AHC: General Joe Johnston
- Thread starter Elfwine
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Anaxagoras
Banned
He should have taken command of the Army of Tennessee when it was first offered to him by Davis, in early 1863 after the Battle of Murfreesboro. The idea of giving him a theater command overseeing both Pemberton's army and Bragg's army was a recipe for disaster, with unclear chains of command, poorly defined areas of responsibility and Davis constantly interfering.
Johnston would have been an ideal Commisary-General of the Confederate Army. He was a genius when it came to routine logistics and organization, as can be seen by his remarkable rejuvenation of the Army of Tennessee between January and May of 1864. Besides, he certainly would have done immensely better than the walking disaster that was Lucious Northrop. But this would never have happened, as Johnston's rank was too high and he never would have accepted a desk job.
Johnston would have been an ideal Commisary-General of the Confederate Army. He was a genius when it came to routine logistics and organization, as can be seen by his remarkable rejuvenation of the Army of Tennessee between January and May of 1864. Besides, he certainly would have done immensely better than the walking disaster that was Lucious Northrop. But this would never have happened, as Johnston's rank was too high and he never would have accepted a desk job.
Joe Johnston gets wounded in the final days of the Mexican War and loses an arm. The US Military retires him at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel forcing him to take up a career outside the military. He becomes a civilian engineer throughout the 1850's and works on the Mississippi strenghtening river defenses along it and constructing barriers to prevent flooding.
When Virginia seceeds Johnston returns to his native state and offers his services. He is commisioned a Colonel in the Virignian Milita under the command of Lee and is sent to the Shenandoah to oversee operations there. When Virginia joins the Confederacy he is promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and confirmed in command of the Shenandoah forces.
1st Manassas goes as OTL with Johnston slipping away from the Valley to come to Beauregards support, only the difference is that Beauregard is the ranking officer. However Johnston still takes command at the crucial moments and wins the battle. In the aftermath of the battle Beauregard is confirmed as commander of this new combined army due to him getting the headlines while Johnston has to make do with a Corps Command under him.
Beauregard sticks around Virginia until the spring of 1862. He is forced to release Jackson into the Valley, he cant take the offensive and is, due to the lack of ammunition, arms and manpower, forced to do the same thing Johnston was in OTL - fall back to the Rappahannock line before moving into the Peninsula to face McClellan.
There on the Peninsula Beauregard is just as incapable of stopping the Federal advance as Johnston was and falls back behind the Chickahominy. Johnston and Longstreet as distinguish themselves as his Corps commanders while Marguer and Huger commanding newer Corps do not.
Beauregard launches an offensive against the Federals at Mechanicsville, characteristically trying to coordinate a complicated plan using raw troops that dont have the ability to undertake the operation. The battle is conducted with Johnston and Magruder's Corps but Johnston is left fighting the majority of the battle due to the complexity of Beauregard's plan and Magruder's inability to follow it. The battle is a Federal victory and Johnston is unfairly tarnished for it.
At this point Davis rides forward to the Army to have a conferance with Beauregard only to find him missing. Beauregard - like he did after Corinth - had put himself on medical leave without informing Richmond - in this scenario we'll say he did have a legitimate reason for doing so but still failed to inform Richmond - leaving the army commanded by his staff. Davis, once he learns of this, is furious and immediately strips Beauregard of command and sends Lee to take command of the Army.
McClellan, like OTL, is spooked by the major Confederate attack and rendered immobile by increasing fears about being outnumbered and upset that McDowell's Corps was sent to the Valley, which allow's Lee time to reinforce and reoganize. Something like the Seven Day Battles follow in which Johnston and Longstreet once more distinguish themselves while Jackson performs dismally upon his arrival and Magruder and Huger's impact proves negligible.
After the conclusion of that Campaign Lee decides to organize his army into three Corps with Johnston, Longsteet and Jackson as his immeidate subordinates. Johnston's performance as a Corps Commander is exemplorary and he becomes regarded with Longstreet as arugably the Wars best Corps Commanders of either Union or Confederate Forces. In 1864 he gets sent out West and takes command of the Army of Tennessee with varying results but he is established as one of the best generals in the war due to his service as a Corps Commanders under Lee and his ability to frustrate the Federals out West while in command of the AoT.
Having written all this I've just seen the challenge is set after the War began so it doesn't qualify. So, in brief, using a POD post 1861 would be for Johnston to command the the AoM instead of Pemberton, for he was be a much tricker opponent for Grant due to the fact that he would not be tied down by Vicksburg so Grant could not just cut away from his supply lines as he did in OTL and with Johnston not in theater command there will be no order to Earl Van Dorn to take his cavalry to Bragg thus strengthening the ability of the Confederates in Mississippi to resist the Federals and likely meaning Grierson's raid will not be the success it was in OTL.
When Virginia seceeds Johnston returns to his native state and offers his services. He is commisioned a Colonel in the Virignian Milita under the command of Lee and is sent to the Shenandoah to oversee operations there. When Virginia joins the Confederacy he is promoted to the rank of Brigadier General and confirmed in command of the Shenandoah forces.
1st Manassas goes as OTL with Johnston slipping away from the Valley to come to Beauregards support, only the difference is that Beauregard is the ranking officer. However Johnston still takes command at the crucial moments and wins the battle. In the aftermath of the battle Beauregard is confirmed as commander of this new combined army due to him getting the headlines while Johnston has to make do with a Corps Command under him.
Beauregard sticks around Virginia until the spring of 1862. He is forced to release Jackson into the Valley, he cant take the offensive and is, due to the lack of ammunition, arms and manpower, forced to do the same thing Johnston was in OTL - fall back to the Rappahannock line before moving into the Peninsula to face McClellan.
There on the Peninsula Beauregard is just as incapable of stopping the Federal advance as Johnston was and falls back behind the Chickahominy. Johnston and Longstreet as distinguish themselves as his Corps commanders while Marguer and Huger commanding newer Corps do not.
Beauregard launches an offensive against the Federals at Mechanicsville, characteristically trying to coordinate a complicated plan using raw troops that dont have the ability to undertake the operation. The battle is conducted with Johnston and Magruder's Corps but Johnston is left fighting the majority of the battle due to the complexity of Beauregard's plan and Magruder's inability to follow it. The battle is a Federal victory and Johnston is unfairly tarnished for it.
At this point Davis rides forward to the Army to have a conferance with Beauregard only to find him missing. Beauregard - like he did after Corinth - had put himself on medical leave without informing Richmond - in this scenario we'll say he did have a legitimate reason for doing so but still failed to inform Richmond - leaving the army commanded by his staff. Davis, once he learns of this, is furious and immediately strips Beauregard of command and sends Lee to take command of the Army.
McClellan, like OTL, is spooked by the major Confederate attack and rendered immobile by increasing fears about being outnumbered and upset that McDowell's Corps was sent to the Valley, which allow's Lee time to reinforce and reoganize. Something like the Seven Day Battles follow in which Johnston and Longstreet once more distinguish themselves while Jackson performs dismally upon his arrival and Magruder and Huger's impact proves negligible.
After the conclusion of that Campaign Lee decides to organize his army into three Corps with Johnston, Longsteet and Jackson as his immeidate subordinates. Johnston's performance as a Corps Commander is exemplorary and he becomes regarded with Longstreet as arugably the Wars best Corps Commanders of either Union or Confederate Forces. In 1864 he gets sent out West and takes command of the Army of Tennessee with varying results but he is established as one of the best generals in the war due to his service as a Corps Commanders under Lee and his ability to frustrate the Federals out West while in command of the AoT.
Having written all this I've just seen the challenge is set after the War began so it doesn't qualify. So, in brief, using a POD post 1861 would be for Johnston to command the the AoM instead of Pemberton, for he was be a much tricker opponent for Grant due to the fact that he would not be tied down by Vicksburg so Grant could not just cut away from his supply lines as he did in OTL and with Johnston not in theater command there will be no order to Earl Van Dorn to take his cavalry to Bragg thus strengthening the ability of the Confederates in Mississippi to resist the Federals and likely meaning Grierson's raid will not be the success it was in OTL.
Good scenario in both cases.
I put the challenge as "after the war starts" to make the focus on altering his ACW career, but I like your first scenario for examining Joe not being promoted to army command (and yet still doing damn well).
Do you think that - if the position's authority had been defined better and Davis didn't meddle (and of course he was kept informed) - that the "supervisor of the Western theater" would work with his abilities, or was field command better?
Thinking someone who would be - theoretically - able to make decisions for the big picture of the West, and pass on relevant information to Davis as relates to the West's needs and so on.
Sort of like Sherman was for the Union in 1864.
Johnston's style - everything he had learnt and experianced that shaped him as a soldier and officer - was geared towards field command. He was not good in an office because he didn't like the work, he didn't like the lack of human interaction and he got bored. He was a work-a-holic who had to be kept busy and office jobs didn't do that for him so he only did a passable job when employed in such a position.
So, no, I dont think was suited for the theater command position at all. He had certain idea's that had merit - such as splittinng the Western Theater into two smaller theaters to make them more managable, and both side of the Mississippi needing to be under the command of one department to effectively oppose the Federals - but he wouldn't have effectively controlled the theater not only because of the afore mentioned aversion to office job but also because he didn't like ordering Army Commanders around for fear that he would be seen to undermine their authority.
Commander of the Western Theater was certainly not the best use of his abilities.
It's hysterical that a certain Elvish character who insists that Stonewall Jackson must necessarily have poisonous relationships with any and all contrary personalities, in spite of a mountain of documentary evidence to the contrary, 
....
.... would then go on and buy the idea that Joe Johnston would become a stellar corps commander under Robert E. Lee, given that such a belief flies in the face of a mountain of evidence proving that Johnston was very jealous of Lee, and in fact had been for decades.
Maybe they would get along, and maybe they wouldn't, but it would certainly be too major a factor to blithely overlook.
Gingrich and Forstchen very rightly bring this sort of thing into play when Beauregard becomes a corps commander under Lee in their series, and Beauregard wasn't half as jealous of Lee as Johnston was.
Another note: Joe Johnston should be rightly praised for putting the Army of Tennessee back on a sound footing, but his performance in that role was not without it's blemishes, as both Albert Castel and T.L. Connelly point out. He was a good, but not a genius logistician. Furthermore, given his sense of entitlement, the only office job he would have accepted in the Confederate Army would have been Samuel Cooper's -- Adjutant General of the Army.
........ would then go on and buy the idea that Joe Johnston would become a stellar corps commander under Robert E. Lee, given that such a belief flies in the face of a mountain of evidence proving that Johnston was very jealous of Lee, and in fact had been for decades.
Maybe they would get along, and maybe they wouldn't, but it would certainly be too major a factor to blithely overlook.
Gingrich and Forstchen very rightly bring this sort of thing into play when Beauregard becomes a corps commander under Lee in their series, and Beauregard wasn't half as jealous of Lee as Johnston was.
Another note: Joe Johnston should be rightly praised for putting the Army of Tennessee back on a sound footing, but his performance in that role was not without it's blemishes, as both Albert Castel and T.L. Connelly point out. He was a good, but not a genius logistician. Furthermore, given his sense of entitlement, the only office job he would have accepted in the Confederate Army would have been Samuel Cooper's -- Adjutant General of the Army.
It's hysterical that a certain Elvish character who insists that Stonewall Jackson must necessarily have poisonous relationships with any and all contrary personalities, in spite of a mountain of documentary evidence to the contrary,
I'll ignore that because I dont want to get involved in your spat with Elfwine when I know he put you on his ignore list.
Joe Johnston was very jealous of Lee in OTL, which is why my scenario removed the cause of the jealousy.
The cause of that jealousy was Lee's advanced rank in comparison to his own - especially considering the fact that Johnston had performed just as well as Lee had in the Mexican War but been denied the rank he had earnt on a technicality and was the only General to leave the Union for the Confederacy but was denied seniority because Davis manipulated Confederate law to give his friends the rub of the green.
Johnston, having been robbed of a military career by an injury and invalided out of service, would have spent a decade or so as a civilian and would have no ideas of rank and seniority being his by right, and he was never the type of person to promote himself at the expense of another or seek something that he did not believe he had earnt.
Ending his service in the Federal Army as a Lieutenant Colonel removes many of the petty problems that led to so many arguments and ill-feelings between Johnston and Richmond, and negates any ill-feelings Johnston would have had towards the other generals, especially considering he wouldn't be a full general in that scenario.
In their West Point Days Lee and Johnston had been close friend, and when Lee showed the slightest bit of support for Johnston in 1865 before Bentonville Johnston was noticably moved and grateful for it, and Johnston always remembered that moment in the Mexican War when Lee shared in his grief at the death of his beloved nephew Preston. It is not, therefore, beyond the realms of all possibility that removing the main issue between them that cause their friendship to break would then lead to reconsiliation and would allow Lee and Johnston to work together effectively.
But Beauregard was a hell of a lot more ambitious than Johnston and had chaffed at being in a militarilly unimportant backward since 1862 and wanted his own glory. A whole different kettle of fish.
That is a unjustified slur against Johnston. He would have accepted any Army appointment. Yes, he wanted the Virignia job but in 1863 he wanted the Army of Tennessee job very badly as well, and he would have welcomed the Army of Mississippi job with open arms if it had been offered to him at the end of 1862.
His sense of entitlement came from what he believed he was owed by Confederate law. Confederate law stating that rank and seniority in the new Confederate Army would be determined by rank and seniority in the old Federal Army, and as he was the only General to leave the Union for the South he believe that, by Confederate law, the position as the top generals in the Confederacy was his by right. Nobody in Richmond or the War Office or Adjutant Generals Officer or the President himself took upon themselves to explain to him the fact that the President had decided to dertmine rank and seniority by the last rank held in a particular arm of the service. Given that fact it is no wonder that he felt slighted.
I think you misunderstand me -- I said he wouldn't accept a desk job. In a prior posting, it was asserted that he should have taken Northrop's job and cleaned up the Commissary Dept. What I meant is that he would have turned that job down.
It's important to remember that Johnston took the Quartermaster General's post in the Old Army solely to get a one-star staff rank, and did so in a peacetime army. I don't think Johnston would have settled for a desk job when a war was on and there were field commands to be had, especially not in view of the handful of amputee generals who were out there as early as 1861.
So, my statement was neither a slur nor unjustified.
As for your scenario, I see your point (something some folks can't do for any reason). If Johnston weren't in direct competition with Lee for almost two decades, his personal issues would have been muted. Not eliminated, but muted. Quite a few of their colleague in the Old Army speculated in writing that Johnston and Lee viewed each other as gentlemen rivals from their very earliest days in the Army, predating the Mexican War.
Still, the basis would be there, and it wouldn't simply go away. A good essay or story on the subject would work it in there, in a much diminished form
You make a bad assertion down here, by the way. Although no one explained the rank law to Johnston before it was promulgated, no one was under any obligation to do so in the first place. You don't run stuff like that past subordinates for their approval. After it was promulgated, Davis and Johnston had a lengthy correspondence on the subject, and the public record shows Davis bending over backwards to try and smooth Johnston's feelings out over the subject.
The assertion that "Nobody in Richmond or the War Office or Adjutant Generals Officer or the President himself took upon themselves to explain to him the fact that the President had decided to dertmine rank and seniority by the last rank held in a particular arm of the service" is completely wrong. If you don't believe me, feel free to look up the letters. They are available through several different archives and online.
It's important to remember that Johnston took the Quartermaster General's post in the Old Army solely to get a one-star staff rank, and did so in a peacetime army. I don't think Johnston would have settled for a desk job when a war was on and there were field commands to be had, especially not in view of the handful of amputee generals who were out there as early as 1861.
So, my statement was neither a slur nor unjustified.
As for your scenario, I see your point (something some folks can't do for any reason
). If Johnston weren't in direct competition with Lee for almost two decades, his personal issues would have been muted. Not eliminated, but muted. Quite a few of their colleague in the Old Army speculated in writing that Johnston and Lee viewed each other as gentlemen rivals from their very earliest days in the Army, predating the Mexican War.Still, the basis would be there, and it wouldn't simply go away. A good essay or story on the subject would work it in there, in a much diminished form
You make a bad assertion down here, by the way. Although no one explained the rank law to Johnston before it was promulgated, no one was under any obligation to do so in the first place. You don't run stuff like that past subordinates for their approval. After it was promulgated, Davis and Johnston had a lengthy correspondence on the subject, and the public record shows Davis bending over backwards to try and smooth Johnston's feelings out over the subject.
The assertion that "Nobody in Richmond or the War Office or Adjutant Generals Officer or the President himself took upon themselves to explain to him the fact that the President had decided to dertmine rank and seniority by the last rank held in a particular arm of the service" is completely wrong. If you don't believe me, feel free to look up the letters. They are available through several different archives and online.
In my TTL I have Johnson being taken out of the field and given the "Chief of Staff" role - effectively equivalent with Halleck's early role in the Union post of the same name. I also couldn't work out what else to do with him!
But is that the best use of his talents, or just the only thing you could think of?
Actually I justified it (to myself mostly) on political grounds - there was a political crisis in 1863 - a chorus against President Davis' conduct of the war (worse in my TTL). The result was that, in order to avoid impeachment, he had to replace the Secretary of War with Breckinridge and appoint a Chief of Staff to co-ordinate strategy. Johnson's rank, lack of proper employment, hostility to Davis and lack of realistic alternatives made me turn to Johnson (Lee necessary in NVirginia and reluctant; and I can't see Beauregard working in the role).
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It has less impact because of "better" Union commanders - Phil Kearny and John F. Reynolds are running the Army of the Potomac by mid 1863 in my TTL.
Anyway enough self promotion - the South desparately needed a strategic co-ordinator that wasn't Davis. Any point of departure that makes it Johnson is a good thing (particularly given he penchant for getting injured alot if I recall correctly).
Johnston took the Quartermaster General's job because it was offered to him and, as an ambitous man in his own right who desired promotion, he was never going to turn it down.
General-in-Chief Winfield Scott gave the Secretary of War a list of four people who could do the job effectively - A.S. Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Joseph E. Johnston and Charles F. Smith - and the Secretary of War chose the man who knew best out of them. There are few when offered promotion to a Generals rank that would turn it down.
I may have misunderstood what you wrote but the way you wrote it appeared to me to ba a criticism of him as if his "sense of entitlement" would be the only thing motivating his decision. It would not have been. Johnston could not have brought himself to sit in an office while the greatest conflict of his lifetime was occuring, he couldn't remove himself from the field and take an administrative position when the very thing he trained and prepared for all his adult life was being played out in the fields and hills of America. To take an office job, to him, would be almost the same as sitting out of the conflict entirely. He was motivated to take a field command because that's where he truely believed his talents could be used the best.
West Point itself had encouraged competition amungst its students so as to cultivate the spirit of ambition and drive that the US Military wanted. Lee and Johnston had been rivals for a long time. Lee had always been ahead while Johnston had always been working hard to catch up. But even so Johnston had admired Lee in his youth and it had touched him deeply when Lee, upon seeing the shere pain that Preston's death brought him, shared in the moment and offered him his emotional support. Johnston never got over Preston's death, so for Lee to be there in the moment of his greatest loss and to have offered him such support in his greif was something he never forgot and always apreciated. Their professional rivalry aside, they were friend.As for your scenario, I see your point (something some folks can't do for any reason
Still, the basis would be there, and it wouldn't simply go away. A good essay or story on the subject would work it in there, in a much diminished form
I dont make the assertion that it was the job of the Richmond Authorities or the President or whatever to seek approval of the decision, nor that it was their job to inform Johnston of the change in assessing seniority before doing it. The case I made was for why Johnston felt so hurt by it, and why he had justification for doing so.
He believed he was entitled to the position as the Confederacy's Top Ranking General through Confederate Law and thought the fact that he had been demoted to fourth a public rebuke and display of lack of confidence in his conduct to that point. Davis's initial response of calling his reasons one sided, unfounded and unbecoming hardly did anything to lessen his feelings that Davis had done it purely to display some disatisfaction in his performance.
From Craig L. Symond's Biography of Joseph E. Johnston:
He [Johnston] painstakingly outlined the legislation that, as he saw it, granted him legal seniority, then offered his conclusion that the proper order of seniority should be: J. E. Johnstons, Cooper, A. S. Johnston, Lee, and finally Beaureard. Since the order of seniority was unchanged with the single exception of Johnston's place in it, he was forced to conclude that "this is a blow aimed at me only." Davis's list of appointments, Johnston maintained, was tantamount to his being broken in rank. Surely it would be percieved by the public as evidence of the governments disapproval of his performance, perhaps even of his loyalty. Such an interpretation led him to offer an impassioned defense of himself as a soldier and a patriot.
Page 128
An angered President Davis took Johnston's letter of protest with him to cabinet meeting on September 16 and railed to his advisers about it's "intemperate" tone. He also read them his breif reply; "I have just recieved and read your letter of the 12th instanct. Its language is, as you say, unusal; its argument and statements utterly one sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming."
Page 129
Page 128
An angered President Davis took Johnston's letter of protest with him to cabinet meeting on September 16 and railed to his advisers about it's "intemperate" tone. He also read them his breif reply; "I have just recieved and read your letter of the 12th instanct. Its language is, as you say, unusal; its argument and statements utterly one sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming."
Page 129
And notes from those paged
Davis later offered several explanations for ranking Johnston fourth, the most prominent of which was Johnston's brigadier generalcy in the Old Army was a staff apointment. But so was Cooper's.
Even Johnston's friends thought he overeacted and believed his letter imtemperate.
Even Johnston's friends thought he overeacted and believed his letter imtemperate.
And from Steve Newton's Joseph E. Johnston and the Defense of Richmond.
Davis, a longtime opponent of brevet rank, had neer believed that staff officers should be entitled to exercize command. In contrast to U.S. Army regulations, therefore, Confederate law specifially prohibited staff officers from asserting the seniority of their rank to assume command
One element of the controversy over rank that had recieved scant attention is the fact that Johnston's instincts in claiming that he had been intentially slighted in favor of Cooper, Sidney Johnston and Lee, however intermperately stated, were more accurate than many historians have been willing to admit. There is significant evidence, as suggested by Willian D. Davis and Steven Woodworth among others, that the president did manipulate his interpretation of the statutes in order to favor Sidney Johnston in particular and to a lesser extent Cooper and Lee. Although Johnston's "momentary lapse of self-control" is emphasized, very little analysis is given to the possibility that Davis first responded so sharply and then tacitly agreed to avoid the issue because he had been caught in an act of favoritism. Davis could rarely suffer himself to be corrected, even tactfully, and the absense of a detailed self-justification, which the president willingly employed on many similar occiasons, could with some justice be construed almost as an admission of at least guilty feelings"
I'll give you the sources Newton and Symond's cite if you want it later.
So you see, I fully accept Johnston overeacted - and I put that down to him having felt the need to protect the few things he actually had to his name - but Davis hardly handled the sitatuton well either so it shouldn't be hard to understand why Johnston was so upset.
Johnston correctly assumed that the Confederate Congress guarenteed former officers of the U.S. Army the same relative rank they had enjoyed before the war. What he missed was the fact that the act of March 6, 1861, changed the manner in which that rank was calculated. Section Tewnty-nine wiped out any practical use for brevet rank beyond court-martial and boards of inquiry. It also specified tat an officer's seniority for purposes of command would be setermined from his highest commission from the corps or arm in which he currently served. This provision accounted quite legally for Johnston's drop in the rankings.
Page 6 and 7
Davis was ill when he recieve Johnston's letter or protest, and he knew that the general was aware of his condition. Had Johnton written more diplomatically, the president might have explained his interpretation of the statutes, no matter how sick he was. But stung by an attack on him in his sickbed, Davis fired back his famous bullet: "I have just recieved and read your letter of the 12th instanct. Its language is, as you say, unusal; its argument and statements utterly one sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming."
Page 7
And notes from that book:Page 6 and 7
Davis was ill when he recieve Johnston's letter or protest, and he knew that the general was aware of his condition. Had Johnton written more diplomatically, the president might have explained his interpretation of the statutes, no matter how sick he was. But stung by an attack on him in his sickbed, Davis fired back his famous bullet: "I have just recieved and read your letter of the 12th instanct. Its language is, as you say, unusal; its argument and statements utterly one sided, and its insinuations as unfounded as they are unbecoming."
Page 7
Davis, a longtime opponent of brevet rank, had neer believed that staff officers should be entitled to exercize command. In contrast to U.S. Army regulations, therefore, Confederate law specifially prohibited staff officers from asserting the seniority of their rank to assume command
One element of the controversy over rank that had recieved scant attention is the fact that Johnston's instincts in claiming that he had been intentially slighted in favor of Cooper, Sidney Johnston and Lee, however intermperately stated, were more accurate than many historians have been willing to admit. There is significant evidence, as suggested by Willian D. Davis and Steven Woodworth among others, that the president did manipulate his interpretation of the statutes in order to favor Sidney Johnston in particular and to a lesser extent Cooper and Lee. Although Johnston's "momentary lapse of self-control" is emphasized, very little analysis is given to the possibility that Davis first responded so sharply and then tacitly agreed to avoid the issue because he had been caught in an act of favoritism. Davis could rarely suffer himself to be corrected, even tactfully, and the absense of a detailed self-justification, which the president willingly employed on many similar occiasons, could with some justice be construed almost as an admission of at least guilty feelings"
I'll give you the sources Newton and Symond's cite if you want it later.
So you see, I fully accept Johnston overeacted - and I put that down to him having felt the need to protect the few things he actually had to his name - but Davis hardly handled the sitatuton well either so it shouldn't be hard to understand why Johnston was so upset.