TFSmith121
Banned
AEF is what guaranteed that a)
The AEF is what guaranteed:
A) the French didn't bow out in 1917 after Nivelle et al;
B) the Allies were in position to wage any sort of counter offensives in 1918;
C) the Allies would win in 1919, even if the Germans held out.
The problem for an "amphibious" BEF in 1914 is no one was thinking in terms of landing and sustaining multiple corps on a hostile shore, and doing so removes a small field army from the Allies' left flank that otherwise could not be replaced; there's a reason the BEF went to France, after all.
The right flank - especially if the Swiss open the door to the French - offers some slight possibilities, but given the stalemate on the Italian front, seems doubtful.
The only other option is conscription in the British and French empires, which was not going to happen.
So stalemate while waiting for the Russians to change the status quo was about the most the French and British could achieve with the alliances as they were in 1914.
The epochal shifts would have been for the Germans and Russians to ally and watch each other's backs at the expense of the Austrians, with a warning to the French and British to stay out of it. A Franco-British-Austrian alliance opposed to a Russo-German one would probably be fairly mobile...
Best,
AEF, you really don’t want to go there. Psychologically very important, actually very limited.
The foresight on Amphib is not too far fetched. The RN view was an the Army is a rojectile fired by the navy, the problems are that the a) the Army is not big enough to matter that much in a European and and b) the Army plan involves being in France alongside the French army and C0 they did not talk to each other.
One of the issues for the French in the battles of the Frontiers is actually a failure of cavalry recon and deployment at divisional level. Its not a matter French charge massacre being hardwired. Very quickly when the recon picks up and the Div Commanders get changed ( like 2 weeks) it become a French set up gun line, suppress the defensive fires, dig in germans charge massacre.
You cant really get away from that tbh as log as there is any sort of offensive around the Vosges though.
The AEF is what guaranteed:
A) the French didn't bow out in 1917 after Nivelle et al;
B) the Allies were in position to wage any sort of counter offensives in 1918;
C) the Allies would win in 1919, even if the Germans held out.
The problem for an "amphibious" BEF in 1914 is no one was thinking in terms of landing and sustaining multiple corps on a hostile shore, and doing so removes a small field army from the Allies' left flank that otherwise could not be replaced; there's a reason the BEF went to France, after all.
The right flank - especially if the Swiss open the door to the French - offers some slight possibilities, but given the stalemate on the Italian front, seems doubtful.
The only other option is conscription in the British and French empires, which was not going to happen.
So stalemate while waiting for the Russians to change the status quo was about the most the French and British could achieve with the alliances as they were in 1914.
The epochal shifts would have been for the Germans and Russians to ally and watch each other's backs at the expense of the Austrians, with a warning to the French and British to stay out of it. A Franco-British-Austrian alliance opposed to a Russo-German one would probably be fairly mobile...
Best,
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