AHC: improved Deutschland-class cruisers.

During WWI American Shipbuilding Corp. designed a "blockade runner" merchant vessel. All I've ever gotten ahold of is picture of the design, no particulars. However, knowing AmShip were no rank amateurs, that they COULD design such a vessel during WWI, there seems no reason the DKM couldn't get a design like this from German sources.
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The small print in the pic describes the ship as "impractical and costly"...hardly a ringing endorsement!
 
Indeed, it isn't a ringing endorsement when your looking to ship large quantities of supplies to Europe! It seems to have been emphasizing speed at the expense of cargo capacity (much like the blockade runners of the US ACW)with just enough armament (judging all this from the picture) to offer some defense against submarines. TBH I found the concept interesting, reversing it to raid instead of breaking a blockade, making suitable changes. But in reality, IMO the DKM did about as well as it could when facing the RN and the geography of where their ports are. No new designs, no excellent raiders, are going to change those two factors.
And I apologize for taking the thread further afield, we were asked originally to improve the Deutschland's, I should have restricted myself to the original question.
 
The small print in the pic describes the ship as "impractical and costly"...hardly a ringing endorsement!


That's why KM stuck with fast diesel merchant vessel converted into disguised raider. The HSK in WW-I , that replenished there coal supply underway[ sorry McPherson -WW-I not WW-II] remained difficult to find and lasted a year or more, while the others were hunted down and sunk quickly. Likewise the WW-I HSK that used seaplanes to scout , inflicted disproportional damage on allies merchant fleets forcing convoy in the south.

The 10 MV sunk & 10 allied warships to hunt down, were the WW-I averages overall. WW-II experiences showed those results were scalable...more HSK would have produced directly more kills. Reviewing WW-II auxiliary merchant warships the Germans used - they had 18-20 large diesel merchants able to manage 15-16 knots top speed and endurance of months at sea. Im Speculating that 3 times as many HSK should produce 3 times as many results.


BTW discussing warships out of context of each sides doctrine/system of war seems like a failure.
 
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Reluctant Allies about naval cooperation with Japan (or lack thereof) had Raeder wanting to send Leipzig light cruiser out as raider, does not seem like a very good plan but at least a window into their thinking at the time.

That's why KM stuck with fast diesel merchant vessel converted into disguised raider. The HSK in WW-I , that replenished there coal supply underway[ sorry McPherson -WW-I not WW-II] remained difficult to find and lasted a year or more, while the others were hunted down and sunk quickly. Likewise the WW-I HSK that used seaplanes to scout , inflicted disproportional damage on allies merchant fleets forcing convoy in the south.

The 10 MV sunk & 10 allied warships to hunt down, were the WW-I averages overall. WW-II experiences showed those results were scalable...more HSK would have produced directly more kills. Reviewing WW-II auxiliary merchant warships the Germans used - they had 18-20 large diesel merchants able to manage 15-16 knots top speed and endurance of months at sea. Im Speculating that 3 times as many HSK should produce 3 times as many results.

that same book cited above had Raeder delaying the final outfitting of 2 - 3 more raiders, if that is to be believed it really was just a lack of interest or belief that stymied larger force.
 
As with any such maritime scheme; (The Russians try this presently.) one must look at the fighter/radar coverage.

GIUK_1945.png




Evasion routing and low/low/low flight profiles to avoid surface based allied radar, aboard ships and on land could chop those numbers in half.

Now some questions can be asked with this additional planning information:

1. Can Junkers, Dornier, and FW allocate sufficient resources to meet the numbers speculated?
2. Will the Allies allow it? They have a bombing campaign in progress.
3. Will the Allies allow it? The antidote in the mid Atlantic is the F4F Wildcat. Plenty of those available.

good map but imagine if Iceland is contested from the beginning and no one can operate effectively from that critical island ?

# 1 yes since the number crunching was based on redirecting all assets/tonnage invested in the KM seaplanes as reported in the seaplane section plus the historical numbers of the CONDOR program [FW-200].

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II

# 2 & 3 Wallie bombing was total failure until 1942 . Then the historical bombing had little effect on the seaplane squadrons or Condor groups. That's first 1/2 of the war covered. The rest of the war would be covered by 1000 Me-261 built instead of the 1000 He-177 historically built.
 
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Getting back to the original question, how to improve the ships, its going to be hard because they really were good designs when considering the time they were built and the constraints they were under. I broke out Siegfried Breyer's "Battleships and Battlecruisers 1905-1970, which includes information on the Deutschland's (p287-290) so I'll summarize briefly the only plausible changes that would have bettered the ships. There were some differences in levels of protection having to do with underwater protection, these should be made uniformly throughout the class. The straight stem caused the vessels to ship large amounts of water in heavy seas, particularly when headed into them. Introducing a more weatherly bow, slightly higher with more sheer, would help with this. That would allow a marginally higher speed in heavy seas, and more effective use of the main guns forward. Lastly, (not addressed in Breyer but elsewhere) was the need for aux machinery redundancy. Adm. Graf Spee was lost in part due to damage to fuel oil purification systems, better protecting those or having another in another location would be of value in a ship destined to sail alone in enemy waters.
 
that same book cited above had Raeder delaying the final outfitting of 2 - 3 more raiders, if that is to be believed it really was just a lack of interest or belief that stymied larger force.

Yeah there was great disagreement in the KM rearmament of the early 1930s . The only thing they agreed on was priority to build Kaptain Donitz 300 U-Boat fleet. Next Kaptain HEYE proposed a dozen Panzerschiffe to attack the enemy escorts and scattering the convoys making it easier for U-Boats to sink the Merchants. Next Admiral Carls proposed four carrier battle groups to integrate the surface raiders with wolf packs with supply trains and Zestroyer escorts. Finally Raeder stepped in and demanded 13 Battleships & Battle cruisers to complete a "balanced fleet". The Z Plan was an attempt to formalise this into an order Hitler could grasp.

Anyway the point of all this is that plans to use HSK were drawn up during rearmament but were so low priority, especially because Raeder was still operating under the delusion that he still had another 10 years before war against the European navies was expected.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Yeah there was great disagreement in the KM rearmament of the early 1930s . The only thing they agreed on was priority to build Kaptain Donitz 300 U-Boat fleet. Next Kaptain HEYE proposed a dozen Panzerschiffe to attack the enemy escorts and scattering the convoys making it easier for U-Boats to sink the Merchants. Next Admiral Carls proposed four carrier battle groups to integrate the surface raiders with wolf packs with supply trains and Zestroyer escorts. Finally Raeder stepped in and demanded 13 Battleships & Battle cruisers to complete a "balanced fleet". The Z Plan was an attempt to formalise this into an order Hitler could grasp.

Anyway the point of all this is that plans to use HSK were drawn up during rearmament but were so low priority, especially because Raeder was still operating under the delusion that he still had another 10 years before war against the European navies was expected.

That is actually the correct order, if you start from a post WW1 mentality focusing on U-boats. First you must have enough U-boats. Then once this number is high enough, you start thinking about how to break up convoys. Then you turn to carriers for scouting and sinking ships. Only at the very end do you think about the main battle line, which you plan to never fight anyway. And the only reason that carriers are after the surface raiders is cost and lead time in development.
 
good map but imagine if Iceland is contested from the beginning and no one can operate effectively from that critical island ?

# 1 yes since the number crunching was based on redirecting all assets/tonnage invested in the KM seaplanes as reported in the seaplane section plus the historical numbers of the CONDOR program [FW-200].

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_aircraft_production_during_World_War_II

Ah, but you forgot the bottleneck.

# 2 & 3 Wallie bombing was total failure until 1942 . Then the historical bombing had little effect on the seaplane squadrons or Condor groups. That's first 1/2 of the war covered. The rest of the war would be covered by 1000 Me-261 built instead of the 1000 He-177 historically built.

And if the KM gets the Do-26, then I invoke BAT. Those NISTI guys had two versions; one guided by SARH (anti-ship) and the other by radio-steer. (grin)

As for Iceland contested, not in an alternate reality that should make sense, if the Germans have to build Deutschlands. (My opinion is not gospel, but read me out on this idea and see if it works as possible for you.) Nothing Axis (German), I believe, could get that far from Europe or stay for long once the Americans decided they need Iceland (and the Azores). It is a question of opposing operational capabilities and naval assets. In another topic discussion on German seapower I remarked that navies can allow or deny the use of the sea. In this case, the German KM is designed as a denier, and within the means to hand chosen those tools are limited rather severely to them for commerce warfare and nuisance raids by their economy and by the lunatic at the top of their government. They do not have the infrastructure or fleet trains to invade or hold anything beyond Europe. Case in point, North Africa. The German adventure there was totally dependent on the Italian navy, the Regia Marina, which was actually built to operate as a power projection force in the Mediterranean and did remarkably well for a year or two until the British got their own act together. At that, the Italians would have gone nowhere if the French Marine had not been neutralized as part of France's surrender.

I am, however, open to a description as to how Iceland stays out of US (or UK) hands once the Germans make noises in that direction. It is not next strait over as Norway was.
 
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That is actually the correct order, if you start from a post WW1 mentality focusing on U-boats. First you must have enough U-boats. Then once this number is high enough, you start thinking about how to break up convoys. Then you turn to carriers for scouting and sinking ships. Only at the very end do you think about the main battle line, which you plan to never fight anyway. And the only reason that carriers are after the surface raiders is cost and lead time in development.

Shipyard capacity, maintenance base, and training areas. I do not see the Z-plans (my opinion) as anything but another set of ill-conceived badly strategized mistakes based on obsolete 19th century naval thinking. As much as I love Mahan, Germany's problems and solutions are more Mackinder driven. She has to keep sea-powers away from her decision centers, not try to compete head to head. She will always lose that game.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Shipyard capacity, maintenance base, and training areas. I do not see the Z-plans (my opinion) as anything but another set of ill-conceived badly strategized mistakes based on obsolete 19th century naval thinking. As much as I love Mahan, Germany's problems and solutions are more Mackinder driven. She has to keep sea-powers away from her decision centers, not try to compete head to head. She will always lose that game.

And if you build the ships in the order listed, you will be able to keep the enemy away from the coast. And at a reasonable cost. The Full Plan Z just will never be funded.
 
I also like air power. And with realistic time lines, you start working on quality land-based naval aviation about a decade before your first carrier goes operation. We are just discussing ships in this thread.

1. In the context of the Deutschlands (if one wants to stick to that topic specifically) radio (electronic warfare) is more important than planes (airpower).

2. The Deutschlands and the rational behind them, is not an isolated item. In the sum of systems, the Deutschlands are but a part. I noticed that some posters understood this aspect when they suggested the Deutschlands might have been better designed for Baltic circumstances or more oriented toward the French and Russians. I happen to think the Deutschlands as built would have sufficed just as well in that expected role as they would as armored cruiser raiders on British merchant shipping. In fact the only reason to overbuild such ships for the merchant commerce raiding role is if the secondary Baltic mission is also in mind, but that is just my opinion.

3. One last word about aircraft carriers.

Germany does not need them. Her strategic and geopolitical position makes them unsustainable, plus she does not know how to begin building them correctly. Now Italy did need aircraft carriers and she had enough modern warship shipbuilding experience (1860s onward) to know how to design a fairly good one. But like France, Britain, and Japan, she has troubles with catapults. Remember what I wrote above about aircraft carriers minimum size, speed and wind over deck? What makes jeep carriers possible? What makes light carriers possible? Catapults. Germany cannot get hers to work. So no carrier for her. Italy was waiting on Germany to figure it out. Nope. No Aquila for her. Britain and the US figure it out. Japan figures out wind over deck surge launch (not recommended, it burns out drive shaft seals) and she has some wonky but workable catapults of her own, but the point is, not being a true seapower with a lot of experience with aviation at sea, unless you have someone show you how (as Britain showed France with Bearn and later the US did with Richelieu, Foch and Charles de Gaulle) one is not going to build a good aircraft carrier.^1

^1 Russia showed China at the start, but whether that result (Liaoning) is as good as the Russian example that is the Kuznetsov? YMMV. I think the Chinese approach, "learn by fail and try again" is something the Russians should have studied themselves for I think the Liaoning is a better example and the task force the Chinese built around her, a much better system of systems than anything the Russians ever came up with.
 
We all judge history from our vantage point....which today has no relevance to that time. This means every thing we write is wrong from either WALLIE or Reich Fanboy. Best we can do is go back to the source material and not opted cliché assumptions.

So to those who say KM couldn't....

Koop & Schmolke wrote a serious of booklets on KM warship classes. They seem German and presented detail, many of us hade not seen. One of the points they made was that post war engineering papers done by Ex KM warship engineers , vetted by chief engineers from the war.

These engineers argued that the fleet Hitler authorized , didn't help German, but a better fleet could have been built instead. They compared the 4 battleships built plus all five heavy cruisers , and showed that the exact same resources /ship yards & labour could have either produced 375 type VII U-Boats or 21 Deutschland PBS instead. This has been dismissed on internet forums , but ask your self. Who is more likely to understand what was possible or not, some naval engineer who were directly involved during the war [almost primary sources] or post modern armatures schooled in the WALLIE "victors history".
 
First you must have enough U-boats. Then once this number is high enough, you start thinking about how to break up convoys. Then you turn to carriers for scouting and sinking ships. Only at the very end do you think about the main battle line, which you plan to never fight anyway. And the only reason that carriers are after the surface raiders is cost and lead time in development.

And if you build the ships in the order listed, you will be able to keep the enemy away from the coast. And at a reasonable cost. The Full Plan Z just will never be funded.

If you plan such a fleet, you end up laying down the capital units first, because they take the longest to build.
 
We all judge history from our vantage point....which today has no relevance to that time. This means every thing we write is wrong from either WALLIE or Reich Fanboy. Best we can do is go back to the source material and not opted cliché assumptions.

That makes sense to me.

So to those who say KM couldn't....

It is not modern sensibility that has me adamant about the subject of aircraft carriers. I have to go anecdotal here a bit. The son of a WW II Italian rear admiral and I exchanged correspondence on a variety of topics that I did not understand, everything from why the Italians preferred high velocity naval guns with lightweight shells to why the French made options for poison gas shells that could be fired from their battleships' main armaments, to why the Italians did not push for radar or aircraft carriers. This was about two decades ago. Some of the questions he referred to his father. And those answers the old man gave surprised me. The one about the catapult being the reason the Aquila was stymied, after Mussolini finally accepted that the aircraft carrier was essential, was the one that floored me. I knew why it made sense, but I could hardly believe that the Germans of all people could not devise a drum and sheaves catapult system. Then the flywheel system they actually devised was described to me and I understood further why the Graf Zeppelin was never going to sea. The Italians, thus, went ahead on their own catapult which would have been a simple pressurized air cannon shuttlecock that probably would have worked for the light planes they planned, but the war ended before they went too far with it.

Koop & Schmolke wrote a serious of booklets on KM warship classes. They seem German and presented detail, many of us hade not seen. One of the points they made was that post war engineering papers done by Ex KM warship engineers , vetted by chief engineers from the war.

These engineers argued that the fleet Hitler authorized , didn't help German, but a better fleet could have been built instead. They compared the 4 battleships built plus all five heavy cruisers , and showed that the exact same resources /ship yards & labour could have either produced 375 type VII U-Boats or 21 Deutschland PBS instead. This has been dismissed on internet forums , but ask your self. Who is more likely to understand what was possible or not, some naval engineer who were directly involved during the war [almost primary sources] or post modern armatures schooled in the WALLIE "victors history".

I would have to see the slip schedules and raw materials availability they cite to agree or disagree. See what I wrote above about my own approach to some of these subjects.
 
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As for Iceland contested, not in an alternate reality that should make sense, if the Germans have to build Deutschlands. (My opinion is not gospel, but read me out on this idea and see if it works as possible for you.) Nothing Axis (German), I believe, could get that far from Europe or stay for long once the Americans decided they need Iceland (and the Azores). It is a question of opposing operational capabilities and naval assets. In another topic discussion on German seapower I remarked that navies can allow or deny the use of the sea. In this case, the German KM is designed as a denier, and within the means to hand chosen those tools are limited rather severely to them for commerce warfare and nuisance raids by their economy and by the lunatic at the top of their government. They do not have the infrastructure or fleet trains to invade or hold anything beyond Europe. Case in point, North Africa. The German adventure there was totally dependent on the Italian navy, the Regia Marina, which was actually built to operate as a power projection force in the Mediterranean and did remarkably well for a year or two until the British got their own act together. At that, the Italians would have gone nowhere if the French Marine had not been neutralized as part of France's surrender.

I am, however, open to a description as to how Iceland stays out of US (or UK) hands once the Germans make noises in that direction. It is not next strait over as Norway was.

that is the problem with any naval build of the KM? they are trapped by GIUK Gap or raiders/u-boats trapped outside of it, even with French Atlantic bases.

they took half way step by seizing Norway but still geography in the way. my view they needed some way to operate around Greenland more than just remote weather stations and ships. coupled with unexpected Soviet collaboration which allowed them to use Northern Sea Route to Pacific. (the former obviously requires pre-war planning)
 
that is the problem with any naval build of the KM? they are trapped by GIUK Gap or raiders/u-boats trapped outside of it, even with French Atlantic bases.

they took half way step by seizing Norway but still geography in the way. my view they needed some way to operate around Greenland more than just remote weather stations and ships. coupled with unexpected Soviet collaboration which allowed them to use Northern Sea Route to Pacific. (the former obviously requires pre-war planning)

Is the below what you are talking about, but dare not say? I’m taking Calbears quote to not get kicked to ASB land.

If it had been possible it would have been very helpful to the Nazi's, and not just because it would make the Battle of the Atlantic that much more difficult. A base on Iceland would have given the Germans a much more accurate view of the weather heading toward Europe (like the 36 hours window that allowed D-Day to occur). The Canadian Navy was on constant lookout for German weather ships in the Denmark Strait for this very reason.

Question is, COULD the Nazi's have done it? Based on the location & the logistics I doubt it. Very little hope of resupply by sea, too far out to get any aircraft in besides Condors. Might get there, but stay there? Not too likely. Sort of like the Japanese on Kiska & Attu.

This is the most off topic thread in a long time
 
These engineers argued that the fleet Hitler authorized , didn't help German, but a better fleet could have been built instead. They compared the 4 battleships built plus all five heavy cruisers , and showed that the exact same resources /ship yards & labour could have either produced 375 type VII U-Boats or 21 Deutschland PBS instead. This has been dismissed on internet forums , but ask your self. Who is more likely to understand what was possible or not, some naval engineer who were directly involved during the war [almost primary sources] or post modern armatures schooled in the WALLIE "victors history".
I would suggest what the engineers could have build technically from the resources is very different from what could have been built politically?
 
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