AHC: France holds during WW2

What would it take for France not to fall to the Germans?

There was some Polish officer that gave the French a report that gave his recommendations for how to deal with blitzkrieg after seeing it first hand. It was never opened.

There are maybe four paradigms that come to mind in stopping blitzkrieg. These are some historical models that the French have to choose from that I can think of that might be good for anti blitzkrieg:

  1. Battles of Kursk/Khalkhin Gol/Moscow -- The interesting thing I think is how the French performed in Belgium itself (Battle of the Gembloux Gap for example). The Germans lost a heavy percentage of their tanks fighting these battles. The French were basically fighting Kursk in Belgium when they needed to be fighting it in France.
  2. Battle of Vukovar (but even here the Croatians had to still defeat the Serbs with other methods-- this by itself only potentially buys valuable time) -- This might translate to a prolonged battle of Sedan. The question becomes to what end? Maybe to buy time for the French to do a retrograde defense, mass withdrawal to avert disaster
  3. Third Battle of Kharkov -- This translate to a larger Abbeville or Montcornet type strategy necessitating the main effort of the French army rather than the half hearted attempt it was OTL. Considering how dangerous to the Germans OTL Arras was this clearly has some potential. If it were successful it would ensure the destruction of the major part of Kleists forces (Guderian and Reinhardt would be ensnared) after they were counter encircled assuming any attack by the cut off Germans or the Germans opposite them to break them out ended with failure.
  4. Something akin to Operation Kutuzov/Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev -- This is what the Germans seemed to have feared the most (an attack from the direction of Verdun). Its purpose is to basically the same as #3 except instead of attacking the German armors flank, attacking further down at the base of the attack (although presumably right smack into German infantry as a risk here)
With #1 the French might need to hold out until 1941, when supposedly the German economy would tank. Unless the French can make the kind of thinking entailed in #3 and 4 work, then they are probably not going to beat the Germans otherwise in a war of attrition. They don't have the population (or Geo-strategic position that the USSR enjoyed) for it, or even the industry presumably. And, they might not fare as well in round 2. Out of #3 and #4 I would say #3 is the best chance they have because of how close of a call Arras was for the Germans; #4 is much more ambitious in spatial terms of distance that needs to be covered (and I wonder if the Germans going into Belgium could possibly act as a reserve to counter this maybe if they were pulled off the Belgian front and redirected to the French attack).

So, my opinion is that something akin to Arras was their most logical option. Whether or not it succeeds is debatable, but if it did then they presumably win the war in the most efficient way possible.
 
There was some Polish officer that gave the French a report that gave his recommendations for how to deal with blitzkrieg after seeing it first hand. It was never opened.

There are maybe four paradigms that come to mind in stopping blitzkrieg. These are some historical models that the French have to choose from that I can think of that might be good for anti blitzkrieg:

  1. Battles of Kursk/Khalkhin Gol/Moscow -- The interesting thing I think is how the French performed in Belgium itself (Battle of the Gembloux Gap for example). The Germans lost a heavy percentage of their tanks fighting these battles. The French were basically fighting Kursk in Belgium when they needed to be fighting it in France.
  2. Battle of Vukovar (but even here the Croatians had to still defeat the Serbs with other methods-- this by itself only potentially buys valuable time) -- This might translate to a prolonged battle of Sedan. The question becomes to what end? Maybe to buy time for the French to do a retrograde defense, mass withdrawal to avert disaster
  3. Third Battle of Kharkov -- This translate to a larger Abbeville or Montcornet type strategy necessitating the main effort of the French army rather than the half hearted attempt it was OTL. Considering how dangerous to the Germans OTL Arras was this clearly has some potential. If it were successful it would ensure the destruction of the major part of Kleists forces (Guderian and Reinhardt would be ensnared) after they were counter encircled assuming any attack by the cut off Germans or the Germans opposite them to break them out ended with failure.
  4. Something akin to Operation Kutuzov/Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev -- This is what the Germans seemed to have feared the most (an attack from the direction of Verdun). Its purpose is to basically the same as #3 except instead of attacking the German armors flank, attacking further down at the base of the attack (although presumably right smack into German infantry as a risk here)
With #1 the French might need to hold out until 1941, when supposedly the German economy would tank. Unless the French can make the kind of thinking entailed in #3 and 4 work, then they are probably not going to beat the Germans otherwise in a war of attrition. They don't have the population (or Geo-strategic position that the USSR enjoyed) for it, or even the industry presumably. And, they might not fare as well in round 2. Out of #3 and #4 I would say #3 is the best chance they have because of how close of a call Arras was for the Germans; #4 is much more ambitious in spatial terms of distance that needs to be covered (and I wonder if the Germans going into Belgium could possibly act as a reserve to counter this maybe if they were pulled off the Belgian front and redirected to the French attack).

So, my opinion is that something akin to Arras was their most logical option. Whether or not it succeeds is debatable, but if it did then they presumably win the war in the most efficient way possible.

In contrast, current research points out that the French not only took extensive interest in what happened in the Polish campaign and adjusted their operational deployments as a result, but that they did so to such a degree that it is what led to the defeat in 1940. It wasn't that the French learned the lessons of the Poland campaign : it is that they overcompensated for it.

While all of these proposals that you present are tactically interesting, none are really applicable given the deployment of French forces. Launching a counter-attack into the Germans is all very well and good, but it requires the forces to carry out that counter-attack to be deployed there, instead of being deployed in Belgium or headed towards the Netherlands.
 
May in 'Strange Victory' his analysis of the development of the German attack plan used gives the German view. Halder repeatedly war-gamed a wide number of plans at the Zossen HQ. As was the German habit the subordinate army group and army commanders gamed out their tasks independently as well as participating in the Zossen map exercises. The games were field exercises as well as map games from the army group down to the division level. In his analysis Mays repeatedly notes one consistent result in all these tests of the plans. None obtained a decisive result with one exception. In March 1940 a intelligence officer Lt Col List was to control the enemy forces. In this game he argued that the French forces were reacting too swiftly in previous games. He proposed the French senior commanders would react much slower, & played the exercise out by slowing French reactions by 48 hours. This game did give the German side a decisive result, with a promising defeat for the Allied side. The assorted senior commanders participating, from Rundsteadt on down through his army commanders dismissed the results. Pointing out that the French could not be counted on to make key decisions so slowly & that it was poor preparation to assume the worst case from the enemy. A few like Guderian & Kliest had a different view, that is the operation had to be executed with all possible speed. Operating at 'normal' pace of operations would fail to preempt French counter moves.

When the campaign was actually executed the German commanders noted the slow response and poor reaction on the part of the French senior leaders. They were surprised by the sluggish response. When Guderian declared the victory in the Sedan battle a "miracle" he was referring to the French reinforcements & counter attacks coming 12 to 24 hours late, long after the tactical situation had changed. Others like the 6th Army commander were astounded at how slowly the French reacted to the assault across the Meuse River south of Namur.

Mays point being had the French commanders such as Georges, Huntzinger, Corap, Billotte, ect... acted as swiftly as the Germans expected the result would have been much closer to what most German army and army group commanders expected. That is a indecisive operational victory and strategic stalemate.
 
In contrast, current research points out that the French not only took extensive interest in what happened in the Polish campaign and adjusted their operational deployments as a result, but that they did so to such a degree that it is what led to the defeat in 1940. It wasn't that the French learned the lessons of the Poland campaign : it is that they overcompensated for it.

While all of these proposals that you present are tactically interesting, none are really applicable given the deployment of French forces. Launching a counter-attack into the Germans is all very well and good, but it requires the forces to carry out that counter-attack to be deployed there, instead of being deployed in Belgium or headed towards the Netherlands.

I mean I agree with you here about the French not having some kind of operational reserves. The operational concentration of forces is of course necessary for more favorable tactical conditions at battles that took place in France. I was merely saying what maybe some options were the French had irrespective of their plausibility to political and other realities, either to attrit the German advancing forces up front (area defense) like was done at Kursk and/or purposely expose the Germans with vulnerable flanks like OTL (mobile defense). The French were apparently more than capable of the former option in the case of their experiences in Belgium. French operational intelligence (or rather Gamelin) ignored the threat of the German military attacking where they did, which is what really set about the whole issue of tempo of combat operations that was mentioned right above because of the unfortunate disposition (due to the surprise) of French forces-- they had to use limited time that they had to fix this, where as meanwhile the Germans were moving through the French defenses with an air of impunity until the French could shuffle forces back to where they needed to be. The German feint into the low countries of course was simultaneously attempting to bog down the French that needed to withdraw as quickly as possible. All in all, I wonder that the reason that more of the 7th and 1st French armies didn't participate at Arras (which basically sealed their fate) for example was not because the French command didn't try hard enough, but it was impossible to coordinate such a thing-- not an issue of decision making or decision superiority on the part of the Germans. For the Germans it was check and mate perhaps before Arras. But they probably should have never moved the 7th army into Belgium in the first place really, as a result of the Breda variant to the Dyle plan/and Gamelin (imagine if that smacked into the Germans at Arras). In truth though a larger scale Arras like counter-attack may have been the way to go, but considering how many tanks and aircraft your article says that the French thought the Germans had, it is kind of hard to blame Gamelin. If those estimates were actually true than the Germans would probably win no matter what the French did, so his sense of defeatism would be somewhat justifiable

The problem I wonder about attacking upwards from around Verdun is the French might not have much success if they hit into the German follow on infantry-- a scenario that was a nightmare for Soviets at for example Grodno plays out in my mind.

The French found out the hard way that time is a medium of war just like space and land is. If the French hadnt of ignored the threat the French wargames alluded to from the Ardennes approach were acknoledged fully then the Germans have a much more difficult time with French forces better positioned and closer.
 
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Have some one high up in the French Government - their Ministry of Defence 'do a Marshall' and as war clouds gather, fire or sideline all of the old generals and promote younger men who are more capable of taking on new ideas and learning the lessons from failed ones.

Marshall by firing all the old Generals probably save many 100,000s of American lives and undoubtidly through this act allowed the US Armed forces to florish despite starting its rearmament later than everyone else - lets do the same for La France eh?
 
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Have some one high up in the French Government - their Ministry of Defence 'do a Marshall' and as war clouds gather, fire or sideline all of the old generals and promote younger men who are more capable of taking on new ideas and learning the lessons from failed ones. ...

This has potential, but must occur fairly early, in 1937 or 36. Marshalls purge started in 1939 & actually Malin had been selectively eliminating unfit Generals earlier. It took the US Army over two years to both work out the practical application of the new doctrine, which it had on the table already, and to train a new generation of commanders and staff. This process was not completed until after AGF, ASF, & AAF were established in early 1942 & the final reorganization of the Army occurred that winter and spring. All that came under the urgency of rapidly approaching war.

Given the peace time constrains the last best PoD for this is Gamelins appointment in 1936. That gives four years to revisit French doctrines and officer training.

However this is not a panacea. Training in the French Army was severely constrained by the defense budget. Unlike the nazi government the Chamber of Deputies were not going to engage in deficit spending until forced to by a immediate threat of war. Neither were they inclined to raise taxes to the necessary level. Between the desire to modernize the air force, and have maximum numbers in the ground forces there was insufficient funds to train the ground force to the needed standards. The training completed and doctrines in place were as much a result of the funds available as any particular devotion to a doctrinal school. Hence officer and staff training suffered. Given some very tough choices the focus on defense and methodical battle planning were chosen because they fit the funds available. Under the nazis the Wehrmacht could afford more than double the training time for their commanding officers & HQ staff than the French, near triple in some cases. "That allowed training to progress to more complex or sophisticated levels.

This is one reason De Gaulle and many like minded thinkers proposed a much smaller standing army. Resources could be concentrated to produce a far more capable ready force. After the Munich Crisis there was some concentration of training resources on the first echelon reservists, the 'Active' units. That increased after mobilization from September 1939, but it was not enough to save the battle in may 1940. The were far to many undertrained Category B formations on the battle front.
 
This has potential, but must occur fairly early, in 1937 or 36. Marshalls purge started in 1939 & actually Malin had been selectively eliminating unfit Generals earlier. It took the US Army over two years to both work out the practical application of the new doctrine, which it had on the table already, and to train a new generation of commanders and staff. This process was not completed until after AGF, ASF, & AAF were established in early 1942 & the final reorganization of the Army occurred that winter and spring. All that came under the urgency of rapidly approaching war.

Given the peace time constrains the last best PoD for this is Gamelins appointment in 1936. That gives four years to revisit French doctrines and officer training.

However this is not a panacea. Training in the French Army was severely constrained by the defense budget. Unlike the nazi government the Chamber of Deputies were not going to engage in deficit spending until forced to by a immediate threat of war. Neither were they inclined to raise taxes to the necessary level. Between the desire to modernize the air force, and have maximum numbers in the ground forces there was insufficient funds to train the ground force to the needed standards. The training completed and doctrines in place were as much a result of the funds available as any particular devotion to a doctrinal school. Hence officer and staff training suffered. Given some very tough choices the focus on defense and methodical battle planning were chosen because they fit the funds available. Under the nazis the Wehrmacht could afford more than double the training time for their commanding officers & HQ staff than the French, near triple in some cases. "That allowed training to progress to more complex or sophisticated levels.

This is one reason De Gaulle and many like minded thinkers proposed a much smaller standing army. Resources could be concentrated to produce a far more capable ready force. After the Munich Crisis there was some concentration of training resources on the first echelon reservists, the 'Active' units. That increased after mobilization from September 1939, but it was not enough to save the battle in may 1940. The were far to many undertrained Category B formations on the battle front.
These are important points. The idea of a "purge" should send shivers up the backs of anyone with knowledge of how large organizations tend to work. Nobody knows in advance that war is coming specifically in 1939. You go to war with the army you have, and if that army is in the middle of wholesale reconstruction at the time, let alone if that's self-imposed via a purge, then you'd better have one heck of a buffer in place to buy you the time to do what needs doing.

Both Britain and Russia had that buffer in place, the first in the form of the Royal Navy and the second in the form of limitless empty farmland. So did the U.S., in the sense that nobody was ever going to invade it anyways. France didn't have this.

Even so, I'm inclined to think that the German conquest of France, swift as it was, was probably a much nearer-run thing than it seems at first blush. If the Ardennes game was done earlier than 1938 or taken more seriously at the time, one has to think that even a modest investment in defenses could have slowed down the German offensive, and the slower the Germans get, the better the chances of it devolving into a stalemate.
 
What would it take for France not to fall to the Germans?

IMHO, the resources wasted on building the Maginot Line would have to be used to modernise their armoured forces (radios in every tank for a start) ...
PLUS it would be necessary to remove of the 'Old Guard' (who only knew how to dig tenches) and replace them with officers trained in mobile warfare (but trained by who ??? the only 'mobile warefare' training available at the time was in Germany :) ... it's possible that the British could have (did ?) come up with the same Blitzkrieg concept == but no way would the 'High Command' have stood for it).
Finally, the commanders in the field would have to be given the authority to act == thinking fast enough to recognise the German 'spearhead' and organise a counter-attack only 'works' if they can do so without having to wait for permission from the 'High Command' in Paris (by the time messengers have gone back and forth the opportunity will have been lost) ..
 
IMHO, the resources wasted on building the Maginot Line would have to be used to modernise their armoured forces (radios in every tank for a start)
The French tanks were superior to the German tanks. It was doctrine which was deficient.
Notably, the B1 had more armor than the German infantry's anti-tanks were able to break through and mowed through German tanks. They usually called Stukas and artillery against those.
PLUS it would be necessary to remove of the 'Old Guard'
I agree.
(who only knew how to dig tenches) and replace them with officers trained in mobile warfare (but trained by who ??? the only 'mobile warefare' training available at the time was in Germany :) ... it's possible that the British could have (did ?) come up with the same Blitzkrieg concept == but no way would the 'High Command' have stood for it).
That's a myth. Mobile warfare was partially theorised in France, notably by De Gaulle and Estienne.
Finally, the commanders in the field would have to be given the authority to act == thinking fast enough to recognise the German 'spearhead' and organise a counter-attack only 'works' if they can do so without having to wait for permission from the 'High Command' in Paris (by the time messengers have gone back and forth the opportunity will have been lost) ..
That is however exact.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
What would it take for France not to fall to the Germans?

1. Gamelin could have chosen to forego the foolish plan to send the 7th Army into southern Holland and instead keeps it as a strategic reserve, which was the original intention and would have been the best course of action. Conceivably, it might have been sent to reinforce the Meuse line and plug the gap the panzers tore in the French line there.

2. On the afternoon of May 14, the French actually had a golden opportunity to mount a devastating counter attack at Sedan, when two of the three panzer divisions formed up in a line facing westward, with only a single infantry regiment protecting their left (southern) flank. At that moment, the French 3rd Armored and 3rd Mechanized Divisions were forming up directly to the south of them in preparation for a counter attack. Had it gone forward, it would have smashed into the exposed German flank and possibly rolled up the German line. But, as happened far too often, the attack was cancelled for reasons that are unclear.
 
1. Gamelin could have chosen to forego the foolish plan to send the 7th Army into southern Holland and instead keeps it as a strategic reserve, which was the original intention and would have been the best course of action. Conceivably, it might have been sent to reinforce the Meuse line and plug the gap the panzers tore in the French line there.

...

There were sixteen divisions outside the fields armies & assigned to the "Stratgic Reserve". They included infantry, motorized infantry, and three of the new armored divisions. These were all at the disposal of Georges, the commander of the North East Front. One, the 71st Inf Div was immediately ordered to return to the 2d Army on 10 May & occupied a position south of Sedan during the 11th & 12th May. The 1st DCR was sent to the 1st Army Group in Belgium 11 May, where it received three different orders in three days switching it between armies, then had orders to make a counter attack, which were modified half a day later. The 2d DCR also had orders to reinforce the 1st AG, then was ordered to support the 9th Army. It was delayed by a misallocation of transport for the tanks, then overrun in bits while attempting to move to its assembly area. The 3rd DCR and the 3rd Motor Inf Div sat for three days, then were ordered to 2d Army which directed them to consolidate near Sedan as army reserve. The next day the received orders to counter attack, which were canceled just as the attack was to start. The other 11 divisions of the strategic reserve were left in place until the 14th or 15th May, then a few at a time were moved to northern France to the reformed field armies covering the Ainse & Somme rivers.

Essentially this large reserve was indecisively wasted by Georges, Billotte, & the army commanders Huntzinger & Corap, adding the 7th Army to this mix is unlikely to change the ability of the relevant commanders to read the situation and make timely decisions. Not sending the 7th Army to Antwerp & the Scheldt region leaves the left flank of the Belgian army uncovered and leads to their faster withdrawal & collapse.
 
These are important points. The idea of a "purge" should send shivers up the backs of anyone with knowledge of how large organizations tend to work. Nobody knows in advance that war is coming specifically in 1939. You go to war with the army you have, and if that army is in the middle of wholesale reconstruction at the time, let alone if that's self-imposed via a purge, then you'd better have one heck of a buffer in place to buy you the time to do what needs doing.

...
Thats why I thought it needed to start not later than 1936, when Gamelin was appointed. That gives three years to accomplish what changes might be made. Tho in the case of the French army there is a different trap.

...
Finally, the commanders in the field would have to be given the authority to act == thinking fast enough to recognise the German 'spearhead' and organise a counter-attack only 'works' if they can do so without having to wait for permission from the 'High Command' in Paris (by the time messengers have gone back and forth the opportunity will have been lost) ..

This is a misunderstanding of the problem in the French command capability. Gamelin in fact had very little to do with the battle from 10 thru 18 May. On the morning of the 10th he confirmed in a phone call with Georges that the Dyle Plan was to be used. He did visit Georges HQ nearly everyday to monitor the battle, but otherwise did not interfere with Georges command of the NE Front. Georges was burdened with no requirement to wait for approval from Gamelin. Similarly the Army Group commanders and Army commanders were not required to wait for approval. The problem was getting the orders or battle plans issued. To repeat post #8

However this is not a panacea. Training in the French Army was severely constrained by the defense budget. Unlike the nazi government the Chamber of Deputies were not going to engage in deficit spending until forced to by a immediate threat of war. Neither were they inclined to raise taxes to the necessary level. Between the desire to modernize the air force, and have maximum numbers in the ground forces there was insufficient funds to train the ground force to the needed standards. The training completed and doctrines in place were as much a result of the funds available as any particular devotion to a doctrinal school. Hence officer and staff training suffered. Given some very tough choices the focus on defense and methodical battle planning were chosen because they fit the funds available. Under the nazis the Wehrmacht could afford more than double the training time for their commanding officers & HQ staff than the French, near triple in some cases. "That allowed training to progress to more complex or sophisticated levels.

The French commanders were badly constrained by undertrained staff. The operations, simply, intelligence sections were manned with officers who had far less understanding of their tasks than the British or German armies. That led to poor situational awareness by the commanders. Their intelligence officers were doing a poor job of feeding them information. Similarly the operations and supply officers had to work their way slowly through tasks they were undertrained for. This meant actions at all levels from battalion to army took painfully long to organize. The commanders had to give the staff clear and details guidance, the senior staff had to do the same for their assistants, detailed instructions had to be written for the next level of command the orders went to, it all had to be checked for errors & omissions. The bulk of the French command were not trained well enough to act correctly on brief mission statements & act without further guidance. There were exceptions. Pirouxs Cavalry Corps the fought far forward in Belgium had a capable corps staff & the HQ of the 2d & 3rd DLM were fairly good. & the 1st Army in general were able to deal with a succession of very difficult situations. But, most others, like Flavigys 21 Corps had difficulty keeping up with organizing a center attack.

The opportunities were lost first because the commanders were late getting information through failures in their staff, & then in the inability to give fast coherent orders down the line.
 
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IMHO, if the (historical) French political and military command structure (+ officers, tactics etc) remains 'in place' the outcome (of a Nazi attack in 1940 = or any other time) is always going to be the same ..

For the French to change that is, I think, virtually impossible = maybe a Military Coup by the younger officers ??? (but why ? and to what end ? = and that has to happen early enough for changes to 'filter through' to the army in the field .. so in 1935 perhaps ???)

A communist take-over before Sept '39 MIGHT do the trick = if a Communist France becomes part of the USSR, then they will have 'signed up' to the Nazi-Soviet Pact (splitting of Poland between USSR and Nazi's) and the British are left without a leg to stand on (so no 'Guarantee' to Poland, no declaration of war) ..
.. but Hitler always had his eyes on attacking the USSR, so it's quite possible he would have invaded France (before Russia) anyway ...

It might work if in 1940 Hitler decides to stop at the French border (after taking the Low Countries and kicking the BEF out of Belgium) and announces a cease-fire ..

Would the BEF / French have carried on fighting ??? After all, they sat on their back-sides for 8 months since Sept 39 so why would they do anything now (except dig in and hide in their trenches) ??

With the French in charge, there's a very good chance the cease-fire gets accepted. The French then extend the Maginot Line to the sea and the BEF can start coming home ... then it's Dec 6 1941, and the BEF is shipped east to defend against the Japs. ... and soon after that the Panzers will start rolling through the Ardennes (or maybe Hitler just ignores the French and starts Barbarossa a bit early ..) the possibilities (of a Nazi dominated Europe) are (almost) endless
 
Have some one high up in the French Government - their Ministry of Defence 'do a Marshall' and as war clouds gather, fire or sideline all of the old generals and promote younger men who are more capable of taking on new ideas and learning the lessons from failed ones.
However, if the politicians, who were deathly afraid of a military/fascist coup, see a strong man in the army who replaces everyone with men loyal to him and turns the army into his own machine, they might raise some objections.
You don't really want strong, enthusiastic, charismatic men to lead the military in that situation

IMHO, the resources wasted on building the Maginot Line would have to be used to modernise their armoured forces (radios in every tank for a start) ...
The Maginot line did exactly what it needed to do, and a lot of bunkers didn't fall at all, they lasted until after the armistice. Of course, the issue of a fixed line is that, if you rely on an ally to close the gaps (like Belgium was supposed to) and they don't do it, the enemy can bypass it.
 
IMHO, if the (historical) French political and military command structure (+ officers, tactics etc) remains 'in place' the outcome (of a Nazi attack in 1940 = or any other time) is always going to be the same ..
....

That's the usual conclusion in the English language literature, which draws haphazardly from some French views. If one takes a close look at the German views, particularly before & during the campaign there is a very different take on the strength and weaknesses of each side. Later Gobbels propagandists & generals like Manstein sought to make the victory seem inevitable. One critical German weakness was in the upper command levels, from army, to army group & on to Hitler. That is very few had any confidence in the plan. While Hitler was at one point infatuated with the Sickle Cut plan his manic depressive personality meant he could not support it consistently & OTL tried to terminate or wreck the plan several times during the campaign. Halder had to force acceptance on the generals, and multiple times argue Hitler into letting it continue. Hitler finally succeeded in terminating the plan with his third or fourth halt order, after a decisive result was obtained

Had Halder been less capable in enforcing continuance of the plan from the 14th to 22 May. Perhaps through illness or exhaustion. Then a enforced halt order gives the Allies the critical 48 hours they needed to get their feet back under them. Guderians account focuses on how close a run the attack and break through at Sedan was, calling it a miracle. In this he was not just speaking of beating the French 10 & 21 Corps on the battle field, but also of escaping pressure from above to go slower and take fewer risks. Had Kliest been less perceptive and done less to shield Guderian & the other armored corps commanders from the fears of the staff officers and commander of the following army group, and Hitler. There are multiple points from 12 through 16 May were the armored assault & Sickle Cut manuver could have been wrecked by the German leaders.

To put it another way the Germans could have lost the battle on their own.

There are details on the French side that could have reduced the scale of the German victory. Allowing Flavignys attack to go forward on the evening of the 14th May, Corap not panicking on the evening of the 14th and not ordered a mass retreat of the 9th Army are two. Weygand not postphoning a counter attack four days when he took command. The artillery commander of the 10th Corps grasping the actual situation and ordering up a preemptive bombardment on the 19th Corps as it assembled to attack. All those items were within the capability of the French command, had they a slightly different PoV at the moment of decision.
 

longsword14

Banned
@Carl Schwamberger
What is your opinion of French doctrine, putting all else aside ?
For all the comments about lack of pace and initiative, do you think that a decently trained French force would have performed well.
Looking at their methods, I really don't think that late British/American doctrine were great improvements over how the French should have fought.
 
The French tanks were superior to the German tanks.
Not really. The Char B-1bis has a one man turret, in which the commander is also the gunner and loader. That is not really helpful in combat.

The same turret was fitted on the Somua S35.
 
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@Carl Schwamberger
What is your opinion of French doctrine, putting all else aside ?
For all the comments about lack of pace and initiative, do you think that a decently trained French force would have performed well.
Looking at their methods, I really don't think that late British/American doctrine were great improvements over how the French should have fought.

Take a close look at the attack of the 3rd & 4th armored divisions vs the French 1st Army @ near Gembloux Belgium. No river or stream, no forrest or marshes, no mud from rain or spring thaw, no rugged ravines or hills. Just a gently rolling plain dotted with some farm villages & orchards. Hard dry fields with a few tiny streams. The German armord corps was ordered to cut through the 1st Army & disrupt any effort to withdraw.

The German armored divisions failed vs infantry on near perfect tank ground. Repeated attacks were halted on the third day & the corps sent south to join Kliests armored group. Why this attack failed gives some useful insights into. The strengths and weaknesses of both sides.
 
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