AHC: Have Appeasement be seen as good policy Post-1938

No, my contention is that appeasement was meant to avoid a war with Germany as its primary goal. Rearmament happening or not happening is irrelevant. The motivation for appeasement was seperate and independent of appeasement.

Why would they be separate, it would seem obvious that there is a huge overlap? You do both but the outcomes of either have an impact on cost/benefit of the other. In fact as per the buying time point the former helps the latter. This is kind of the same point about Chamberlain having to be such a political moron as to to never have got to where he was in the first place.


No. It means that war is possible, and maintaining a military to fight it is necessary.

So its like the two different possibilites of war / not-war could be entertained at once and maybe concurrent policies might take that into account?

Oppose Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland.

Already answered, you are going to attack or otherwise oppose a country for stationing troops on its own land? How likely do you think it would be to politically pull that off let along practically. Especially as it would involve getting at least France on board. The problem here is what looks reasonable 1919 at versaille realsy doesn't in 1935+. So to ask the question again do you really think that Germany was never ever going to have a military larger than what was stipulated by the ToV or that it would never be able to station troops where it liked on its own land? Or more importantly that anyone ever was going to fight a war with them over it.


Fight Germany when that nation was drastically unprepared over Czechoslovakia. Actually act like they are at war with Germany after war was declared rather than leaving Poland completely out to dry.


OK so practicalities time how does the UK actually physically attack Germany in 1938*, let alone fight against the German army invading Czechoslovakia, (and how does it do so in Poland, a few hundred miles further east). To be frank the UK "hanging Poland out to dry" whan Poland had been invaded by both Germany and then the USSR in a space of weeks, what exactly do you think the UK could have been down to reverse that?


*about the best we can do is try to blockade the Northern coast with the RN.
 
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Why would they be separate, it would be obvious that there is huge overlap? This is kind of the same point about Chamberlain having to be such a political moron as to to never have got to where he was in the first place.
Because something being "obvious" is not evidence. British statements of the time point to their motivation. If you want to try to claim something different then there needs to be evidence beyond "well of course they did".

Already answered, you are going to attack or otherwise oppose a country for stationing troops on its own land? How likely do you think it would be to politically pull that off let along practically. Especially as it would involve getting at least France on board. The problem here is what looks reasonable 1919 at versaille realsy doesn't in 1935+. So to ask the question again do you really think that Germany was never ever going to have a military larger than what was stipulated by the ToV or that it would never be able to station troops where it liked on its own land? Or more importantly that anyone ever was going to fight a war with them over it.

Irrelevant. You asked what they could do, and that is a key point. Germany stationing troops in the Rhineland is against the Treaty Germany is still supposed to be under, and they've already been breaking so many other terms of peace that Germany has in effect already declared war, they just aren't actually attacking yet.

OK so practicalities time how does the UK actually physically attack Germany in 1938*, (how does it does it do so in Poland). To be frank the UK "hanging Poland out to dry" whan Poland had been invaded by both German and then the USSR in a space of weeks, what exactly do you think the UK could have been down to reverse that?
Oh please. There were months between the outbreak of war and the invasion of France. During this time the UK's big military action amounted to planning an invasion of Norway, which at the time was neutral. Germany had dedicated the VAST majority of their military to Poland, and the Allies did virtually NOTHING. They just let the Germans have their way for months and months.
 
The French designed the Versailles Treaty to permanently weaken Germany, however various provisions needed to be enforced. When the French lost the taste for enforcement, the smart thing would have been to renegotiate the treaty. By keeping intact on paper, and failing to deal with remilitarizing the Rhineland, rearmament etc they sent the message that the Germans could simply scrap the whole thing unilaterally. It then becomes a version of "give an inch they take a mile". While I understand the idea of 20-20 hindsight, the reality that the German military in 1936-38 was not what it was in 1939-40 not being understood by the UK and France is either a case of willful avoidance of the facts presented to leaders, or an incredible failing of the intelligence services of the UK and France and Czechoslovakia and Poland. While France and the UK did begin to put more money in to rearmament in the late 1930s, much of that was making up for the lack of funding for the previous 15 years, and there was very little urgency about it until very close to the actual war.
 
Because something being "obvious" is not evidence. British statements of the time point to their motivation. If you want to try to claim something different then there needs to be evidence beyond "well of course they did".

1). I was being polite it's more so obvious to the point that you need to provide a huge amount of evidence to back up your assertion. (you didn't actually address the why it so obvious). The thing is your assertion is basically UK foreign policy and it's defence policy were entirely separate things that had no overlap on each other. This has to be blunt never been true, it not been true for anyone ever I don't think!

2). As pointed out earlier there was plenty of evidence from papers that they thought war was coming. But again see the context of the time and how "war mongering" would have gone down.



Irrelevant. You asked what they could do, and that is a key point. Germany stationing troops in the Rhineland is against the Treaty Germany is still supposed to be under, and they've already been breaking so many other terms of peace that Germany has in effect already declared war, they just aren't actually attacking yet.


I asked what they could in the context of the time, but you don't address that point. Yes they're breaking the treaty but I already addressed that. The problem I think is you are attaching an unspoken "and thus WW2 happened" to every time Germany does a thing and isn't instantly stamped on. Yes you are technically right, but it's not very realistic way to assess what happened and how it happened.

Oh please. There were months between the outbreak of war and the invasion of France. During this time the UK's big military action amounted to planning an invasion of Norway, which at the time was neutral. Germany had dedicated the VAST majority of their military to Poland, and the Allies did virtually NOTHING. They just let the Germans have their way for months and months.

Go on then what is your military plan for the UK jumping in and defending Poland from Germany and the USSR?

If your thinking oh just invade germany nice and quick it will all be over by Christmas your forgetting that a lot of the people involved had already thought or been told that once and suffered for it what it was shown not to be the case. Your also kind of doing the whole perfect knowledge of military forces thing as well as assuming country's mobilise instantly.
 
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1). I was being polite it's more so obvious to the point that you need to provide a huge amount of evidence to back up your assertion. (you didn't actually address the why it so obvious). The thing is your assertion is basically UK foreign policy and it's defence policy were entirely separate things that had no overlap on each other. This has to be blunt never been true, it not been true for anyone ever I don't think!
Your essential argument has been this entire time that the statements and historical consensus is incorrect because it is obvious its incorrect. Select a given source on appeasement, and the desire to avoid war is more or less always given as the primary motivator, while buying time is not mentioned. Its on you to demonstrate that this thought process is incorrect. You mention papers, okay. Bring up one with Chamberlain, or any other advocate of appeasement using buying time as the motivation for appeasement.

I asked what they could in the context of the time, but you don't address that point. Yes they're breaking the treaty but I already addressed that. The problem I think is you are attaching an unspoken "and thus WW2 happened" to every time Germany does a thing and isn't instantly stamped on. Yes you are technically right, but it's not very realistic way to assess what happened and how it happened.

That IS the way things happened. The British and French let Germany do whatever the fuck it wanted for six years, and because of that World War II happened. Yes they eventually took action, but not before they had allowed Hitler to run roughshod over Central Europe, and ultimately make Germany prepared for a war it wouldn't have been able to fight even a year or two before. Sure they didn't have perfect information, but it doesn't matter. Even the information at the time showed Germany wasn't prepared for war. Yes Britain (and France) weren't either, but they were better prepared than Germany.
 
The French designed the Versailles Treaty to permanently weaken Germany, however various provisions needed to be enforced. When the French lost the taste for enforcement, the smart thing would have been to renegotiate the treaty. By keeping intact on paper, and failing to deal with remilitarizing the Rhineland, rearmament etc they sent the message that the Germans could simply scrap the whole thing unilaterally. It then becomes a version of "give an inch they take a mile".


This is true, but the problem with renegotiation is how do you make it stick, France losing its taste for enforcement of the ToV also means losing it's taste for enforcing a renegotiation as well. Thing is Germany's early moves are seen by many as reasonable defacto renegotiation of the ToV anyway!


While I understand the idea of 20-20 hindsight, the reality that the German military in 1936-38 was not what it was in 1939-40 not being understood by the UK and France is either a case of willful avoidance of the facts presented to leaders, or an incredible failing of the intelligence services of the UK and France and Czechoslovakia and Poland.

This comes up but,

1). it's kind of based on hindsight, there was lots of reports going around at the time, such things are hardly ever 100% Ironclad, and with the shadow of WW1 still fresh in the mind it's a big risk of going through that again. Plus you have other players, Italy, USSR etc. With the report we tend to hone in on the ones we know now to be true and say wait why didn't no one act on this. When quite often there was nothing really at the time to show those ones were 100% demonstrably true and the ones that we know now not to have been true was 100% demonstrably false.

2). German Military forces might not have been at 1939-40 levels in 36-38 but well nether was France's or Britain's. The problem Britain has it's not a big standing army continental invasion kind of power. You want a nice navy blockade? No problem but they don't work just be themselves. France on paper is a big standing army continental invasion kind of power, but to be frank France is a mess for large chunks of the interwar period, and even leaving aside that it's still carrying the shadow of WW1 and is going to need a massively good reason to go and invade Germany and risk that again. It's just put its resources into fortresses, an expenditure it politically sold to itself on the basis that it wasn't going to go invading and opposing armies would break themselves on stone and not french corpses.

3). the Czech one is interneting one, it's a common thing to look at the Czech and German forces on paper and those lovely mountain passes and fortifications and say wow why didn't the Czechs fight, give the Germans a bloody nose and WW2 averted? Only they weren't seeing a lot of commitment to fight from anyone else and frankly not many else see good enough reason to fight (and well the sudetenland is a tricky one anyway as per the ToV).



While France and the UK did begin to put more money in to rearmament in the late 1930s, much of that was making up for the lack of funding for the previous 15 years, and there was very little urgency about it until very close to the actual war.

That's true, but well politically there's no way we're upping Military spending in late 20's early 30's, and frankly the threat of Hitler et al isn't present to incite doing so. Also very few people were heavily spending on defence earlier (including Germany, Hitler and co where not making rearmement decisions until 33/34)
 
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Your essential argument has been this entire time that the statements and historical consensus is incorrect because it is obvious its incorrect.

No I made my points, howover on the obvious point when it is that obvious it kind of you to prove overwise. So once again please can you provide proof that the UK's defence policy (its ability to express military force) and it's foreign policy (when and where it might express military force) were in no way overlapping.


Select a given source on appeasement, and the desire to avoid war is more or less always given as the primary motivator, while buying time is not mentioned. Its on you to demonstrate that this thought process is incorrect. You mention papers, okay. Bring up one with Chamberlain, or any other advocate of appeasement using buying time as the motivation for appeasement.

See Ian_W's post. The thing is you seem to think an a prior desire to avoid war somehow vadiates your argument. But it doesnt of course there was a desire to avoid war (hell even hitler didn't what war with the UK) but it's rare we get what we want especially in foreign policy


That IS the way things happened. The British and French let Germany do whatever the fuck it wanted for six years, and because of that World War II happened. Yes they eventually took action, but not before they had allowed Hitler to run roughshod over Central Europe, and ultimately make Germany prepared for a war it wouldn't have been able to fight even a year or two before. Sure they didn't have perfect information, but it doesn't matter. Even the information at the time showed Germany wasn't prepared for war. Yes Britain (and France) weren't either, but they were better prepared than Germany.

Ok you have not addressed my points, you've not shown how practically what you think should have been done, and you lead with a point that is pretty much based on hindsight.

and as i said initially this is kind of the whole thing in a nutshell

"wouldn't it have been nice if WW2 had been prevented at some point prior to it kicking off"

is not the same as

"the allies in 1930-39 acting in the context of that time failed to stop WW2, they hung Poland out to dry, etc, etc"
 
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France and Britain in the 1930's were democratic governments bound by the will of their people. After the slaughter and losses of the Great War their was no political will among the Majority of either the populace of France or Britain for a further conflict less than 20 years after the end of the "War to End all Wars".
Historically just look at how Churchill and the few others who stood up and were counted were treated for warning of the consequences of the unfettered rise of Nazi Germany, they were basically politically isolated and reviled.
Britain could not act in Isolation and France was not prepared to invade Germany at any time and suffer the casualties of an offensive war. therefore to deride the UK for not taking offensive action in 1939 is banging a hollow drum. Holland and Belgium were neutral and unless France attacked there was no possibility of a land offensive.
It is so easy for us armchair historians to deride the decisions made more than three quarters of a century ago. Without full considerations of the restraints and political realities placed upon the makers of those decisions our critique is simply a naïve accusation no different to that made in the polemic book "Guilty Men" by Cato in 1940.
Appeasement became the belt to re-armaments braces, whilst one or other might hold up your trousers using both is surer, unfortunately both France and Britain had been caught with their trousers down in 1933/34. So with the state of re-armament in Britain and France and the perceived state of preparedness for war both materially and politically by Nazi Germany as a totalitarian state the options for the British Government were severely limited.
 
No I made my points, howover on the obvious point when it is that obvious it kind of you to prove overwise. So once again please can you provide proof that the UK's defence policy (its ability to express military force) and it's foreign policy (when and where it might express military force) were in no way overlapping.

See Ian_W's post. The thing is you seem to think an a prior desire to avoid war somehow vadiates your argument. But it doesnt of course there was a desire to avoid war (hell even hitler didn't what war with the UK) but it's rare we get what we want especially in foreign policy

As I said, the historical consensus on appeasement is that it was to avoid war, NOT to buy time. That's why I wanted something, anything, from the lead proponents of appeasement showing this to be true. If it was to buy time as originally claimed then surely you can provide just one quote from Chamberlain supporting that. I'm not going to provide proof that defense policy and foreign policy were in no way overlapping, because I have never claimed it. You tried to claim that I have so that you don't have to show what I've asked for, that is to say the idea that "The point of appeasement was to buy time for Britain and France to rearm." This is not supported by the historical record.

Ok you have not addressed my points, you've not shown how practically what you think should have been done, and you lead with a point that is pretty much based on hindsight.

People and policies are judged on their consequences as much as, or more than, the intent behind them. Historically it has been shown that appeasement does not work. Well before WWII this was shown. When you give into an aggressor, a bully, etc. all you do is incentivize them to push for more. Hitler's behavior throughout the mid-1930s showed this clearly. Every time Britain and France gave ground he pressed for more. Yes they didn't know how horrible WWII would be, but everything pointed to the reality that appeasement would not work, as indeed it didn't. Yes it would have been politically difficult, but the point of representative government is that the representatives give their constituents the aid of judgement as well as represent them. Yes it would have been hard, maybe even ended the careers of everyone involved. BUT if someone wants to serve the public interest then they should be prepared to do that if the action is the right thing to do. Public servants have a responsibility to serve the public, and they betray that responsibility if they sacrifice good judgement simply to continue their careers.
 
Putting it tritely appeasement in the 1930's of Nazi Germany could be seen as doing the 'wrong thing for the right reasons'. It is worth remembering that in 1938 when Chamberlain returned from Munich he received a heroes welcome by the British public and was lauded for his efforts by governments world wide. Context in history can at times be very important in interoperating and understand the facts and sometimes explains the inexplicable!
 
Appeasement as a policy failed to prevent WWII but let's not forget that Nazi success in WWII was rather unlikely. It's easy to imagine a scenario where the Battle of France turns into a complete fiasco for the Germans and as a result the Reich collapse much sooner as the generals turn on Hitler and Stalin abrogates the non-aggression pact when he realizes Hitler is going to lose.

If that happens appeasement wouldn't be viewed as negatively as it is today since a rapid collapse of the Third Reich butterflies away the Final Solution and makes WWII a less bloody affair compared to WWI.
 
As I said, the historical consensus on appeasement is that it was to avoid war, NOT to buy time. That's why I wanted something, anything, from the lead proponents of appeasement showing this to be true. If it was to buy time as originally claimed then surely you can provide just one quote from Chamberlain supporting that. I'm not going to provide proof that defense policy and foreign policy were in no way overlapping, because I have never claimed it. You tried to claim that I have so that you don't have to show what I've asked for, that is to say the idea that "The point of appeasement was to buy time for Britain and France to rearm." This is not supported by the historical record.

you said (and i quote):
No, my contention is that appeasement was meant to avoid a war with Germany as its primary goal. Rearmament happening or not happening is irrelevant. The motivation for appeasement was seperate and independent of appeasement.....
sounds like your claiming they weren't overlapping to me

as to cites again check Ian_W's post

Also no the political consensus is not what you claimed, it's changed over time, this partly what started the thread.



People and policies are judged on their consequences as much as, or more than, the intent behind them.

Right only consequences are inherently judged on hindsight, whereas decisions don't have the luxury of that, so basically see earlier posts.


Historically it has been shown that appeasement does not work. Well before WWII this was shown. When you give into an aggressor, a bully, etc. all you do is incentivize them to push for more. Hitler's behavior throughout the mid-1930s showed this clearly. Every time Britain and France gave ground he pressed for more. Yes they didn't know how horrible WWII would be, but everything pointed to the reality that appeasement would not work, as indeed it didn't.

this is kind of a circular argument yes of course all examples of someone who kept taking more until stopped by force, are examples of people who kept taking more until stopped by force. But international politics has plenty of examples of people making demands and them being met without ending up in world war and genocide (especially when there's a sympathy towards a rebalancing of now seen prior imbalance). Hell that's what foreign policy is in general, countries working towards their own desires, all the time. And yet were not in a contact state of war or genocide. Don't give in to bullies they only get stronger is that kind of pat context-less thing we stay to ourselves, but it kind og ignores the reality of the situation. The problem is there is no sure fire way to tell the difference between the two at the time! (not to mention that sometime there are few other viable alternatives at each point, and viable ones take time to come into play)

Which is why the inexorable road to WW2 is a bad concept because that series of stepping stones that led to WW2 is only clear once you have WW2. The a-priori appeal of why didn't we stop Hitler before WW2, also ignores the point that WW2 is how we stopped hitler.


Yes it would have been politically difficult, but the point of representative government is that the representatives give their constituents the aid of judgement as well as represent them. Yes it would have been hard, maybe even ended the careers of everyone involved. BUT if someone wants to serve the public interest then they should be prepared to do that if the action is the right thing to do. Public servants have a responsibility to serve the public, and they betray that responsibility if they sacrifice good judgement simply to continue their careers.

Only what's the right thing to do? Stop a six year long war with a 60m death toll and the final solution yeah of course, that's pretty much worth any sacrifice. But again that is not the situation being presented to people when they were making decisions*. Also you are wrong politicians whose careers are ended or who campaign on unpopular platforms don't get to enact policy.

But go one once again please tell me how the UK is going to drop into Czechoslovakia or Poland (or even invade Germany and overthrow the nazis)? Well unless you are going to go with the kind of PoD like we should at all times maintain enough military advantage over Germany in order to physically invade Germany and overthrow a potentially world war starting German dictator.



*so to put it another way, asking some average British person in the 30's do you fancy going to war with Germany again? I'm guessing their answer might be a bit different depending on the reason given
 
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Appeasement as a policy failed to prevent WWII but let's not forget that Nazi success in WWII was rather unlikely. It's easy to imagine a scenario where the Battle of France turns into a complete fiasco for the Germans and as a result the Reich collapse much sooner as the generals turn on Hitler and Stalin abrogates the non-aggression pact when he realizes Hitler is going to lose.

If that happens appeasement wouldn't be viewed as negatively as it is today since a rapid collapse of the Third Reich butterflies away the Final Solution and makes WWII a less bloody affair compared to WWI.

Yep good point!
 

Ian_W

Banned
As I said, the historical consensus on appeasement is that it was to avoid war, NOT to buy time. That's why I wanted something, anything, from the lead proponents of appeasement showing this to be true. If it was to buy time as originally claimed then surely you can provide just one quote from Chamberlain supporting that. I'm not going to provide proof that defense policy and foreign policy were in no way overlapping, because I have never claimed it. You tried to claim that I have so that you don't have to show what I've asked for, that is to say the idea that "The point of appeasement was to buy time for Britain and France to rearm." This is not supported by the historical record.
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I not only quoted, but also linked, the UK Cabinet documents from 1935-1939 that shows you are wrong.

The other thing you're avoiding is the toxic role of Poland in the 1938 crisis, which was far more interested in grabbing it's share of Czechoslovakia than in supporting France against Germany.
 
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