AHC:Eastern Front level brutality in Western Front during WW2

Do you seriously not understand how history is written?

I understand. I just also understand how claiming their writing it to "sell their books" is worthless and dismissing it on that basis. I might as well make the same claim of how an author like this which you like to cite are writing just to "sell their books" by being controversial and bucking the mainstream historical consensus rather then trying to actually argue their point. We might as well throw out the entire discipline of history if your gonna seriously be dismissive of modern scholars opinion on... anything on such a basis.

I mean I get why you want to go personal and try to make this into me being a crypto-nazi or something to try and deflect the argument away from an area you're uncomfortable with, but come on that's a cheap shot for an alternate history forum where we discuss the 'might have beens'. I'm interested in strategic, operational, and technical what ifs around WW2 that would make it more interesting in those realms, because general speaking making tweeks to the Allies just usually gets OTL, but quicker.

And that just so happen always to have the Germans outright win the war, or at least do massively better in the East without said improvement in the East impacting really the WAllies whatsoever. Also an acceptance of Nazi economic ideas in regards to the East becoming a "free source of raw resources". I've also seen you been dismissive on the idea that German soldiers were influenced in their attitude towards the USSR, despite that being very much the modern mainstream historical consensus. I can also observe that you don't view the Wehrmacht as modern military history scholars do: an army which excelled at fightng in Western and Central Europe, where the infrastructure could support German efforts and where the lack of strategic depth of expected enemies did not require a deep manpower pool or much long-term industrial thought but when it went up against an enemy that spanned immense territory and immense population was utterly out of it's depth. You don't view the Wehrmacht's strategic-operational failures as being part of the Germans larger history going back to WW1. But then you apparently think the mainstream historical consensus is a "fad".

BTW why don't you start any what ifs?

I tried my hand at starting to write a timeline once, only to find I don't have the patience or attention span to see even the first part through to the end. There's some older stuff I did over on the ASB forum that did progress a bit that I abandoned after awhile. I do contemplate it from time to time. Maybe one day I'll actually try to do so again. If you mean "what ifs" as in just asking the question? I did, a long time ago. Kinda grew out of it as I embarked on doing the research myself.

It seems like all you have been doing is come and criticize other people's or offer opinions on other questions at nitpick in debates rather than fully participating in actual 'what if-ery'.

And the moment anyone does the same for the Soviets or WAllies, your all over doing the same thing.

In terms of the accusations of downplaying Soviet contributions, well, in large part their ability to win their conflict was a function of efforts of their allies. I similarly do the same for the Brits, who were even more dependent on their allies and the US to continue fighting, but since you don't frequent those threads when I'm pointing out British dependency on the US you apparently have a distorted perspective on the opinion I have of the way the conflict actually ran.

No, I've seen those and I actually agree with you that the Brits depended on the US to keep fighting past Spring 1941. However, I doubt that you think the British won the Battle of Britain due to any sort of dependence on a third party rather then being all down to German and British actions.

The reality is no Allied power achieved ANYTHING on their own. Even Soviet survival in Barbarossa was in part a function the damage the British had done to the German forces up to that point and how much they pinned them down on other fronts and the economic impact of the blockade.

A blithe assertion you based on a overestimate on the capabilities of airpower and the belief that the Germans would have actually applied the lack of economic impact from blockade in 1941.

The WW2 Germans aren't 'my side' in a debate that I have to defend as a point of personal pride or something as you oddly seem to do with the Soviets,

So you say, anyone can look through your posting history and see how you try to bend over backwards to argue against German failings as being German instead of Hitler's and similar such issues. How you constantly posit this or that extremely minor tactical or technical POD having an outsized impact on the German war effort while dismissing similar such doing it for the Soviets or WAllies. I mean, for gods sakes do you know how many times have you posted a thread where the Germans ditch the Panther in favor of more Panzer IVs or one of the VK designs and positing that this radically alters the course of 1943? A quick search gives me at least 7 such threads, and there's possibly more given I was able to find that numbers simply by searching thread titles with the word "Panther" in it posted by you. And of those 7, 3 were in 2016 and 2 of them were literally within a month of each other. Most repeat threads here are usually by completely different people (usually new).

it's just that in my read of the military history of the conflict that by the time the war started no one in Europe was really in an organizational position to stop them short barring even worse mistakes than they made IOTL.

And you just blithely pretend the Germans never make slightly (or bigger) worse mistakes or their enemies slightly better ones that derail them, despite both being eminently possible even if earlier PoDs improve their odds.

The issue is not that I have a Nazi view of history, rather one laid out by David Glantz himself in Stumbling Colossus. Stalin screwed up the nation and military very badly and it was only the depth, poor infrastructure, weather, and German failings that saved the USSR from a far worse than France.

You claim to present a Glantz view and then present something completely different. In reality, Glantz argues throughout his books on the 1941 campaign that it was the vicious fighting conducted by the Red Army in the course of the summer and autumn that wore down the Germans and conditioned Barbarossa's ultimate failure and that "the depth, poor infrastructure, weather, and German failings" were at best secondary contributors or at worse nice bonuses. The one exception is German failings, but those are rather counter-balanced by similarly awful Soviet failings that Glantz established in Stumbling Colossus, which is very much how war goes: both sides will make their share of screw-ups. Glantz also points out that Soviet actions at certain points actually came extremely close to collapsing Barbarossa months ahead of time and, like many modern scholars, note that the Germans even being successful as it was is the startling thing, not their ultimate failure. Thus, it is extremely possible to posit even the Red Army of 1941 stop Barbarossa much earlier then OTL, during the course of the Smolensk-Kiev Battles. All of these are ideas I've seen you poo-poo at.

As to Stumbling Colossus, yeah Glantz does a good job describing how screwed up the Red Army was in mid-1941 and that it precludes Barbarossa failing at the frontiers. But I have seen you use it as a basis to argue about the Soviets condition would be come mid-1942 or '43 in the absence of a German assault, with the implication that what Glantz said for 1941 would apply for then too. This despite the fact that Glantz has noted both in Stumbling Colossus and elsewhere that the Soviets were in the process of radical transformation of their armed forces and having innumerable people detail to you how it would have developped.

Hell, I've seen you in one thread treat the Red Army of OTL 1944-45 basically be much closer to the one of 1941 except with more and shinier toys. You argued, for 8 pages, that the Wehrmacht of 1944-45 could destroy a Soviet front and maul two more into submission (a force of some 1.5 million men), advance clear across Hungary, and at the end of it all still have enough strength to rush up and throw back as many as the four Soviet fronts advancing across East Prussia and Poland, driving them from the Eastern approaches of Berlin. If that isn't a sign of someone who constantly underrates the Red Army and/overrated the Wehrmacht, I don't know what is.

The Germans did not have air superiority by November 1942 as Bergstrom notes,

Actually, Bergstrom German air superiority in late-1942 as being even greater then what they enjoyed in 1941. Even with the resurgence of the VVS during Uranus, the Luftwaffe still retained the upper-hand. They conducted furious air attacks on several of the advancing Soviet formations but did not achieve any ability to check their advance.

the Germans had run themselves ragged and then transferred out multiple Gruppen to the Mediterranean before Operation Torch, leaving the Soviets with air superiority over Stalingrad.

Again with this dishonesty. Luftlotte 6's transfer of six bomber gripped was compensated for. In numerical terms, Luftwaffe strength at Stalingrad this changed zilch.

Then too Hitler was ignoring all the reports of growing Soviet reserves massing on the flanks opposite the Romanians throughout October because he didn't want to believe it. So it wasn't a matter of not detecting it, it was a matter of the political leadership ignoring it, much like Stalin did in May-June 1941...

I see your still knee-deep in the blame Hitler myth. In reality, German intelligence failed to detect the Soviet preparations and divine their intention. As late as November, they were stating that there would be nothing more then probing attacks against the Romanians.

If you have to characterize historical face as apologetic excuses then you've really got an ideological problem.

No, it's pretty clearly an excuse. You just try to hide it by pointing to overall numbers and not the numbers in question.

Regardless of what Soviet claims were the German records show where they put the majority of their forces and by late 1942/early 1943 it was not in the East

And German records also show that their air forces in the Stalingrad area were not weakened at all.

This is hilarious but I don't think he goes to this extreme with his PODs.

I was being deliberately satirical with that one.
 
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Glantz also points out that Soviet actions at certain points actually came extremely close to collapsing Barbarossa months ahead of time and, like many modern scholars, note that the Germans even being successful as it was is the startling thing, not their ultimate failure. Thus, it is extremely possible to posit even the Red Army of 1941 stop Barbarossa much earlier then OTL, during the course of the Smolensk-Kiev Battles. All of these are ideas I've seen you poo-poo at.

Even if Moscow were taken, the war goes on, Germany has to take the next capital hundreds of miles away, and they lose. There were possible ways to defeat the USSR, though. There agricultural output was in free fall in the first couple years. Another may be Germany had merely to goad the USSR into mobilizing, Barbarossa would have been even more of a disaster for the USSR, with monstrously more forces lost in the German advance.

The Soviet army had sufficient understanding of military theory as it was at that time, but let us not ignore the parade of military disasters that followed them on this long trek back to Moscow until somewhat miraculously figuring out how defeat German forces in technical, unforgiving successful detail, in the lesser known battles in November-December where Germany sustained heavy casualties on the drive to Moscow (fortified defense, in depth like at Kursk).

Saying that they could defeat Germany much earlier because Glantz has pointed out certain actions that he thinks almost made Barbarossa a failure is completely disregarding the facts. The Red Army was seriously flawed as repeatedly shown in defeat after defeat. Zhukov learned only at Leningrad and Moscow how to defeat Germany in defense. And only then.

So, to make the Western Front more devastating one need only have Germany defeat the USSR in some form, then losses on the side of the Allies mounts considerably.

A successful Soviet defense means holding strongpoints that germans need to take at first example Leningrad, Moscow (extended to Tula-Kalinin), Kursk, Stalingrad, even Smolensk. Heavily fortifying these places by tens of kilometers and having absurd concentrations of forces prepositioned there. And a minimal force to check the rate of advance of the panzer divisions. The panzers still have to wait on the infantry. The inclusion of adequate tank formations as happened later was also an issue for the USSR as was inexperienced officers and the indecision by Moscow as to what the strategy should be because the one they had was clearly a failure.

To say that the the Red Army could stop the Germans before Moscow needs a lot of explanation as to how, because OTL I doubt it was possible.

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Can I suggest watching this;

RE the Eastern front, even if only for the starting bit where he talks about the scale and scope.

The Werhmacht bled to death on the Eastern front, and despite the Soviets MANY blunders in the 1941 period (not in any way shape or form helped by the Purge of the Officer Corps or the stifiling of initative by Commisars etc) by 1942 they were learning. Yes inexperienced officers made the same mistakes as those of 1941 and often died for it, but they still learned. Stalingrad before Operation Uranus had basically stopped pretty much the creme of the German army dead in its tracks in the burning hell that was the shell of that city.
With both sides forced into a brutal slugging match, despite facing superior troops, the Soviets held, all be it barely and by the skin of their teeth at more than a few times. And the scale and scope of Operation Uranus is what stunned the Germans. They thought that the Russians were on their last legs, and with Moscow still threatened, that an attack would come further north. I can't remember what officer said this but "It was the first time they used our tactics against us" (or words to that effect).
The Soviets very successfully camoflagued the units involved both physically and electronically and whilst the Germans knew an offensive was coming, its winter so the Soviets are going to attack, thats just common sense. They were not expecting an attack of that scale.

But re the OP to get a war of that scale of brutality on the west? ASB really without massive massive butterfly flaps.

And another good vid.

 
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RE the Eastern front, even if only for the starting bit where he talks about the scale and scope.

The Werhmacht bled to death on the Eastern front, and despite the Soviets MANY blunders in the 1941 period (not in any way shape or form helped by the Purge of the Officer Corps or the stifiling of initative by Commisars etc) by 1942 they were learning. Yes inexperienced officers made the same mistakes as those of 1941 and often died for it, but they still learned. Stalingrad before Operation Uranus had basically stopped pretty much the creme of the German army dead in its tracks in the burning hell that was the shell of that city.
With both sides forced into a brutal slugging match, despite facing superior troops, the Soviets held, all be it barely and by the skin of their teeth at more than a few times. And the scale and scope of Operation Uranus is what stunned the Germans. They thought that the Russians were on their last legs, and with Moscow still threatened, that an attack would come further north. I can't remember what officer said this but "It was the first time they used our tactics against us" (or words to that effect).
The Soviets very successfully camoflagued the units involved both physically and electronically and whilst the Germans knew an offensive was coming, its winter so the Soviets are going to attack, thats just common sense. They were not expecting an attack of that scale.

But re the OP to get a war of that scale of brutality on the west? ASB really without massive massive butterfly flaps.

And another good vid.
Interesting video, will watch both.

I agree that you can trace the evolution of the Red Army but as you said it took a while. Moscow was a milestone as was Stalingrad for Red Army skill in conducting battles with groups of fronts as well as the eventual realization of a necessity for the tank and combined arms armies.

That Germany was destined to lose a protracted war I realize, but that was never their objective. The USSR mobilized over 30 million throughout the war. However 6.5 could have been on the border instead of 2.9 at Barbarossa start as per Soviet mobilization plans, many of which would be destroyed as per OTL in the unfolding disaster of Barbarossa. These were the forces that defended at Smolensk. There are limits to how many forces that can be drafted for a month, constituted, deployed, and after a mobilization of the reserves it seems that the numbers of soldiers raised decreases dramatically. If you destroy the forces detailed in the mobilization plans quickly enough their entire front becomes destabilized the way the French line did before the final German push on Paris because they cannot raise troops fast enough to stabilize it.

in destroying all these forces early the USSR will be forced to capitulate like France did even if they can continue to afford to draft over 20 million more soldiers, those forces would be destroyed piecemeal. Their army is effectively destroyed, one objective Hitler must have had for Barbarossa.

Or maybe not, in which case the USSR stabilizes or keeps the front stabilized and forces the Germans into positional war and the attrition that inevitably follows. A German defeat. The USSR was undoubtedly a superpower whereas Germany was not.
 
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