Hitler croaks or gets offed.
Actually I don't see this helping at all. Soviet reserves perhaps prevent German troops from getting to Stalingrad and getting into the Caucasus, but it doesn't attrit the German troops as badly as those campaigns did, leaving German forces closer to their supply lines and less worn down than IOTL, while chewing up Soviet reserves as they run into the most powerful air fleet in the world at the time. Remember too that the Soviet reserves attacked the flank of the German advance from the Moscow area and were pretty much shattered in the process.Let's see...
What about if the Soviets get the direction of the 1942 German summer offensive right? OTL they guessed Moscow and the Germans went south.
That has the potential to do quite a lot of damage to the Germans, and keep a lot of territory in Soviet hands - and attrit the Panzers heavily early on.
It wouldn't be as bad as Kursk for the Germans, perhaps, but it'd be a nasty reverse without a large bag of Soviet prisoners beforehand.
...mate.Actually I don't see this helping at all. Soviet reserves perhaps prevent German troops from getting to Stalingrad and getting into the Caucasus, but it doesn't attrit the German troops as badly as those campaigns did, leaving German forces closer to their supply lines and less worn down than IOTL, while chewing up Soviet reserves as they run into the most powerful air fleet in the world at the time. Remember too that the Soviet reserves attacked the flank of the German advance from the Moscow area and were pretty much shattered in the process.
All this does in keep the Germans away from getting overextended and cut off at Stalingrad and worn down in the long advance, while making Hitler realize sooner that his forces are in trouble in the East. This might well actually extend the war, as the Soviets have to actually grind down the Axis armies instead of getting the benefits of a worn down, overextended force that is cut off in 1942-43, unable to breakout or be relieved due to the overstretched logistic situation.
See first post in this thread for an example. I usually don't explore Germany losing more quickly, because its OTL, just quicker, which is less interesting to talk about....mate.
Mate.
I have a question for you.
Are you capable of picturing a situation where the Germans do worse?
I mean, I don't think it's controversial that the Soviets knowing where the Kursk blow was going to fall helped them out a lot. I'm using the same strategic situation a year earlier, which is to say the Germans don't get a big victory in the summer campaign and don't get the resources from the area they captured in OTL 1942 - which I swear I've seen you talking up on other threads...
Basically, the German strategic situation would mean they had much less in the way of certain resources (like grain, say) which they captured OTL, while the Russian strategic situation would include all that productivity they OTL did not have.
I don't necessarily think the Soviets would in turn be able to achieve a 1943-style counteroffensive in the summer, but I certainly think the Soviets would be able to do a winter offensive because they tended to manage those.
Okay. What do you think would have happened if the Germans had gone for Moscow again? I allow either option, remember...
Fine, I'll redefine my original question.See first post in this thread for an example. I usually don't explore Germany losing more quickly, because its OTL, just quicker, which is less interesting to talk about.
Kursk and Case Blue were two vastly different situation in terms of German and Soviet relative strength. Just having the Soviets know where the blow is going to fall in 1942 isn't going to change the outcome given the lack of time to prevent and the relative strengths and experiences of the two forces. The Soviet forces of 1943 were a vastly different animal than that of 1942, while the same was true for the Axis forces due to the losses of 1942-43, especially the massive encirclements that wiped out huge German forces, the losses of Tunisia, the draw off of huge amounts of air power drawn off to fight the Wallied air forces starting in late 1942. Plus of course the huge German equipment losses in 1942-43 prior to Kursk that totally changed the balance of power in the East.
What major resources did they gain in their attacks in 1942? They already held the best agricultural lands in Ukraine before Case Blue, while they got virtually no food or oil in 1942 from the areas they captured. The Soviets would relatively gain by avoiding agricultural losses in 1942 (which they regained in 1943 and then also millions of tons of US food). In terms of industrial productivity the major retention is Stalingrad itself, which had its weapons factories mostly evacuated IOTL. The thing is the relative losses the Germans took in the process of the 1942 campaign in the East is far more draining to them than the retentions the Soviets have ITTL instead. So when the Soviet winter offensive happens its against a much stronger foe far closer to his own supply hubs and is thus able to inflict heavier damage without taking nearly as many losses. The entire strategic context of the war in the East changes in 1943 without Stalingrad.
Now with the Moscow option, which the Germans did not choose specifically because of the need for capturing Soviet oil AND it being too well defended (far better than East Ukraine would be ITTL due to the pre-war and 1941 fortifications built around Moscow, plus its air defenses, which couldn't be shifted south), would be a blood bath for the Germans like what you're talking about. The thing is that is exactly why they didn't do it IOTL because it wouldn't get them what they needed to fight the Wallies in 1943 and on, while the oil loss would cripple the Soviets, as least in German planning. Kill the body and the head dies just as readily as cutting off the head and the move against the 'body' of East Ukraine and the Caucasus was much less well defended and open, so there is far more reason to go south than at Moscow.
In the East in 1942 that was realistically on the table? Not really unless Hitler dies suddenly, which then causes a power struggle. The Axis were at their relative peak strength and its like saying was there a chance of the Allied armies doing worse in September 1944, yes potentially, but in a more minor tactical way that doesn't change the outcome of the year. Really the only option for the Soviets was to turtle up in 1942 and just try to survive while the Germans punch themselves out and then counterattack when the chance presents itself, which is pretty much what they did IOTL. They were just too outclassed at that point to do anything serious to stop the Germans other than putting so many forces as speed bumps into the Germans' path that they just run out of time wrapping them up, the potential best of which would be to stop them sort of Stalingrad and the Caucasus. I don't even know if that was possible even if the Soviets drew down their reserves around Moscow.Fine, I'll redefine my original question.
Anypossible outcome that involves the German army doing worse?
Depends on who and when. Reading the US army monograph on the planning done during 1941-42 things changed a lot depending on what the political and war situation was at any moment. By the end of the Soviet 1942 offensives (really during the break in April/May and its resumption through June) it was clear that the Moscow option was not viable given the German army's strength and Ukraine was the best one on the table.As for what you just said about why they didn't do Moscow - yes, that makes sense.
But.
They nearly did it OTL. The Generals said Moscow was still within reach, it was Hitler who insisted on going south - that's why he ranted about his Generals not understanding strategy!
If he didn't overrule them, then the German summer offensive in 1942 would have run into the Moscow defences.