I'll hypothesise a use scenario.
By 1939 minor changes in the German racial construction of "German" and "Inhuman" lead to a view that Slavs are not fully fit for labour, and are closer to "life-unworthy-of-life" than they are to a useful slave class. The 1941 plan still proceeds with the expectation of limited armies of agricultural slaves in the occupied areas, but more emphasis is placed on the total elimination of Slavs behind the expected 1941 stop line (Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov). Extending from "by starvation" to "by starvation and other means as appropriate."
In 1941 the use of Nerve Gas is suggested to
*Test equipment readiness, doctrine, and combat capacity of gas warfare units
*Reduce the excess population of Soviet POWs
While the first makes sense in any condition, the second requires more explanation. IOTL Soviet POWs were systematically starved and reduced by disease. Some were sent to death camps. Many were death marched. It should be a small step, if such a large mass of able-bodied military age men exist, and if they're considered as life-unworthy-of-life rather than as potential slave labour (despite "acceptable losses"), to test gas weapons on them in the large open air holding camps.
Some of the conditions required for use are met, a war between a Western power and a "racially inferior other;" no operational friction caused by limiting advance or manoeuvre; and, an expectation of disproportionate capacity such that OPFOR is not expected to be able to significantly respond in kind.
In late 1941 gas warfare becomes a standard part of "anti-partisan" operations, including the clearing of areas of Slavs and Jews as part of the ongoing genocide in the East.
This ramifies as nerve gassing is viewed as a supplemental ghetto clearing option. By 1943 most Police Battalions are well versed in gas warfare. This is incidentally when the now "gas friendly" genocidal portions of the German state force gas as part of defensive operations.
Prior to late 1943, gas had not been considered for use against Soviet forces in the field. Soviet doctrine, while well aware by mid 1942 of the systematic genocide of Soviet POWs, has used this to play the pity card internationally; and for normal military reasons has restricted its own use of gas warfare to heightened preparations, and preparation for retaliation.
So, in late 1943 on the defensive, the Police Battalions, the "Dad's Army" of the Reich, start using gas in defensive operations. The military effectiveness of this action is extremely limited after the first use; but, it creates a sticky slow operational situation in the East. Soviet retaliation is limited and judicious, bearing in mind that the major requirement is to force Germans to be gas prepared also; rather than viewing Gas as achieving anything significant.
Use rapidly spreads at this point to anti-partisan operations in Greece and Yugoslavia where the racial opinion of partisans, and the brutality of partisan warfare, are similar to the East.
The rest kind of writes itself; though, I doubt that the Soviet Union will attempt to reduce Koenigsberg, Budapest or Berlin by gas. It will certainly give more "justification" in the impetus to the revenge and power in the second line Soviet troops' actions towards women in occupied Poland and Germany.
I doubt it will significantly change the long-term Soviet occupation strategy of selective and limited trials. In the longer term social-democrats, and "national" communists are also threats to maintaining Stalinist, pro-Moscow rule.
This might change the tenor of the West's involvement in the show-trials. The rediscovery of the role of Police Battalions in the Holocaust is unlikely to happen, the connection with a gas centred narrative will be fairly clear.
yours,
Sam R.
By 1939 minor changes in the German racial construction of "German" and "Inhuman" lead to a view that Slavs are not fully fit for labour, and are closer to "life-unworthy-of-life" than they are to a useful slave class. The 1941 plan still proceeds with the expectation of limited armies of agricultural slaves in the occupied areas, but more emphasis is placed on the total elimination of Slavs behind the expected 1941 stop line (Leningrad, Moscow, Rostov). Extending from "by starvation" to "by starvation and other means as appropriate."
In 1941 the use of Nerve Gas is suggested to
*Test equipment readiness, doctrine, and combat capacity of gas warfare units
*Reduce the excess population of Soviet POWs
While the first makes sense in any condition, the second requires more explanation. IOTL Soviet POWs were systematically starved and reduced by disease. Some were sent to death camps. Many were death marched. It should be a small step, if such a large mass of able-bodied military age men exist, and if they're considered as life-unworthy-of-life rather than as potential slave labour (despite "acceptable losses"), to test gas weapons on them in the large open air holding camps.
Some of the conditions required for use are met, a war between a Western power and a "racially inferior other;" no operational friction caused by limiting advance or manoeuvre; and, an expectation of disproportionate capacity such that OPFOR is not expected to be able to significantly respond in kind.
In late 1941 gas warfare becomes a standard part of "anti-partisan" operations, including the clearing of areas of Slavs and Jews as part of the ongoing genocide in the East.
This ramifies as nerve gassing is viewed as a supplemental ghetto clearing option. By 1943 most Police Battalions are well versed in gas warfare. This is incidentally when the now "gas friendly" genocidal portions of the German state force gas as part of defensive operations.
Prior to late 1943, gas had not been considered for use against Soviet forces in the field. Soviet doctrine, while well aware by mid 1942 of the systematic genocide of Soviet POWs, has used this to play the pity card internationally; and for normal military reasons has restricted its own use of gas warfare to heightened preparations, and preparation for retaliation.
So, in late 1943 on the defensive, the Police Battalions, the "Dad's Army" of the Reich, start using gas in defensive operations. The military effectiveness of this action is extremely limited after the first use; but, it creates a sticky slow operational situation in the East. Soviet retaliation is limited and judicious, bearing in mind that the major requirement is to force Germans to be gas prepared also; rather than viewing Gas as achieving anything significant.
Use rapidly spreads at this point to anti-partisan operations in Greece and Yugoslavia where the racial opinion of partisans, and the brutality of partisan warfare, are similar to the East.
The rest kind of writes itself; though, I doubt that the Soviet Union will attempt to reduce Koenigsberg, Budapest or Berlin by gas. It will certainly give more "justification" in the impetus to the revenge and power in the second line Soviet troops' actions towards women in occupied Poland and Germany.
I doubt it will significantly change the long-term Soviet occupation strategy of selective and limited trials. In the longer term social-democrats, and "national" communists are also threats to maintaining Stalinist, pro-Moscow rule.
This might change the tenor of the West's involvement in the show-trials. The rediscovery of the role of Police Battalions in the Holocaust is unlikely to happen, the connection with a gas centred narrative will be fairly clear.
yours,
Sam R.