AHC: German's Defeated Sooner

With no earlier POD than Dec. 8 1941, create a plausible scenario where Germany unconditionally surrenders before 1945.
 
Hitler croaks or gets offed.

pretty much this - with a bloody fight for power that disables the Government

While they are not looking a Military Coup takes power and after consolidating control - starts to put out feelers to the Western Powers.

Rebuffed and told by Britain and USA that Peace would only be accepted if Russia was included - peace is eventually agreed - with Stalin obliged to accept (for fear of a Axis / Wallies alliance against him)

Japan Shits itself!
 

Orry

Donor
Monthly Donor
If its an agreed peace is it unconditional???

You really need boots on the ground in Germany to enforce an unconditional surrender - so that probably means Russian boots as the Wallies need time to train up the American Army.

Unless before 1945 includes late 1944..... In which case you could have a situation where Hitler decides that the Wallies will not really invade Germany (He is nuts after all). He orders the Military to keep most of the Army in the East which then 'allows' the Wallies to occupy Germany and then we find that the Wallies hand the East of Germany over to the Russians anyway.
 
A few things. Russia does not attack at Rhzev in 1942 and plays Stalingrad pretty much as per OTL. THen, those reserves not pissed away at Rhzev are used to reinforce the overextended Russians preventing Third Kharkov. The Germans might be pushed to the Dnieper by the end of winter 1943 and they will pull out of Rhzev simply to build enough reserves for defense. This puts the Russians 6 months ahead of OTL and by this point, the Germans could not stop the Russians. Berlin is reached 6 months sooner and it falls some time at the beginning of December 1944, with much of West Germany being overrun by collapsing German resistance as almost everything is shifted East.
 

Deleted member 1487

The USAAF goes after Germany's electrical grid and/or the RAF instead of area bombing goes after Ruhr industry via the Light Night Bomber Force instead of getting a bunch of heavy Lancasters to burn cities. Alternatively having the oil plan kick in in 1943 instead of 1944 with RAF help instead of burning cities. Have the RAF follow up on Operation Chastise with further bombing, rather than a one off raid. Historically the Combined Bomber Operation was pretty mis-aimed until mid-1944 and left some good options on the table that could have ended the war sooner at much less cost in bomber crew and civilian lives. A collapsed industry prevents Germany from maintaining its forces in the field, as was the situation once the damage from the oil campaign got into effect.
http://historum.com/war-military-hi...e-target-germany-s-electrical-power-grid.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Plan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II#Opinions_on_outcome
 
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I will also vote for the oil-strategy, but let us also open it up for more.

Precision bombing was not an art form until 1944/5. Even then it was also a matter of identifying choke points and hurl enough bombs at it.

So, let us assume that US/UK go for the choke points instead of burning down apartment blocks and killing civilians. This point is important as the UK air force was not admired in great detail by the Germans in general.

With all the efforts going into
1) Oil plants
2) oil distribution
3) air fields for jet fighters
4) Transport hubs (a shunting yard is hard to damage but let us just go for it)
5) Bridges
6) mining of the internal water ways

... all of it, really.

THEN let Brooke be SHAEF and let the Rhine be crossed in September 1944 as was possible.

Berlin is conquered in October/November 1944.

This is not impossible.

What will the consequences be?

1) Germany is not occupied by USSR
2) German infra-structure in the East is intact
3) Poland is not integrated into the Soviet bloc
4) Eastern Europe is hardly touched by USSR.
5) Occupation zones might not really mean a lot if W-Allies are sitting in Berlin and USSR are on the other side of Warsaw.
6) A lot of Germany might not even be occupied if it is a rapier thrust on Berlin and the Nazi leadership

and as well:

7) Fewer civilians in Germany dead
8) infra-structure less damaged
9) Fewer US dead (Not Hurtgen and so on)
10) Fewer Russian dead

Could it be that with a less damaged infra-structure there is no need for a Marshall plan?

Fewer dead = easier 'coming to terms' with the end?

No USSR occupation in the East = No Warsaw pact?

No USSR occupation in the East = democracy given a chance

EU sooner?

Ivan
 
Alex: Be careful of the bomb discussion. It can side-track it all.

But you are of course right: Would an earlier defeat of Germany be due to the bomb or to just a faster follow-up in the West?

Let us chuck this into the mix:

Let us assume the two bombs are ready for D-Day.

The bombs can hardly be used as tactical battle-field weapons. That would mean they had to be dropped on France. Not a great decision.

They would have to be used to kill civilians in cities (a la Japan). Targets can be anything (political centre = Berlin, production = Dortmund, etc).

However, if only two bombs were available (there was a time delay OTL for the invasion of Japan where anything between 7-15 bombs would be available for Coronet after some 1-2 months after Hiroshima) would it be enough to convince Germany of surrendering in 1944?

The decision to use nuclear bombs would be FDR's. Would he have sanctioned the bombing of Germany? Let us also look at the racial aspect.

Would it be 'easier' to kill Japanese than fellow whites?

If Germany had been bombed, would it have opened up for the use of WMD by Germany, i.e. Gas? V1 or V2 with gas or biological things is a horrible thought.

Would a nuclear usage on Germany have produced so much resentment that any future cooperation between Germany and UK/US would have been impossible?

Rebuilding Europe with a nuclear wasteland in the middle (i.e. Ruhr is a parking lot) and a rather high amount of fall-out all over could set the world economy back with decades. Has anybody got an opinion about that?

Ivan
 
Just consider Japan. Being bombed did not prevent close alliance with the US. On the contrary : crushing and unquestionable defeat probably was a condition for them becoming close allies.

The monster States had to be broken and rebuilt on new foundations.
 
Matt, fully agree with you. In the case of Japan, it showed everyone that Japan was defeated. That, however, was achieved with occupation of German soil in the case of Germany.

I do believe that there are still pockets of resentment in Japan pertaining to the nuclear bombing. Anybody?

Could it have gone the other way in Japan or Germany? THAT is a good question and worthy of another What IF

Ivan
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Let's see...
What about if the Soviets get the direction of the 1942 German summer offensive right? OTL they guessed Moscow and the Germans went south.
That has the potential to do quite a lot of damage to the Germans, and keep a lot of territory in Soviet hands - and attrit the Panzers heavily early on.

It wouldn't be as bad as Kursk for the Germans, perhaps, but it'd be a nasty reverse without a large bag of Soviet prisoners beforehand.
 

Deleted member 1487

Let's see...
What about if the Soviets get the direction of the 1942 German summer offensive right? OTL they guessed Moscow and the Germans went south.
That has the potential to do quite a lot of damage to the Germans, and keep a lot of territory in Soviet hands - and attrit the Panzers heavily early on.

It wouldn't be as bad as Kursk for the Germans, perhaps, but it'd be a nasty reverse without a large bag of Soviet prisoners beforehand.
Actually I don't see this helping at all. Soviet reserves perhaps prevent German troops from getting to Stalingrad and getting into the Caucasus, but it doesn't attrit the German troops as badly as those campaigns did, leaving German forces closer to their supply lines and less worn down than IOTL, while chewing up Soviet reserves as they run into the most powerful air fleet in the world at the time. Remember too that the Soviet reserves attacked the flank of the German advance from the Moscow area and were pretty much shattered in the process.

All this does in keep the Germans away from getting overextended and cut off at Stalingrad and worn down in the long advance, while making Hitler realize sooner that his forces are in trouble in the East. This might well actually extend the war, as the Soviets have to actually grind down the Axis armies instead of getting the benefits of a worn down, overextended force that is cut off in 1942-43, unable to breakout or be relieved due to the overstretched logistic situation.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Actually I don't see this helping at all. Soviet reserves perhaps prevent German troops from getting to Stalingrad and getting into the Caucasus, but it doesn't attrit the German troops as badly as those campaigns did, leaving German forces closer to their supply lines and less worn down than IOTL, while chewing up Soviet reserves as they run into the most powerful air fleet in the world at the time. Remember too that the Soviet reserves attacked the flank of the German advance from the Moscow area and were pretty much shattered in the process.

All this does in keep the Germans away from getting overextended and cut off at Stalingrad and worn down in the long advance, while making Hitler realize sooner that his forces are in trouble in the East. This might well actually extend the war, as the Soviets have to actually grind down the Axis armies instead of getting the benefits of a worn down, overextended force that is cut off in 1942-43, unable to breakout or be relieved due to the overstretched logistic situation.
...mate.
Mate.
I have a question for you.

Are you capable of picturing a situation where the Germans do worse?


I mean, I don't think it's controversial that the Soviets knowing where the Kursk blow was going to fall helped them out a lot. I'm using the same strategic situation a year earlier, which is to say the Germans don't get a big victory in the summer campaign and don't get the resources from the area they captured in OTL 1942 - which I swear I've seen you talking up on other threads...
Basically, the German strategic situation would mean they had much less in the way of certain resources (like grain, say) which they captured OTL, while the Russian strategic situation would include all that productivity they OTL did not have.

I don't necessarily think the Soviets would in turn be able to achieve a 1943-style counteroffensive in the summer, but I certainly think the Soviets would be able to do a winter offensive because they tended to manage those.


Okay. What do you think would have happened if the Germans had gone for Moscow again? I allow either option, remember...
 

Deleted member 1487

...mate.
Mate.
I have a question for you.

Are you capable of picturing a situation where the Germans do worse?
See first post in this thread for an example. I usually don't explore Germany losing more quickly, because its OTL, just quicker, which is less interesting to talk about.

I mean, I don't think it's controversial that the Soviets knowing where the Kursk blow was going to fall helped them out a lot. I'm using the same strategic situation a year earlier, which is to say the Germans don't get a big victory in the summer campaign and don't get the resources from the area they captured in OTL 1942 - which I swear I've seen you talking up on other threads...

Basically, the German strategic situation would mean they had much less in the way of certain resources (like grain, say) which they captured OTL, while the Russian strategic situation would include all that productivity they OTL did not have.

I don't necessarily think the Soviets would in turn be able to achieve a 1943-style counteroffensive in the summer, but I certainly think the Soviets would be able to do a winter offensive because they tended to manage those.

Okay. What do you think would have happened if the Germans had gone for Moscow again? I allow either option, remember...

Kursk and Case Blue were two vastly different situation in terms of German and Soviet relative strength. Just having the Soviets know where the blow is going to fall in 1942 isn't going to change the outcome given the lack of time to prevent and the relative strengths and experiences of the two forces. The Soviet forces of 1943 were a vastly different animal than that of 1942, while the same was true for the Axis forces due to the losses of 1942-43, especially the massive encirclements that wiped out huge German forces, the losses of Tunisia, the draw off of huge amounts of air power drawn off to fight the Wallied air forces starting in late 1942. Plus of course the huge German equipment losses in 1942-43 prior to Kursk that totally changed the balance of power in the East.

What major resources did they gain in their attacks in 1942? They already held the best agricultural lands in Ukraine before Case Blue, while they got virtually no food or oil in 1942 from the areas they captured. The Soviets would relatively gain by avoiding agricultural losses in 1942 (which they regained in 1943 and then also millions of tons of US food). In terms of industrial productivity the major retention is Stalingrad itself, which had its weapons factories mostly evacuated IOTL. The thing is the relative losses the Germans took in the process of the 1942 campaign in the East is far more draining to them than the retentions the Soviets have ITTL instead. So when the Soviet winter offensive happens its against a much stronger foe far closer to his own supply hubs and is thus able to inflict heavier damage without taking nearly as many losses. The entire strategic context of the war in the East changes in 1943 without Stalingrad.

Now with the Moscow option, which the Germans did not choose specifically because of the need for capturing Soviet oil AND it being too well defended (far better than East Ukraine would be ITTL due to the pre-war and 1941 fortifications built around Moscow, plus its air defenses, which couldn't be shifted south), would be a blood bath for the Germans like what you're talking about. The thing is that is exactly why they didn't do it IOTL because it wouldn't get them what they needed to fight the Wallies in 1943 and on, while the oil loss would cripple the Soviets, as least in German planning. Kill the body and the head dies just as readily as cutting off the head and the move against the 'body' of East Ukraine and the Caucasus was much less well defended and open, so there is far more reason to go south than at Moscow.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
See first post in this thread for an example. I usually don't explore Germany losing more quickly, because its OTL, just quicker, which is less interesting to talk about.



Kursk and Case Blue were two vastly different situation in terms of German and Soviet relative strength. Just having the Soviets know where the blow is going to fall in 1942 isn't going to change the outcome given the lack of time to prevent and the relative strengths and experiences of the two forces. The Soviet forces of 1943 were a vastly different animal than that of 1942, while the same was true for the Axis forces due to the losses of 1942-43, especially the massive encirclements that wiped out huge German forces, the losses of Tunisia, the draw off of huge amounts of air power drawn off to fight the Wallied air forces starting in late 1942. Plus of course the huge German equipment losses in 1942-43 prior to Kursk that totally changed the balance of power in the East.

What major resources did they gain in their attacks in 1942? They already held the best agricultural lands in Ukraine before Case Blue, while they got virtually no food or oil in 1942 from the areas they captured. The Soviets would relatively gain by avoiding agricultural losses in 1942 (which they regained in 1943 and then also millions of tons of US food). In terms of industrial productivity the major retention is Stalingrad itself, which had its weapons factories mostly evacuated IOTL. The thing is the relative losses the Germans took in the process of the 1942 campaign in the East is far more draining to them than the retentions the Soviets have ITTL instead. So when the Soviet winter offensive happens its against a much stronger foe far closer to his own supply hubs and is thus able to inflict heavier damage without taking nearly as many losses. The entire strategic context of the war in the East changes in 1943 without Stalingrad.

Now with the Moscow option, which the Germans did not choose specifically because of the need for capturing Soviet oil AND it being too well defended (far better than East Ukraine would be ITTL due to the pre-war and 1941 fortifications built around Moscow, plus its air defenses, which couldn't be shifted south), would be a blood bath for the Germans like what you're talking about. The thing is that is exactly why they didn't do it IOTL because it wouldn't get them what they needed to fight the Wallies in 1943 and on, while the oil loss would cripple the Soviets, as least in German planning. Kill the body and the head dies just as readily as cutting off the head and the move against the 'body' of East Ukraine and the Caucasus was much less well defended and open, so there is far more reason to go south than at Moscow.
Fine, I'll redefine my original question.
Anypossible outcome that involves the German army doing worse?


As for what you just said about why they didn't do Moscow - yes, that makes sense.
But.
They nearly did it OTL. The Generals said Moscow was still within reach, it was Hitler who insisted on going south - that's why he ranted about his Generals not understanding strategy!
If he didn't overrule them, then the German summer offensive in 1942 would have run into the Moscow defences.
 

Deleted member 1487

Fine, I'll redefine my original question.
Anypossible outcome that involves the German army doing worse?
In the East in 1942 that was realistically on the table? Not really unless Hitler dies suddenly, which then causes a power struggle. The Axis were at their relative peak strength and its like saying was there a chance of the Allied armies doing worse in September 1944, yes potentially, but in a more minor tactical way that doesn't change the outcome of the year. Really the only option for the Soviets was to turtle up in 1942 and just try to survive while the Germans punch themselves out and then counterattack when the chance presents itself, which is pretty much what they did IOTL. They were just too outclassed at that point to do anything serious to stop the Germans other than putting so many forces as speed bumps into the Germans' path that they just run out of time wrapping them up, the potential best of which would be to stop them sort of Stalingrad and the Caucasus. I don't even know if that was possible even if the Soviets drew down their reserves around Moscow.

As for what you just said about why they didn't do Moscow - yes, that makes sense.
But.
They nearly did it OTL. The Generals said Moscow was still within reach, it was Hitler who insisted on going south - that's why he ranted about his Generals not understanding strategy!
If he didn't overrule them, then the German summer offensive in 1942 would have run into the Moscow defences.
Depends on who and when. Reading the US army monograph on the planning done during 1941-42 things changed a lot depending on what the political and war situation was at any moment. By the end of the Soviet 1942 offensives (really during the break in April/May and its resumption through June) it was clear that the Moscow option was not viable given the German army's strength and Ukraine was the best one on the table.
 
I wrote a France stays in TL. I had France and Britain conquer Libya in July 1940. Hitler decides not to mess with North Africa. The invasion of Sicily comes in November 1942, I thought the invasion of Normandy could come in October 1943. VE Day would come in September 1944.
 
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