AHC: Europe vs the USSR

With any PoD before the signing of the treaty of Versailles until 1940, is it possible to sway most, if not all if Europe on one side against an expansionist USSR?
 
A good start would be preventing Germany from going fascist, or at least the Nazis trying harder with the "enemy of my enemy" theme against Bolshevism.
 

Pomphis

Banned
Have the red army win the battle of warsaw

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Warsaw_(1920)

The Battle of Warsaw refers to the decisive Polish victory in 1920 at the apogee of the Polish–Soviet War. Poland, on the verge of total defeat, repulsed and defeated the invading Red Army. It was, and still is, celebrated as a great victory for the Polish people over Russia and communism.
As Soviet forces invaded Poland in summer 1920, the Polish army retreated westward in disorder. The Polish forces seemed on the verge of disintegration and observers predicted a decisive Soviet victory.
The battle of Warsaw was fought from August 12–25, 1920 as Red Army forces commanded by Mikhail Tukhachevsky approached the Polish capital of Warsaw and the nearby Modlin Fortress. On August 16, Polish forces commanded by Józef Piłsudski counterattacked from the south, disrupting the enemy's offensive, forcing the Russian forces into a disorganized withdrawal eastward and behind the Neman River. Estimated Russian losses were 10,000 killed, 500 missing, 30,000 wounded, and 66,000 taken prisoner, compared with Polish losses of some 4,500 killed, 10,000 missing, and 22,000 wounded.
The defeat crippled the Red Army; Vladimir Lenin, the Bolshevik leader, called it "an enormous defeat" for his forces.[3] In the following months, several more Polish follow-up victories saved Poland's independence and led to a peace treaty with Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine later that year, securing the Polish state's eastern frontiers until 1939.


If the red army wins, you suddenly have bolshevists controlling poland, germany being very weak and a tempting target, and the british and french seriously afraid.
 
No miracle on the Vistula - the Soviets overrun Poland and are only stopped at, roughly, Germany's WWI borders. Germany becomes a bulwark against the communist menace, leading to France and Britain helping German re-armament (provided it's pointed against the Soviets).

Soviet intervention into the Spanish Civil War sees the nationalist/conservative factions siding against the red threat (potentially with the civil war splitting the country in two, for a more interesting situation when the war actually begins). The Soviets manage to walk away with the Baltic states, but Finland's proximity to Leningrad means a critical vulnerability for the Soviet regime.

The Soviets continue rebuilding, even as Europe increasingly arrays itself against them - leading to an eventual conflict when the Soviets try to intimidate Finland into pushing the border back from Leningrad, some decades later. The conflict is largely characterized as a crusade against Bolshevism by democratic (-ish) Europe, led by Britain, France and Germany.

There's a brief side-show where Italy (and its ally, Hungary) starts some trouble with conflicts over neighbouring territories and German pretensions on Austria. That ends when Mussolini's regime winds up blundering into conflict with the allies (Germany, Britain and France) and is, subsequently, overthrown and Italy subjected to a brief occupation.

Soviet efforts to undermine the European nations with funding of terrorist and/or revolutionary groups backfires and the majority of Europe is arrayed against them by the end of it. The Soviet calls for a global revolution backfire.

EDIT: And I was ninja'd ... damn, dirty ninjas.
 

Deleted member 1487

I agree that the Soviets winning the Polish-Soviet war is a good start, but it also helps if Trotsky gets power and keeps trying to export the revolution.

There's a brief side-show where Italy (and its ally, Hungary) starts some trouble with conflicts over neighbouring territories and German pretensions on Austria. That ends when Mussolini's regime winds up blundering into conflict with the allies (Germany, Britain and France) and is, subsequently, overthrown and Italy subjected to a brief occupation.
German without Hitler in charge has little interest in Austria. There was the Austro-German customs union attempt, which may work here if the French aren't motivated to pull their money out of Austria's banks and collapse their economy as a result to stop them. In fact with Germany the bulwark of Europe Astride Briand's plan for an EU may well work and make any German efforts on Austria moot and really fix the Franco-German enmityand harnesses German power to defend Europe and have them work with France for that. The ToV would probably be scrapped as a result of Soviet conquest of Poland and probably soon the Baltic states. German remilitarization would be necessary and would remove a major problem Germany had with the ToV, especially as they reclaim their 1914 border, and probably also scrap the reparations plans due to the need for Germany to pay for its own remilitarization.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristide_Briand#Briand_Plan_for_European_union
https://www.wdl.org/en/item/11583/
 
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The big problem was how USSR expansionism was in some ways a natural ally of the revanchism of Germany, Hungary, Italy etc. You'd need to make the Soviets a universal threat - not only to the states which were created or enlarged after WWI but also to the revisionist states; at least to Germany, as the most powerful of the revisionist block.

I'm not sure if the Soviets could have overrun the whole of Poland in 1920. In any case, if they partially take over Poland or Lithuania and then get the idea to invade Eastern Prussia, it might be enough.
 
The big problem was how USSR expansionism was in some ways a natural ally of the revanchism of Germany, Hungary, Italy etc. You'd need to make the Soviets a universal threat - not only to the states which were created or enlarged after WWI but also to the revisionist states; at least to Germany, as the most powerful of the revisionist block.

I'm not sure if the Soviets could have overrun the whole of Poland in 1920. In any case, if they partially take over Poland or Lithuania and then get the idea to invade Eastern Prussia, it might be enough.

We also need to remember that if the Soviet-Polish War extends into 1921, the Soviets would still be facing a lot of problems on the homefront, what with rebellions (Kronstadt, Tambov), food shortages/famine and so on. Partly because of such problems, they were ready to finally make deals with the Baltic states and Finland that ended the state of war between them and the Soviet state. Had the Red Army penetrated deeper into Poland, it has even more in a chance to overextend its reach and this might lead into some sort of smaller or bigger Soviet internal problems, with the attack itself, or say in Ukraine or closer to Petrograd.
 

Deleted member 1487

The big problem was how USSR expansionism was in some ways a natural ally of the revanchism of Germany, Hungary, Italy etc. You'd need to make the Soviets a universal threat - not only to the states which were created or enlarged after WWI but also to the revisionist states; at least to Germany, as the most powerful of the revisionist block.

I'm not sure if the Soviets could have overrun the whole of Poland in 1920. In any case, if they partially take over Poland or Lithuania and then get the idea to invade Eastern Prussia, it might be enough.
I don't think Germany would have much interest in working with the USSR with it on its doorstep and Poland effectively destroyed, especially as the ToV would likely get mostly rewritten before hyperinflation hit so that Germany could be the new bulwark against the USSR. Germany would probably then have its 1914 border back, plus maybe even more of rump Poland depending on how things play out, while none of the worst of the border conflict with Poland happens in Silesia, while the occupation of the Ruhr and Hyperinflation cannot be allowed to happy by the Allies/US due to the threat of the USSR taking over parts or all of Germany.

We also need to remember that if the Soviet-Polish War extends into 1921, the Soviets would still be facing a lot of problems on the homefront, what with rebellions (Kronstadt, Tambov), food shortages/famine and so on. Partly because of such problems, they were ready to finally make deals with the Baltic states and Finland that ended the state of war between them and the Soviet state. Had the Red Army penetrated deeper into Poland, it has even more in a chance to overextend its reach and this might lead into some sort of smaller or bigger Soviet internal problems, with the attack itself, or say in Ukraine or closer to Petrograd.
Of course the USSR wouldn't have been in a good way with an extended war, but likely the victory would have some good impacts on public morale. You're right a deal would be worked out in the short term to stabilize the situation at home, but depending on how the politics of the USSR work out then perhaps they get going again later in the 1920s or even in the 1930s.
 
I don't think Germany would have much interest in working with the USSR with it on its doorstep and Poland effectively destroyed, especially as the ToV would likely get mostly rewritten before hyperinflation hit so that Germany could be the new bulwark against the USSR. Germany would probably then have its 1914 border back, plus maybe even more of rump Poland depending on how things play out, while none of the worst of the border conflict with Poland happens in Silesia, while the occupation of the Ruhr and Hyperinflation cannot be allowed to happy by the Allies/US due to the threat of the USSR taking over parts or all of Germany.

That sounds plausible, if Poland is destroyed. Is the USSR really capable of completely removing Poland from the map around 1920, though? Not least because, as DrakonFin pointed out, the Soviets aren't really even masters of their own house yet.

There's also the Baltic states. From what I understand, the Baltische Landeswehr didn't have much of a chance of accomplishing its long-term political goals, but it still represented a sizeable fighting force. If something happens to screw over the Latvian (or Estonian) national government and drag the Germans into a prolonged, more bitter war with the Soviets over the region...maybe that could sow the necessary seeds of permanent hostility between Germany and the USSR.
 
No miracle on the Vistula - the Soviets overrun Poland and are only stopped at, roughly, Germany's WWI borders. Germany becomes a bulwark against the communist menace, leading to France and Britain helping German re-armament (provided it's pointed against the Soviets).

Soviet intervention into the Spanish Civil War sees the nationalist/conservative factions siding against the red threat (potentially with the civil war splitting the country in two, for a more interesting situation when the war actually begins). The Soviets manage to walk away with the Baltic states, but Finland's proximity to Leningrad means a critical vulnerability for the Soviet regime.

A point about the idea of the Soviets grabbing the Baltic states without "the miracle on the Vistula" - all three Baltic states had made peace with the Soviet state before the beginning of the Battle of Warsaw. Estonia in February 1920, Lithuania in July and Latvia in early August just before the beginning of said battle. All these treaties included the Soviet state recognizing the newly independent states next to it, relinquishing Russian claims to these areas "for all times". Notice that of the new states bordering the Baltic Sea north of Poland, only Finland did not have a peace treaty with the Soviets in August 1920 - it was being negotiated, and would be signed on October 14th IOTL.

If the Soviets win in Poland and then turn on the Baltics, promptly breaking these peace deals to incorporate these areas to the nascent Soviet Union... How do you think anyone else will think about the Soviet government's ability to keep to any treaties it signs? I believe that in such a scenario, many a European nation would not consider any papers signed by the representatives of Moscow as worth the scrap of paper they were scribbled on. And with good reason, I believe.
 
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yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
Germany not being Nazi + Trotsky in charge of USSR (because you need a man who don't give a shit about realpolitik if you want him to try his luck against a united Europe).
 

Deleted member 1487

Isn't that basically the backstory of Red Alert?
Not exactly. Stalin is in charge, not Trotsky, and I don't think there was any mention of the Polish-Soviet war, just time travel and wacky technology preventing the Nazis, which meant Stalin opts to conquer the world in the 1940s.
 
1920: The Soviets win the Battle of the Vistula. Poland absorbed into the USSR.
1921: Germany make an emergency appeal to the Allies about re-armament. The Red Army was badly mauled taking Poland, but is re-equipping quickly. Lessons learned are being integrated into the Red Army's doctrines. The French are opposed to re-armament, the British lukewarm at best. Paris and London send a strongly worded note to Moscow - copying Berlin - informing the Soviets that Germany is an independent country and the Allies will act to defend it if the Soviets violate any borders.
1922: Communist revolt in Bavaria. Vicious and brutal street fighting between the communists, various right-wing militias and the local police. Weimar hesitates, but when additional communist agitators appear in the Ruhr, acts, and sends in the Army.

The delay is costly.

The communists seize the Munich municipal government, and proclaim the 'People's Republic of Germany'. They request admission to the League of Nations, and ask for Soviet help in putting down 'rebels' in Berlin (aka the Weimar government).

The Soviets recognize the People's Republic of Germany and send in the re-vitalized Red Army to 'restore order'. The German Army is mostly engaged in Bavaria and the Ruhr, and a scratch force of two divisions on the Oder is swept aside by the Red Army.

Britain and France declare war on the Soviet Union.

1923: With French help, the German Army occupies Munich, and manages to hold the line at the Elbe. France is wracked by unrest, both from French communists and from people horrified at the idea of another Great War less than five years after the previous one. The British send a smallest BEF to Hamburg.

The Soviets find their logistics strained, both by a fractured industrial base at home, and by Polish, Ukrainian and German partisans behind the lines. The Soviets are unable to translate their numeric and doctrinal advantages into battlefield success, and the line stabilizes on the Elbe, with the Weimar government re-locating to Essen.

The Soviets inspire communist movements throughout Europe, being particularly effective in France, Spain and Italy.

1924: Revolt in Italy. Communist partisans seize Milan, Turin, Florence and Bologna. Attempted seizure of Rome fails. Italian civil war begins; Soviets decline (for now) to recognize Italian People's Republic as there is no way to support it from the Soviet bits of Germany.

Massive Soviet gas attack and offensive over Elbe beaten back with heavy losses by French and German armies. French Communists start terrorist campaign at home. Soviet responses to partisan attacks in Poland beyond cruel as Lodz gassed to death when People's Commissar Trotsky killed by Polish Freedom fighters.

1925: Lenin suffers stroke and dies, replaced by Stalin. Allies have struggled to build up forces on Elbe. Massive debts to America for war materials, heavy strain on colonial empires. Allies wonder at Soviet quiescence on front are no longer confused after June 1. June 1 sees huge Soviet invasion of Romania, Balkans and Turkey in attempt to use Soviet manpower advantages to flank the Elbe line. Fierce Czech resistance allows Allied relief force into Bohemia, while Romanians prepare Bucharest for siege. Soviet attack on Istanbul succeeds, and Soviet submarines in Black Sea sortee to Med to prey on Allied shipping.

Allies feeling strain of war very badly.

British appeal to America is met with lukewarm (at best) response. British and French diplomats take a journey to Tokyo.

By end of 1925, Romania (except for Bucharest), Slovakia and most of Yugoslavia occupied. French forces enter Italy and help suppress the Communist rebels, Italy becomes full partner. Spain falls to 'neutral' communist regime; French forces details to garrison the Pyrenees. European Turkey occupied; Soviets fighting a slog through eastern Turkey vaguely trying to link up with Kurds.

1926: Japan declares war on Soviets. Vladivostok occupied, Japanese start move into far eastern Siberia. Stopped cold by Soviets if they too far inland, out of range of Japanese Naval gunfire support.

Bucharest falls. Allies forced back in Bohemia - Prague falls - but stabilize Austrian and Italian Fronts.

Soviets sink an American liner in the Med, outraging US public opinion, but not to the point where America will enter.

Grim mid-year British Cabinet assessment. Allied economies tottering, kept afloat by massive loans from America. Japanese intervention helpful, but not decisive. Restless communist movements in all Allied states. French reaction has been to go hard right - basically fascist, as are Italy, Austria and Germany. The conclusion: The Allies will lose Europe in the next years without intervention from an outside power; that power can only be the United States. British plan to somehow convince the Americans to formally join the Allies.

How's this?

Mike Turcotte
 
A point about the idea of the Soviets grabbing the Baltic states without "the miracle on the Vistula" - all three Baltic states had made peace with the Soviet state before the beginning of the Battle of Warsaw. Estonia in February 1920, Lithuania in July and Latvia in early August just before the beginning of said battle. All these treaties included the Soviet state recognizing the newly independent states next to it, relinquishing Russian claims to these areas "for all times". Notice that of the new states bordering the Baltic Sea north of Poland, only Finland did not have a peace treaty with the Soviets in August 1920 - it was being negotiated, and would be signed on October 14th IOTL.

A POD that might be used is another outcome of the Libau coup. In the spring 1919 German troops couped the legitimate Latvian government (without an OK from Berlin). Following the coup, and the deteriorating relations between Germany and Poland, Berlin intended to evacuate their Baltic troops in order to station them against Poland, and sign a peace treaty with the Soviets. The Entente would not have any of that insisting on the troops being kept in the Baltic states. However, if the Entente is upset enough about the April coup, maybe they would agree to a removal of German troops. As a result Riga remains in Soviet control, and the Baltic states fall to Soviet pressure.

Either that, or deeper problems against Poland, results in a Berlin-Moscow peace and evacuation from the Baltic states, without an OK from the Entente. The result is a quite quick destruction of the Baltics. Later on, better Soviet strategic position results in a fall of Poland.
 
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Deleted member 1487

1922: Communist revolt in Bavaria. Vicious and brutal street fighting between the communists, various right-wing militias and the local police. Weimar hesitates, but when additional communist agitators appear in the Ruhr, acts, and sends in the Army.

The delay is costly.

The communists seize the Munich municipal government, and proclaim the 'People's Republic of Germany'. They request admission to the League of Nations, and ask for Soviet help in putting down 'rebels' in Berlin (aka the Weimar government).
Not happening after the Spartakists are crushed in 1919, the Bavarian Soviet Republic was crushed the same year, and the same with uprisings in the Ruhr.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bavarian_Soviet_Republic#Demise
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spartacist_uprising#Attack_by_the_Freikorps
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germa...#Murder_of_Karl_Liebknecht_and_Rosa_Luxemburg
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_Revolution_of_1918–19#Aftermath

The Communist leadership had largely be crushed in 1919 and the movement scattered so a 1921 uprising was out of the question given that they had blown their wad in 1919 and had their leadership taken out. The right wing was preeminent in Germany after the failed uprisings and they would have cracked down early and hard on the remaining German communists if the Soviets won Warsaw and were moving to the German border.
 
A POD that might be used is another outcome of the Libau coup. In the spring 1919 German troops couped the legitimate Latvian government (without an OK from Berlin). Following the coup, and the deteriorating relations between Germany and Poland, Berlin intended to evacuate their Baltic troops in order to station them against Poland, and sign a peace treaty with the Soviets. The Entente would not have any of that insisting on the troops being kept in the Baltic states. However, if the Entente is upset enough about the April coup, maybe they would agree to a removal of German troops. As a result Riga remains in Soviet control, and the Baltic states fall to Soviet pressure.

After the coup, though, I believe the Germans under von der Goltz did not advance against the Reds IOTL but instead against the Estonians, making it not easier but more difficult for the Baltic troops to fight against Soviet troops in turn. The situation was not the Soviets vs. everyone else, after all, but one of changing alliances.

In 1919, the Estonians, with Finnish support, were doing pretty well for themselves against the Reds. Also at this time, the White Russian Northwestern Army under Yudenich was active against the Reds in the nearby areas, in cooperation with the Estonians and Finns. And if the Germans withdraw earlier, we might expect the Entente itself try to bring some sort of reinforcements to the area. Finland might also get more involved, if Mannerheim manages to convince leading politicians that stronger support to Estonia is in the Finnish interest. All in all, is not at all certain that an earlier removal of the German troops would mean the Baltics falling to the Reds in 1919-20.
 
If the UK's 1940 War Cabinet Crisis had lead to peace talks would that not leave Europe in general free to attack the USSR? You wouldn't have the UK and maybe you wouldn't have France giving it 100% (though I think a fascist puppet government in France would send expeditionary forces like Spain did), but it would leave the Axis as the masters of Europe and therefore most of Europe would be attacking the Soviet Union.
 
After the coup, though, I believe the Germans under von der Goltz did not advance against the Reds IOTL but instead against the Estonians, making it not easier but more difficult for the Baltic troops to fight against Soviet troops in turn. The situation was not the Soviets vs. everyone else, after all, but one of changing alliances.

In 1919, the Estonians, with Finnish support, were doing pretty well for themselves against the Reds. Also at this time, the White Russian Northwestern Army under Yudenich was active against the Reds in the nearby areas, in cooperation with the Estonians and Finns. And if the Germans withdraw earlier, we might expect the Entente itself try to bring some sort of reinforcements to the area. Finland might also get more involved, if Mannerheim manages to convince leading politicians that stronger support to Estonia is in the Finnish interest. All in all, is not at all certain that an earlier removal of the German troops would mean the Baltics falling to the Reds in 1919-20.

My knowledge is a bit sketchy and mostly based on The Baltic states and Weimar Ostpolitik by John Hiden (1987). Some excerpts from it indicates another tale though.

Following quotes detail the change of heart of the Berlin opinion. Mostly Brockdorff-Rantzau's change in policy towards Moscow. (page 20-21)
The Libau coup prompted the first concerted discussion of events in the Baltic at Cabinet level, as the Scheidemann government had its gaze wrenched from the imminent presentation of the draft peace terms by the Allies. Groener had to counter strong fears about a military reaction when he addressed the Cabinet on 24 April 1919 to keep his colleagues up to date about the situation in the East. 'Premature demobilization', Groener warned, 'is not only dangerous in foreign policy terms, for with it the ambition of the enemy grows, but in domestic terms too. At the moment the East is essentially in our control. All orders from the government can be executed there. The charges of reaction and militarism are unjustified. The OHL insists that there is no question of counterrevolution. It does everything for, nothing against the government.' His assurances did not placate the SPD press and party organization, which expressed its extreme displeasure at the overthrow of the legally constituted government in Latvia. Yet the Cabinet discussion of the points raised by Groener confirmed how far the military leaders could continue to influence policy in the uneasy first months of 1919. The German government refused formally to recognize the Needra government, but 'without detriment to actual relations'. The important question in Berlin remained the relationship of events in the Baltic to what was perceived to be Allied policy towards Russia. Brockdorff-Rantzau was then adamant in rejecting the suggestion of Erzberger at the Cabinet meeting of 22 April, that Germany should consider the idea of an armistice with the Soviets 'as soon as possible'. The Foreign Minister continued to argue that the struggle against Bolshevism was one of the few agreed points for reconciliation with the Western powers, especially the United States, and that it would seem disloyal were Germany to deal with the Soviets. In the event, a compromise was reached at the meeting of the Cabinet on 24 April. It was one which took account of the fears voiced by Erzberger and Bell about offending the Soviets and ruled that the front in the East be maintained where it was. No further offensive was to be sanctioned. Consciences could be squared by the belief that to shorten the front would leave Lithuania vulnerable. Noske argued in addition, with some force, that to pull the German troops back from Latvia would provoke civil war, 'directly on our borders'.

The Libau coup and its aftermath thus confirmed the disagreement between the political and the military leadership over events in the East. Further strains were imposed when the draft peace terms were presented on 7 May 1919. Rantzau's objection that these were wholly unacceptable raised the prospect of renewed hostilities with the Entente which would mean, as Zimmerle was told in Kovno, that large troop formations would no longer be allowed outside the Reich. Indeed, Ebert informed an emotional Cabinet meeting on 8 May that German forces in the still occupied areas of Russia would be transferred to the defence of the frontiers against Poland. The Allies were formally notified on 9 May of the German Cabinet's intention to pull back its forces from Latvia and Lithuania in the shortest possible time, a decision originating in Brockdorff-Rantzau's telegraphed instructions from Paris on 3 May. Here he finally dropped his earlier objections to the idea of an armistice between the Soviet and German forces at the front, provided official relations were not restored between Germany and Russia before the peace terms had been finally clarified. The Allied Powers formally rejected Germany's note on 9 May and insisted two day later that German troops fulfill the terms of Article 12 of the Armistice. Yet the German Cabinet decision in principle to liquidate the Baltic campaign had been made. Inevitably, the German military leaders felt apprehensive, sharing as they did Groener's conviction that at the very least the German troops in the East should stay put for as long as possible. Their views were echoed too, in those of the Auswartiges Amt's Russian expert, Zitelmann, who worried about the effects of any premature ceasefire with the Bolsheviks on the future relations between Germany and a restored White Russian government.

The following detailing the importance of capturing Riga 22 May. The author might overstate it though, as he mainly is an historian focusing on diplomacy, rather than strategy. (page 22)
Above all the irresolution of the German government owed much to the still unfathomable Allied policy towards Russia and the Baltic. Blicher's judgement might well have been passed on any of the Allied governments. After all, the Baltic states had been saved from Bolshevism by the defeat inflicted pn the Soviet forces-at Riga on 22 May. This achievement itself vindicated the provisions of the Armistice. The 'miracle on the Daugava' preceded the rather better known 'miracle on the Vistula' by a year. Only four days after Riga had been retaken, the Allied Powers reaffirmed their opposition to the Soviets with their decision to support the White Russian Admiral Kolchak and his forces. These were to be provided with 'munitions, supplies and food, to establish themselves as the government in Russia'. In such a setting it is not difficult to see why von der Goltz encouraged the Landeswehr, reinforced by German troops and ostensibly in the service of Needra's 'government', to continue the advance beyond Riga. The situation only changed dramatically when those troops engaged with a joint Estonian-Latvian force supporting the deposed Ulmanis government. The event greatly intensified Allied fears that Russia would be restored under German rather than Allied auspices. The clash finally provoked a decisive display of Allied resistance to the entire Baltic undertaking by German troops; an armistice was imposed on the Freikorps/Landeswehr force on 10June and again, after a brief resurgence of fighting, on 3July (at Strasdenhof). The latter document insisted on the Germans evacuating Riga, which duly occurred on 5 July, and repeated the Supreme Council decision of 13 June, that all Reich German soldiers were to leave the region in the shortest possible time.

So all in all, it depends on how much one values the capture of Riga. If Latvia falls, I cannot see Estonia survive for long. You are correct though, that the overly ambitious von der Goltz really hurt the Estonian and Latvian position, and you might very well be correct in that the Reds would be in a worse position if Germany does not advance on Riga.

Do you know any good book detailing the more military side of this conflict?
 
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