As somebody else mentioned, Vietnam was a possibility of a modernized Asian state. They actually managed to have strong relations with the French in the 18th century, and it was only Minh Mang's violent persecutions of Catholics in the early 19th century that created a rebellion that then led to colonization. If the 19th century Nguyen Dynasty can manage their relations with the Catholics better, and realize they could be used as an asset. The Vietnamese might also try to convince the French that having them as an ally in the region might help in expanding their influence in East Asia, and that investing in them could be worthwhile.
Relations actually started deteriorating with Gia Long who wasn't a big fan of christians despite the help of Pigneau de Béhaine.
But yeah, the played really really stupid with the Christian population. I understand the general idea of not letting them flourish because they could potentially be a counter power, but they got so hard headed it actually had the exact opposite effect as you mentioned.
The thing is that for the XVII and XVIIIth century they basically saw the jesuits as a free cannon dispenser. Maybe if one of those rose up to the Trinh?
 
Regarding the Philippines, I think the Philippines needs to Balkanize a bit in order to be a more progressive countries, I think majority of Luzon and Mindanao needs to be independent countries, if some other languages was the Linguafranca of most of Luzon like Pangasinense and for Mindanao it remains Maranao then it means Spanish could become the linguafranca of the Archipelago and it would mean that the union of the archipelago is weak, the other thing is the strengthening of visayan in central philippines.
 
Regarding the Philippines, I think the Philippines needs to Balkanize a bit in order to be a more progressive countries, I think majority of Luzon and Mindanao needs to be independent countries, if some other languages was the Linguafranca of most of Luzon like Pangasinense and for Mindanao it remains Maranao then it means Spanish could become the linguafranca of the Archipelago and it would mean that the union of the archipelago is weak, the other thing is the strengthening of visayan in central philippines.

It's small enough to be subsumed by other nations as is. So nuts to that.
 
It's small enough to be subsumed by other nations as is. So nuts to that.
But at least having Maguindanao as linguafranca of Mindanao and Pangasinense as linguafranca of Luzon would mean that the nations are stable the three states would make a stable countries that could pull a siam...
 
A modern nation-state needs to develop adequate state capacity, the foundations of which were around in pre-Meiji Japan and not in China. This includes effective tax collection and non-absolutist hierarchy (no monopoly of absolute ruler on expenditures, i.e. emperor doesn't waste what little taxes are collected on wars etc.), leading to decrease in free-riding and so on.
 
<snip>
11. You don't buy that a dynasty of over 600 years is susceptible to decay and inevitably ending? Like I said, Ottomanism can survive, it has nothing to do with multiethnic anything, it has to do with the extreme age of the dynasty and how well they did otl. To make them any better, legitimately makes them the greatest empire in history, that is just ASB. Could the Ottomans survive to ww2 or the corresponding date? Sure, but that's at best, after which it is subject to communism and a war likely with the USSR, which it will not survive and likely neither does Ottomanism.

Japan has an even older Imperial House and did very well over most centuries.
 
1)I think we are going a bit off topic with Ottomans there. The state itself could have modernized but it is near impossible keep the power vested in the Osmanoglu dynasty. They are bound to become ceremonial figureheads with time. I think this modernised *Ottoman Empire* wouldn't hold vast swathes of territory but most likely concentrate on Anatolia, Syria, Palestine and the Sunni parts of northern Iraq. Not sure how much land could they have in the Balkans, as I am not knowledgeable enough about the area. Thrace, Thessalonika, Albania and Bulgaria( dominated by the Turkish population) seem possible. The combined population would be ~150 million. If per capita GDP rises to half of Germany's you would have a middle eastern power with 4 trillion dollar economy.
2) Any suggestions for POD dates?
(preferably single POD date scenarios) I posted a possible POD and scenarios in post #18
 
1)I think we are going a bit off topic with Ottomans there. The state itself could have modernized but it is near impossible keep the power vested in the Osmanoglu dynasty. They are bound to become ceremonial figureheads with time. I think this modernised *Ottoman Empire* wouldn't hold vast swathes of territory but most likely concentrate on Anatolia, Syria, Palestine and the Sunni parts of northern Iraq. Not sure how much land could they have in the Balkans, as I am not knowledgeable enough about the area. Thrace, Thessalonika, Albania and Bulgaria( dominated by the Turkish population) seem possible. The combined population would be ~150 million. If per capita GDP rises to half of Germany's you would have a middle eastern power with 4 trillion dollar economy.
2) Any suggestions for POD dates?
(preferably single POD date scenarios) I posted a possible POD and scenarios in post #18

Actually, to have the Ottomans evolve into a modern nation-state you would need a more constitutional rule (i.e. abolishment of absolutism) and some sort of economic integration of all its territories.

Reforms would also be needed to create more modern institutions, financial, governmental, or otherwise. Unlike, say, the Austrian Empire/ HRE, a modern Ottoman nation-state would go for the opposite of Metternich's policies and incur reforms promoting fiscal liberalization. Though the problem on the economic front is that the Mediterranean economic region was basically stagnant, and it will be hard for the Ottoman state economically.

E: OK, there are several issues when it comes to the Ottomans building effective state capacity and thus establishing a modern nation-state. The Ottomans need to get rid of their tax system and go for more fiscal centralization. Think of Austria-Hungary imposing the Cisleithanian system taxation on Hungary after the revolutions of 1848.

The Ottoman bureaucracy needs to be expanded with administrative reforms, with all the fiscal and governmental apparatus centered on Constantinople. And there needs to be a development of a stable regime based on constitutionalism and parliamentarianism. In the rest of Europe, this sort of thing only came about after revolutions!

A strong state emerging from the above political reforms will be able to hold the Ottoman realm together. The peripheral states won't be able to secede easily, and the other great powers won't be able to undermine Ottoman authority by formenting nationalist dissent in the peripheries. This also would allow for the creation of an Ottoman cultural identity into which the elites of all the disparate ethnic groups can assimilate, in contrast to a national identity based on ethnicity which will only fuel secessionist ideologies.

The Ottoman identity spreading to the Balkans and Middle East will prevent other great powers from meddling, and prevent the populations of the non-core groups from identifying in solidarity with other great powers, e.g. the Slavs and Orthodox Christians to the Russian Empire. The ruling political elites of the Slavic territories, Greece, Arab territories, Maghreb etc. should identify part of the Ottoman core, influenced most by Constantinople than anywhere else.

If an area at the periphery is considered unimportant by the center, and isn't integrated as a result, that makes it easier for external powers to lead them away. The Ottoman state should prevent this at any cost, and focus on integrating all territories it can through sociopolitical means and through fiscal and governmental organization.

In Conclusion, the modernized Ottoman state wouldn't be a nation-state in the form of Germany or France at all. A strong Ottoman state would have long abandoned its original system of taxation in favour of one that's more effective, centralized, and uniformly imposed.

The old system of absolutism would have been transformed into a more limited structure based on parliamentarianism and constitutionalism. There wouldn't be a notion of a core Ottoman population of Muslim Turks, but rather a high-status Ottoman identity in which the political elites of all Ottoman regions would be folded into, perpetuating the imperial institutions that will prevent nationalist secession in the periphery. While nationalism in the periphery won't necessarily end, as ethnically homogeneous groups concentrated within a region will always end up creating their own institutions based on their cultural distinctions, targeting the sociopolitical elite will ensure the preservation and consolidation of Ottoman institutions, and ultimately lay the foundations for a strong, self-perpetuating, Ottoman state.
 
Last edited:
But at least having Maguindanao as linguafranca of Mindanao and Pangasinense as linguafranca of Luzon would mean that the nations are stable the three states would make a stable countries that could pull a siam...

The situation of the Philippines is actually more feasible as is than if we took your scenario. As a single nation-state, it can play politics with Britain and the Netherlands instead of going into infighting within the region being exploited by European powers. Actually being colonized by European powers gives it a taste of the importance of modernization. And of course, the region has no oil, so being a single expansionist nation-state benefiting from British patronage as a proxy against the Dutchmen is more profitable than, say, being crushed underfoot by European powers trying to get their place in the sun from scattered polities.
 
Top