AHC - Estonia not annexed to USSR

When Finland and Sweden OTL discussed a state alliance Summer 1940, Sweden demanded that Finland acknowledge the losses of the winter war and drop any claims to regaining Karelia. Finland did not want to do that, and the talks collapsed on this and German and Soviet unwillingness to guarantee that they had no hostile designs on the state alliance. Sweden was willing to assume responsibility for defending Finland, if Finland dropped the claims to Karelia. Finland chose to invite German troops and get involved in the Continuation War instead. At the time, it might have been seen as the more sensible choice, but the fact remains, it cost Finland even more, because of nationalist tendencies. There's your example from OTL.

I was expecting you mention that. It is debatable, though, how much the collapse of the deal was due to Finnish nationalism as such. For one thing, the loss of Karelia was an ongoing national trauma in 1940. It had been grabbed by the USSR in an attack that was universally condemned and led to the USSR's expulsion from the LoN. One must underestimate the deep-seated injustice felt by the Finns, who were at the time trying to resettle over ten percent of their population in very tense international and domestic conditions to chalk Finnish unwillingness to abandon their claims to a territory historically and righfully theirs in what amounts to a heartbeat. What would have Sweden done in a similar situation after it had just lost most of Götaland south of Jönköping to the Germans, say? You just don't shrug that off.

For another thing, the Swedish Foreign Minister Günther made both relinquishing claims and German and Soviet acceptance preconditions to the defensive union. It was the latter point that finally brought the deal down, as Finland in its desperation would have accepted the first one. The demand for the support of the major powers, one of which had just waged a war of aggression against Finland, might in some ways be called a get-away-from-jail card on the Swedish side. Sweden would have wanted a defensive union, sure. One in which it was certain you don't need to actually defend yourself or your ally against hotile powers.

Finland was driven into Germany's waiting arms by nationalism and irredentist dreams, but only for a part. It was much more important that Finland in 1940 was in existential fear over its very survival. That Stalin wuld come and finish what he had started, the annexation of Finland, was accepted as a commonplace, especially as Finland was being kept in a diplomatic vise by the Soviets through 1940. As help from Sweden was not forthcoming, Finland had to turn to the only option left for support and that was Hitler's Germany. Mannerheim and Ryti certainly had no love for the Nazis, but after all the other options had been exhausted, that was it.

I'll return to the other points later.
 
I have read accounts of low-level staff talks between Finnish and Swedish army officers, discussing cooperation against the Soviets in the 30s, where the Finns would assume that they could make demands (for resources, men, timetables etc.), and when asked what they were willing to offer in return, answered 'We are not here to make offers.' The general feeling in Finland seem to have been that the fact that they were in between Sweden and the USSR was enough to entitle them to make demands - which would be pretty ok if it actually looked like Stalin did intent to swallow Scandinavia, but it die not until the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact.

If Sandler had remained in place, the state union of 1940 might actually have gone through. He might not have been as strong on the Soviet and German acceptance as Günther was. Sandler was a pan-nordic supporter, Günther only looked after Sweden.

I am not saying that Finland was making stupid decisions at the time, only that the general attitude of both Sweden and Finland would need to (but also could) change in order for a pre-1939 or post-1940 alliance to go through.

For example, a much shorter and less bloody Finnish civil war (and especially the repressions during and after it) might do it, or Lenin not acknowledging the independence of Finland and ordering the Russian troops in the country to start a revolution (instead of merely passing their arms to Finnish communists). While the Swedish social democrats were decently anti-communist, they were also very much against political violence, and the repressions against the reds in Finland created a huge rift between Sweden and Finland that was not really healed until a month or so into the Winter War.

A shorter and much less bloody civil war, mostly headed by Russians against the Finns, with more Swedish support could create a much better climate for low-level and then high-level staff work. A more active Soviet Union in the 20s leads to less or no Swedish defence cuts. A full defensive alliance on the terms of LoN aggression could most likely be possible, with Estonia joined in too.

And if Sweden really did ship 6-8 divisions over the Baltic late Autumn 1939, Stalin would probably look elsewhere.
 
The Interwar Baltic states were actually as pro-Soviet as they could be without outright declaring their support for worldwide communist revolution. We have to remember that the leadership of the Baltic states was not composed of imbeciles, they realized full well that while they had won their independence from the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union was a military threat far too great for them to be able to overcome in a war, and as a result the policies of the Interwar Baltic states generally attempted to steer as far clear from any potential conflict with the Soviet Union as possible. The Baltic states even accepted an ultimatum to allow Soviet basing rights rather than deny it (with the likely outcome of that being war), probably knowing full well that their future as sovereign, independent states was in doubt.

Join Sweden, Finland and Estonia into some kind of serious defensive alliance. Have them invest credibly in their mutual defence in the 20s and 30s. Stalin was an opportunist, and a careful such. He did not want to get entangled in war with anyone he did not feel completely superior to.

The Soviets take over Estonia and use the defensive pact as an excuse to go for Finland next. Sweden gets embroiled in an unpopular war and strengthens the position of people who would rather simply be neutral.This is a net-win for Soviet interests.

Sweden was neutral, but maybe have a Finnish-Estonian alliance? It would be backed by the Nazis during WWII, and afterwords, a communist revolution jut happens to occur in Estonia, but the UN is already formed at this point, and the USSR doesn't want to lose any more UN seats, so Estonia stays independent?

Interwar Finland was governed by some remarkably intelligent people, namely ones who realized that conflict with the Soviet Union should be avoided rather than encouraged. The lack of any real cooperation between the two states (despite the very large amount of cultural and ethnic ties between Finland and Estonia in particular) is rather telling. The ultimatum presented to the Finns by the Soviet government shortly before the Winter War began was actually the subject of serious debate in the Finnish government.

Why would the Soviets do this? Estonia was much more important to them than Lithuania or Latvia so only taking those two without Estonia sounds very unlikely. It's not like Estonia could really resist them in any meaningful way.

This, pretty much entirely this. The Soviet guarantees of access to the Baltic are much more important to them than a small, indefensible neutral state. Estonia is more more valuable as a direct part of the USSR than in a situation where it plays the part of the small, neutral Netherlands to a larger Germany.
 
The Soviets invaded and annexed the Baltic states only when the international change situation changed completely with the Fall of France. Moscow decided to not annex Finland or set up a puppet government in 1945 because it knew that the West was opposed to it. The West did not view the Finns as being in the same league as the other Axis powers because of the Soviets earlier aggression. In order to maintain good relations with Britain and America to recognize its more important conquests in Eastern Europe, Stalin decided a neutralized Finland was acceptable. These are important lessons because it shows us that Stalin was opportunistic, but only took reasonable chances. In face of sufficient opposition, he would back away.

The only way for Estonia to escape annexation is if the international situation puts too high a political cost for Stalin. That can't be done with World War II as we know it. Substantial changes would need to be made.

First, let's say Norway does not fall. Perhaps plans for Weserubung become known. Norway plans for its defense and cooperates with the British and French when the Germans attack.

Second, with an independent Allied Norway, Finland never joins Hitler in an attack on the Soviet Union. It instead places its trust with Allied Norway and neutral Sweden to keep its independence from the Soviet Union.

Third, later in the war, Finland joins the Allies after D-Day. British and American troops are sent there, especially air power.

Fourth, the Finns work with Estonian nationalists behind German lines are able to land in Talinn before the Red Army in September 1944.

Fifth, Finland recognizes the National Committee of the Republic of Estonia as the provisional Estonian government. A native Estonian defense force is recognized. Perhaps the Estonian members of the SS even officially surrender, disarmed, made POWs and then released and join the new Allied unit with their old weapons again. Eventually Britain and America recognize it as well.

Sixth, Stalin is reluctant to intervene since firing on the Finnish troops would be provocative.

Seventh, Stalin accepts an independent Estonia as part of the negotiations after the war provided it is friendly and agrees to various treaties similar to Finland IOTL.

Since no Allied troops ever enter the other Baltic states, Stalin does whatever he wants in those places.

That is about the only way I could see it happening, and it relies very much on Finland able to land troops across the Gulf of Finland. Even under cover of Western airpower, that is unlikely. But it is at least possible.
 
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