German without Hitler in charge has little interest in Austria. There was the Austro-German customs union attempt, which may work here if the French aren't motivated to pull their money out of Austria's banks and collapse their economy as a result to stop them. In fact with Germany the bulwark of Europe Astride Briand's plan for an EU may well work and make any German efforts on Austria moot and really fix the Franco-German enmityand harnesses German power to defend Europe and have them work with France for that. The ToV would probably be scrapped as a result of Soviet conquest of Poland and probably soon the Baltic states. German remilitarization would be necessary and would remove a major problem Germany had with the ToV, especially as they reclaim their 1914 border, and probably also scrap the reparations plans due to the need for Germany to pay for its own remilitarization.There's a brief side-show where Italy (and its ally, Hungary) starts some trouble with conflicts over neighbouring territories and German pretensions on Austria. That ends when Mussolini's regime winds up blundering into conflict with the allies (Germany, Britain and France) and is, subsequently, overthrown and Italy subjected to a brief occupation.
The big problem was how USSR expansionism was in some ways a natural ally of the revanchism of Germany, Hungary, Italy etc. You'd need to make the Soviets a universal threat - not only to the states which were created or enlarged after WWI but also to the revisionist states; at least to Germany, as the most powerful of the revisionist block.
I'm not sure if the Soviets could have overrun the whole of Poland in 1920. In any case, if they partially take over Poland or Lithuania and then get the idea to invade Eastern Prussia, it might be enough.
With any PoD before the signing of the treaty of Versailles until 1940, is it possible to sway most, if not all if Europe on one side against an expansionist USSR?
I don't think Germany would have much interest in working with the USSR with it on its doorstep and Poland effectively destroyed, especially as the ToV would likely get mostly rewritten before hyperinflation hit so that Germany could be the new bulwark against the USSR. Germany would probably then have its 1914 border back, plus maybe even more of rump Poland depending on how things play out, while none of the worst of the border conflict with Poland happens in Silesia, while the occupation of the Ruhr and Hyperinflation cannot be allowed to happy by the Allies/US due to the threat of the USSR taking over parts or all of Germany.The big problem was how USSR expansionism was in some ways a natural ally of the revanchism of Germany, Hungary, Italy etc. You'd need to make the Soviets a universal threat - not only to the states which were created or enlarged after WWI but also to the revisionist states; at least to Germany, as the most powerful of the revisionist block.
I'm not sure if the Soviets could have overrun the whole of Poland in 1920. In any case, if they partially take over Poland or Lithuania and then get the idea to invade Eastern Prussia, it might be enough.
Of course the USSR wouldn't have been in a good way with an extended war, but likely the victory would have some good impacts on public morale. You're right a deal would be worked out in the short term to stabilize the situation at home, but depending on how the politics of the USSR work out then perhaps they get going again later in the 1920s or even in the 1930s.We also need to remember that if the Soviet-Polish War extends into 1921, the Soviets would still be facing a lot of problems on the homefront, what with rebellions (Kronstadt, Tambov), food shortages/famine and so on. Partly because of such problems, they were ready to finally make deals with the Baltic states and Finland that ended the state of war between them and the Soviet state. Had the Red Army penetrated deeper into Poland, it has even more in a chance to overextend its reach and this might lead into some sort of smaller or bigger Soviet internal problems, with the attack itself, or say in Ukraine or closer to Petrograd.
I don't think Germany would have much interest in working with the USSR with it on its doorstep and Poland effectively destroyed, especially as the ToV would likely get mostly rewritten before hyperinflation hit so that Germany could be the new bulwark against the USSR. Germany would probably then have its 1914 border back, plus maybe even more of rump Poland depending on how things play out, while none of the worst of the border conflict with Poland happens in Silesia, while the occupation of the Ruhr and Hyperinflation cannot be allowed to happy by the Allies/US due to the threat of the USSR taking over parts or all of Germany.
No miracle on the Vistula - the Soviets overrun Poland and are only stopped at, roughly, Germany's WWI borders. Germany becomes a bulwark against the communist menace, leading to France and Britain helping German re-armament (provided it's pointed against the Soviets).
Soviet intervention into the Spanish Civil War sees the nationalist/conservative factions siding against the red threat (potentially with the civil war splitting the country in two, for a more interesting situation when the war actually begins). The Soviets manage to walk away with the Baltic states, but Finland's proximity to Leningrad means a critical vulnerability for the Soviet regime.
Not exactly. Stalin is in charge, not Trotsky, and I don't think there was any mention of the Polish-Soviet war, just time travel and wacky technology preventing the Nazis, which meant Stalin opts to conquer the world in the 1940s.Isn't that basically the backstory of Red Alert?
A point about the idea of the Soviets grabbing the Baltic states without "the miracle on the Vistula" - all three Baltic states had made peace with the Soviet state before the beginning of the Battle of Warsaw. Estonia in February 1920, Lithuania in July and Latvia in early August just before the beginning of said battle. All these treaties included the Soviet state recognizing the newly independent states next to it, relinquishing Russian claims to these areas "for all times". Notice that of the new states bordering the Baltic Sea north of Poland, only Finland did not have a peace treaty with the Soviets in August 1920 - it was being negotiated, and would be signed on October 14th IOTL.
Not happening after the Spartakists are crushed in 1919, the Bavarian Soviet Republic was crushed the same year, and the same with uprisings in the Ruhr.1922: Communist revolt in Bavaria. Vicious and brutal street fighting between the communists, various right-wing militias and the local police. Weimar hesitates, but when additional communist agitators appear in the Ruhr, acts, and sends in the Army.
The delay is costly.
The communists seize the Munich municipal government, and proclaim the 'People's Republic of Germany'. They request admission to the League of Nations, and ask for Soviet help in putting down 'rebels' in Berlin (aka the Weimar government).
A POD that might be used is another outcome of the Libau coup. In the spring 1919 German troops couped the legitimate Latvian government (without an OK from Berlin). Following the coup, and the deteriorating relations between Germany and Poland, Berlin intended to evacuate their Baltic troops in order to station them against Poland, and sign a peace treaty with the Soviets. The Entente would not have any of that insisting on the troops being kept in the Baltic states. However, if the Entente is upset enough about the April coup, maybe they would agree to a removal of German troops. As a result Riga remains in Soviet control, and the Baltic states fall to Soviet pressure.
After the coup, though, I believe the Germans under von der Goltz did not advance against the Reds IOTL but instead against the Estonians, making it not easier but more difficult for the Baltic troops to fight against Soviet troops in turn. The situation was not the Soviets vs. everyone else, after all, but one of changing alliances.
In 1919, the Estonians, with Finnish support, were doing pretty well for themselves against the Reds. Also at this time, the White Russian Northwestern Army under Yudenich was active against the Reds in the nearby areas, in cooperation with the Estonians and Finns. And if the Germans withdraw earlier, we might expect the Entente itself try to bring some sort of reinforcements to the area. Finland might also get more involved, if Mannerheim manages to convince leading politicians that stronger support to Estonia is in the Finnish interest. All in all, is not at all certain that an earlier removal of the German troops would mean the Baltics falling to the Reds in 1919-20.
The Libau coup prompted the first concerted discussion of events in the Baltic at Cabinet level, as the Scheidemann government had its gaze wrenched from the imminent presentation of the draft peace terms by the Allies. Groener had to counter strong fears about a military reaction when he addressed the Cabinet on 24 April 1919 to keep his colleagues up to date about the situation in the East. 'Premature demobilization', Groener warned, 'is not only dangerous in foreign policy terms, for with it the ambition of the enemy grows, but in domestic terms too. At the moment the East is essentially in our control. All orders from the government can be executed there. The charges of reaction and militarism are unjustified. The OHL insists that there is no question of counterrevolution. It does everything for, nothing against the government.' His assurances did not placate the SPD press and party organization, which expressed its extreme displeasure at the overthrow of the legally constituted government in Latvia. Yet the Cabinet discussion of the points raised by Groener confirmed how far the military leaders could continue to influence policy in the uneasy first months of 1919. The German government refused formally to recognize the Needra government, but 'without detriment to actual relations'. The important question in Berlin remained the relationship of events in the Baltic to what was perceived to be Allied policy towards Russia. Brockdorff-Rantzau was then adamant in rejecting the suggestion of Erzberger at the Cabinet meeting of 22 April, that Germany should consider the idea of an armistice with the Soviets 'as soon as possible'. The Foreign Minister continued to argue that the struggle against Bolshevism was one of the few agreed points for reconciliation with the Western powers, especially the United States, and that it would seem disloyal were Germany to deal with the Soviets. In the event, a compromise was reached at the meeting of the Cabinet on 24 April. It was one which took account of the fears voiced by Erzberger and Bell about offending the Soviets and ruled that the front in the East be maintained where it was. No further offensive was to be sanctioned. Consciences could be squared by the belief that to shorten the front would leave Lithuania vulnerable. Noske argued in addition, with some force, that to pull the German troops back from Latvia would provoke civil war, 'directly on our borders'.
The Libau coup and its aftermath thus confirmed the disagreement between the political and the military leadership over events in the East. Further strains were imposed when the draft peace terms were presented on 7 May 1919. Rantzau's objection that these were wholly unacceptable raised the prospect of renewed hostilities with the Entente which would mean, as Zimmerle was told in Kovno, that large troop formations would no longer be allowed outside the Reich. Indeed, Ebert informed an emotional Cabinet meeting on 8 May that German forces in the still occupied areas of Russia would be transferred to the defence of the frontiers against Poland. The Allies were formally notified on 9 May of the German Cabinet's intention to pull back its forces from Latvia and Lithuania in the shortest possible time, a decision originating in Brockdorff-Rantzau's telegraphed instructions from Paris on 3 May. Here he finally dropped his earlier objections to the idea of an armistice between the Soviet and German forces at the front, provided official relations were not restored between Germany and Russia before the peace terms had been finally clarified. The Allied Powers formally rejected Germany's note on 9 May and insisted two day later that German troops fulfill the terms of Article 12 of the Armistice. Yet the German Cabinet decision in principle to liquidate the Baltic campaign had been made. Inevitably, the German military leaders felt apprehensive, sharing as they did Groener's conviction that at the very least the German troops in the East should stay put for as long as possible. Their views were echoed too, in those of the Auswartiges Amt's Russian expert, Zitelmann, who worried about the effects of any premature ceasefire with the Bolsheviks on the future relations between Germany and a restored White Russian government.
Above all the irresolution of the German government owed much to the still unfathomable Allied policy towards Russia and the Baltic. Blicher's judgement might well have been passed on any of the Allied governments. After all, the Baltic states had been saved from Bolshevism by the defeat inflicted pn the Soviet forces-at Riga on 22 May. This achievement itself vindicated the provisions of the Armistice. The 'miracle on the Daugava' preceded the rather better known 'miracle on the Vistula' by a year. Only four days after Riga had been retaken, the Allied Powers reaffirmed their opposition to the Soviets with their decision to support the White Russian Admiral Kolchak and his forces. These were to be provided with 'munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the government in Russia'. In such a setting it is not difficult to see why von der Goltz encouraged the Landeswehr, reinforced by German troops and ostensibly in the service of Needra's 'government', to continue the advance beyond Riga. The situation only changed dramatically when those troops engaged with a joint Estonian-Latvian force supporting the deposed Ulmanis government. The event greatly intensified Allied fears that Russia would be restored under German rather than Allied auspices. The clash finally provoked a decisive display of Allied resistance to the entire Baltic undertaking by German troops; an armistice was imposed on the Freikorps/Landeswehr force on 10June and again, after a brief resurgence of fighting, on 3July (at Strasdenhof). The latter document insisted on the Germans evacuating Riga, which duly occurred on 5 July, and repeated the Supreme Council decision of 13 June, that all Reich German soldiers were to leave the region in the shortest possible time.