Your challenge is to have the Entente win WW1. However the USA must remain Neutral and not get involved in this tl.
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AHC Have the Entente win WW1 without America
- Thread starter CanveyFanNumberOne
- Start date
Might want to rename this to, Have the Entente win WW1 without America.
Right now it sounds like a double blind AHC.
Right now it sounds like a double blind AHC.
The PODs are multiple and from a contemporary POV more probable than OTL.
Russia does better in 1914;
AH colapses in late 1916;
Ottoman empire stays neutral;
Salonika works;
etc
The Germans took the strategic risk they did because the dangers of fighting a war in two fronts against a coalition with better ressources and control of the seas were so great that they expected to loose rapidly if they went for a "safe" plan.
Russia does better in 1914;
AH colapses in late 1916;
Ottoman empire stays neutral;
Salonika works;
etc
The Germans took the strategic risk they did because the dangers of fighting a war in two fronts against a coalition with better ressources and control of the seas were so great that they expected to loose rapidly if they went for a "safe" plan.
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The obvious answer is the Russians don't mess up so catastrophically in East Prussia, and the Allies take advantage of the Marne more effectively to annihilate the German right wing. However, this always feels a bit like a cheat with Entente victory questions, as it makes winning what was very likely to be a long and bloody war a little too easy.
I personally prefer Entente victory's where lots of smaller changes add up to a decisive victory. Say for example RN sinks the Goeben, and thus despite vacillating, the Ottomans ultimately stay out (shortening the war by 2 years according to Ludendorff). Failing that the Entente don't waste resources on side theaters like Gallipoli and Salonika, and instead bring to bear the most pressure possible on the Western Front. Britain organises its empire for war earlier and more efficiently, meaning its munitions production is ramped up quicker. Either Nicholas II doesn't take overall charge of the Russian armies and so his incompetent wife isn't left in sole charge of the government with Rasputin, meaning the Russian war effort is slightly better organised. Or, failing that the Germans aren't as despicably cynical in foreign policy as they proved to be and so don't fund a Bolshevik coup in the country and the provisional government hangs on. Serbia invades Bulgaria when it has the chance to pre-emptively crush it, and so hangs on for longer, stretching the Austrians further. Maybe Haig becomes Commander in Chief earlier and bite and hold is also adopted sooner. The RN decisively wins at Jutland and so is able to deal with the U Boat threat more effectively.
All of these little changes can add up to an Entente victory in say Mid 1917 without US military assistance. However, if by your question you meant no US assistance at all (in other words no financial assistance), this really does have to be a short war. The nature of the Entente's exterior lines and the German strategic position inside French territory, meant they had to continually be on the offensive, and so naturally spend a lot more money than the Central Powers (and even then Germany ruined its economy). Without US money the Entente can't really fight a long war, at least not one in which they emerge financially sound to some degree.
I personally prefer Entente victory's where lots of smaller changes add up to a decisive victory. Say for example RN sinks the Goeben, and thus despite vacillating, the Ottomans ultimately stay out (shortening the war by 2 years according to Ludendorff). Failing that the Entente don't waste resources on side theaters like Gallipoli and Salonika, and instead bring to bear the most pressure possible on the Western Front. Britain organises its empire for war earlier and more efficiently, meaning its munitions production is ramped up quicker. Either Nicholas II doesn't take overall charge of the Russian armies and so his incompetent wife isn't left in sole charge of the government with Rasputin, meaning the Russian war effort is slightly better organised. Or, failing that the Germans aren't as despicably cynical in foreign policy as they proved to be and so don't fund a Bolshevik coup in the country and the provisional government hangs on. Serbia invades Bulgaria when it has the chance to pre-emptively crush it, and so hangs on for longer, stretching the Austrians further. Maybe Haig becomes Commander in Chief earlier and bite and hold is also adopted sooner. The RN decisively wins at Jutland and so is able to deal with the U Boat threat more effectively.
All of these little changes can add up to an Entente victory in say Mid 1917 without US military assistance. However, if by your question you meant no US assistance at all (in other words no financial assistance), this really does have to be a short war. The nature of the Entente's exterior lines and the German strategic position inside French territory, meant they had to continually be on the offensive, and so naturally spend a lot more money than the Central Powers (and even then Germany ruined its economy). Without US money the Entente can't really fight a long war, at least not one in which they emerge financially sound to some degree.
The Russians win (or do not lose) at the Battle of Tannenberg - and the Stalemate that follows coupled with the victory at the Battle of Galicia in the south does much to derail German plans obliging them to keep larger numbers than planned on the Eastern Front preventing them from reinforcing the Western Front as planned.
OTL the quite stunning German victory at Tannenburg and the subsequent one at Masurian lakes allowed the Germans to quite frankly 'get away' with what was a very risky 2 front strategy.
Failure to do so better allows the Entente strategy of drawing out the war and using the 3 Empires far greater resources to win - which is what happened but this time Russia is more likely to 'stay in'.
This places a far greater burden on the Austro Hungarian Empire and with the Germans less able to 'come to their aid' might very well suffer greater disasters in 1914 and 1915.
This in turn might very well have had the effect of the Ottoman Empire not joining the Entente in Oct 1914
And this in turn might very well draw in the Italians earlier than OTL May 1915
OTL the quite stunning German victory at Tannenburg and the subsequent one at Masurian lakes allowed the Germans to quite frankly 'get away' with what was a very risky 2 front strategy.
Failure to do so better allows the Entente strategy of drawing out the war and using the 3 Empires far greater resources to win - which is what happened but this time Russia is more likely to 'stay in'.
This places a far greater burden on the Austro Hungarian Empire and with the Germans less able to 'come to their aid' might very well suffer greater disasters in 1914 and 1915.
This in turn might very well have had the effect of the Ottoman Empire not joining the Entente in Oct 1914
And this in turn might very well draw in the Italians earlier than OTL May 1915
A more patient France.
While I have a better idea of the political realities now, when I was younger the War seemed a case of the Entente repeatedly slamming itself into a well fortified Germany.
But the basics remain. Once the Western Front is stabilised Germany has to commit something to win. Sure it would be politically nice for the French to win some dirt back, but not absolutely necessary.
Keep Russia alive. Run some mid sized experimental battles. And wait for the Germans to starve. But that is not politically acceptable.
While I have a better idea of the political realities now, when I was younger the War seemed a case of the Entente repeatedly slamming itself into a well fortified Germany.
But the basics remain. Once the Western Front is stabilised Germany has to commit something to win. Sure it would be politically nice for the French to win some dirt back, but not absolutely necessary.
Keep Russia alive. Run some mid sized experimental battles. And wait for the Germans to starve. But that is not politically acceptable.
How about when the Western Front stabilizes in the Autumn of 1914 it ends not at the English Channel but at Antwerp? That not only reduces the eventual U Boat threat but frees up a fair chunk of Northern France and Belgium.
Driftless
Donor
Alter French pre-war infantry tactics away from the repeated headlong assaults to reduce the tremendous numbers of early casualties? At the bare cynical level, that all-in assaults led to an excessive waste of manpower resources. At the operational level, it was an excessive waste of trained and motivated manpower, that was progressively harder to replace for multiple reasons. On a lower level of importance, replace the distinctive pre-war red and dark blue unis with olive drab or the horizon blue of 1915 on.
Without digging in more, in the opening swing east of Paris in 1914, wasn't there an increasing gap between German armies? Either have that gap get enlarged to the point of unsustainability, or have the OTL gap better exploited (though you'd need the forces at hand to be able to do that)
Without digging in more, in the opening swing east of Paris in 1914, wasn't there an increasing gap between German armies? Either have that gap get enlarged to the point of unsustainability, or have the OTL gap better exploited (though you'd need the forces at hand to be able to do that)
French 1st and 2nd Army failed attacks successfully baited the German 6th and 7th Armies to go into the offensive when they shouldn't.
French 5th Army fought a brilliant fighting retreat. against the German 1st, 2nd and 3rd armies.
The problem is that when French 3rd and 4th armies attacked what the French expected to be a weak spot on the German lines they hit head on a strong German attack by the German 4th and 5th armies.
The main French problem in 1914 was that the germans had more men, not just in the German right flank but pretty much all along the front. Better mobilization methods coupled with a more efficent use of your transport network and better peace time trainning for reservists give one hell of a headstart. The French had been discussing tactics, the Germans had been studying logistics.
Garrison
Donor
Well there is the story that the two Russian Generals at Tannenberg detested one another and before the war had come to blows on a railway platform, observed by a German Military officer, Max Hoffman. This, along with other factors, allegedly allowed Hoffman to conclude the two Russian armies would not co-ordinate and he informed Hindenburg accordingly. Of course after the war he said of the battle:
Implying that Hindenburg had little to do with the victory. A different Russian leadership, or the absence of Hoffman who, possibly apocryphal tales aside, was a superb staff officer who almost certainly did play a major role in the victory could see an outcome different enough to engender panic in Berlin.
David Flin
Gone Fishin'
Trivial. During the Race to the Sea in 1914, the BEF had the opportunity to get between the German First and Second Armies, and Joffre was keen for the BEF to advance into that very space. It never happened, but if it had, then there are the following effects:
1. The BEF takes heavy casualties holding the position as the German Second Army has to plough through them. While the BEF takes heavy casualties, the German 2nd (and later 3rd) armies take heavier casualties, having to carry out unprepared and unplanned assaults on defensive positions - and we all know how that generally works out in this period. "Shot flat" was, I believe, the phrase.
2. The German 1st Army is isolated. It has to deal with three French Armies while on the move and without support. If the German Army settle to fight a defensive battle, they lose the Race to the Sea, and the Entente gets Armies onto the German lines of supply and Good Night, German Armies. If the German Army continue to push to reach the sea, it's an open encounter at roughly 3:1 odds in the French favour. Good Night, German 1st Army, and Hello, French Armies behind the German lines.
3. If that happens, it's all over by Christmas.
1. Russian steamroller.
2. Decisive Anglo-French victory in the western campaigns of 1914, including the destruction of at least one German army. The Germans didn't knock France out of the war as in 1940, but they wound up in a good defensive position and holding a lot of coal and iron ore mines. If they lose decisively there is a good chance they will throw in the towel early.
2. Decisive Anglo-French victory in the western campaigns of 1914, including the destruction of at least one German army. The Germans didn't knock France out of the war as in 1940, but they wound up in a good defensive position and holding a lot of coal and iron ore mines. If they lose decisively there is a good chance they will throw in the towel early.
What is the extent of American neutrality? Do we just mean no direct military involvement, or is it to the point of the U.S. government trying to restrict American banks, merchants, investors and the like involving themselves with loans and sales contracts with the Entente states? Censorship of pro-entente newspapers?
That depends on how badly the CP is defeated, and how well the Entente is doing at home (part of the peace deal was down to looming elections and a citizenry tired of war).
Germany is losing most, if not all, of its colonies. France is definitely getting Alsace-Lorraine. Japan is probably keeping everything it takes.
Russia will probably get Galicia-Lodomeria, and border modifications in eastern Germany. If the Germans don't run roughshod over western Russia, there won't be an independent Poland to give a Polish corridor to.
The fate of Austria-Hungary would IMO be similar to OTL if it collapses.
I believe it was Plumer, not Haig, who was the advocate of "Bite and Hold". The seeming success of this strategy was based on lowered expectations of what defined success. Haig had intended to conquer the Belgian coast. How far expectations had fallen by September 1917,, when these "bite and hold" operations took place, is shown by the fact that three advances which advanced the front by one mile at the cost of fifty thousand men were lionised as great triumphs. German defensive tactics quickly adapted, as subsequent attacks in late October and November failed, despite the heroic efforts of the British Empire forces. It is hard to envisage a scenario where the German front breaks without American intervention, as it was this that cracked German morale, and enabled the victorious advance of late 1918. The French were more successful up to this point, generally due to the fact that Petain was very careful as to the location and scope of his offensive efforts, as shown at Malmaison.
Coulsdon Eagle
Monthly Donor
It was Rawlinson, whose original plan for the Somme in 1916 was a series of bite-&-hold asaults. Haig wanted a breakthrough battle, so - as usual - they adopted a very British compromise and instead of starting a new plan of attack, meddled with the original. Notably the attacks after 1st July were more bite-&=hold.
Plumer could manage bite-&-hold at Messines. It was Gough who really mishandled it at Third Ypres.
German casualties at the Somme were mostly due to their then tactic of immediate counter-attack. The concept of elastic defence grew out of the muddy grave of the German field army.
The US Army, which did not have a direct major effect on the battlefield, gave the Allies the backing of a huge army in place for late 1918, early 1919, so they knew they would eventually win, which kept them going through the German advances in the first half of 1918, and effectively forced the Germans to undertake the costly offensives before they were buried under the huge wave of American troops.
I agree that, without the Americans, the strategic situation for 1918 looks completely different. Germany could risk a "Peace Offensive" in 1918 with the knowledge that Allied reserves were reduced, or perhaps consider remaining on the defensive and look for a peace borne out of mutual exhaustion. The French did have plans for large number of colonial soldiers from their Empire in West Africa, but I wonder if - like the often mooted huge Indian Army - it would turn out to be more wishful thinking than substance. The French (& British) also hoped to win the war in 1919 on the backs of the Americans.
