would Tojo need to have been removed?

This subject is understudied in English language literature. I've seen only the briefest references to it. Assuming a Japanese government was willing to negotiate something I wonder if the Chinese government would have been able to negotiate anything, or been hampered by unrealistic expectations.
 
This subject is understudied in English language literature. I've seen only the briefest references to it. Assuming a Japanese government was willing to negotiate something I wonder if the Chinese government would have been able to negotiate anything, or been hampered by unrealistic expectations.

That's a shame about the amount of info. Hadn't considered how the Chinese might react, I imagine that Chiang would be rather desperate for peace, maybe trade space for time.
 
That's a shame about the amount of info.

It may be worse than I thought. Just checked the Purdue University cataloge & notice that a couple titles I'm certain were there in 1979 are not on the shelf now. Checked the history shelf of the used book store here. Absolutely nothing concerning China there. Lots of books about the SS or Tiger tanks, and a multitude of Ambrose authored volumes. There might be something buried in one of the books concerning Japan in WWII. There are a fair number of those in the used book stores.

Maybe some expert on China can help us out in this :confused:
 
It may be worse than I thought. Just checked the Purdue University cataloge & notice that a couple titles I'm certain were there in 1979 are not on the shelf now. Checked the history shelf of the used book store here. Absolutely nothing concerning China there. Lots of books about the SS or Tiger tanks, and a multitude of Ambrose authored volumes. There might be something buried in one of the books concerning Japan in WWII. There are a fair number of those in the used book stores.

Maybe some expert on China can help us out in this :confused:

Might pose the question on one of the (very active) Japanese Empire threads that are up atm.
 

raharris1973

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The US could as it did in the Atlantic is declare a extensive nuetral or exclusion zone around the Phillipines & send out patrols. In the Atlantic the USN was operating with "Shoot on Sight" orders even tho there was no declared war. With the November War Warning from Washington came a similar directive. That all Japanese ships or air craft ins sight of US warships, bases, or aircraft were to be considered hostile & were to be attacked

A question on applying the Autumn 1941 Atlantic war rules of engagement (ROEs) to the Pacific.

The Atlantic rules definitely were shoot on sight, but were those only against U-Boats, or against German surface ships and aircraft, armed and unarmed?

In a late stage of the undeclared Atlantic War, the US began convoys all the way to Iceland, did they extend that all the way to Ireland in the final weeks before declared war?

PI was capable of hosting near thirty submarines. Even at a 20% hit/detonation rate that means six Japanese ships holed with each thirty war patrols.

Did the US employ submarines against surface vessels in the Atlantic undeclared war? The optics of doing so are a little different from the other way around. If the US began to do so in the Pacific, it could certainly no longer expect to make political capital off of German submarine warfare.

Add in the B17s bombing Japanese ports & other PI based air strikes & it all adds up.

During the undeclared Atlantic war, the US did many things, shoot U-Boats on sight, share information to help the British prosecute offensive action against subs and declared wide exclusion zones, but never exclusion zones that extended clear to the coast of adversary owned and adversary occupied territory.

FDR could and was able to do all those things without a declaration of war.

But, if he applied the precedents of the undeclared Atlantic war to the Pacific, that still would not include submarine attacks on cargo traffic or bombing of land targets.

Patrolling over and bombing belligerent ports, blockading belligerent ports and launching submarine attacks on cargo ships would be setting new precedents, and so would declaring and patrolling maritime exclusion zones that extend all the way up to belligerent coasts. The last would be farcically and transparently provocative. Even members of Congress ready and willing to declare war on the Axis and send air and ground expeditionary forces to come to grips with them, could be insulted by an executive branch policy transparently to give a belligerent no way out (or around) but to shoot.
 
FDR could and was able to do all those things without a declaration of war.

But, if he applied the precedents of the undeclared Atlantic war to the Pacific, that still would not include submarine attacks on cargo traffic or bombing of land targets.

Patrolling over and bombing belligerent ports, blockading belligerent ports and launching submarine attacks on cargo ships would be setting new precedents, and so would declaring and patrolling maritime exclusion zones that extend all the way up to belligerent coasts. The last would be farcically and transparently provocative. Even members of Congress ready and willing to declare war on the Axis and send air and ground expeditionary forces to come to grips with them, could be insulted by an executive branch policy transparently to give a belligerent no way out (or around) but to shoot.

Two different situations have been conflated together in the thread. Some of the quotes refer to after the US is at war with Japan. They illustrate the problem Japan is faced with if it does not nuetralize the US combat power in the PI as fast as possible. The others refer to before a DoW & were aimed at the mechanism by which Japan can have its hand forced.

A question on applying the Autumn 1941 Atlantic war rules of engagement (ROEs) to the Pacific.

The Atlantic rules definitely were shoot on sight, but were those only against U-Boats, or against German surface ships and aircraft, armed and unarmed?

There were efforts to interdict surface ships. Specfically the armed merchant cruisers Germany deployed, and some false flagged cargo ships that tested the blockade.

In a late stage of the undeclared Atlantic War, the US began convoys all the way to Iceland, did they extend that all the way to Ireland in the final weeks before declared war?

Near Iceland. Other than that the USN had established a base on Iceland with a US Marine brigade replacing part of the Commonwealth units there.

Did the US employ submarines against surface vessels in the Atlantic undeclared war? The optics of doing so are a little different from the other way around. If the US began to do so in the Pacific, it could certainly no longer expect to make political capital off of German submarine warfare.

US submarines patroled in the Atlantic.


During the undeclared Atlantic war, the US did many things, shoot U-Boats on sight, share information to help the British prosecute offensive action against subs and declared wide exclusion zones, but never exclusion zones that extended clear to the coast of adversary owned and adversary occupied territory.

Dont need to extend them that far in the Pacific or South China Sea. The sea nearer China & Formosa is thicker with reefs, islands, & similar navigation hazards. If the exclusion zone covers the most navigable portion of the Formosa/PI strait it will be a problem for the Japanese & considered a arrogant insult by many. It wont take long for the warships & aircraft to cross paths.
 

raharris1973

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Two different situations have been conflated together in the thread. Some of the quotes refer to after the US is at war with Japan. They illustrate the problem Japan is faced with if it does not nuetralize the US combat power in the PI as fast as possible. The others refer to before a DoW & were aimed at the mechanism by which Japan can have its hand forced.

Got it Carl, sorry to conflate the two. I think I cleared up what you meant.
 
Assuming the Japanese attack British & Dutch possessions, no PH there is the issue that the convoys heading that way WILL be spotted by US forces in the PI and this means that the British and Dutch will be marginally more prepared when they arrive - some level of attrition before landings. This could very well allow for more complete destruction of oil facilities in the DEI and Borneo, so the near term gain for the Japanese is less than OTL, and long term even worse as there is more damage to repair and the Japanese capability to do so is no better than OTL when is was limited at best.

The USA will immediately institute a 100% embargo on everything to Japan, as well as totally isolating Japan from the international banking system (which was pretty much complete by 12/41 - see " Bankrupting the Enemy"). Furthermore the fortification/reinforcement of US Pacific holdings from Hawaii to the PI and down to Samoa will accelerate. Much like Iceland, you'll see US forces replace or reinforce Commonwealth forces on British islands. Basically even a company of US troops on an island will present the Japanese with the option of don't invade, or invade/kill US forces, start a war. The net result will be a very large "exclusion zone" with shoot on sight for subs, and warning away surface warships. Needless to say once the Japanese have attacked the UK & Netherlands in the Pacific, the possibility of a surprise attack on PH or in the PI becomes very very small. The capability of Japanese carrier air will be demonstrated, expect defense to be on heightened alert, Hawaiian (and possibly PI) radar will be working 24/7 and better coordinated etc.

As I noted in another posting, the US can declare any raw materials coming from SE Asia as "theft/contraband/piracy", and use the PI as a base for stopping contraband traffic. The position of the PI/US forces there astride the sailing routes from SE Asia to Japan made the neutralization of the US there a necessity for the Japanese in exploiting SE Asia.

The reality is that while seizing SE Asian resources would allow the Japanese to continue the war in China in the face of US petroleum embargo, it really would do little to deal with the reality that the US was getting stronger militarily vis-a-vis Japan at an accelerating pace. Limitations in Japanese shipbuilding, aero engine production, the need for most precision machine tools to be imported etc won't change appreciably in this scenario. In fact when the US-Japan war starts (as it inevitably will) absent PH and the disaster in the PI, loss of Guam/Wake and an accelerated US buildup will mean things are worse for Japan than OTL.

While Japan really could not win looking at it objectively, those in Japan who said that the longer they waited to have it out with the USA the worse off they would be were correct.
 
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