TFSmith121
Banned
Actually, you're dead wrong. Sorry.
Actually, you're dead wrong. Sorry.
All US combat divisions were formed using a very rational and thoughtful doctrine; the press of events, however, required infantry replacements/fillers - at times, especially in the ETO in the winter of 1944-45 - to be drawn from other than infantry branch, but the alternative would have been to start writing off combat divisions.
I would suggest reading:
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops by Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley; and
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops by Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, which are both available here for free:
http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/ww2-agf.html
They both go into great detail on exactly how the AUS raised its combat divisions and support elements in 1940-43 and sustained them in action in 1941-45 (which is basically summed up by Carl, above); the reality is there were basically three "groups" of US Army divisions, as follows:
Regular formations, in existence and at peacetime or cadre strength, before the 1940 mobilization;
National Guard formations, ditto, and activated for federal service in 1940-41;
and wartime formations, activated in 1942-43.
It is worth noting that the numerical designations of said formations, dating to WW I, were in set blocks, as per:
1st-25th - RA;
26th-45th - NG;
all others - "wartime"
The RA and NG formations were brought up to strength with Selective Service personnel in 1940-41, and were cadreed in 1942 for the new wartime formations formed that year, some of which were cadreed in turn for the formations formed in 1943. The six USMC divisions followed roughly similar patterns.
As Carl said, the largest single factors in the abilities of any of the US formations upon their introduction to battle had to do with:
a) the quality of their cadre;
b) how many times they were cadreed for new formations;
c) how much training time between the final cadreeing and rebuilding and then introduction to combat.
In many ways, the divisions raised in 1942-43 actually were among the best performers in 1944-45, largely because they had more training and shakedown time than the prewar divisions (regular and NG), some of which were committed to combat absent the most basic support elements; sending the 32nd Division into action in Papua in 1942-43 absent any significant field artillery is probably the most egregious example.
Best,
When I used the term scrap, what I was referring to was not quality, as some of these divisions actually turned out to be very effective (like the 99th and 94th Divisions), but rather how they were composed.
There were, at least to my knowledge, 3 main types of US Infantry Divisions in the ETO. There were peacetime formations that may not have had their prior personnel but had their structure and training programs and these were quite good most of the time. There were activated National Guard Units, some of which were quite good (like the 28th, 29th, 30th, 45th) and some of which were not (90th and in the Pacific, the 32nd). Combat situations often dictated these things, of course. But then you get to the divisions created in the expansion to a larger army needed to prosecute the war. These were the "scrap" forces I was talking about. They were composed of an amalgamation of transport, supply, anti-air, anti-tank, quartermaster, HQ, and other support personnel who simply were in abundance and could be made into quick infantry units. Individual replacements made up a large majority of these units, and combat experience was lacking. These units were literally scrapped together using unassigned or extra personnel and had little of the same cohesion of the other divisions.
Actually, you're dead wrong. Sorry.
All US combat divisions were formed using a very rational and thoughtful doctrine; the press of events, however, required infantry replacements/fillers - at times, especially in the ETO in the winter of 1944-45 - to be drawn from other than infantry branch, but the alternative would have been to start writing off combat divisions.
I would suggest reading:
The Organization of Ground Combat Troops by Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley; and
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops by Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, which are both available here for free:
http://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/collect/ww2-agf.html
They both go into great detail on exactly how the AUS raised its combat divisions and support elements in 1940-43 and sustained them in action in 1941-45 (which is basically summed up by Carl, above); the reality is there were basically three "groups" of US Army divisions, as follows:
Regular formations, in existence and at peacetime or cadre strength, before the 1940 mobilization;
National Guard formations, ditto, and activated for federal service in 1940-41;
and wartime formations, activated in 1942-43.
It is worth noting that the numerical designations of said formations, dating to WW I, were in set blocks, as per:
1st-25th - RA;
26th-45th - NG;
all others - "wartime"
The RA and NG formations were brought up to strength with Selective Service personnel in 1940-41, and were cadreed in 1942 for the new wartime formations formed that year, some of which were cadreed in turn for the formations formed in 1943. The six USMC divisions followed roughly similar patterns.
As Carl said, the largest single factors in the abilities of any of the US formations upon their introduction to battle had to do with:
a) the quality of their cadre;
b) how many times they were cadreed for new formations;
c) how much training time between the final cadreeing and rebuilding and then introduction to combat.
In many ways, the divisions raised in 1942-43 actually were among the best performers in 1944-45, largely because they had more training and shakedown time than the prewar divisions (regular and NG), some of which were committed to combat absent the most basic support elements; sending the 32nd Division into action in Papua in 1942-43 absent any significant field artillery is probably the most egregious example.
Best,
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