AHC: France wins the Franco-Prussian War

I would say it would help a lot: certainly Germany will be a big player in China and the Philippines are another good bet. They would also need a string of coaling stations and when the scramble for Africa starts Germany would have a leg up. The focus on China might work the other way around though. It depends how TTL world shapes up.

See, I was thinking that a German presence in Indochina that was continually expanding might have slowed down or weakened its interests in Africa. Some of the Pacific though, I could totally see still going to Germany, but the possibilities there are indeed interesting.
 
See, I was thinking that a German presence in Indochina that was continually expanding might have slowed down or weakened its interests in Africa. Some of the Pacific though, I could totally see still going to Germany, but the possibilities there are indeed interesting.

Germany still needs coaling stations on the African coast. Once there is a coaling station ....
 
That much is true. Still, there's the school of thought which argues that the loss of Alsace-Lorraine sped up the Scramble for Africa.

Did not Bismarck even support French colonialism in Africa? Apparently on the logic that imperial adventures along the Congo and Niger might a) distract France from re-reaching the Rhine and b) drive a wedge between France and the UK, to the obvious advantage of Germany.
 
Did not Bismarck even support French colonialism in Africa? Apparently on the logic that imperial adventures along the Congo and Niger might a) distract France from re-reaching the Rhine and b) drive a wedge between France and the UK, to the obvious advantage of Germany.

Despite any such efforts, there was little to show until the 1880s.
 
Maybe I was not clear enough. The objective of the exercise that Bismarck was planning was twofold: the important part vis-a-vis France was to keep the Bonapartist regime alive so that they would agree to a quick peace and there would have been no risk of interference by other European Powers; however for the internal front it was also necessary to gain some indisputable token which showed that the NGC had won against French aggression and France was punished. IOTL the token was Alsace-Lorraine; ITTL it would be the demolition of the main French fortresses on the border (Strasbourg, Metz, Belfort) which would be the proof that France could no more threathen German lands at will plus the colonial gains in Indochina. From the point of view of Louis Napoleon giving away French lands was very very hard; accepting the demolition of three fortresses and loosing some remote possessions in Indochina (which were not even producing revenues) was much more palatable. Neither Bismarck nor the French emperor were interested in neutralizing the border lands (and in no war the winner ever accepted restriction to its capacity of waging a new war).

Now I understand.

I would believe the Catholicism of the Prince Imperial was the result of his mother's influence.

Sounds plausible. A late 19th century France with a pro-clerical, pro-rural clicque at the top will be very different from OTL.

It is a very long shot, no doubt about it. It requires Henri becoming king (difficult), being able to bully the Assemblee Nationale (or however he wanted to call his parliament) into accepting Juan Carlos as his heir (almost impossible: a Spaniard on the throne of France?) and then Juan Carlos (or Jean Charles as he would be styled in France) being able to revive the Carlist faction in Spain and somehow getting that throne too (if the two pre-conditions somehow come to happen the final act is almost easy :D).

Just a minor detail, but I think you are mistaken about the name of the Carlist pretender. First there was Juan (III), Count of Montizón, but he abdicated from his claim in 1868 in favor of his son Carlos (VII), the Duke of Madrid and Duke of Anjou.

This idea of mine came up a few years ago in a TL (A Different 1866) where Italy was performing better in the 1866 war: this would have resulted in stronger ties between Italy and Prussia and the signing of a defensive treaty against France and Austria. Louis Napoleon would declare war on Italy at the end of 1867 (Italy emboldened by the good performance in 1866 and reassured by the defensive treaty would enter in Rome 3 years earlier than OTL; upon the French declaration of war the NGC would issue an ultimatum threatening intervention and would subsequently invade; the war would end up even worse for France and in the post-war turmoil Henri would get the throne to be succeded by Jean Charles who would gain the Spanish throne too).

Interesting. Do you have perchance a link?
 
Sounds plausible. A late 19th century France with a pro-clerical, pro-rural clicque at the top will be very different from OTL.
Very much so, and I believe it will not be a better France: obdurately conservative, clerical of the deepest dye, with the pope tossed into the mix and either an absolutist Bonaparte or a more absolutist Bourbon at the top? Just like an Action Francais regime only worse.


Just a minor detail, but I think you are mistaken about the name of the Carlist pretender. First there was Juan (III), Count of Montizón, but he abdicated from his claim in 1868 in favor of his son Carlos (VII), the Duke of Madrid and Duke of Anjou.
You are quite right of course. Carlos would have become the official Carlist pretender in 1868. It would even work better since Carlos was a staunch conservative (unsurprisingly given he was raised in Modena by his uncle duke Francis V: even in the bleak panorama of Italian states post 1848 the hardship of the repressions in Modena was notorious) while his father was considered more liberal-leaning. The third Carlist war was fought between 1872 and 1876 and notwithstanding some early successes the Carlist party did not probably have a real chance of winning. However ITTL things might be different: there might be French volunteers fighting for Carlos and supplies being smuggled across the border (the Carlist strongholds were in the Basque country and in Catalonia). Even better Pius IX (who has decamped to France ITTL and is even more pissed than ever with Italy and the Savoys) might well bless the Carlist cause and - taking a leaf from the past - send Carlos a papal banner to be brought forward in the fight against the godless liberals. ITTL Carlos might possibly become king of Spain.


Interesting. Do you have perchance a link?
Ask and you shall be given https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=136060&highlight=1866
 
Very much so, and I believe it will not be a better France: obdurately conservative, clerical of the deepest dye, with the pope tossed into the mix and either an absolutist Bonaparte or a more absolutist Bourbon at the top? Just like an Action Francais regime only worse.

Not good for non-catholics, the urban working population, women, Jews ... Would this have tangible economic consequences? I admit I know only the most superficial stuff about French economics: All the money French banks invested in OTL Russia - where did it come from? Would less wealth be generated in this ATL France?

You are quite right of course. Carlos would have become the official Carlist pretender in 1868. It would even work better since Carlos was a staunch conservative (unsurprisingly given he was raised in Modena by his uncle duke Francis V: even in the bleak panorama of Italian states post 1848 the hardship of the repressions in Modena was notorious) while his father was considered more liberal-leaning. The third Carlist war was fought between 1872 and 1876 and notwithstanding some early successes the Carlist party did not probably have a real chance of winning. However ITTL things might be different: there might be French volunteers fighting for Carlos and supplies being smuggled across the border (the Carlist strongholds were in the Basque country and in Catalonia). Even better Pius IX (who has decamped to France ITTL and is even more pissed than ever with Italy and the Savoys) might well bless the Carlist cause and - taking a leaf from the past - send Carlos a papal banner to be brought forward in the fight against the godless liberals. ITTL Carlos might possibly become king of Spain.

And not for the best of Spain. There might be some neo-feudalism with regional Carlist strongmen in the various parts of the kingdom, only nominally united by their loyalty to the king.

General question: With a oppressive conservative king in madrid, what will happen in the colonies? I expect a German attempt to buy the Spanish East Indies, but what about Cuba and Puerto Rico? An earlier Spanish-American War in the late 1870s or early 1880s?

Thank you. I hope I will find time soon to study it.
 
Not good for non-catholics, the urban working population, women, Jews ...

Yes, not very good at all. I was thinking that if Louis Napoleon does not stay with MacMahon he would return to Paris. This would have the advantage of avoiding the sudden collapse of the government structure and the siege of Paris. There would be some manifestations in Paris as there were IOTL, and they may become armed insurrections, but the lesser difficulties of the Parisian population and the presence of a tottering but still alive regime would avoid a full radicalization. The lower classes in Paris number more than 1 million (out of 2 million population) and there are some 100,000 political refugees from other European states almost unanimously republicans and leftists: in a Paris where the economy has almost stopped their lot will be a very hard one and it is most likely that with spring there will be another armed insurrection; still the government should be able to repress it and possibly without too much blood unless they panic, A lot depends on the health of Louis Napoleon (which is not good: his kidney stones are getting worse and worse), but it is quite likely that an armistice can be arranged by mid-September both on the northern front and at the siege of Metz and peace negotiations can start by the end of the month. Let's assume that they take place in Frankfurt, same as IOTL. The French delegation will be very different from the one that negotiated with Bismarck IOTL February 1871 although it is not guaranteed that it will be better: it will be heavily slanted toward the extreme right (the Mamelukes) and may include Count Palikao (if he is still prime minister - if the emperor decides to form a new government of Unite Nationale Ollivier may take his place) and the marquis de Gremont (or his replacement as Foreign Minister). Trochu should be the military advisor. If the government of UN is formed, both Thiers and Favre may be drafted for the negotiation (not a big advantage for France: IOTL Otto run rings around them both). In the meantime Pius IX decides to decamp to France when the last French troops are recalled home (but still leaves the commander of Papal troops with the order to oppose with force any Italian attempt to enter Rome: when Italian troops enter Latium on schedule the resistance is longer and bloodier and there is fighting in Rome too).

After a month of negotiation Bismarck grinds down the French resolve (the military situation is bad, Bazaine is still holed up in Metz and the imperial regime is weak) and gets the peace terms he wants: the fortifications of Metz, Strasbourg and Belfort will be demolished and France will not rebuild them in the future, Cochinchina and the protectorate over Cambodia are transferred to the NCG (= to Prussia) and reparation shall be paid by France (half the amount of IOTL since the war was shorter). Bismarck has not had the time to negotiate with the southern German states: no German empire proclaimed in 1871 ITTL; the liberal-nationals will be somehow unhappy but also that the issue of integrating the southern territories into the German Reich is deferred; Prussia will take the lead for the joint defense of the other members of the NCG and for the southern states too, and the "German Indochina" will be included in the Zollverein (Otto may be happy enough with the compromise, the conservatives too).

The peace treaty is signed in Frankfurt on 15 November and the siege of Metz is lifted. The Prussians occupy Strasbourg, Metz and Belfort pending the payment of the war indemnity. Bazaine rush to Paris in the attempt to capitalize on being at the head of the last undefeated French Corps (bullshit, but you know) but without success. The peace treaty is not well received by Parisian masses and there are continuous although sporadic outburst of violence. The government of National Unity does not survive and again count Palikao form a right wing government. The emperor is despondent and his health continues to deteriorate. On 31 December he abdicates in favor of his son, under a Regency Council, and goes into exile in England with the empress. New elections are called for mid April 1871 but will not be held: in March Paris erupts in a full insurrection. Napoleon IV, the Regency Council and the government flee to Fontainebleu. The insurrection is bloody but does not last: within two weeks the insurrection is repressed by loyalist troops under MacMahon (Bazaine is furious). The Prussian ambassador delivers a congratulatory message to the emperor in occasion of his return to Paris. The National Assembly is dissolved but no new elections are called: for the next two years the Regency Council will rule by decree in the name of the underage emperor. Nothing much happens for two years (the economy is in a slump, the Regency Council is divided with the Ultramontane faction pressing for help for the exiled pope, anti-foreigner riots are frequent in the major cities and antisemitism increases. The rural areas are calmer but tense: the young emperor is not popular and royalist sentiments start to emerge not just among peasants but also within the bourgeoisie and the administration. The only good news are the completion of the payment of war indemnities (1872: the Prussian occupiers evacuate the fortresses) and the marriage between the emperor and Gisela of Austria in June 1873. The end of the 2nd empire comes in March 1874: a strike in Lyons is broken by troops leaving a few dead on the ground. When the news reach Paris the capital erupts into insurrection. This time is much worse than in 1871: some of the regiments garrisoning Paris join the insurgency and the emperor and his young bride flee for Calais and thence a safe exile in England. It is the hour of Bazaine, who is now commanding the army camp at Chalons: he marches on Paris, where a Commune has been proclaimed, and after two weeks of bloody city fighting (the bloody days of May) the Commune is defeated. An obscure colonel, Georges Ernest Boulanger, distinguishes himself in the fight and is wounded in the attack of the Pantheon. Bazaine declares the dissolution of the empire, assumes ad interim dictatorial powers and calls a referendum for 1st September: a king of the House of Bourbon or a republic. The referendum returns a majority of almost 80% for the royalist option. Bazaine at the head of a delegation of notables goes to offer to Henri de Bourbon the crown of France.

I decided to draft this micro-TL just to put into perspective the political and economical situation of France and it is not written in stone.

Would this have tangible economic consequences? I admit I know only the most superficial stuff about French economics: All the money French banks invested in OTL Russia - where did it come from? Would less wealth be generated in this ATL France?

The regime that governs a country has obviously a strong influence on its economic outcome even if no country lives in isolation. However it's not so easy just to change a regime and see an immediate impact on the economic result. IOTL France economy went by cycles: over the period 1830-1860 economy rose pretty strongly and industrial production went with it (this happened under the Orleans and the first half of the Bonapartist regime); from 1860 to 1890 economy still rose, but very slowly and significantly below the inflation rate and industrial production did even worse, raising at a rate of 0.5% per year (second half of the Bonapartist regime and 3rd Republic. To get a more complete picture this factors in the liberalization of the law on public companies in 1867, the loss of the position of first financial center of Europe in favor of London, the agricultural crisis of the late 1870s-early 1880s when imports from the Americas started to undercut the agricultural sector in Europe and the big financial crash of 1882); after 1890 bot economy and industrial production rose, accelerating after 1905 and up to 1914. My point here is that the Orleans revolution in 1830 is not the only motor of the economic growth over the next 30 years, the revolution of 1848 did not influence too negatively the economic cycle but also that the first 10 years of Bonapartist regime most likely are at the root of the economic downturn of the next 20 years not forgetting the shock of the Franco-Prussian war (the economic reforms of the late 1860s did not kick in enough to start a new growth cycle); the reforms of the 3rd republic - even if partly vitiated by political instability - were successful and are probably at the root of the next economic cycle (I'd say that without the agricultural crisis the recovery might have started earlier, but the crash of 1882 is not serendipity: boom-and-bust cycles must always be assumed).
It is also necessary to consider the peculiarities of France: first of all the relatively low percentage of people living in large cities (30%) which compares with the 45% of British urbanites (and the 55% in the Low Countries) in the same period; second the very high percentage of workers in the agricultural sector (50% of able bodied workers which means 8.5 million people to which we must add women and children who are always a significant percentage of an agricultural workforce) compared with the percentage of able bodied workers in the industrial sector (25%); third the French predilection for smallish industries and artisans which resulted in a much larger fragmentation of industrial enterprises compared with UK, Belgium or Germany; fourth (and quite significant) the distaste (not to say virulent antagonism) with which both the extreme right and the extreme left regarded the nouveau riches, the entrepreneurs that where fast climbing the social hierarchies (and it is interesting that a lot of industrialists and entrepreneurs were not really proud f what they were doing even if money and success were abundant: there is the story of an industrialist from Normandy, a very successful one, who became minister during the 2nd empire. Not only he did neglect his factories but found better satisfaction in marrying his daughters in the peerage and gaining a title himself. While it was a common goal of many industrialists in Great Britain too to marry their offspring to a title, none of them would have been ashamed of his profession nor would he neglect his factories. The only parts of France where this way of thinking was not practiced were the Pays du Nord and Alsace-Lorraine).
Mind, I'm not an economist nor an economic historian. If you are interested in the economic history of France the must-read is "The French Economy in the XIX Century" by Maurice Levy-Leboyer. It's obviously a very dry book, but very well reserched and choke-full of figures.
The attraction of French banks for getting involved in foreign loans (often to the detriment of the national access to credit) was heavily criticized by contemporary economists too. However Levy-Leboyer demonstrates that the returns French banks were making on foreign loans were much higher than what they made out of domestic loans and that their business strategy was not absurd at all. The question then is why German companies in the 1870s financed their expansion by setting up bank facilities in countries where the banking system was more free and efficient than in Germany (mainly Switzerland and Belgium: Krupp financed the acquisition of very rich iron mines in northern Spain in this way, and the same did later Thyssen this time in France and Sweden) but the French industrialists were more reluctant to follow this path.

And not for the best of Spain. There might be some neo-feudalism with regional Carlist strongmen in the various parts of the kingdom, only nominally united by their loyalty to the king.
Not necessarily. While Carlism was big in promising to defend ancient authonomies I doubt it would have really approved any form of neo-feudalism. It looks more like a sponsor of the "one king, one religion, one country" motto.

General question: With a oppressive conservative king in madrid, what will happen in the colonies? I expect a German attempt to buy the Spanish East Indies, but what about Cuba and Puerto Rico? An earlier Spanish-American War in the late 1870s or early 1880s?
Philippines, Marianas, Guam: it would be quite possible that these dependencies might be ultimately sold either for cash or as a fee to pay in special circumstances (if it comes to a personal union between France and Spain for example). If Germany is already present in Indochina it might become a possible buyer (IIRC during the Spanish-American war the German Far East squadron was dispatched to Manila to create a fait accompli while Spain and Germany negotiated the sale. Dewey got there before of them and the defeat of the Spanish fleet killed for ever the opportunity).
Cuba and Puertorico are much thornier issues. From 1868 to 1878 Cuba was in revolt against Spain (the Little War): IOTL the 3rd Carlist war (1872-76) may have disrupted the Spanish forces on the island, but in the end the independentist movement was defeated. ITTL Carlos may have bigger fishes to fry, and not be interested enough or have spare troops and money to suppress the insurrection and Cuba might go on her own way (meaning as an informal protectorate of the USA who were the main investors on the island). The 1868 insurrection of Puertorico was immediately repressed by Spain but the autonomist party was quite active in the 1870s. If Spain let Cuba go, the same might happen for Puertorico too (other on his own or in some kind of federation with Cuba).

The alternative might be that Carlos keeps both islands (for the time being at least) and a solution is delayed by 10 or 20 years.
 
I decided to draft this micro-TL just to put into perspective the political and economical situation of France and it is not written in stone.

Thank you very much for writing down the scattered ideas. Just a minor comment: With his strong catholic leanings and the background of his wife, the Emperor will probably wind up in exile somwhere on a castle in Austria.

The regime that governs a country has obviously a strong influence on its economic outcome even if no country lives in isolation. However it's not so easy just to change a regime and see an immediate impact on the economic result.

Very interesting overview. Sadly economics are often overlooked in political altTLs the same way logistics are ignored in many military TLs.

Not necessarily. While Carlism was big in promising to defend ancient authonomies I doubt it would have really approved any form of neo-feudalism. It looks more like a sponsor of the "one king, one religion, one country" motto.

In theory surely. But my (cursory) reading about the Third Carlist War implied that it could only have been won for the Carlist side by many coordinated localized efforts, not by one centralized army.

Cuba and Puertorico are much thornier issues. From 1868 to 1878 Cuba was in revolt against Spain (the Little War): IOTL the 3rd Carlist war (1872-76) may have disrupted the Spanish forces on the island, but in the end the independentist movement was defeated. ITTL Carlos may have bigger fishes to fry, and not be interested enough or have spare troops and money to suppress the insurrection and Cuba might go on her own way (meaning as an informal protectorate of the USA who were the main investors on the island). The 1868 insurrection of Puertorico was immediately repressed by Spain but the autonomist party was quite active in the 1870s. If Spain let Cuba go, the same might happen for Puertorico too (other on his own or in some kind of federation with Cuba).

The alternative might be that Carlos keeps both islands (for the time being at least) and a solution is delayed by 10 or 20 years.

Are there any probable repercussions for US politics if the antiliberal Carlos becomes King of Spain? Grant as president is a given, but will anti-Spanish and/or anti-Catholic sentiment bring some other Republican to the top in 1876? How will it affect the almost-success of Tilden?
 
A differrent topic: Is there any possibility of derailing or changing the First Vaticanum in this TL? The final ballot regarding the infallibility dogma was on 18th july 1870; while the FPW started on 19th july. Having the Council end (or be adjourned sine die) without an adoption of that dogma would be a great PoD.
What about the idea that the French troops were withdrawn earlier (perhaps because Paris does not believe Italy will act quickly) and make a small difference during the fighting against Prussia?

Hoi, I just read this: According to Bismarck, Pius I had asked if Germany would offer asylum, and Bismarck had thought of Cologne or Fulda (both Prussian). But King Wilhelm I. was vehemently opposed to that. Oh, the AH possibilities.
Other places for a reconvened Council mentioned are (British) Malta and (Austrian) Trent. At least in this Wiki article, no French or Spanish places are suggested.
 
A differrent topic: Is there any possibility of derailing or changing the First Vaticanum in this TL? The final ballot regarding the infallibility dogma was on 18th july 1870; while the FPW started on 19th july. Having the Council end (or be adjourned sine die) without an adoption of that dogma would be a great PoD.
Not a chance, I'm afraid.
Vatican I does not comes out of the blue when Pius IX officially convokes the council on 29 June 1868.
The "necessity" to have the doctrine of papal infallibility is not a new one, but in 1864 the pope and the curia reach the decision that it is necessary for the future that this doctrine be ratified by a council. The dogma of the Immaculate Conception had been proclaimed by Pius IX in 1854, speaking ex-cathedra, but had not been well received: not only other Christian confessions had refused to accept it but also a significant portion of the Catholic world was critical and it was thought that the validation of the doctrine of papal infallibility by a full council had become necessary. Even more worrying for the Church was the proliferation of materialistic doctrines and in general the concept of the freedom of conscience and the separation between Church and State. The loss of the majority of the former papal states and the danger of loosing even Rome (in 1864 France and Italy had signed a convention for the recall of French troops from Rome, the re-location of the Italian capital to Florence and a joint guarantee to the rump papal state in Latium) was another reason of discontent. Pius IX was ready to condemn the principles of modernity and freedom of conscience (which he did on 8 December 1864 by the enciclic Quanta Cura and the attached Syllabus which listed the 80 "errors" which were against Catholic doctrine). Quanta Cura condemned the right of freedom of conscience and of individual worship but went also on to condemn the right of states to provide a lay education, the obligation of Catholics to obey the laws of the state whenever they were in contrast with catholic doctrine and so on. The idea was to call a council for 1866, but when the war against Austria started the convocation was cancelled. Still the council had to be convened and the extra years gave even more time to the pope and the curia to prepare their strategy. The pope himself decided not to invite regnants (or their delegates) as had been customary in previous councils (to have to invite the king of Italy would have been embarrassing since the pope had never recognized the title and still referred to him as the king of Sardinia). The Council first opened on 8 December 1869, the 5th anniversary of Quanta Cura as well as the feast day of the Virgin Mary. The dogmatic constitution of the Catholic church (Dei Filius) was unanimously approved on 24 April 1870, then the troubles started. The doctrine of papal infallibility was not unanimously accepted: the papal party was supported by a significant majority of the participants to the council (at least 530 out of 600), but this majority was not completely homogeneous and included different positions. Notwithstanding the fix that was already in (the key commissions were all in the hands of staunch papal supporters, many of whom had participated in the redaction of Quanta Cura and the Syllabus) when an attempt was made to convert the Syllabus into dogma the reaction of a large number of prelates convinced even Pius IX that it would be almost impossible to have it approved without the risk of wrecking the church unity: the attempt was terminated. In order to avoid future problems the procedures for discussion in the council are suddenly modified: any objection to the text presented by the commission must be submitted in writing beforehand and the commission will decide if they are acceptable or not; even the discussion of the objections admitted by the commission may be terminated at any time by a majority vote of the assembly. The new scheme under discussion (De Ecclesia Christi) should deal with the church itself and its relations with the modern world. The official account of the council says that the question of the papal infallibility was introduced only later, by some 60 bishops and cardinals led by Manning, archbishop of Westminster, Duchamps, archbishop of Malines, and Senestrey, bishop of Ratisbona : the petition submitted to the council asks to recognize the "supreme and infallible power of the pope". There is an immediate and strong reaction to this proposal: central Europe, most of France and Germany (Ignaz von Dollinger a famous theologian from the university of Munich is a leader of this opposition and will end up excommunicated in 1873). Italian prelates are divided but two important archbishops (Nazari of Milan and Guidi of Bologna) are openly critical: Guidi is a Dominican and the entire order supports him (opposing the Jesuits who were behind the doctrine of papal infallibility). The reaction of the European diplomacy is even stronger. In the end the original petition is watered down and papal infallibility is (more or less) limited to the full and unarguable supremacy of the pope in all ecclesiastical aspects and whenever speaking ex-cathedra on matters of faith or moral. Pastor Aeternus is approved on 18 July 1870 by an overwhelming majority (533 yes, 2 no) but almost 70 prelates have already left Rome to distance themselves from this deliberation and the discussion which has led to the final vote has been quite heated.

To recapitulate: it is obvious that Pius IX wanted his infallibility doctrine and he got it although a bit watered down. The minority opposing it did its best but there was no chance to postpone the vote (and anyway the council was only officially suspended on 20 October 1870; even the Italian entry in Rome was on 20 September which means that there were at least two more months to wrap it up). It is however conceivable that Pius IX might have insisted on the first version of the doctrine ("supreme and infallible power of the pope") and might have rammed it by force: the church would have certainly be lacerated and the reaction of the states with catholic population would have certainly been very hostile, but then Pius IX had a history of bullying ahead without caring for consequences. This would be a hell of a POD.

What about the idea that the French troops were withdrawn earlier (perhaps because Paris does not believe Italy will act quickly) and make a small difference during the fighting against Prussia?
Since we are talking of just two regiments I don't think it would have made any difference. In a way these troops helped a bit to stiffen up the army of the Provisional Government.

Hoi, I just read this: According to Bismarck, Pius I had asked if Germany would offer asylum, and Bismarck had thought of Cologne or Fulda (both Prussian). But King Wilhelm I. was vehemently opposed to that. Oh, the AH possibilities.
Other places for a reconvened Council mentioned are (British) Malta and (Austrian) Trent. At least in this Wiki article, no French or Spanish places are suggested.
It looks funny, but Pius IX did not have a lot of alternatives: the Bonapartist regime had fallen, Austria was really pissed by the doctrine of papal infallibility and the same was Bavaria and Belgium, the king of Spain was the brother of the king of Italy. Where should he have gone? Possibly that is the reason for which Pius IX in the end remained holed up in the Vatican palace: unless he decided to go to Brazil or Argentina (not exactly places from which he might easily be heard) there was nowhere else to go. If the Bonapartist regime does not fall he may well decide to go.
On 10 September 1870 Italian ambassadors informed the various European capitals of the decision to enter in Rome: all the response were favourable or at worst neutral (including the French Provisional Government and Austria). The only one who took 10 days before answering was Bismarck: maybe it is linked to the papal request of asylum, maybe he just wanted to better evaluate the situation. Still 10 days to answer on a matter in which the NGC was not really involved?

The idea of reconvening the council in Malta or Trent was clearly absurd: Austria was unhappy with the proceeds of the council and Gladstone would not have been inclined to do a favor to the pope. It would have also put Pius IX in a sort of quandary: the pope has to be present when the council is in session but he would have needed to ask for the permission of the Italian government to come and go from Rome. Pius IX?
 
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Thank you very much for writing down the scattered ideas. Just a minor comment: With his strong catholic leanings and the background of his wife, the Emperor will probably wind up in exile somewhere on a castle in Austria.
In the end he almost certainly would. When he leaves Paris in a hurry I would bet his only thought is to run to mommy :D


Very interesting overview. Sadly economics are often overlooked in political altTLs the same way logistics are ignored in many military TLs.
Very true. However economic PODs are the most difficult to handle, both because of the law of unintended consequences (something that looks very reasonable in the immediate may become a big liability in the future) and some economic changes which make perfect sense from the perspective of the 21st century may well be politically impossible to implement in the 19th (I am strongly convinced that a radical land reform was the only way to put the south of Italy back on track. I also recognize that it would be mightily difficult for any government to implement them even if someone had been bright enough to recognize the need)


In theory surely. But my (cursory) reading about the Third Carlist War implied that it could only have been won for the Carlist side by many coordinated localized efforts, not by one centralized army.
You are talking of IOTL. ITTL I would posit French supplies and volunteers for the Carlists and this might change the perspective. Coordinating in a successful way a number of localized efforts is a bit like herding chickens (and in the end the Carlists lost: looks like their strategy was the wrong one, wasn't it?)


Are there any probable repercussions for US politics if the antiliberal Carlos becomes King of Spain? Grant as president is a given, but will anti-Spanish and/or anti-Catholic sentiment bring some other Republican to the top in 1876? How will it affect the almost-success of Tilden?

I am not knowledgeable in internal USA politics of the era. My guess is that the USA administration would be concentrated on the reconstruction of the south and anyway did not much care one way or another for the bizarre behavior of European monarchies as far as they were not infringing on their turf.
 
When would German unification happen in the minitimeline you established, Lord Kalvan, if not in 1871?
 
Also, would it be plausible for the Prussians/Germans to seek the cession of Weissenburg and Lauterburg from France in this timeline? I suppose they'd be going to Bavaria, but still...
 
When would German unification happen in the minitimeline you established, Lord Kalvan, if not in 1871?

A sort of German unification has already happened in a way: Zollverein parliament has been going since 1867 and after the peace with France the southern German states enter into a "common defense pact" with NGC.

What is going to happen after that is less easy to be sure of: I believe that Bismarck may not be really interested to push for a German Empire in the immediate.
OTOH it is also obvious that the National-Liberal will not be happy but this may make it easier for Bismarck to manage the conservatives (he needs to raise taxation and they are in opposition).
Another good question is the financial stability of the southern German states (Bavaria in particular is almost broken). In the end they may have to push for the empire to stay afloat.
A possible alternative might be that they cling to their (more or less nominal) independence and try to find someone else that foots the bills (Austria? If they do the Hungarians will be very unhappy, but there is also a possibility of a rapprochement between Austria and France - be it an imperial or a monarchical France - and it would make sense to do some spadework in south Germany. This obviously might lead to a war sometime in the late 1870s - early 1880s or alternatively to an early break-up of A-H because the Hungarians are very pissed. It might also result in less Austrian interest in the Balkans and more space for Russia).
Latest I suppose might be when Wilhelm II gets crowned: if anyone wanted to become emperor more than Willy I don't know him.
It is very vague, and the dice might fall in different ways
 
A sort of German unification has already happened in a way: Zollverein parliament has been going since 1867 and after the peace with France the southern German states enter into a "common defense pact" with NGC.

What is going to happen after that is less easy to be sure of: I believe that Bismarck may not be really interested to push for a German Empire in the immediate.
OTOH it is also obvious that the National-Liberal will not be happy but this may make it easier for Bismarck to manage the conservatives (he needs to raise taxation and they are in opposition).
Another good question is the financial stability of the southern German states (Bavaria in particular is almost broken). In the end they may have to push for the empire to stay afloat.
A possible alternative might be that they cling to their (more or less nominal) independence and try to find someone else that foots the bills (Austria? If they do the Hungarians will be very unhappy, but there is also a possibility of a rapprochement between Austria and France - be it an imperial or a monarchical France - and it would make sense to do some spadework in south Germany. This obviously might lead to a war sometime in the late 1870s - early 1880s or alternatively to an early break-up of A-H because the Hungarians are very pissed. It might also result in less Austrian interest in the Balkans and more space for Russia).
Latest I suppose might be when Wilhelm II gets crowned: if anyone wanted to become emperor more than Willy I don't know him.
It is very vague, and the dice might fall in different ways

Lots of fun possibilities. If Bavaria is broke, might this mean a German Empire with fewer caveats for particular member states?
 
Lots of fun possibilities. If Bavaria is broke, might this mean a German Empire with fewer caveats for particular member states?

IOTL Bavaria negotiated while the Paris siege was ongoing, and king Ludwig was selected to offer the imperial crown. ITTL who knows?
 
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