There is a number of PODs, one of which being France using the Escaut plan instead of the Dyle plan during the German invasion of Belgium, which is explored in A Blunted Sickle.What would it take for France not to fall to the Germans?
What would it take for France not to fall to the Germans?
There was some Polish officer that gave the French a report that gave his recommendations for how to deal with blitzkrieg after seeing it first hand. It was never opened.
There are maybe four paradigms that come to mind in stopping blitzkrieg. These are some historical models that the French have to choose from that I can think of that might be good for anti blitzkrieg:
With #1 the French might need to hold out until 1941, when supposedly the German economy would tank. Unless the French can make the kind of thinking entailed in #3 and 4 work, then they are probably not going to beat the Germans otherwise in a war of attrition. They don't have the population (or Geo-strategic position that the USSR enjoyed) for it, or even the industry presumably. And, they might not fare as well in round 2. Out of #3 and #4 I would say #3 is the best chance they have because of how close of a call Arras was for the Germans; #4 is much more ambitious in spatial terms of distance that needs to be covered (and I wonder if the Germans going into Belgium could possibly act as a reserve to counter this maybe if they were pulled off the Belgian front and redirected to the French attack).
- Battles of Kursk/Khalkhin Gol/Moscow -- The interesting thing I think is how the French performed in Belgium itself (Battle of the Gembloux Gap for example). The Germans lost a heavy percentage of their tanks fighting these battles. The French were basically fighting Kursk in Belgium when they needed to be fighting it in France.
- Battle of Vukovar (but even here the Croatians had to still defeat the Serbs with other methods-- this by itself only potentially buys valuable time) -- This might translate to a prolonged battle of Sedan. The question becomes to what end? Maybe to buy time for the French to do a retrograde defense, mass withdrawal to avert disaster
- Third Battle of Kharkov -- This translate to a larger Abbeville or Montcornet type strategy necessitating the main effort of the French army rather than the half hearted attempt it was OTL. Considering how dangerous to the Germans OTL Arras was this clearly has some potential. If it were successful it would ensure the destruction of the major part of Kleists forces (Guderian and Reinhardt would be ensnared) after they were counter encircled assuming any attack by the cut off Germans or the Germans opposite them to break them out ended with failure.
- Something akin to Operation Kutuzov/Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev -- This is what the Germans seemed to have feared the most (an attack from the direction of Verdun). Its purpose is to basically the same as #3 except instead of attacking the German armors flank, attacking further down at the base of the attack (although presumably right smack into German infantry as a risk here)
So, my opinion is that something akin to Arras was their most logical option. Whether or not it succeeds is debatable, but if it did then they presumably win the war in the most efficient way possible.
In contrast, current research points out that the French not only took extensive interest in what happened in the Polish campaign and adjusted their operational deployments as a result, but that they did so to such a degree that it is what led to the defeat in 1940. It wasn't that the French learned the lessons of the Poland campaign : it is that they overcompensated for it.
While all of these proposals that you present are tactically interesting, none are really applicable given the deployment of French forces. Launching a counter-attack into the Germans is all very well and good, but it requires the forces to carry out that counter-attack to be deployed there, instead of being deployed in Belgium or headed towards the Netherlands.
Have some one high up in the French Government - their Ministry of Defence 'do a Marshall' and as war clouds gather, fire or sideline all of the old generals and promote younger men who are more capable of taking on new ideas and learning the lessons from failed ones. ...
These are important points. The idea of a "purge" should send shivers up the backs of anyone with knowledge of how large organizations tend to work. Nobody knows in advance that war is coming specifically in 1939. You go to war with the army you have, and if that army is in the middle of wholesale reconstruction at the time, let alone if that's self-imposed via a purge, then you'd better have one heck of a buffer in place to buy you the time to do what needs doing.This has potential, but must occur fairly early, in 1937 or 36. Marshalls purge started in 1939 & actually Malin had been selectively eliminating unfit Generals earlier. It took the US Army over two years to both work out the practical application of the new doctrine, which it had on the table already, and to train a new generation of commanders and staff. This process was not completed until after AGF, ASF, & AAF were established in early 1942 & the final reorganization of the Army occurred that winter and spring. All that came under the urgency of rapidly approaching war.
Given the peace time constrains the last best PoD for this is Gamelins appointment in 1936. That gives four years to revisit French doctrines and officer training.
However this is not a panacea. Training in the French Army was severely constrained by the defense budget. Unlike the nazi government the Chamber of Deputies were not going to engage in deficit spending until forced to by a immediate threat of war. Neither were they inclined to raise taxes to the necessary level. Between the desire to modernize the air force, and have maximum numbers in the ground forces there was insufficient funds to train the ground force to the needed standards. The training completed and doctrines in place were as much a result of the funds available as any particular devotion to a doctrinal school. Hence officer and staff training suffered. Given some very tough choices the focus on defense and methodical battle planning were chosen because they fit the funds available. Under the nazis the Wehrmacht could afford more than double the training time for their commanding officers & HQ staff than the French, near triple in some cases. "That allowed training to progress to more complex or sophisticated levels.
This is one reason De Gaulle and many like minded thinkers proposed a much smaller standing army. Resources could be concentrated to produce a far more capable ready force. After the Munich Crisis there was some concentration of training resources on the first echelon reservists, the 'Active' units. That increased after mobilization from September 1939, but it was not enough to save the battle in may 1940. The were far to many undertrained Category B formations on the battle front.
What would it take for France not to fall to the Germans?
The French tanks were superior to the German tanks. It was doctrine which was deficient.IMHO, the resources wasted on building the Maginot Line would have to be used to modernise their armoured forces (radios in every tank for a start)
I agree.PLUS it would be necessary to remove of the 'Old Guard'
That's a myth. Mobile warfare was partially theorised in France, notably by De Gaulle and Estienne.(who only knew how to dig tenches) and replace them with officers trained in mobile warfare (but trained by who ??? the only 'mobile warefare' training available at the time was in Germany... it's possible that the British could have (did ?) come up with the same Blitzkrieg concept == but no way would the 'High Command' have stood for it).
That is however exact.Finally, the commanders in the field would have to be given the authority to act == thinking fast enough to recognise the German 'spearhead' and organise a counter-attack only 'works' if they can do so without having to wait for permission from the 'High Command' in Paris (by the time messengers have gone back and forth the opportunity will have been lost) ..
What would it take for France not to fall to the Germans?
1. Gamelin could have chosen to forego the foolish plan to send the 7th Army into southern Holland and instead keeps it as a strategic reserve, which was the original intention and would have been the best course of action. Conceivably, it might have been sent to reinforce the Meuse line and plug the gap the panzers tore in the French line there.
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Thats why I thought it needed to start not later than 1936, when Gamelin was appointed. That gives three years to accomplish what changes might be made. Tho in the case of the French army there is a different trap.These are important points. The idea of a "purge" should send shivers up the backs of anyone with knowledge of how large organizations tend to work. Nobody knows in advance that war is coming specifically in 1939. You go to war with the army you have, and if that army is in the middle of wholesale reconstruction at the time, let alone if that's self-imposed via a purge, then you'd better have one heck of a buffer in place to buy you the time to do what needs doing.
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Finally, the commanders in the field would have to be given the authority to act == thinking fast enough to recognise the German 'spearhead' and organise a counter-attack only 'works' if they can do so without having to wait for permission from the 'High Command' in Paris (by the time messengers have gone back and forth the opportunity will have been lost) ..
However this is not a panacea. Training in the French Army was severely constrained by the defense budget. Unlike the nazi government the Chamber of Deputies were not going to engage in deficit spending until forced to by a immediate threat of war. Neither were they inclined to raise taxes to the necessary level. Between the desire to modernize the air force, and have maximum numbers in the ground forces there was insufficient funds to train the ground force to the needed standards. The training completed and doctrines in place were as much a result of the funds available as any particular devotion to a doctrinal school. Hence officer and staff training suffered. Given some very tough choices the focus on defense and methodical battle planning were chosen because they fit the funds available. Under the nazis the Wehrmacht could afford more than double the training time for their commanding officers & HQ staff than the French, near triple in some cases. "That allowed training to progress to more complex or sophisticated levels.
However, if the politicians, who were deathly afraid of a military/fascist coup, see a strong man in the army who replaces everyone with men loyal to him and turns the army into his own machine, they might raise some objections.Have some one high up in the French Government - their Ministry of Defence 'do a Marshall' and as war clouds gather, fire or sideline all of the old generals and promote younger men who are more capable of taking on new ideas and learning the lessons from failed ones.
The Maginot line did exactly what it needed to do, and a lot of bunkers didn't fall at all, they lasted until after the armistice. Of course, the issue of a fixed line is that, if you rely on an ally to close the gaps (like Belgium was supposed to) and they don't do it, the enemy can bypass it.IMHO, the resources wasted on building the Maginot Line would have to be used to modernise their armoured forces (radios in every tank for a start) ...
IMHO, if the (historical) French political and military command structure (+ officers, tactics etc) remains 'in place' the outcome (of a Nazi attack in 1940 = or any other time) is always going to be the same ..
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Not really. The Char B-1bis has a one man turret, in which the commander is also the gunner and loader. That is not really helpful in combat.The French tanks were superior to the German tanks.
@Carl Schwamberger
What is your opinion of French doctrine, putting all else aside ?
For all the comments about lack of pace and initiative, do you think that a decently trained French force would have performed well.
Looking at their methods, I really don't think that late British/American doctrine were great improvements over how the French should have fought.