AHC: Earliest possible Allied victory in WWII?

A German clusterfuck in 1940 produces a German disintegration by 1943 when the Germans' tenacious reliance on urban warfare leads to their entire army being cut off and destroyed in the Ruhr and the Rhineland, producing the collapse of Nazi military power and a Western joyride through Germany reducing any town so foolish as to fire a shot at them to rubble.

For a dark-horse possibility, avert the Soviet purges but butterfly-net any effect this might have on Stalin's actions, and in six months WWII in the East is over with Hitler's suicide in Berlin and the subsequent disintegration of the Nazi Empire. Outside of these two possibilities, having the Allies win WWII much earlier than IOTL is low probability. Especially if we assume the 1941 battles in the Axis-Soviet War go as per OTL.
 
Yeah, france probably still gets its ass kicked.
I'm not convinced that Germany can loose before at least 1943 without a completely different WWII.

Germanys gonna blitzkrieg its way to spain, and then as far into the USSR as it can before they get their shit together.

People really forget that 1940 was an astonishing surprise won by a razor-thin margin, not a great sweeping triumph ala Napoleon's invasion of Prussia. That campaign is literally one where for want of a horseshoe nail the entire German Empire's rise might be nipped in the bud. And the real benefit of the 1940 scenario is butterflying both the Holocaust and potentially even the Warsaw Pact, as the Germans will "merely" limit themselves to some of the most savage and disgusting cruelties of modern warfare as opposed to genocide in their occupied zones of Poland without ever having the massive numbers of Jews under their control IOTL that made a Holocaust feasible.
 
People really forget that 1940 was an astonishing surprise won by a razor-thin margin, not a great sweeping triumph ala Napoleon's invasion of Prussia. That campaign is literally one where for want of a horseshoe nail the entire German Empire's rise might be nipped in the bud. And the real benefit of the 1940 scenario is butterflying both the Holocaust and potentially even the Warsaw Pact, as the Germans will "merely" limit themselves to some of the most savage and disgusting cruelties of modern warfare as opposed to genocide in their occupied zones of Poland without ever having the massive numbers of Jews under their control IOTL that made a Holocaust feasible.

I only differ in one thing - the campaign was not won razor thin, but by a wide margin.

The campaign was "razor-thin" during the first days - IF the ALLIES had managed to hold onto a SINGLE line of defence the attack had stalled.

Afterwards it was a cakewalk with serious blunders on the German side...
 
I only differ in one thing - the campaign was not won razor thin, but by a wide margin.

The campaign was "razor-thin" during the first days - IF the ALLIES had managed to hold onto a SINGLE line of defence the attack had stalled.

Afterwards it was a cakewalk with serious blunders on the German side...

I would say that the end of the campaign was definitely a dramatic, cataclysmic, total victory. But the foundation on this rested was one of an extremely narrow margin, thus the overall point stands. Germany needs everything to go right, the Allies need only a few things to go right.
 
People really forget that 1940 was an astonishing surprise won by a razor-thin margin, not a great sweeping triumph ala Napoleon's invasion of Prussia. That campaign is literally one where for want of a horseshoe nail the entire German Empire's rise might be nipped in the bud. And the real benefit of the 1940 scenario is butterflying both the Holocaust and potentially even the Warsaw Pact, as the Germans will "merely" limit themselves to some of the most savage and disgusting cruelties of modern warfare as opposed to genocide in their occupied zones of Poland without ever having the massive numbers of Jews under their control IOTL that made a Holocaust feasible.

this is only true from a numerical sense given that France had many more tanks and artillery pieces of much better quality than the Germans

It wasn't really razor thin from a practical sense on the ground given that the few well fought French battles (Stonne and Gembloux) were tactical draws in the midst of the germans rapidly sweeping around their forces and pounding the hell out of them with airpower

In the entirety of sickle cut and case red the germans inflicted ~20 to 1 casualties on the French, British, Dutch and Belgians ie 2 million to 100k. 20 to 1 is about as decisive a victory as you can possibly have; let alone against someone with competitive equipment and numerical parity
 
this is only true from a numerical sense given that France had many more tanks and artillery pieces of much better quality than the Germans

It wasn't really razor thin from a practical sense on the ground given that the few well fought French battles (Stonne and Gembloux) were tactical draws in the midst of the germans rapidly sweeping around their forces and pounding the hell out of them with airpower

In the entirety of sickle cut and case red the germans inflicted ~20 to 1 casualties on the French, British, Dutch and Belgians ie 2 million to 100k. 20 to 1 is about as decisive a victory as you can possibly have; let alone against someone with competitive equipment and numerical parity

It actually was razor-thin in a practical sense on the ground, if we factor in just how narrow the French drive through the Ardennes was as a victory. A few more artillery pieces and Sickle-Cut is halted in the bud. According to German records, IIRC, it was Allied artillery that was most dangerous, and a few more batteries wouldn't decide the war one way or another.
 
I would say that the end of the campaign was definitely a dramatic, cataclysmic, total victory. But the foundation on this rested was one of an extremely narrow margin, thus the overall point stands. Germany needs everything to go right, the Allies need only a few things to go right.

I don't quite agree with this; German air superiority was absolute; and in the cases were the French did assemble; they found themselves under repeated air attack especially against their fuel and ammo trucks which zapped tactical and strategic effectiveness and deployment respectively. De Gaul's division didn't just run out of fuel because the French didn't know how to fuel a mobile division; he lost critical rear echelon units to air strikes

In that sense the LW acted as a huge force multiplier which reduced in large part the demand for tactical skill or effectiveness to be made on the heer; so thing's like Rommel and Reinhardt's initial clumsiness or Guderian pushing his men too hard so that they were fighting exhausted could be overcome by sheer airpower
 
It actually was razor-thin in a practical sense on the ground, if we factor in just how narrow the French drive through the Ardennes was as a victory. A few more artillery pieces and Sickle-Cut is halted in the bud. According to German records, IIRC, it was Allied artillery that was most dangerous, and a few more batteries wouldn't decide the war one way or another.

a couple of batteries were not going to stop 30 divisions and 1300 tanks snake :p

more to the point; it's not like the dyle forces did anything special to stop army group B in holland or northern belgium either; they fought a spectacular battle at gembloux, but the mobile divisions flowed around this anyway and the LW pounded the crap out of the survivors rendering the effort largely wasted

sickle cut was a 2 pronged attack; the entente didn't stop either one with their hoards of tanks and artillery, their only "achievements" where two tactical draws in the context of a strategic throat slashing
 

Jason222

Banned
I think French put more resourse into air force Franca able hold force Nazi Germany lose great deal more man power.
 
I read somewhere that bad weather might have slowed down the Germans long enough for the French to get their act together, fall back and reorganise.
 
I don't quite agree with this; German air superiority was absolute; and in the cases were the French did assemble; they found themselves under repeated air attack especially against their fuel and ammo trucks which zapped tactical and strategic effectiveness and deployment respectively. De Gaul's division didn't just run out of fuel because the French didn't know how to fuel a mobile division; he lost critical rear echelon units to air strikes

In that sense the LW acted as a huge force multiplier which reduced in large part the demand for tactical skill or effectiveness to be made on the heer; so thing's like Rommel and Reinhardt's initial clumsiness or Guderian pushing his men too hard so that they were fighting exhausted could be overcome by sheer airpower

Not in the Ardennes, which is where things really mattered. In 1940 no air force was going to provide effective CAS in the middle of tangled country like that. No air force had the ability or organization to do any such thing, nor will among the air generals to demean themselves by actually fighting the real war.

a couple of batteries were not going to stop 30 divisions and 1300 tanks snake :p

more to the point; it's not like the dyle forces did anything special to stop army group B in holland or northern belgium either; they fought a spectacular battle at gembloux, but the mobile divisions flowed around this anyway and the LW pounded the crap out of the survivors rendering the effort largely wasted

sickle cut was a 2 pronged attack; the entente didn't stop either one with their hoards of tanks and artillery, their only "achievements" where two tactical draws in the context of a strategic throat slashing

The Ardennes is what made the victories in Belgium worthless. If the Germans are held there, their entire plan died stillborn. It's the nature of loading everything in one area extremely vulnerable to the kind of firepower that turns a logistical jam into a clusterfuck. If it works well, it's brilliant, if it doesn't it's Tannenberg if you're Samsonov.
 
Suppose the Germans are bitch slapped by the Anglo-French in 1940.

Could we possibly see a modern Germany that ironically retains some of the eastern territories they lost OTL but loses land in the west instead?
 
Suppose the Germans are bitch slapped by the Anglo-French in 1940.

Could we possibly see a modern Germany that ironically retains some of the eastern territories they lost OTL but loses land in the west instead?

What land in the west exactly? Why would France want to occupy German populated areas? :confused:

What might happen is the generals attempt to mutiny, cause civil war and coupled with collapse of Germany, Polish rebel. Resulting disintegration and military failure taints the perception of the Army and generals in Germany forever, while nazis might even make some sort of come back later on, portraying themselves as being betrayed by military.
 
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