From
The Climate of Rebellion in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, a widely acclaimed monograph that finds the causes of the Ottomans' loss of their sixteenth-century position as Europe's single greatest power in the Little Ice Age:

Over a period of months or years the disasters of the Little Ice Age would have had a synergistic nature, with problems of flight, famine, and unrest driving a downward spiral of mortality. Examined over a period of decades or generations, we can imagine the change in demographic momentum as a shift from a virtuous circle of security and settlement to a vicious cycle of insecurity and flight. Throughout the long crisis and its aftermath, therefore, the Ottoman Empire revealed some of the same environmental vulnerabilities as its ancient and medieval predecessors in the Near East. Agriculture remained highly sensitive to climatic fluctuations, as did the delicate balance between the desert and sown. The region continued to feel the ravages of epidemic diseases more than perhaps any other part of the world, exacerbated by unusually high rates of urbanization.
These developments stand in contrast to ecological trends in most of the early modern world, which one environmental historian has characterized as an “unending frontier” of new resources. In China, the destructive transition from the Ming to the Qing may have wiped out a third of the population, but it represented only a temporary setback in a long-term trend of agricultural intensification, frontier expansion, and demographic growth. Although’s Russia’s “Time of Troubles” resembled the Celali Rebellion with its scenes of violence, flight, and famine, it barely slowed the empire’s ecological momentum, as it conquered the vast Eurasian steppe, and its population multiplied several times over in the following two centuries......
Therefore, the slow pace of Ottoman recovery stands out even more from a global perspective. By the mid-nineteenth century, at which point Ottoman lands had only just attained levels of the 1580s [Ottoman populations did not recover from the Little Ice Age for almost three centuries!], populations across Europe and Asia had doubled and in some cases redoubled: Continental Europe grew by around 135 percent, and English population rose roughly fourfold. Even Germany, devastated by the Thirty Years War, had more than recovered its population by the mid-eighteenth century and more than doubled its numbers by the mid-nineteenth. Whereas once the number of the Ottoman Empire’s subjects had placed it in the class of major world empires, by 1850 it probably held fewer people than France or Japan and could no longer even compare with countries such as China, now more than ten times its size. Significant in themselves, these comparisons underscore the powerful role of ecological factors in shaping the fate of the empire by the early 1800s.
If the Ottomans had recovered from the Little Ice Age as well as Qing China did (tripling the pre-LIA population), the Empire in 1850 would have had
100,000,000 people, making it the single most populous power this side of China and the Marathas and by far outstripping Russia and France in the amount of human resources it controlled.
Instead the 1850 population was around 35,000,000, almost exactly the same as the population under Suleyman the Magnificent.