AHC: Improve Confederate Navy

Why don't you look it up? I never see YOU cite sources, I don't have to do the work for you particularly since this pretty much common knowledge. Look up Freedmen's Bureau, Northern Aid Society and American Missionary Association on Google and you can probably find others from there.

Also use common sense. The South was pretty much sacked during the war, the South has been whining about that for over a hundred years. Do you think the North was run by people so stupid they wanted to rule of an economic desert that would be dependent on Northern paid supplies just to survive?

The US government was eager (in fact overeager) to resume the cotton trade. That can't be done on burned down farms, twisted track and a half starved populace. The railroads had to be rebuilt, the port facilities had to be rebuilt, the Southern populace had to be fed for the US even to dream of re-exporting cotton. This takes money and the South had practically none. I can show you pictures of Richmond or Atlanta after the war, they look like post-war Berlin!
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Why don't you look it up? I never see YOU cite sources, I don't have to do the work for you particularly since this pretty much common knowledge. Look up Freedmen's Bureau, Northern Aid Society and American Missionary Association on Google and you can probably find others from there.
That's the point, though, you're saying it's common knowledge - but it's "common knowledge" that the British Army in the Victorian era was incompetent, and it clearly wasn't.

I've been citing specific examples of where naval PoDs (Mississippi and Louisiana, more commerce raiders drawing off more Union ships as per the OTL drawing off of ships) could make a big difference.

Here's a case of a Union vessel (Iroquois) attempting to break neutrality regulations to be informed of the departure of a Confederate on (Sumter):



"In the morning a French man-of-war arrived from Port Royal, the seat of government, only twelve miles distant. The Sumter had been there for the last two days. The Government, it is true, had refused to give her any of its coals, but had allowed her to come around to St. Pierre, where she readily obtained them from some merchants (English, I believe). " She evidently had been received with courtesy at the seat of Government, and this farce of the non-recognition of the Confederate flag is played out by both France and England in the most flagrant manner. " I now addressed a letter to the Governor, assuming him to be ignorant of the character of the Sumter, a copy of which I enclose, I also enclose a translation of his reply. The Department will observe that from the generous disposition of the Governor, the Sumter has the same privileges as this vessel. " The captain of the French war- steamer also addressed me a letter, saying he was directed by the Governor to request me no longer to compromise the neutrality of the French waters by establishing a blockade within their jurisdiction, but to anchor, when every hospitality and facility should be afforded me, or to take my position without the distance of a marine league from shore. At the same time, that, while under anchor weigh it was contrary to the police regulations of the port to communicate with the shore. " I consequently decided upon anchoring, which I had no sooner done than the French commander paid me a visit, offered me every civility and attention, saying that he did not doubt that all international law would be respected by me ; and in the course of conversation, quoting from Wheaton, reminded me that one belligerent could not depart until twenty-four hours after the other. I instantly got tinder weigh, with him on board, fearing that the Sumter should do so before me, as her steam was up. "I have now accepted the alternative, and established myself at the mouth of the harbour, without the marine league, with much anxiety lest during the darkness of the night, under cover of the high land, the Sumter should be able to get off without my being aware of it. " The majority of the town is in favour of the Sumter ; and with the utmost vigilance, which all on board exert, she may yet escape some night for want of signals from the shore to give us notice of her departure. " I am also in want of coal, and shall send over to St. Thomas to-morrow for a supply, as well as provisions, stores, &c., for when I leb I did not bargain for this blockade. 278 THE SUMTER AND IROQUOIS. XI. " The Sumter seems in good condition. The Consul informs me she has 120 men. She does not certainly appear to be in the dis- organized state in which late accounts have represented her. " She has latterly captured but two American vessels one the brig Joseph Parke, of Boston, on the 25th of September; the other the schooner Daniel Trowbridge, of New Haven, on the 27th of October. She has landed here fourteen prisoners on their parole. Three of the Joseph Parke's men (all foreigners) joined the Sumter. " I regret to give the Government so long and unsatisfactory a letter, but must avail myself of the opportunity for St. Thomas, which offers to-morrow. "I have, &c. (Signed) " JAMES S. PALMER, Commander. " To Hon. Gideon Welles, "Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C." "P.S. November 18. I feel more and more convinced that the Sumter will yet escape me, in spite of all our vigilance and zeal, even admitting that I can outsteam her, which is a question. " To blockade such a bay as this, which is almost an open roadstead, fifteen miles in width, the surrounding land very high and the water very bold, obliged, as we are by the neutrality laws, to blockade at three miles' distance, it would require at least two more fast steamers, and a vessel of war of any description in port to notify us by signal of her departure, to give any reasonable hope of preventing her escape. " Even now, moonlight though it be, she may yet creep out under shadow of the land, and no one be able to perceive her, she being always able to observe my position, open to .seawards. Though 1 have made arrangements to be informed by signal of her departure from shore, I fear I cannot depend upon the parties, so fearful are they of the authorities and of popular indignation. " I have done all I can, and if she escapes me, we must submit to the distress and mortification. " I believe we have no vessel on this station except the Macedonia, and there is no knowing when she may get up this way to learn our .situation. " I wish the Sumter were anywhere else except in this port, or under French protection. The authorities here, under plea of neutrality, are throwing every obstacle in my way, in the way of communicating with the shore. They are so full of punctilio, and withal so polished, that it is provoking to have anything to do with them."







Here, have a book:



https://archive.org/details/historicalaccoun00bernrich
 
That's the point, though, you're saying it's common knowledge - but it's "common knowledge" that the British Army in the Victorian era was incompetent, and it clearly wasn't.

I've been citing specific examples of where naval PoDs (Mississippi and Louisiana, more commerce raiders drawing off more Union ships as per the OTL drawing off of ships) could make a big difference.

Here's a case of a Union vessel (Iroquois) attempting to break neutrality regulations to be informed of the departure of a Confederate on (Sumter):



"In the morning a French man-of-war arrived from Port Royal, the seat of government, only twelve miles distant. The Sumter had been there for the last two days. The Government, it is true, had refused to give her any of its coals, but had allowed her to come around to St. Pierre, where she readily obtained them from some merchants (English, I believe). " She evidently had been received with courtesy at the seat of Government, and this farce of the non-recognition of the Confederate flag is played out by both France and England in the most flagrant manner. " I now addressed a letter to the Governor, assuming him to be ignorant of the character of the Sumter, a copy of which I enclose, I also enclose a translation of his reply. The Department will observe that from the generous disposition of the Governor, the Sumter has the same privileges as this vessel. " The captain of the French war- steamer also addressed me a letter, saying he was directed by the Governor to request me no longer to compromise the neutrality of the French waters by establishing a blockade within their jurisdiction, but to anchor, when every hospitality and facility should be afforded me, or to take my position without the distance of a marine league from shore. At the same time, that, while under anchor weigh it was contrary to the police regulations of the port to communicate with the shore. " I consequently decided upon anchoring, which I had no sooner done than the French commander paid me a visit, offered me every civility and attention, saying that he did not doubt that all international law would be respected by me ; and in the course of conversation, quoting from Wheaton, reminded me that one belligerent could not depart until twenty-four hours after the other. I instantly got tinder weigh, with him on board, fearing that the Sumter should do so before me, as her steam was up. "I have now accepted the alternative, and established myself at the mouth of the harbour, without the marine league, with much anxiety lest during the darkness of the night, under cover of the high land, the Sumter should be able to get off without my being aware of it. " The majority of the town is in favour of the Sumter ; and with the utmost vigilance, which all on board exert, she may yet escape some night for want of signals from the shore to give us notice of her departure. " I am also in want of coal, and shall send over to St. Thomas to-morrow for a supply, as well as provisions, stores, &c., for when I leb I did not bargain for this blockade. 278 THE SUMTER AND IROQUOIS. XI. " The Sumter seems in good condition. The Consul informs me she has 120 men. She does not certainly appear to be in the dis- organized state in which late accounts have represented her. " She has latterly captured but two American vessels one the brig Joseph Parke, of Boston, on the 25th of September; the other the schooner Daniel Trowbridge, of New Haven, on the 27th of October. She has landed here fourteen prisoners on their parole. Three of the Joseph Parke's men (all foreigners) joined the Sumter. " I regret to give the Government so long and unsatisfactory a letter, but must avail myself of the opportunity for St. Thomas, which offers to-morrow. "I have, &c. (Signed) " JAMES S. PALMER, Commander. " To Hon. Gideon Welles, "Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C." "P.S. November 18. I feel more and more convinced that the Sumter will yet escape me, in spite of all our vigilance and zeal, even admitting that I can outsteam her, which is a question. " To blockade such a bay as this, which is almost an open roadstead, fifteen miles in width, the surrounding land very high and the water very bold, obliged, as we are by the neutrality laws, to blockade at three miles' distance, it would require at least two more fast steamers, and a vessel of war of any description in port to notify us by signal of her departure, to give any reasonable hope of preventing her escape. " Even now, moonlight though it be, she may yet creep out under shadow of the land, and no one be able to perceive her, she being always able to observe my position, open to .seawards. Though 1 have made arrangements to be informed by signal of her departure from shore, I fear I cannot depend upon the parties, so fearful are they of the authorities and of popular indignation. " I have done all I can, and if she escapes me, we must submit to the distress and mortification. " I believe we have no vessel on this station except the Macedonia, and there is no knowing when she may get up this way to learn our .situation. " I wish the Sumter were anywhere else except in this port, or under French protection. The authorities here, under plea of neutrality, are throwing every obstacle in my way, in the way of communicating with the shore. They are so full of punctilio, and withal so polished, that it is provoking to have anything to do with them."







Here, have a book:



https://archive.org/details/historicalaccoun00bernrich

I never heard the British Army in the Victorian Era was incompetent. What I have heard was that there were better armies such as the Prussian. and probably the French and possibly a few others. Most people I know would put it in at least in the top five.

Saying it would be extremely difficult for it to beat a great power on its home turf from 3,000 miles away when said great power is entirely connected by railroads and has the third largest economy on the planet and fast closing to number 2 along with being one of the largest countries on the planet as in the ACW does not make it incompetent. By 1890 or so it would be taking on the world's largest economy on its home turf from 3000 miles away. 3,000 mile supply lines are a bitch.

So the ship escapes, big deal. If it were to become a real threat the US can buy its own ships from the UK and can pay CASH. Getting into a naval arms race with a richer power is stupid. Look at what it did to Germany in both World Wars.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I never heard the British Army in the Victorian Era was incompetent. What I have heard was that there were better armies such as the Prussian. and probably the French and possibly a few others. Most people I know would put it in at least in the top five.

Saying it would be extremely difficult for it to beat a great power on its home turf from 3,000 miles away when said great power is entirely connected by railroads and has the third largest economy on the planet and fast closing to number 2 as in the ACW does not make it incompetent. By 1890 or so it would be taking on the world's largest economy on its home turf from 3000 miles away. 3,000 mile supply lines are a bitch.
Er... why does three thousand miles make it impossible? Is it just that it means that supply ships have a one month round trip - when that means two dozen of them can supply:
1) The entire artillery corps of Great Britain to fire a hundred rounds a week in perpetuity.
2) An army of 100,000 with enough food and fodder to eat only British food and fodder.
3) Enough bullets for everyone to fire 1,200 rounds a year.


Especially when the third largest economy is still a third that of the British economy.


3,000 mile supply lines may be "a bitch", but if so she's a lady the British have experience dealing with - the Indian Mutiny was in India, as the name suggests, which is over 3,000 miles from home, and the British were sustaining a large army fighting a war at that distance.


Also - top five is underselling them. In the year 1860 the Prussian army was unable to shoot straight, the French were shock-tactic focused, the Austrians couldn't shoot straight either and the Russians had been beaten at the Crimea. There is a good case to be made that the British Army of 1860 was the world's best, with every man trained to use a rifle to the limits of its capabilities backed by an experienced long-service NCO corps, and every gun a rifled steel breech-loader capable of dropping shells into a nine foot target at a range of two miles. And, for once, the numbers to back that up - 220,000 regulars (100,000 of them home establishment) as well as a large corps of militia (better trained at shooting than US infantry of the Civil War, and with a fairly demanding drill schedule) and another separate large number of volunteer reserve.
In 1860 the British were a kind of amalgam of the best qualities of the Prussians of 1870 and the Boers of 1900 - an army of experienced, well-equipped snipers with the world's most modern artillery to back them up. The only thing they lack in the comparison is breech-loader rifles - but when equivalent weapons fight, accuracy wins. (The Prussians of 1870 and the Boers of 1900 both had similar class weapons to their opponents, but could shoot better.)

And the Union, by contrast, has nothing as a counterbalance but raw, untrained numbers. This is a way to, at best, win a victory indistinguishable from defeat.




Back to the topic.

I've given an example of where a Union ship was so closely pressing on what the French allowed that there's scope for a diplomatic incident - you seem to have completely missed this. The Union captain was specifically told not to have signals sent from the shore, but he arranges it anyway! That's an incident in the making.

There's also examples of the Union nearly having a battle with the Confederacy inside British territorial waters, say.
 
Er... why does three thousand miles make it impossible? Is it just that it means that supply ships have a one month round trip - when that means two dozen of them can supply:
1) The entire artillery corps of Great Britain to fire a hundred rounds a week in perpetuity.
2) An army of 100,000 with enough food and fodder to eat only British food and fodder.
3) Enough bullets for everyone to fire 1,200 rounds a year.


Especially when the third largest economy is still a third that of the British economy.


3,000 mile supply lines may be "a bitch", but if so she's a lady the British have experience dealing with - the Indian Mutiny was in India, as the name suggests, which is over 3,000 miles from home, and the British were sustaining a large army fighting a war at that distance.


Also - top five is underselling them. In the year 1860 the Prussian army was unable to shoot straight, the French were shock-tactic focused, the Austrians couldn't shoot straight either and the Russians had been beaten at the Crimea. There is a good case to be made that the British Army of 1860 was the world's best, with every man trained to use a rifle to the limits of its capabilities backed by an experienced long-service NCO corps, and every gun a rifled steel breech-loader capable of dropping shells into a nine foot target at a range of two miles. And, for once, the numbers to back that up - 220,000 regulars (100,000 of them home establishment) as well as a large corps of militia (better trained at shooting than US infantry of the Civil War, and with a fairly demanding drill schedule) and another separate large number of volunteer reserve.
In 1860 the British were a kind of amalgam of the best qualities of the Prussians of 1870 and the Boers of 1900 - an army of experienced, well-equipped snipers with the world's most modern artillery to back them up. The only thing they lack in the comparison is breech-loader rifles - but when equivalent weapons fight, accuracy wins. (The Prussians of 1870 and the Boers of 1900 both had similar class weapons to their opponents, but could shoot better.)

And the Union, by contrast, has nothing as a counterbalance but raw, untrained numbers. This is a way to, at best, win a victory indistinguishable from defeat.




Back to the topic.

I've given an example of where a Union ship was so closely pressing on what the French allowed that there's scope for a diplomatic incident - you seem to have completely missed this. The Union captain was specifically told not to have signals sent from the shore, but he arranges it anyway! That's an incident in the making.

There's also examples of the Union nearly having a battle with the Confederacy inside British territorial waters, say.

India was already far behind the US in technology. By that time India was NOT the US. It wasn't Prussia, it wasn't France and it wasn't England. I am not even sure it was as advanced as Russia. Fighting a backwards society that barely had rails is not the same as fighting a Great Power on its home turf when it is completely connected by rail.

Wars almost always take more supplies than on paper for a whole host of reasons. Europe did not win a single war in the Western Hemisphere against an independent country in the entire 19th century. France couldn't hold Mexico and you expect the UK to prevail against the US which was far tougher? The difference in power between the US and Mexico was far greater than any difference in land power between the UK and France.

A big reason it didn't result in a big diplomatic incident is, unlike you, the various European governments did not greatly underestimate the US. The cost would have far exceeded the benefits.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
India was already far behind the US in technology. By that time India was NOT the US. It wasn't Prussia, it wasn't France and it wasn't England. I am not even sure it was as advanced as Russia. Fighting a backwards society that barely had rails is not the same as fighting a Great Power on its home turf when it is completely connected by rail.

Wars almost always take more supplies than on paper for a whole host of reasons. Europe did not win a single war in the Western Hemisphere against an independent country in the entire 19th century. France couldn't hold Mexico and you expect the UK to prevail against the US which was far tougher? The difference in power between the US and Mexico was far greater than any difference in land power between the UK and France.

A big reason it didn't result in a big diplomatic incident is, unlike you, the various European governments did not greatly underestimate the US. The cost would have far exceeded the benefits.

Sorry, but I was trying to give an example of how the British could supply an army at long range, and I calculated out an example of how the British could dramatically oversupply any conceivable army with the shipping potential that they mobilized OTL for Trent.

The British can get the supplies to the Americas. I don't think that's in doubt, you'd have to give a countervailing reason why not. You'd also need to give a good reason why the British would use literally millions of shells in a war with the US - as well as over ten million bullets per month.
(At OTL British hit rates in combat, that would suffice to completely destroy the entire US male population - from babies on up - in about a year.)

Now, fighting the US...

...the problem the US has is basically that it's a long way below the curve militarily speaking. It learns fast in the ACW, but never really manages to work some things out (accuracy past a hundred or so yards remains the province of sharpshooters in the ACW, it's standard practice for Britain and to a lesser extent France).

The French intervention in Mexico was one that was lost largely because the French couldn't pin down the Mexican Republican army to destroy it - they managed to hold most of the territory. The Union is of course free to take to the hills and enact guerilla warfare, but that's not a way to win so much as it is to outlast.

As for how a war could blow up - well, Trent is the obvious one. European nations knew a war with the US would be expensive, but they were willing to avenge insult to their flag. It's national honour and essentially reputation - same reason the US nearly went to war over British ships boarding US ones off Cuba in 1858.
 
Sorry, but I was trying to give an example of how the British could supply an army at long range, and I calculated out an example of how the British could dramatically oversupply any conceivable army with the shipping potential that they mobilized OTL for Trent.

The British can get the supplies to the Americas. I don't think that's in doubt, you'd have to give a countervailing reason why not. You'd also need to give a good reason why the British would use literally millions of shells in a war with the US - as well as over ten million bullets per month.
(At OTL British hit rates in combat, that would suffice to completely destroy the entire US male population - from babies on up - in about a year.)

Now, fighting the US...

...the problem the US has is basically that it's a long way below the curve militarily speaking. It learns fast in the ACW, but never really manages to work some things out (accuracy past a hundred or so yards remains the province of sharpshooters in the ACW, it's standard practice for Britain and to a lesser extent France).

The French intervention in Mexico was one that was lost largely because the French couldn't pin down the Mexican Republican army to destroy it - they managed to hold most of the territory. The Union is of course free to take to the hills and enact guerilla warfare, but that's not a way to win so much as it is to outlast.

As for how a war could blow up - well, Trent is the obvious one. European nations knew a war with the US would be expensive, but they were willing to avenge insult to their flag. It's national honour and essentially reputation - same reason the US nearly went to war over British ships boarding US ones off Cuba in 1858.

And the US was and is far, far, far tougher than Mexico. The US is not Zanzibar! You can't send a regiment of Her Majesty's finest and win. 100,000 men is far too few to take and hold the US even in 1860! The British plan was to try and take Maine and hope they can hold it long enough to make peace, not marching in the heart of Great Power from three thousand miles away.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
And the US was and is far, far, far tougher than Mexico. The US is not Zanzibar! You can't send a regiment of Her Majesty's finest and win. 100,000 men is far too few to take and hold the US even in 1860! The British plan was to try and take Maine and hope they can hold it long enough to make peace, not marching in the heart of Great Power from three thousand miles away.
Do you know how big the US army was in 1860?


Once that's checked on...

...do you know that the British and French kicked China up and down the country several times in the 19th century?
China is by any measure a very large country, it's several times further away than the US, and it was armed with weapons not a million miles from what the US had in 1860. (Smoothbores, in the main). Nor were the Chinese static - they upgraded their weapons as the fighting went on, copying the weapons of their opponents (in this case, rifle-muskets). And yet, the Western force (British and French) marched into Beijing.


Remember, US citizens are no more able to naturally fight than Chinese peasants. The differences between the potential fighting ability of hurriedly-mobilized civilians all boil down to training structure and weapons... and the US does not have very good training structure, nor does it have a good source of sufficient numbers of domestic weapons.


In any case. It's interesting that "win" has suddenly been defined as "take and hold". No, the British can't "take and hold" the US, but that's not really necessary to win a victory - it's quite sufficient to destroy an army on the battlefield. (Once the pre-war regulars - who are not numerous in the slightest and whose artillery is much worse than the British, and who are in any case not trained to use their weapons with British-style proficiency - are taken out, it becomes the US attempting to swarm the British army under by sheer weight of barely trained numbers. Even if this works it will result in a hideous casualty count.) From there, reaching Washington is quite enough to secure a favourable peace.

(This is similar to how the US fought the Mexican-American War -most of the fighting there was done by the hard core of pre-war regulars.)



But - once again - that's getting off point.
You are appealing to "common knowledge" - hopefully I've shown that that's not necessarily sufficient.
 
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Farragut was Navy. His step-father was Navy. His step-brother was navy. All three heavily influenced each other in their unionism.

Thomas Drayton is army - for the CSA. and his brother seems to be navy - for the USA?

How exactly does this make Farragut go south?:confused:

It doesn't. Drayton is another example of a career Navy officer who went north despite heavy Southern ties.
 
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