AHC:Hitler starts WWII in 1939 with an alliance with Japan, and no deal with Stalin

raharris1973

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Although there were good circumstantial reasons of timing and other factors that made Japan unwilling to sign onto the alliance Hitler was seeking with them in 1939, it is important to note that Hitler did pursue such an alliance and some Japanese at points in 37, 38 and 39 favored it.

So how can we make it come to fruition?

Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe.
 
Justified or not, Hitler placed a lot of confidence in Japan's ability to distract his enemies, so if a deal were made, he probably would not offer an explicit non-aggression pact to the Soviets, or agree to Soviet territorial aggrandizement in Europe.

The army would tell him you are going to get Germany stuck in Poland and the Red Army and France are going to crush us from both sides when they are good and ready and if he doesn't listen to reason well his political support and level of coercion in society was not great enough yet to commit to a two front war against major powers with only a sea power half way around the world as an ally.

Frankly they would try to reason with him and then words would become guns and bombs.
 

raharris1973

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Until March 1939 Japan was in an informal war with Russia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet–Japanese_border_conflicts

That's a misperiodization and a mischaracterization in my opinion.

The peak Soviet-Japanese clash was in the spring-summer of 1939, after March 1939. Also, because of the breaks in between clashes each year, I think it's a bit much to call it all a single war. There were no incidents near the scale of Nomonhan-Khalkin-Gol after 1939, and the Soviets and Japanese agreed to their neutrality treaty in April, 1941, a bit later on.

The army would tell him you are going to get Germany stuck in Poland and the Red Army and France are going to crush us from both sides when they are good and ready and if he doesn't listen to reason well his political support and level of coercion in society was not great enough yet to commit to a two front war against major powers with only a sea power half way around the world as an ally.

Thing is, the Wehrmacht did not think the Soviets were any more capable than Hitler thought they were at this time. Replaying WWI in their heads, they all, Hitler and Wehrmacht, thought Russia wasn't that formidable but getting bogged down in France and Belgium was the real risk. This actually comported better with French, British and American and Soviet expectations than what actually happened in OTL.


Frankly they would try to reason with him and then words would become guns and bombs.

What a convenient thing for German military leaders to imply or state when talking to western interrogators after 1945!
 
Thing is, the Wehrmacht did not think the Soviets were any more capable than Hitler thought they were at this time. Replaying WWI in their heads, they all, Hitler and Wehrmacht, thought Russia wasn't that formidable but getting bogged down in France and Belgium was the real risk. This actually comported better with French, British and American and Soviet expectations than what actually happened in OTL.

Sorry but they would be plowing through Poland and then the Soviet Union while dealing with the French and British?

This war isn't going to 1945. Not even close. The Germans bog down deep in Eastern Poland or on the USSR border and its over and what more the generals would know it would end that way. They didn't underestimate the Soviet's as much as you think.

You lose a major war and your nation is screwed and you face a possible firing squad, hanging or dying in the war and the field generals do know that score.
 
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raharris1973

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A. Milman: But the question is interesting. Obviously, Stalin would not rush to help
Poland: there were no mutual defense agreement and Poland was an openly
hostile state. OTOH, would he risk to move into the Western Ukraine and
Belorussia? Why not unless the Germans were already moving there? Lithuania,
Latvia and Estonia are less clear cases but let's say that unless Hitler
explicitly declared them under his protection before or immediately after
invasion of Poland, how Soviet occupation could be prevented?

As an option, Hitler annexes the Baltic republics while Stalin stays neutral.
Quite obviously, after defeat of Poland the Brits and French
would be more than eager to offer almost anything to convince Stalin to join
anti-Hitler coalition.

How is your scenario going to develop after defeat of Poland? Is Hitler
acting pretty much like in OTL by turning to the West or is he moving
further East occupying ALL Poland (including Western Ukraine and Belorussia)
and then doing something to the Baltic republics before that?

The Germans, having the Italian and Japanese alliances in their pocket, at first have high confidence that Britain and France will refrain from actually declaring war on Germany over Poland.

As I said, the Germans are discounting Soviet potential and don't anticipate the Soviets cooperating with Poland. So Germany starts the fight in Poland in September or August 1939 assuming that Britain and France are bluffing or will be deterred.

After all, Hitler probably sees a Japanese alliance as an even a better deterrent to Britain than a Soviet nonaggression pact or alliance. Unlike the USSR, Japan has a blue water naval capability, and is in closer quarters with British forces and interests in China and Southeast Asia than the Soviets are to British territories and forces (neutral Turkey and Iran and Afghanistan are buffers between the USSR and British possessions).

Hitler strikes Poland in August or September 1939 and...

a) he's right, Britain (and France) do not declare war, fearing fighting on two or three fronts, or

b) he's wrong, Britain and France do declare war, but still fight it phony on land.

At that point, the Japanese (and Italians), have a choice to make, declare war on the British and French as implied in the alliance terms, or do not.

The estimation of Rome that Tokyo will get into the war, or the estimation by Tokyo that Rome will enter the war, each *could* encourage each other to enter the war at that point, since the amount of British and French naval force either one has to contend with is diminished by the involvement of the other.

Leaving aside Italy for a moment, if Japan declares war on Britain and France in the fall of 1939 as part of its alliance with Germany, it will likely capture British and French enclaves throughout China and then in Indochina (probably would not be invading Malaya and Singapore in the initial offensive). On the other hand, at least while the phony war goes on, the British and French will do *some* reinforcing of the Far East and aiding of China as part of anti-Japanese resistance. Maybe in a few months however, the Japanese campaign extends down to Malaya and Borneo [but not yet the Philippines or the DEI, because the USA and Netherlands are still neutrals, trading partners and only at the very beginning of any process of restricting trade.]

Japanese war on Britain and France in the Far East will have the knock-on effect of keeping Australian and Indian troops employed almost entirely in their local areas, and lead to correspondingly greater demands for South African, Canadian and British troops for battlefronts in Europe and later Africa and the Middle East.

-----alternatively, the Japanese could take a pass on immediate declaration of war on Britain and France as Italy did, only joining the assault in May 1940. [and if joining at that stage, the Netherlands are getting invaded, so it becomes logical for the Japanese to extend the fight to the DEI].


---Now the Soviet factor, which I have not dealt with. The very PoD possibly enabling the German-Japanese alliance in 1939 might be the lack of a big summer engagement with the Soviets in summer 1939 [in OTL the simultaneity of the Danzig crisis and Nomonhan was bad for German-Japanese cooperation]. Or, if the change is earlier, and internal to Japan, resulting in an alliance with Hitler by spring or summer 1939, in the context of diplomatic tension with Britain and France, Tokyo might have a tighter leash on the Kwangtung Army and a looser leash on the North China Army that was hassling the British at Tientsin as a result, perhaps resulting in the Japanese never seizing Mongolian territory, or them backing away earlier with an overall lesser scale of skirmishing with Mongolian or Soviet forces.

Or, confidence buoyed by the alliance with Germany, the Japanese could get into a battle as big as Nomonhan. They could react to their defeat as in OTL, by backing off, or, they could refuse to settle and try to prepare to do better in later rounds in the not too distant future, once they've reinforced Manchuria and the Germans have gotten to the Soviet border, possibly advocating a "Soviets-first" approach to the Germans.

In turn the Soviets could react to the emerging situations in a variety of ways. Alex for one is *not* assuming Soviet cooperation with Poland and the WAllies. In Europe, maybe the Soviets cross their western border or maybe they don't. If they do cross their border they either come to a meeting engagement with the Germans or achieve tactical deconfliction and de facto partition.

Europe is still the main show, so the Soviets reacting to Nomonhan by escalating beyond just squashing the offending Japanese trespassers to launch a full invasion of Manchuria is still low.

On the other hand, Stalin might think that a grab for Manchuria is at this point a perfect move against a Japan that is also tangling with China, France and Britain. He might think of the westerners as being more open to cooperation on the Far Eastern front than in Europe. Or, he might hold back in the Far East unless and until he gets terms he wants from Britain and France in Europe. At least as likely, even with developing dangers in Europe and the Far East, would be Stalin not crossing his borders and reinforcing them (and the borders of Mongolia) and preparing for all sorts of unpredictable contingencies without committing himself to anything [except perhaps invasions of Estonia and maybe Latvia].
 
Japan wouldn't consider an alliance with Hitler. Japan at that stage, only wanted a quick victory in China and it's resources, a war with the Soviet Union would have been seen as a waste. Japanese only occupied Indochina and later attacked Pearl Harbour to try and cut off Chinese supply lines and gain Allied resources respectively. Allying with Hitler would cause a war Japan is not ready for at least strategically.
 
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