Greenville
Banned
How can President Buchanan prevent the Secessionist Crisis and ultimately the American Civil War?
How can President Buchanan prevent the Secessionist Crisis and ultimately the American Civil War?
He probably can't. It was getting very late in the day. But a few things which might help.
a) Don't try to force through the Lecompton Constitution
b) Put a bigger guard on the arsenal at Harper's Ferry - or move it somewhere else.
c) Don't veto Andrew Johnson's Homestead Bill.
The idea is to avert John Brown's raidu, but that might be better worked in other ways. The utter unreality of Brown's plan suggests it would be hard to stop him from trying.
Don't incite Taney to issue the Dred Scott decision.
Support Stephen Douglas for the Democrat nomination in 1860.
The idea is to avert John Brown's raid, but that might be better worked in other ways. The utter unreality of Brown's plan suggests it would be hard to stop him from trying.
Fro what I can gather he needed little inciting.Don't incite Taney to issue the Dred Scott decision.
Support Stephen Douglas for the Democrat nomination in 1860.
How can President Buchanan prevent the Secessionist Crisis and ultimately the American Civil War?
From what I recall from when we covered that in my SCOTUS class that was in fact the case. Taney originally intended to issue a limited ruling but was pushed into issuing the massively expansive, and mostly dictum, OTL ruling after reading McLean's draft dissent. McLean's dissent was such an aggressive and outspoken attack on the majority was in part to boost his political prospects.Fro what I can gather he needed little inciting.
Was Nevins too optimistic in thinking that the Deep South states that threatened secession over Lecompton were bluffing?
Shelby Foote wrote otherwise, but he was often superficial and conventional, to the detriment of accuracy.Note by the way that in 1857 Douglas was not the great bugbear of the southern Democrats... It was only after Douglas broke with Buchanan on Lecompton that Southerners became violently opposed to him (and suddenly discovered that his "Freeport Doctrine," which he had actually expressed long before the debates with Lincoln, was heretical).
"Sooner or later, any one of them, like Lecompton, might have disrupted the Democratic party" and as in 1860 led to the election of a "Black" Republican and subsequent secession."
One question not addressed: how would the reapportionment of 1860 affect the electoral map? In 1860, there were 183 electoral votes in free states, and only 120 in slave states; after the reapportionment, and Kansas statehood, that would be 196 to 115. The Republicans could drop 40 free state EV and still win - a plausible outcome even with no Democrat split.
A lot could depend on what happens in New York.
It had a very curious electoral history. In 1856 Fremont took it by about 80,000 votes, but in 1860 Lincoln's majority there was only about 50,000. Then in 1864 Lincoln edges out McClellan by about 7,000 votes (less than one percentage point) and in 1868 Grant loses it to Seymour by about 10,000.
After all, some at least of the North's additional electors will go to NY...
Does the Kansas-Nebraska Act fit into any of this?
A lot could depend on what happens in New York.
It had a very curious electoral history. In 1856 Fremont took it by about 80,000 votes, but in 1860 Lincoln's majority there was only about 50,000. Then in 1864 Lincoln edges out McClellan by about 7,000 votes (less than one percentage point) and in 1868 Grant loses it to Seymour by about 10,000.
The Republicans win comfortably in 1872, but thereafter it settles down as a "swing" state, going Democratic three times, Republican twice, until the realignment of 1896.
Any idea what was going on here, or how the absence or delay of the ACW might affect it?
I think the difference between 1856 and 1860 can be explained pretty easily. In 1856, there was a three-way race. In 1860, Lincoln was opposed by a fusion ticket, which included Bell as well as Douglas and Breckinridge electors. Not surprisingly, some conservative Whigs who had voted for Fillmore in 1856 supported the fusion ticker in 1860--though others voted for Lincoln. As for 1864 and 1868, many New Yorkers who opposed slavery expansion in 1856-60 were not keen on a war whose end did not seem to be in sight (to some people even after Atlanta) or conscription or arbitrary arrests or immediate emancipation or (by 1868) Reconstruction involving African American suffrage. Also in 1868 and 1876 the Democratic candidate was a New York governor; of course Greeley too was from New York, but not exactly beloved by many New York Democrats (or for that matter some Liberal Republicans). *Southern* Democrats swallowed their reservations about Greeley fairly easily; ending Reconstruction took precedence over everything. For Northern Democrats, memories of their disagreements with Greeley (and for that matter current disagreements on issues like protectionism) were harder to overcome....