Doesn't Majapahit (or any other Indonesian state) have the same issues as sub-Saharan Africa? In that people go to them for trade, spend their money on their goods, and make them rich without any further investments? It seems like a place that doesn't have any reason to really improve since what they have is working perfectly (from their point of view).
AHC: Five modernised Nations in Asia by 1900
ben0628
Banned
Not only that but it's seems that the majapahit only has control of Java while the other islands are just under their temporary influence through military force so it's empire really isn't that strong nor is it centralized. The problem seems to be that each island in Southeast Asia (Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Malaysia, etc) doesn't want to be ruled by one of the other islands. Unless they can somehow unify, they don't stand a chance against European colonization.
Actually, if Majapahit shrinks to just java and neighboring islands they can so does its other daughter countries..
That's the mandala system, and that's basically the entire model of how Southeast Asian history evolved. That's why you could see the rise of massive empires like Taungoo in Burma that would collapse within a few decades and then rise again. It goes without saying that that's horrible for any sort of stability or modernisation, hence why it would have to be similar to Thailand's evolution (many of the vassal kingdoms in Thailand were not abolished until the early 20th century).
It definitely seems interesting. Does that part of India have significant coal/iron like modern day Orissa or Jharkhand states have, though? There's also the issue that they need a continued succession of good rulers. Was their internal organisation anything workable? Because I know the Maratha and I believe the Mughals too had something akin to the Holy Roman Empire in Europe (hence why the Maratha are called the "Maratha Confederacy" sometime), which definitely isn't good for modernisation.
India as a whole seems underrated for potential, since the subcontinent is comparable to Europe in many ways. Many competing states, shared religious background (Christianity/Hinduism), and a decent amount of resources.
Even Java has a myriad of states waiting to break free of Majapahit, case in point the Sundanese who really didn't like them. I guess holding Java down might be worth something in the long run, but probably not enough since the underlying trade issues are still there.
In worst case scenario,they can always be another Five Dynasty Ten Kingdoms period.
I suggested an ATL Spanish Philippines which breaks off of the Spanish Empire early because they'd have early enough contact with the West to understand the importance of modernization. The drastic shift from the mandala system of datus and petty princedoms to a colonial system centered on Manila helped with creating a nation state, or at least the idea of one. The early 19th century had the ilustrados (intelligentsia, usually the sons of the middle class) going to Europe to learn from the culture and science of the West. And though the region doesn't have much coal or oil, it has a path to expansion in the form of the Dutch East Indies. Of course, a fledgling state centered in Manila would have to deal with the southern sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu one way or another.
My idea is the Sultanate of Sulu expands and reforms into a reformed and industrial state, but it will happen once it conquers whole visayas and Southern Luzon while Northern Luzon( Luzon north of Metro Manila) is under a Majapahit daughter state(Northern Luzon languages are similar and quite intelligible with each other and can form a nation state) and Mindanao is ruled by Maguindanao sultanate, the two states are slightly backward in a way..
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4. I suppose the Durrani or Afghans could do better in how they just remain a buffer zone of no mans land. Then keep that state relatively into modern times and perhaps have some market weight in today's time. Afghanistan will still be backwards however, as the decentralized (in a bad way) systems there would need to end, in many ways they haven't ended today after centuries of changes. The Taliban was simply a modern Durrani (the similarities are striking), and it created no growth. Afghans to progress further, requires a civil war of epic proportions, worse than the one that happened otl and with an extremely liberal sultan or republic taking control, rather than otl which was narco state vs Neo Durrani lol.
7. The problem is that Iranian identity was already created by the Safavids... The Punjab will never see Tehran as its capital or Istafan. Having Afghanistan is a net loss for Iran, it forces the diverting of resources and needless bloodshed in policing the land, which by this point is ripe for the rise of the Durrani, who if, the Iranians aren't prepared in their own borders, will invade Iran. Safavid powers again, is the only state outside of modern Iran to actually stabilize situations in Iran, just tweak them a bit and add flavor and it is possible for Iran to be basically modernized and likely a member of some world war.
But no, I would say by this time, the Afsharids expanded too far, and further we want the most likely to modernize... That choice is the Safavids, they could've otl and their track record is phenomenal compared to other Iranian dynasties.
8. I'd say the Khedives are too late, they had already suffered net economic and demographic loss under the Ottomans who diverted resources into Turkey. The Burji was the last period in which Egypt was still the largest economic player in the Mid East.
10. I was referring to the Mughals, their dynasty and system of rule is doomed... Perhaps someone else in India, but not the Mughals.
11. The Ottomans could do better, but you are denying the immense age of the dynasty, I mean the Ottoman dynasty dated from the 1200s with continued absolute rule. It was bound to slow down seriously and decay, I would say otl was an incredible and glorious showing for Turkey and the Ottomans and the 1800s was only the end to a great saga.
- Ottomans for example did better than Poland... Also, Russia modernized mainly due to the growth in industry during Stalin, however at what price? Their freedom and economic future... Then the rest of east Europe would modernize as a result of modern era, the same for Turkey...
This is digging back a bit in the thread, but why is India necessarily lacking in the resource base for industrialization? They have a very large population, they had a very large trade surplus until the British took over with a major import of silver, a sophisticated financial and trade system, their agricultural base produced food at significantly cheaper cost than their European equivalents (according to "Rethinking Wages and Competitiveness in the Eighteenth Century: Britain and South India", 90 pounds of rice in India was equivalent in cost to 75 pounds of British wheat - the country with the most developed agricultural base in Europe - which had calorically the value of 45 pounds of rice, which therefor meant the cost of food was dramatically cheaper and therefor wages were relatively lower, thus enabling Indian manufactured goods to have a significant advantage over European equivalents) and with land-taxes taking up to 50% of the peasant's crop as tax (there was also productivity by land which the paper estimates as higher than the British 900-1000 pounds per acre, perhaps rice levels of 1500-1750), it seems like they'd be able to have the resources necessary for the creation of a sufficient industrial base. They had around ~25% of the world's manufacturing base under some accounts of world manufacturing output, so the base that exists is already good too. The revenue was growing under the Mughals continuously, from "A History of Modern India 1480-1950", the tax base increased by two and a half by the 18th century before the Mughal Empire started to decline. This also saw large increases in the monetization of the economy, with India's trade surplus resulting in major silver influxes from Europe that essentially replaced copper from my recollections.
But this isn't a question of hostility, I'm more interested in if the author cited a reason why.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coal_mining_in_India#Distribution_of_coal_reserve_by_states.5B2.5D
I don't know how these are distributed (I've tried in vain to find something like the "The Iron-Ore Resources of Europe" , or "Iron and Associated Industries of Lorraine, the Sarre District, Luxemburg, and Belgium" which is even better), but if those are correct then a South Indian state, especially if it takes a significant portion of Tamil Nadu, will be well set for its coal supplies. For comparison the 1913 supplied of the German Empire and France are respectively 53,344,000,0000, and 4,120,000,000, which if I am converting correctly is less is less than Tamil Nadu's supplies alone. On the other hand, there seems to be but limited actual production there, so perhaps either reserves are wrong, or coal quality is bad, or it is difficult to extract. But there are some mines there at least, as well as in Maharashtra.
South India also has good timber supplies (good for shipbuilding; to add on to previous comments about the Mysoreans and their navy I'd recommend British seapower and the Mysore wars, where apparently timber supplies were of sufficient quality to cover most all shipbuilding capacities; quantities were also very extensive, form my recollection most British south Indian railroads were timber-fired.
According to "A History of Modern India 1480-1950", the principal iron-working regions were Assam, Mysore, Gujart, Berar, and Kashmir (these were iron regions, the link to coal wasn't yet established so iron was the principal economic agent and wood used for fuel - I presume, that was the case in Europe at least - instead of coal being the determinant of metal-working economics), with Golconda having the best iron product quality in India.
So I think Mysore should be well set for resources, but I'm still figuring out their exact degree of political centralization. It did appear centralized under Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, with a professional army and the imposition of direct taxation (Tipu Sultan implemented direct tax collectors instead of the previous indirect affair), but I'm still foggy on their long term and how much those two leaders were radical breaks or evolutions.
South India does have advantages over Northern India in that its caste structure seems to have been less strong and more fluid, and they were more integrated into the world economy, more maritime and less land-based. Its important to note that the caste system wasn't as rigid before the British took over, the policies of whom resulted in racialized and administrative aspects of it being created, but there is the potential problem in that in southern India overseas mercantile affairs principally are in the hands of certain religious groups, these being the Muslims, Christians, Jews, Armenians, and Jains, who don't have the black-water taboo that Hinduism has. Such a fragmentation seems like it would create problems for the states to effectively engage with the sea in the long run, although as noted rulers like Tipu Sultan (admittedly, he was Muslim) did manage to deal with this.
I personally think that if modernization happens in India, it is most likely to happen with a southern state, although this might be bias; I've been involved in a separate site playing along on these lines, and I've grown rather attached to the idea.
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4. Which that sounds like a 19th century version of Soviet Afghanistan. Which since the whole post-monarchy Afghanistan could have been better handled (not a 30+ year civil war, for one), I'd assume the challenge is surmountable.
7. If Persia could incorporate semi-nomad groups like the Lurs, they could incorporate the Dari people of Afghanistan (and the Tajiks). Since Qajar Persia tried to gain the Herat region OTL, control over at least parts of Afghanistan was always a goal. The concept of the greater Persian world seems translatable to political movements in Central Asia as well as a drive on the part of the Iranian state to incorporate that region. Though that runs into the issue that Central Asia (the main land area of the Persian world) was poor, and India was rich, and Persia can't hope to hold onto India, meaning Central Asia is a secondary target at best. But for modernisation, remember that population means something. Hence why Japan could punch above its weight as far as WWII. By my estimates, a Greater Persia (let's say borders around the Tigris, Indus, modern China and somewhere along the Kazakhstan border, and land not lost to Russia in Azerbaijan) would have at least 60 million people by the 20th century. It would have plenty of issues, but with the oil wealth it will have might alleviate them. And if Russia could govern such a massive land (even rivers weren't enough), Persia might have some luck too. Either way, it's a recipe for success especially later on, probably somewhere between modern PR China and Japan. A modern Greater Persia with those same borders might have over 200 million people.
But yes, I suppose for a simpler, less world dominating power, the Safavids are a better bet, even if the Afsharids (or anyone else who might accomplish what they did) have greater potential.
8. Are there economic stats here? All I've got is Angus Maddison's estimates, which suggests that Egypt was slightly ahead of the rest of North Africa but declined from the Burji era. But they certainly put up a fight in the Oriental Crisis, they had significant colonies, and with their economy (cotton, exports, etc.) combined with demographics, certainly they could end up a major regional player like Brazil or Argentina even if they're very vulnerable to fluctuations in the global economy. I'm thinking Latin America here, and since Siam is regarded as a success story, couldn't Egypt be the same way--especially if those same fluctuations let Egypt exploit the situation to develop moreso, like some Latin American presidents did during WWII (cotton, American Civil War). Although granted, it isn't quite modernisation to the level of potential Egypt could have, and perhaps I overestimate its potential.
10. Yes, Mughals didn't have much left in them, but what about earlier? Other than the structural issue that they were very decentralised and basically like the Holy Roman Empire.
11. Okay, true about the Turks. I still find it interesting how the same Ottomans of the early modern age who conquered Rome (in Byzantine form) were still around in World War I and considered one of the main Central Powers. But if they genuinely wanted to compete with Europe (they clearly had some intention of doing so), then you can look by European terms on their dynasty. They really were like the Muslim version of Russia, struggling between "east" and "west", but with unsettled internal struggles comparable to Peter the Great's era, and one where much of the empire was like what Poland was to Russia--a powderkeg. But that does ignore that their 19th century wars post-Tanzimat were a lot closer fought than epithets like "sick man of Europe" would suggest. Yes, obstacles were there, but these obstacles were not insurmountable.
It wasn't just Stalin, though, for industrialisation. Tsarist Russia made great strides starting with Alexander II (who to be fair, introduced as many issues as he helped solve) and especially during Sergei Witte's influence in the 1890s. Since Sergei Witte came to power based on a total fluke (basically a train accident involving the Tsar, which Witte had been warning about, which was ignored by the bureaucracy, and resulted in Witte's rise after the fact), couldn't history make a similar circumstance involving a brilliant mind and the Ottoman sultan? The Turks don't have as big of a resource base to draw on as Russia did, granted, but less transport is required to access it.
4. The point would be to basically have a ruler or government so powerful or so revolutionary that the entire culture of Afghanistan is snapped into the modern world. Otherwise, it is impossible, as the conflicts there will inevitably be between silly communists vs narco state vs neo Durrani/Islamofascists.
7. But at what point will the Iranian powers control these large, Sunni and hyper aggressive populaces in Afghanistan? The Durrani defeated Iran in wars and was extremely fierce, and by this point the Pashtun tribes are strong enough to mount serious resistance. Adding on, they disagree with the types of rule in Iran, by this point I doubt any Pashtun tribe will accept weak rule, by the token of national identity. An Iranian power would need to exterminate the male populace in wars, in which case the Pashtun likely win, gaining allies from Punjab, and push Iran out into Sistan or Khursan. Also, this is just watering Iran down, it is forced to distribute resources to all these far flung lands, whilst plundering itself. The Safavid was the first Iranian state to internally invest and focus on issues relating to Iran and Iran itself, in the same manner Japan did; which is why I say it is the best and frankly the only state for Iran to be able to modernize.
8. Of course the Burji era was a decline, but it was still the center of Islamic power during its rule. The Mamluk regimes in Egypt inherited this sole power after the Mongol hordes and resisting Timur, whilst the Ottomans stumbled. The Burji era can be rectified, if so, then the future is perhaps, possibly, bright for Egypt, as it is enriched by Syria and internal investment. Khedivite Egypt is also late to the party in terms of losing its relative significance as it had during the Burji era.
-Economic numbers are flawed for this era, however, one need only look at the geopolitical situation at the time, to see why the Mamluk regimes and to a later period, the Burji, were the center of the Islamic world's economy. As a note, the Burji inherited the pinnacle of Arab literature and culture, not too shabby. What did the Khedivites inherit? A failed economy of the Ottomans and centuries of foreign rule?
10. The Mughals were the same state as they were before Aurangzeb... It was a state like the Qing, a foreign dynasty, built on two concepts that conflicted oddly with one another:
- military superiority over its enemies in the Indian subcontinent. It needed this power to exemplify it's right to rule over the masses as it lacked any other effective reasoning.
- tolerance and elegance, which is the vast beauty that exemplified the Mughal rule. This coincides with economic stability, however, to maintain the elegance and Royal culture, resources were diverted to courts and the family as opposed to the actual development of the land. This is precisely why the Mughals cannot modernize effectively....
Yes, the Mughals can do better and deny the British Raj their existence, but to modernize as 'mega Mughal', is very, very unlikely.
11. Again, I think the Ottomans did incredible for what they had and their circumstance. To have them modernize completely and dominate Russia in the later stages, would make them, in my book, the greatest ongoing regime in the history of mankind.
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Wheat is higher in protein than rice. Robert Allen's wage data series, deflated to a general subsistence basket and not just grain prices, shows that in fact wages in the major Indian cities (Delhi, Calcutta, Bombay, Madras) were at subsistence in the 18th century. A lot of rice, but not much protein, whereas European diets included a fair amount of meat and cheese; after he started looking at India and China, Allen redid the consumption baskets in Europe, which originally had a respectable subsistence with some meat and cheese, and included a more austere basket based on oats, because that's how you get to the low protein consumption of premodern Asia.
Delhi was much richer in the 17th century, in the heyday of the Mughal Empire, but this collapsed as the empire declined, and most likely the high wages were extractive rather than productive.
Egypt was a subsistence economy in the 19th century too, just like India. But it made investments, especially under Muhammad Ali, that could stimulate mechanization even in a low-wage environment. However, it didn't really have money to fund these investments, leading to international loans, nonpayment, and occupation.
7. Well, Afsharids were Sunni. Which suggests they would be the best to create a larger Persia. The Durrani only succeeded when they took advantage of the Afsharid weakness--yes, opportunities like that always exist, but at some point with the advance of technology the response will be fiercer and stronger and rebellions can be put down. But I guess you're right with the increased difficulty of getting infrastructure and such into the lands of this Greater Persia, but the Russian example seems valid--if you have such a massive land, with massive potential, with internal affairs (in regards to potential rebellions) under control, you can be considered a great power even if you are by any definition underdeveloped.
And besides, there's resources in Afghanistan, Central Asia, correct? There is agricultural land, there are mines, the investment not spent on Persia proper will not go to waste.
8. Yes, they are flawed, but they are decent estimates and represent a solid if crude grasp on the economic situation in terms of numbers. But Egypt's always been a center of the Arab world, and the potential was always there.
10. But that brings up back to the fact an India with minimal instead of total British rule will likely be better off than OTL. Even if the Mughals end up like Qing, they'll find an India with a stronger economy with more people. Well, I guess all bets would be off in a hypothetical "Indian Warlord Era", but it couldn't be worse than the British neglect that led to minimal economic development along with periodic horrifying famines likewise caused by neglect. I would bet the British Indian famines killed/harmed far more people than the Chinese Civil War anyway (in far less time). Not that a "mega Mughal" wouldn't have famines, but no way could they be worse than British India's famines.
A lot India has similar problems with the "elegance", looking at the decadence the rulers of many of the princely states enjoyed. Such a culture had to have existed to some extant even pre-colonialism.
11. Not dominating Russia, but not being kicked around by it either. No loss of what became Russian Kars, no war with Italy that loses what was effectively their colony in Libya, and a more even dealing with the nationalities of the Balkans. That's what I imagine is doable. Like late Tsarist Russia, it would be a state with many issues, a state backward by Western/Central European standards, but still a state that can compete with the world and be a considerable powerhouse.
metalinvader665 said:
I'll go backward on your post and work my way up.
Agreed with Lao, it's just too poor, resource poor and constantly disunited. No way it can become anything of significance.
Cambodia is the abandonned step child of SEA. Everybody hits them without remorse because they are between super agressive powers. Nothing of significance since the Khmer. I was actually reading about them last week and after their defeat at Lovek in 1594 they completely internalised the fact they were racially inferior to the Thai. They changed their founding myth on their own to reflect that. Talk about being submissive...
The Malay states are nice and all, resource rich and everything but the geography keeps them from reaching a critical mass. ue to the fact it's an archipelago with different centers of power makes it extremely hard to unify and actually start to matter beyong being a commercial power.
Vietnam, I still think they're a very strong bet. After the Tay Son rebellion, Gia Long regained his kingdom with the help of French troups, so he knew about the efficiency of European warfare and technology. Vietnam has historically been a strong state in the region and has been independant from China since the XVth century (1427 when Le Loi starts a new dynasty). There was SOME ingerence by China through the Mac but it seizes to have a major impact like it could have in Korea. Relationship, depending on the time, could be something like Japan and the US in the 80's.
By 1810 you have a unified Vietnam with strong ties to France, a fairly solid army and a good ruler. If it didn't have a few bad ruler and a fetish for Christian persecution it could have modernised way further. Unfortunately, Gia Long's successor weren't nearly as good. Give him competent heirs, Vietnam will skyrocket, led by a learned elite and a traditionally imperialistic drive toward the South (see: Cambodia, Champa)
Burma I don't know enough. Had a shot if not for the Brits? Again, I don't know much.
Thailand, they could have gone well into the XXth century but they were caught in a big game of "why are you hitting yourself?" by the French and Brits after French Indochina. France takes some territory, Thailand asks for GB for some assistance, GB waves a finger at France and seizes some Thai territory as payment. If you get tag teamed by the two biggest power of the day, you don't get much of a chance. Eliminate French Indochina, or limit it, and they stand a better chance.
Regarding Oman, sure they had a native manpower problem but they had a certain control on Eastern Africa, being the referent power there for a long time, as well as strong link to Madagascar. Using them well, like they did, they can get even further than OTL
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4. The resources there are not worth the rebellions innate. The Afsharids being Sunni means little whenever the Pashtun are fanatical and will call for Jihad upon Shi'i in their borders, which then brings the Afsharids into defense of its citizens; the same occurred in the Ottoman sphere in Iraq against the Sultanate of Nejd and later with the Kurds. Afsharid just awakens a political force that is best left alone in Afghanistan or the Punjab. It's best to leave this wild land alone....
8. Egypt was a center of power in the Islamic world but one of only many, until the final stumble of Iraq. Egypt stood as the major source of Arab literature for centuries until it's conquest in 1514. This is agreed upon unanimously, that the Mamluk period was the height Arabic cultural achievement and in such, we get a possibly more agreeable Egypt as opposed to the Khedivite failure. Further, the militaristic nature of the Mamluks mimics the institutions in Japan in many ways, both in decentralization and cultural achievement both in manners and noble code. It also gives time for Egypt to develop before being challenged extensively by the West (not counting Portugal).
10. I suggest a Indian subcontinent expert to address this, it is not my area. But to assume Mughals make modernization is mute, you seem to agree that it is impossible...
I also do not know, the tensions in India is worse than China, war would be more widespread and likely include foreigners from Pashtun lands arriving murdering to assist Islamic states or warlords. Such a civil war would be the Yugoslavic break up times 10 and would exemplify genicide and religious/ethnic cleansing. India would benefit more from British rule or butterflying the Mughals.
Of course Indian states practiced this elegance or royal court culture, as did China, the problems are mirrored.
11. Still, to have the Ottomans be any larger of a power in the 1800-1900s would make them the greatest ongoing state in human history, bar none. It would be a state that would have perpetual imperialistic power with the same dynasty for over 700 years, that is completely ridiculous. The fact the Ottoman dynasty pulled this off otl, is completely incredible and insane. What you are proposing is making the Ottomans have longevity to the point of insanity.
- one thing that you could do is keep some sort of Ottomanism alive, as in a trade agreement between Turkey, Greece, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, etc... Or Cyprus being completely inside Turkey. Kind of like a EU of the former Ottoman states. Rather than symbols of the Ottomans being completely crushed and only seen in the aftermath of genocides in the Balkans (as in without the overarching Ottomanism spread by the Ottomans).
To put Oman any higher is still pushing the bill. How do you expect the Omani to resist France, England, Dutch and Portugal? The Omani were subjugated early on by Portugal who is a complete lightweight to what is to come, to expect them to put up resistance is insanity. Further, Oman never even took Madagascar, likely due to a lack of manpower.... How are they suppose to do any better? In all honesty, Oman is one of the most well run and extraordinary countries in terms of accomplishment (for what they have) in the world, but to increase this accomplishment is to make Oman have growth incomparable to any other state I can think of.
Could Oman do slightly better? Perhaps, but to modernize to a point like say Latin America without oil revenue is impossible.
You're the expert so you'll have the last word on this but I enjoy the discussion so I'll challenge this.
From what I understand (Empires of the Moonsoon by Richard Hall), the big pressure from the UK was because of the slave trade. They were also partially backed by the French and the US at times.
I posit they can exist between the states, using their position in the Ivory trade and the profits from there to modernise even further, maybe getting a more solid implementation in East Africa, possibly through a system of alliance, like every other power did on the continent. Oman is rich but it doesn't have that many resources to extract by itself, making it a big target.
I also don't think it can be a "Great Power" but I definitely think it can be the equivalent of Korea, Singapour, Taiwan or Shangai nowadays. An important trading partner in the world with limited diplomatic influence
Inchoate
Banned
How about if the Taiping rebellion succeeds, and after toppling the Qing, moderates? The first few emperor's could pursue some sort of nativist economic development, not quite westernisation, but perhaps undergoing a Meiji-esque or Mamluk-esque reforms. The only problem with this is that the western powers would surely intervene to prevent such a powerful China.