AHC: Democrats and Republicans switch

IMO it is precisely the two times in the twentieth century where the Democrats most attempted to appeal to conservatives--1904 and 1924--which show the utter hopelessness of the task. First of all, 1904--see David Sarasohn, The Party of Reform, pp. xiv-xv.:

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As for 1924, by nominating the Wall Street lawyer Davis, the Democrats managed to get 28.8 percent of the popular vote and to finish not just behind Coolidge but behind La Follette in a dozen midwestern and western states. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1924_United_States_presidential_election

Again, I'll quote the New York Sun, the journal considered the voice of Wall Street, on why it was supporting TR over Parker in 1904: "We prefer the impulsive candidate of the party of conservatism to the conservative candidate of the party which the business interests regard as permanently and dangerously impulsive." https://books.google.com/books?id=X43uHzjM_GIC&pg=PA82
Yes, it looks to me like the results of the 1924 election did alot to cement the positions of the two parties. But IOTL, Davis was running against an incumbent Coolidge, himself a Conservative northeastern famous for saying "the Business of America is business", with a booming economy.

I've read your positions on other threads, my understanding is you believe it possible that Roosevelt as Republican couldve beat Wilson in 1912; if this occurred, is it possible that FDR comes into the Republican fold? And presumably this butterflies President Harding, which would likely butterfly the apolitical Coolidge...

I've also read Hoover considered running for the Democrats in 1920. Is it possible to see an ATL with something like TR in 1912, Hughes in 1916 and 1920, and then a Progressive-Republican successor v. Hoover (D) in 1924? I've read lots of the threads but I'm not particularly familiar with the characters at the time.

Thanks for your input
 
IMO it is precisely the two times in the twentieth century where the Democrats most attempted to appeal to conservatives--1904 and 1924--which show the utter hopelessness of the task. First of all, 1904--see David Sarasohn, The Party of Reform, pp. xiv-xv.:


I mean, they won as Cleveland, and almost won as Tilden, not to mention were a considerably stronger presence in the gilded age overall than during the progressive era (the exception is the age of Wilson). What you're describing is not the folly of being a conservative Democrat, but merely describing the position of the Democratic party post civil war and pre Great Depression party, the party that was not the party of Lincoln. As for their extremely embarrassing defeat in 1924, it was caused largely by a split in the party not along ideological lines, but amongst communal and regional.

And Teddy Roosevelt, a progressive Republican, won the presidency in a landslide, and even the 1920 rise of the conservative branch of the GOP had to do with an anti-Wilsonian backlash in the aftermath of his decision to break his promise in 1916, that is to keep the country out of the first world war: context matters.
 

Deleted member 84726

Republicans (USA) have been many things: the party of the Union (Civil War Era), the party of the gold standard (Gilded Age), the party of temperance (Early 20th Century), and the party of free enterprise (Since Reagan), among others. Amid all these changes, there is one thing that has never changed: Republicans have always been the party of American unified democratic nationhood.

Democrats (USA), by contrast, have historically tended to attract those who felt themselves in some way marginal to the American experience: slaveholders (Pre-Antebellum), indebted farmers (Jacksonian Era), immigrants (from "ethnic" whites in the past to many others groups today), intellectuals, Catholics, Jews, blacks (Civil Rights Era), feminists, gays (after the 60s) — people who identify with the “pluribus” in the nation’s motto, “e pluribus unum.”

If "the Left" becames associated with those who fell included in the American National Identity and "the Right" with those who fell mostly unsatisfied with it, we can have them switch quite a lot in relation to OTL.
 
I mean, they won as Cleveland, and almost won as Tilden, not to mention were a considerably stronger presence in the gilded age overall than during the progressive era (the exception is the age of Wilson). What you're describing is not the folly of being a conservative Democrat, but merely describing the position of the Democratic party post civil war and pre Great Depression party, the party that was not the party of Lincoln. As for their extremely embarrassing defeat in 1924, it was caused largely by a split in the party not along ideological lines, but amongst communal and regional.

And Teddy Roosevelt, a progressive Republican, won the presidency in a landslide, and even the 1920 rise of the conservative branch of the GOP had to do with an anti-Wilsonian backlash in the aftermath of his decision to break his promise in 1916, that is to keep the country out of the first world war: context matters.

(1) IMO 1876 really should have been a winning year for the Democrats, even without the disputed southern states, and Tilden's conservatism was one reason it wasn't.

"There is no question that during the depression of the 1870s taxpayers across the nation felt overburdened, but this program of reducing government expenditures rather than increasing them to deal with economic hardship had a cost. That cost is illustrated by two revealing letters. Immediately after Tilden’s nomination, a furious Kentuckian sent a letter to a Philadelphia newspaper vowing to oppose Tilden and instead marshal support for the separate Greenback candidate who wanted to print more paper money to promote economic recovery. “Our motto,” he wrote, “will be ‘relief’ and not Tilden reform.” Then, on October 25 Horatio Seymour, who had been the Democratic presidential candidate in 1868, wrote the following to Tilden:

"I have reason to know that your opponents in and out of the party count upon the large towns to defeat you. They rely upon deserters among Democrats, hard times & the role of money. The word ‘reform’ is not popular with working men. To them it means less money spent and less work. Most of these men are Catholics. You will see that the Republicans have dropped the school question. I think it important that some quiet judicious person should visit the large towns and see the leading Irishmen and call their minds back to the hostility of Hayes and the Republicans to their nationality & religion. There is danger of a loss of votes among this class.”

"No evidence exists of any substantial swing of Irish Catholics, Democrats’ most loyal constituency, to Hayes in 1876, and even abstention seems unlikely given the growth in the Democratic vote. Unemployed Protestants, however, are another matter. They too wanted an increase, not a decrease, in public expenditures. Tilden, in short, may have bet on the wrong horse. During hard times promises of relief may have trumped reform among all but the silk-stocking Liberal Republicans. With Democrats offering no program for immediate economic recovery and Republicans stirring up still-visceral sectional and religious hatreds, the Republican comeback in 1876 becomes more understandable.'


(2) As for Cleveland, I'll quote Lipset again:

""It should be remembered that it was a conservative Democrat, Grover Cleveland, who, in 1886, sent the first message to Congress on labor. In it he urged that a commission on labor disputes be set up which could investigate and even arbitrate if so requested by the parties involved or by the state government. In 1888 in his last message to Congress after being defeated for re-election, Cleveland denounced 'the communism of combined wealth and capital, the outgrowth of overwhelming cupidity and selfishness...not less dangerous than the communism of oppressed poverty and toil...'...It is important to note that Cleveland was much more conservative in his second term of office when he no longer had to anticipate facing the voters than in his first one, and that he was repudiated by the Democratic party at its next convention in 1896. In fact, Cleveland was the only President elected in his own right to be repudiated by a convention of his own party while still holding office.." https://archive.org/details/politicalmansoci00inlips/page/308/mode/2up Bryan lost in 1896 but at least made a respectable race. Can you imagine how a Cleveland Democrat would have done?

(3) TR was pretty much an accidental president. The Republicans would almost certainly not have nominated him for president in 1904 if he had not already become president through McKinley's assassination (Fairbanks seems a more likely candidate had McKinley lived). Once he became president and was enormously popular, they couldn't give up on him, but it is noteworthy that the Democrats in Congress actually supported "Square Deal" measures more solidly than Republicans, who (with some success and the acquiescence of TR) tried to water them down. TR didn't really become radical until after he had left the presidency--and in his role as radical he after all failed to win the nomination in 1912.

(4) Maybe the Democrats were doomed to lose in 1904 anyway, but the fact remains that Parker lost far worse than Bryan ever did. Among other things, he showed that a conservative Democrat couldn't even get the financial support of big business. "The Republicans may appeal with success to the conservatism of the country , ” admitted the anti - Bryan Louisville Courier - Journal after Parker's defeat; "not so the Democrats." https://www.google.com/search?q=louisville+"not+so+the+democrats"&source=lnms&tbm=bks&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjuoczt99DsAhXFna0KHQYEAUgQ_AUoAXoECAUQCQ&biw=1722&bih=902
Indeed, could Hearst have done worse than Parker? After all, Hearst was almost elected Governor of New York in 1906!

(5) 1924 may have been a losing year for the Democrats in any event but if they had nominated someone progressive enough to persuade La Follette not to run, they surely would have done better than 28.8 percent...

Being a progressive was certainly no guarantee of victory for a Democrat in the twentieth century but the two times when the conservative Democratic strategy was tried, it turned out far worse.
 
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BTW, even John W. Davis and Alton Parker had not-entirely-reactionary records at the time they were nominated:

"After serving in the West Virginia House of Representatives, he [Davis] served two terms in the United States Congress, where he soon became known as the ablest lawyer in Congress. During his time m Congress, he championed the cause of workmen's compensation as an appropriate regulation of interstate commerce and favored free trade, despite the fact that his own constituents felt threatened by it.Perhaps the high point of his progressive record came when he offered a bill to limit the issuance of injunctions against strikers in labor disputes. It eventually became a part of the Clayton Antitrust Act.

"In August 1913, Davis was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson as Solicitor General of the United States. True to form, he excelled in that post, as he had in each of is other career opportunities. During his service
there he won a significant victory for black voters by convincing the United States Supreme Court that an Oklahoma "grandfather clause" exempting from a literacy test those voters whose ancestors had been eligible to vote prior to January 22, 1866 violated the Fifteenth Amendment." https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1807&context=wlulr

As for Parker, "As a judge, Parker was notable for independently researching each case that he heard. He was generally considered to be pro-labor and was an active supporter of social reform legislation, for example upholding a maximum-hours law as constitutional." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alton_B._Parker (That was the *Lochner* case...)
In your opinion, could Hiram Johnson have won the Republican nomination in 1920?
 
In your opinion, could Hiram Johnson have won the Republican nomination in 1920?

I once explained why the convention might even have trouble accepting him as vice-president (not that he would ever have agreed to that, though Harding offered it): "Even apart from die-hards who couldn't forgive his bolt in 1912, a lot of Republicans--fairly or unfairly--blamed him for Hughes' defeat in California (and therefore in the Electoral College) in 1916. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25121461?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents The fact that his ally Borah had launched a Senate investigation of campaign finances that proved embarrassing to both Wood and Lowden also helped to make Johnson unpopular with the delegates."
 
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- Replace Truman with a vp for Roosevelt that's less friendly towards minorities.

- Have JFK loses the 1960 democratic nomination to someone more conservative.

- No Truman means Eisenhower and Nixon get all the credit for desegregating the armed forces.

- Nixon wins the 1960 presidential election due to no JFK and gets credit for all the Civil Rights legislation.

- GOP winning means Goldwater faction loses credibility, Nixon doesn't become corrupt, the Southern Strategy is never born, and the GOP liberal wing wins out.

- African Americans decide that after 16 years of Republicans helping them out means they are the party for African Americans.

- 1970s/80s come around and we begin to see the Rust Belt and white flight. This time though, these working class socially conservative citizens are Democrats who after losing 4 elections in a row to the Republicans decide to make amends with Southern Democrats and become a the socially conservative party.

- By the 21st century, the Democrats are "conservative populists" while the Republicans are liberal libertarians.
 
I once explained why the convention might even have trouble accepting him as vice-preisdent (not that he would ever have agreed to that, though Harding offered it): "Even apart from die-hards who couldn't forgive his bolt in 1912, a lot of Republicans--fairly or unfairly--blamed him for Hughes' defeat in California (and therefore in the Electoral College) in 1916. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25121461?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents The fact that his ally Borah had launched a Senate investigation of campaign finances that proved embarrassing to both Wood and Lowden also helped to make Johnson unpopular with the delegates."
But Harding did offer VP? Then if Johnson accepts (as unlikely as that may be), he's probably President!
 
One further note on the Gilded Age--even then, one should not judge the Democrats solely by their rather conservative presidential candidates (e.g., Tilden and Cleveland). Southern Democrats were willing to accept the leadership of people like Cleveland to win New York and thus protect white supremacy in the South--but their voting records on things like monetary policy, restoration of the income tax, and railroad regualation showed them making common cause with western Democrats more often than with the more conservative Northeasterners. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2208003?seq=1 And together the southerners and westerners were definitely a majority of the Democrats in Congress.

For example, on the income tax:

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On railroad regulation:

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On monetary policy:

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So even during the Gilded Age it is misleading to view the Democrats as a whole as economically conservative.

(Harris's article btw is also available at https://books.google.com/books?id=47LS_wc9IHEC&pg=PA59 As noted there, even C. Vann Woodward, Harris's target, pretty much conceded the justice of Harris's critique.)
 
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- Replace Truman with a vp for Roosevelt that's less friendly towards minorities.

The problem with this is that even if, say, a Roosevelt-Byrnes ticket wins in 1944 (which is by no means certain), and Byrnes becomes POTUS in 1945, Byrnes would be very unlikely to win the 1948 election. Without Truman's levels of support from labor, liberals, and minorities, the Democrats would lose states like Illinois, California and Ohio, which they narrowly won in OTL and which would be enough to give Dewey an Electoral College majority. The defeat of Byrnes is likely to produce a backlash among Democrats against southern conservatives--they "can't win."
 
But Harding did offer VP? Then if Johnson accepts (as unlikely as that may be), he's probably President!

What I doubt is whether Johnson will win the 1924 nomination. The Republican machinery was widely opposed to any insurgent type candidate and were still by and large the power brokers of the party; the reason Roosevelt was able to run in 1904 without (major) opposition was because his personal popularity was extremely strong and because he always made sure he was never seen as a radical (until after he left office, that is - and we all saw how that went). Johnson does not control the Republican machinery, is practically hated by the party establishment (both because of his 1912 Progressive candidacy and for his refusal to support Hughes in 1916). It's more than likely that the Republicans deny him the nomination and select someone like, say, Lowden or possibly Hughes. The latter I think might be the candidate-- he chose not to run in 1920 because of his daughter's death, but was fresh enough 1924 to be chosen. Johnson could try to run an insurgent Progressive candidacy, but like La Follette, he probably wouldn't do well outside of a few Western states.
 
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The Democrats were always the “left”-wing party, and the Republicans the right. But the Democrats were a left-wing populist party, backed by farmers, working class, and immigrants — who were often very socially conservative. There is no comparing this position to how the Republicans are today; the GOP has always been the party most aligned with business, and even its most socially liberal position — abolitionism — represents their business interests. Even during the progressive era, it was always Democrats most inclined towards progressivism; for the Republican to turn into a left-wing party today, a few election switches won’t work.

What happened was the power centers of the party shifted to the cities - before that, the Democrats had always balanced their rural and urban wings out. The party on a national level became one backed by organized labor and city machines, thereby accepting a lot of socially liberal professionals who advocated for civil rights, disarmament, etc.

The cracks in the Solid South were appearing as early as 1928, when Hoover swept the region. You can say this is an anomaly, but by 1948 Dewey was coming within ten points of Truman’s lead in Upper South states like Virginia and Kentucky. Eisenhower swept most of the South in 52 and 56, and Nixon took most of the upper South while holding Kennedy close in 1960. That the Republican Party’s New Right wing — which attacked the New Deal consensus, backed social conservatism, and supported a hawkish Cold War stance — did not help, but it’s not surprising the New Right found its home in the GOP, which was always closer to their stances anyways.

For the Democrats to be a truly right-wing party today, you would need them to take the support of white collar workers, business interests, etc. But the support base of each party inclines them towards left- and right-wing policies respectively.

On some level though you could argue that it was an anomaly in 1928 as Smith was Catholic, though he still won the deep south, but I'd argue that in the more protestant reasons this had to do more with that they just really hated the party of Lincoln and that even a Catholic was better than a Lincolnite. However, you are right, and this has always been the case. The Democrats were the party of the ordinary people. Granted I'd argue that in the South this was subverted as most whites were Democrats and especially in the deep south, the wealthy establishment still was very much part of the Democratic party, though i'm guessing even they felt snubbed by the northern elite.
 
Thank you!




The solution to this, I imagine, would be African-Americans migrating to rural (preferably Western or Midwestern) areas -- where the Republicans had an advantage. You concurrently need a Republican -- ideally a conservative-type administration (conservative Republicans were always more sympathetic to blacks than were the progressives, odd as that might seem). The Democrats, simultaneously, need to be dominated by their rural faction. I imagine this might lead to a much different America as today, but maybe I'm just unimaginative :)

I could maybe see this happening if the Exoduster movement was much more successful. Think of it, you'd have a lot of farmers who made something out of nothing and beat the odds and without much government intervention. I don't know how you'd get more blacks to move to say Kansas or Nebraska or the Dakotas to farm, but if you increase the numbers just a tad, you might be able to make them somewhat of a force.
 
I could maybe see this happening if the Exoduster movement was much more successful. Think of it, you'd have a lot of farmers who made something out of nothing and beat the odds and without much government intervention. I don't know how you'd get more blacks to move to say Kansas or Nebraska or the Dakotas to farm, but if you increase the numbers just a tad, you might be able to make them somewhat of a force.
Why do they have to go to Nebraska? There was perfectly confiscatible rebel land in areas with black majorities...

I guess if minority groups were on average wealthier than European Americans, the more right-wing party economically would tend to be more progressive socially?
 

Thomas1195

Banned
You can kill off the Copperheads in the North with a different American Civil War, creating a Second Era of Good Feeling with the Democrats being reduced to a regional party. The Republicans would split into 2 parties, one on the right and the other on the left. If the original Republican Party is the left party and the splinter party is the right party, then the switch is achieved.
 
One further note on the Gilded Age--even then, one should not judge the Democrats solely by their rather conservative presidential candidates (e.g., Tilden and Cleveland). Southern Democrats were willing to accept the leadership of people like Cleveland to win New York and thus protect white supremacy in the South--but their voting records on things like monetary policy, restoration of the income tax, and railroad regualation showed them making common cause with western Democrats more often than with the more conservative Northeasterners. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2208003?seq=1 And together the southerners and westerners were definitely a majority of the Democrats in Congress.

Well, I wouldn't exactly call that progressive or conservative in today's usage of the word. The Democrats were definitely the more populist party, and also had more working-class support, but it wasn't left-wing. I feel there's a confusion between the two, and it serves to much detriment. Remember that in the South, industry was less established, and disproportionately northern-dominated, so Southern views on the matter are more of an "anti-carpetbagger" mentality than a genuine left-wing movement. And beginning in the 1920s, when industries started coming in full-swing southward, the Southern Democratic establishment was by and large supportive of it. Politics back then were much more regional and communal rather than ideological.
 
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Thomas1195

Banned
"Progressive" and "Liberal" meant differently during the 19th century. "Pro-capitalism" was progressive up until the 1870s not just in America but throughout the West as a whole.
 
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