AHC: Italy Knocked Out of WWI

Do you care to provide details?

Yes. Logistically, the Central Powers have the issue that even if they accomplish a Karfreit, the ability to project their power deep into Italy doesn't exist. Here the major limitation is the small number of avenues to attack into Italy and the problem of sustaining an offensive deep into Italy when the Italians have a relatively simpler task concentrating in such a case against overextended CP forces. Strategically, too, for Austria-Hungary Russia will always be a more dangerous enemy than Italy.
 

I cannot stay here discussing with some guy who has no knowledge of geography, even less of logistics and believes that the u-boats were the main reason for USA to enter the war (which was not: the warparty triumphed because the US of A had to protect the loans made to the Entente).

Have you any idea of the logistical difficulties in moving a significant number of troops and supplies and ammunitions and victuals across Europe in 1918 after 4 years of war? The Austrians were almost unable to feed their own troops.

The German divisions in any case are not supermen: they may fight better than the Austrians, but when confronted by prepared defenses they fail like anyone else. If it were otherwise, they would have won the war in 1914.

The reasonsfor which Ludendorff is not going to send his best troops gallivanting across Europe to assist a clearly failing ally is that there is no upside for Germany. Even the mythical victory in Italy would not change the end game of the war. On the other end, a victory in France might do it.

But what did Ludendrff know? He should have bought a time machine and travelled to 2012 to ask your input :rolleyes:
 
LordKalvan, the US entered WWI because of the German decision to return to unrestricted submarine warfare combined with the alliance proposals of the Zimmerman Telegram.

Those proposals regarding Mexico and Japan not only killed neutral sentiment in a large portion of the US at the very moment when any action provoking the US beyond the u-boats was utterly ill-advised but made even less sense considering Germany's inability of actually aiding Mexico.
 
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Did you look at the source I linked? Yes, I it is Wiki, but I have seen at least two other sources with the same number for the battle. About 300K POW, 300K deserters. Within a period of a few weeks, Italy's military became 600,000 men smaller, and this is why I call them casualties. And the 600,000 number is the relevant number in determining if Italy leaves the war. BTW, do you have any sources to back you 300K number as total losses in the battle?

I did check your Wiki source. The compiler tagged as "deserters" soldiers who became temporarily separated from their units, and reformed once behind the Piave. The best source I found on internet (in English) is http://www.worldwar1.com/itafront/caporetto.htm
According to this source, Italian losses were:

280,000 prisoners
350,000 soldiers temporarily separated from their units
40,000 dead and wounded
3,150 artillery pieces (2/3 of the Army's total)
1,700 mortars
3,000 machine guns
400,000 civilian refugees

It was a major defeat, but it was only the 2nd army who was trounced. The 3rd and the 4th armies were able to retret in good order (even if they lost almost 20% of their strength and all artillery).

These numbers stand to reason, which Wiki's claim of 350,000 "deserters" does not.Where would all these "deserters" have gone?

BTW, the Italian version of the same article on Wiki is quite different, and reports "300,000 soldiers temporarily separated from their units", which makesme think that both wiki articles cut and pasted from the source I linked.

Virtually all histories of WW1 have the U-boat as the main reason the USA enters the war. So what is your theory on why the USA enters the war?
An Entente defeat would have resulted in a defaults on the loans advanced from USA financiers and manufacturers, which would have precipitated a deep economic crisis. The u-boats (and the Zimmermann telegram) were decent fig leaves, same as the propaganda about "the Huns". Real politik is a bit different.


And we are supposed to take your expert military opinion. When you have made obvious logistical mistakes in this thread? See Below
Obvious logical mistakes? Do you have an idea of the distance between Fiume and northern Dalmatia? Or maybe it is because I'm so honest to own up when I make a mistake?
And talking about logistics: the Germans sent 6 divisions to support the Austrians at Caporetto, and they took more than 2 months to move them (the first units arrived in August). These 6 divisions introduced on the Italian front tactics never used before (including grenades attacks and the use of poison gas) which had an initial surprise effect. After which Cadorna and Capello (with some help from Badoglio too) did their best to transform a setback into a disastrous ratfuck. The main problem however was that at the start of Caporetto the Italians were on the offensive: they were close to taking mount Ermada, which commanded Trieste. It is quite obvious that they should have noticed the build up in the enemy's forces, but what can you do?
6 months later (which is the first accessible time window for a new and revised offensive of the CPs) the situation is quite different: the Italians are in prepared defensive positions, the change in the command of the army has produced a substantial morale build among the troops and the flood of supplies from the Entente has more than made good the material losses of Caporetto. Even if Ludendorff has a brainstorming and decides to go for another offensive in Italy (which would not be the right thing to do in any case) sending back the 6 first-class divisions would not be likely to achieve a breakthrough. Obviously these divisions would be taken away from the western front for at least 5-6 months during the typical window for offensives and while American supplies and troops are starting to arrive in France. That's quite smart: why didn't you do it, Herr Ludendorff?
 
LordKalvan, the US entered WWI because of the German decision to return to unrestricted submarine warfare combined with the alliance proposals of the Zimmerman Telegram.

Those proposals regarding Mexico and Japan not only killed neutral sentiment in a large portion of the US at the very moment when any action provoking the US beyond the u-boats was utterly ill-advised but made even less sense considering Germany's inability of actually aiding Mexico.

And obviously the unsecured loans to the Entente did not play any role?
Mind, it's a bit awkward to tell the people that their nation is entering the fray to protect the legitimate interests of a bunch of financiers :rolleyes:
Don't know why, but it makes me think of that fateful explosion on the Maine...
 

The Sandman

Banned
Yeah; going off of their two-week land-snatch in eastern Europe in 1917, I'm not too worried about the CP saying, "Screw logistics, we got 'em on the run! WHEEEE!"

In this case, though, the critical part is that the CP forces need to be able to get a bridgehead across the Piave before the Italians can bring sufficient forces to plus the gap. It doesn't really matter what they might want to do; without sufficient food, ammunition and rest the men on the ground will simply not be able to sustain the necessary effort. By destroying the Third Army somewhere between the Tagliamento and the Isonzo, the CP armies buy themselves enough time to at least start moving the sort of resources to the area they would need to sustain their breakthrough.

Assuming the Italian Third Army can be destroyed, the Italian Fourth Army is left covering the entire stretch of the Piave from the Adriatic to the Alpine foothills by itself against three full CP armies (two AH, one combined AH-German) along with whatever forces can be spared from the AH army in the Trentino. Even if there aren't CP forces on the west bank of the Piave before the Italians pull together a new defensive line, they'll have trouble holding the river under those circumstances; if the CP are across the river, then the Fourth Army will be enveloped and destroyed if it tries to stand and fight. Further retreat, however, would require the Italians to abandon Treviso, Venice, and probably Padua, which is going to be very difficult from a political standpoint.

And all I think you'd need to get this result is for Cadorna to wait a day or two too long to permit the Italian forces in Friuli to retreat to the Piave. Given that we're talking about Cadorna here, I doubt it would take that much for him to make one more stupid decision atop all the rest.
 
Do you care to provide details?

The terrain and logistical problems.

The Italian front was about THE worst front to launch attacks on during the entire war. Lots of mountains, limited lines of advance and limited lines of communications.

In terms of strategic focus Italy wasn't viewed as a strategic theater. If you knock Italy out that doesn't directly effect France or Russia. It just frees German and Hapsburg resources that were tied down facing Italy. At the same time it wasn't viewed as likely that Italy could knock the Hapsburgs out of the war. So neither side viewed Italian Front as being able to achieve a knock out blow.

Michael
 
And obviously the unsecured loans to the Entente did not play any role?
Mind, it's a bit awkward to tell the people that their nation is entering the fray to protect the legitimate interests of a bunch of financiers :rolleyes:
Don't know why, but it makes me think of that fateful explosion on the Maine...

Thats nice, get congress to declare war on that basis alone. Without USW and the event chain that followed Congress lets JP Morgan and company go down in flames.

Michael
 
The terrain and logistical problems.

The Italian front was about THE worst front to launch attacks on during the entire war. Lots of mountains, limited lines of advance and limited lines of communications.

In terms of strategic focus Italy wasn't viewed as a strategic theater. If you knock Italy out that doesn't directly effect France or Russia. It just frees German and Hapsburg resources that were tied down facing Italy. At the same time it wasn't viewed as likely that Italy could knock the Hapsburgs out of the war. So neither side viewed Italian Front as being able to achieve a knock out blow.

Michael

And it's worth noting that the Italian Campaign of WWII was not any smoother or simpler, despite the rather greater advantages in firepower and mobility enjoyed by the WWII Allies over the WWI Allies.
 
Strange how so many members of the House and Senate previously known as staunch supporters of neutrality changed their opinions so dramatically when they had apparently held no concern for any of the banks involved in unwise loans to the Entente previously.


LordKalvan, feel free to offer actual evidence that saving JP Morgan was the reason that the US entered the war at any time.
 
I cannot stay here discussing with some guy who has no knowledge of geography, even less of logistics and believes that the u-boats were the main reason for USA to enter the war (which was not: the warparty triumphed because the US of A had to protect the loans made to the Entente).

Here is an :rolleyes: back at you. People that believe in conspiracy theories, IE that the US entered the war to save a cabal of bankers or the like aren't to be taken seriously. What got the US public and US congress upset enough to declare war was USW and what followed. I am sorry if you think otherwise but its in the record.

As to the bank loans I am aware of them. A number of books cover the details of Entente War fiances or you can do stuff like look up NYT achieves for details of the time period.


Have you any idea of the logistical difficulties in moving a significant number of troops and supplies and ammunitions and victuals across Europe in 1918 after 4 years of war? The Austrians were almost unable to feed their own troops.

I am aware of the state of the German railnet, German food supply and Hapsburg problems. The Germans did look at doing an offensive vs Italy as an alternative to going after France. It was discarded as not being decisive before US troops arrived in force and worries over state of German food supplies. Issue was never that they couldn't do it. With respect I take the evaluation of the people of the time over yours.


The German divisions in any case are not supermen: they may fight better than the Austrians, but when confronted by prepared defenses they fail like anyone else. If it were otherwise, they would have won the war in 1914.

Except the Germans didn't fail ever time they went against prepared defenses did they? Battle of Caporetto is the obvious one to look at.

Issue is that the Germans were MUCH better than the Hapsburgs and or the Italians. I don't see any particular reason why the Germans can't drive the Italians back if they decide to do so. Question is could they rupture the front line to achieve a complete breakthrough and if they could would the Italians rally when the Germans eventually outran their logistics? Also if Italian government could survive another bad battle. To me the later question is the key and by 1918 most governments were very fragile.

The reasonsfor which Ludendorff is not going to send his best troops gallivanting across Europe to assist a clearly failing ally is that there is no upside for Germany. Even the mythical victory in Italy would not change the end game of the war. On the other end, a victory in France might do it.

But what did Ludendrff know? He should have bought a time machine and travelled to 2012 to ask your input :rolleyes:

You do make a valid point on that Italian Front not being viewed as a critical front and not able to by itself achieve decisive results. At the same time this was but one factor that was in consideration when thinking over the situation. US entry was THE key issue during the debates over course of action. With US entry pushed off it changes things. It is still possible that the Germans go for France anyways but it is no longer an absolute given.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
No I agree to all you said, but the Austrians had all their ships available even if you add a few MORE ships there would be probably heavy losses on both sides, but Austria being nearer to repair facilities would have it easier. They are defending and choose advantageos position (look at the map of the Adriatic.

The Allies could throw enough in to defeat the Austrian navy, but are they willing to do it - an attack would also prompt the Austrians to bring in reserve units to the coats in anticipation of an attack.

It was so much easier to attack the weaker Ottoman fleet... (or at least protect the invasion against that fleet).

IOTL the Allies weren't prepared to venture into the Adricatic, so presumably they had good reasons. The geological / geographical layout of the Adriactic, with very few natural harbours on the Italian side were one reason. If the Allies thought it was worthwhile then I think they would have risked it, as they did with the number of ships lost on station around the Dardanelles even after the initial losses. Personally I don't think the problem would necessarily been landing any troops, but how they would move off the beaches & inland in that terrain.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
The Italians had the 3 dreadnoughts of the Giulio Cesare class, 2 of the Andrea Doria class and the prototype Dante Alighieri; not sure how many pre-dreadnoughts. More than enough torpedo boats and destroyers to screen the capital ships and contest the coastal waters. U-boat are not much goodin the Adriatic: it's a shallow sea, with good visibility of the bottom,and the Italians developed their torpedo boats (MAS) as anti-Uboat units. Torpedo boats saw most of the actions in the war: the pre-dreadnought Wien was sunk in the harbour of Trieste by one of them in December 1917 and two other MAS torpedoed and sunk the dreadnought Saint Stephan who had developed engine troubles during the raid on the Otranto barrage(March 1918). Another dreadnought, Viribus Unitis, was sunk in the harbour of Pola by navy incursors with a limpet mine on November 1, 1918.

With the only exception of a raid against Ancona, a cruisers raid to harass the evacuation of the defeated Serbian troops from Albania, during which the Austrian cruiser Novara was quite heavily damaged, and the already mentioned fleet raid on the Otranto barrage there was no other significant action during the war.

If the entente navies decide to blockade Pola in order to cover a landing in western Istria or northern Dalmatia the Austrian navy has the option of steaming out to engage, against probable odds of 3:1 or remain in the harbour under the protection of the coastal batteries, but without being unableto contest the landing.

The Italians had 8 operational pre-dreds operational at the start of the war, of which two (the Saint Bon & Emanuele Filiberto) were pretty small. They lost two in 1916, one to mines (Regina Margherita), and the other (Benedetto Brin) to an internal explosion supposedly caused by a bomb brought on board by an Austrian agent acting as (or perhaps was) a prostitute!

The Italian dreadnoughts barely went to sea and, like so many other battleships, never really fired a shot in anger. The Leonardo da Vinci was also lost to an internal explosion IIRC. The bulk of the war effort fell on the smaller Italian vessels, particularly the light cruisers & destroyers, again as in so many other navies, as you note with the A-H above.

IMO the Italian & A-H navies were pretty evenly matched in materiel; the A-H had the advantage of better bases; the Italians had some pretty impressive allies in the RN & MN.
 
IMO the Italian & A-H navies were pretty evenly matched in materiel; the A-H had the advantage of better bases; the Italians had some pretty impressive allies in the RN & MN
& IJN, whom we eventually persuaded to base a destroyer squadron at Malta IOTL for anti-submarine work... :cool:
 
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