AHC: CSA Wins 1863 (No Gettysburg Win)

With no PoDs before May 7, 1863 (the day after Chancellorsville), how can the CSA win the war as soon as possible -- without winning Gettysburg or similar battle. That means either no Invasion of the North following Chancellorsville (my preference), or if such an invasion must happen to meet the OP, then said campaign cannot go any better operationally for the CSA than it did OTL.

Bonus points if the CSA manages to get foreign recognition/mediation said year.

There should be plenty to work with here -- Grant's campaign in Vicksburg had a lot of gambles that might not have paid off; abroad, the Roebuck was maneuvering for British and French recognition of the CSA; there were two gubernatorial elections that November with Copperhead candidates, one of whom lost only by a couple of points; and, of course, the OP should allow Davis and the Confederate government to listen to Longstreet's proposal to reinforce the west. Just don't mention the Battle at Gettysburg.
 
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Anaxagoras

Banned
I think you can use a 1863 POD to set the stage for a Confederate victory in 1864 (either via foreign recognition or Lincoln losing the 1864 election), but I don't see any way for the Confederacy to end the war victorious before December 31, 1863. Even if Grant's army is destroyed in Mississippi (not impossible), the fighting would still go on into the next year.
 
Gotta agree with Anaxagorus; the CSA, without foreign intervention (i.e. to break the blockade, etc.), would likely be stuck fighting the Union well into '64 -even if- Gettysburg had gone in their favor.

A POD in late 1863 that has Great Britain intervening on behalf of the South would likely only result in a truce, as the order of the day back then was to reduce conflicts everywhere as much as possible---especially after the Crimean War.

If the South stands alone, they will likely still lose. They simply did not have the means to turn back army after army. Even if Lincoln were to lose the '64 election, his successor would probably still prosecute the conflict to total victory given the massive public support after the events of spring '63.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
If the South stands alone, they will likely still lose. They simply did not have the means to turn back army after army. Even if Lincoln were to lose the '64 election, his successor would probably still prosecute the conflict to total victory given the massive public support after the events of spring '63.

But the question here is how those "events of spring '63" could go differently. And there are a myriad of potential PODs to work with there.
 
But the question here is how those "events of spring '63" could go differently. And there are a myriad of potential PODs to work with there.
Actually most of the useful PODs are eliminated by the cutoff of no POD before May 7.

My take would be that Johnston dies from his wounds on May 7 and someone else is transferred out West.

Longstreet is possible but Lee would be more fun (pre-supposes a defensive stance in the East).

Even if the worst case for the Union (say Grant is dismissed for fouling up the Vicksburg campaign after being defeated by Lee or Longstreet and Sherman is KIA) I can't see this leading to victory for the CSA in 1863. It would take until 1864 for any foreign intervention to be significant and any political solution also relies on the 1864 elections.
 
Yeah the earliest the CSA could win by that point is 64 short of some drastic catastrophe that knocks out both Grant's army and Meade's.
 
OK, "winning" in 1863 isn't strictly necessary, though a sooner truce is called, the better for the OP; OP is also obviously met if GB and France recognize the CSA or mediate the conflict within said year. (As it happens, France was OTL losing interest in the CSA early 1864, due to events in Europe, so it's pretty much the last chance for that anyway.)
 
It's very, very hard for the CSA to win in 63 without a fight.
Fighting a defensive battle would possibly making them win in 64 if they manage to defend themselves well and the Union chooses another president.
If by "No Gettysburg" you mean no Rebel invasion, maybe you can have another Union invasion, the "one to end the war" and have it be an even bigger disaster than Chancellorsville. Then the people riot and finally Lincoln agrees to a ceasefire or something.
I got no other ideas.
 
A thought I've been having: in OTL, the Roebuck motion (the last serious attempt at moving toward British and French recognition of the CSA) was introduced June 30, and the debate on the motion began that day; while Britain would certainly have known of the invasion contextualizing the debate, the key event moving the events leading to this motion (backdoor diplomacy with Napoleon, etc) was the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville. However, the resumption of the debate was put off by the Palmerson government for several days, before, on July 10 (when Britain had could not yet have received word of the outcome at Gettysburg) moved to adjourn without finishing the debate on the motion.

I've been gleaming the notes on the Parliament debate, and it seems the invasion did in fact play a major role in keeping the motion from coming to a vote. Ferguson, who introduced the adjourning motion, remarked "The war, which up to the present time had been a defensive one on the part of the Southern States, now appeared to hare received the character of an expedition of the South against the North". And the Prime Minister explained it outright: "Events of the utmost importance are about to take place in America, and we may hear in the course of a few hours of results commensurate with the importance of those events—evidently, then, the present is not a proper moment to ask the Government to prejudice itself with respect to its free action."

My conclusion from this: if the Battle of Chancellorsville had not been followed up with the "Gettysburg Invasion", then events leading to the introduction of the Roebuck motion would still happen, only the motion would now be allowed to move forward. (I think that means it comes to a vote, but not 100% sure about Parliamentary procedure here.) What are your thoughts?
 
My trademark, patented POD is Benjamin Butler raids the French and Spanish Consulates along with the Dutch one in New Orleans. Napoleon now has European allies (not GB) and the three of them recognize the CSA and try to break the blockade. GB stays on the fence, but finally convinces Lincoln to negotiate after Antietam goes poorly. A ceasefire is agreed to but the negotiations for secession go long and only end in 1863.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
They can't...

22 million whites in the loyal states vis a vis 6 million in the rebel states.;)

As has been written (in these very hallowed halls, and elsewhere, of course):

In terms of agriculture, in 1860 the United States both fed itself and exported large amounts of produce to Europe; all that production was available for the war effort, if necessary. In terms of industry, in 1860 the North possessed 110,000 manufacturing establishments to the South’s 18,000, many of which had relied on Northern technical expertise and skilled labor. The same year, the whole of what became the Confederacy produced only 36,700 tons of pig iron; Pennsylvania alone produced 580,000 tons. The value of goods manufactured in New York state alone in 1860 amounted to almost $300 million; this was more than four times the value of manufactured goods produced in Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi combined. This staggering disparity in the economic base of each belligerent steadily transformed itself into real military effectiveness.

For example, whereas the South could make few of its own small arms, instead relying heavily upon what was initially captured from the various federal forts and arsenals (roughly 100,000 modern firearms – a mix of rifles and muskets) - in 1861 and then what could be imported from Europe, the U.S. massively expanded weapons manufacturing, producing no less than 111,000 modern rifles in the national armories alone in the first 15 months of the war to add to the 440,000 long-arms already stockpiled. Another 62,000 modern rifles and carbines were purchased from private manufacturers in the North in the same period, and hundreds of thousands more were purchased and shipped from Europe, beginning as soon as hostilities broke out in April of 1861.

More than 3 to 1 odds in population, a huge economic disparity, 2.5 times as many railroad miles, US control of the sea and rivers, and the US can recruit even more men - white and black - with every step south of the southern borders of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.

I mean, "rebels victorious" is entertaining, and god knows there's a built-in fan base of those who think they would love to live in the Confederacy, but it's like arguing Denmark could have defeated the Prusso-Austrians in their war the same decade...


One could, without getting all Godwiny, consider it akin to arguing for ZEELOWE as being likely to lead to a German victory over Great Britain in 1940.:rolleyes:

And for many of the same reasons...

Best,
 
So, no thoughts on my Roebuck post?


A few pertinent quotes from Battlecry of Freedom, by James McPherson:

"History is replete with examples of peoples who have won or defended their independence against greater odds [than the CSA faced]: the Netherlands against Spain of Phillip II; Switzerland against the Hapsburg Empire; the rebels of 1776 against mighty Britain; North Vietnam against the United States of 1970." (pg 855)

"The Civil War was pre-eminently a political war, a war of peoples rather than of professional armies." (pg 332)

"Most attempts to explain southern defeat or northern victory lack the dimension of contingency -- the recognition that at numerous critical points during the war things might have gone altogether differently... Of all the possible explanations for Confederate defeat, the loss of will thesis suffers the most from its own particular fallacy of reversibility that of putting the cart before the horse. Defeat causes demoralization and loss of will; victory pumps up morale and the will to win." (pg 857-858)

I would add (though I really should not have to) that the recognition of this historical contingency is not, and must not be, the domain of Confederate apologists; any presumption to the contrary, that the rejection of historical determinism amounts to romanticizing the proposed alternative, is false. If such is repeated here, I will take the highest offense to it.
 
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TFSmith121

Banned
Geography much?

John Fredrick Parker - So, no thoughts on my Roebuck post?

Nope; there was no economic, military, political, diplomatic, or strategic reason for the British to consider recognition of the rebellion. Other than that, yep, you're bang on.

Well, let's see:

A few pertinent quotes from Battlecry of Freedom, by James McPherson:

"History is replete with examples of peoples who have won or defended their independence against greater odds [than the CSA faced]: the Netherlands against Spain of Phillip II; Switzerland against the Hapsburg Empire; the rebels of 1776 against mighty Britain; North Vietnam against the United States of 1970." (pg 855)

Spain had to get to the Netherlands by sea; Switzerland is an alpine country and the Austrians always had one or several enemies on their other borders; "mighty Britain" was 3,000 miles away across the North Atlantic from the rebels of 1776, and North Vietnam had not one but two allies armed with nuclear weapons ... and it was 8,000 miles across the Pacific. Not exactly the geo-strategic situation of the rebels in 1861-65, are they?;)

"The Civil War was pre-eminently a political war, a war of peoples rather than of professional armies." (pg 332)

Yep, and the US had three times as many "peoples" to start, and only added more as the loyalists - black and white - in the rebel states came across; the rebels had fewer white men under arms by 1865 than there were black men in blue uniforms...:)

"Most attempts to explain southern defeat or northern victory lack the dimension of contingency -- the recognition that at numerous critical points during the war things might have gone altogether differently... Of all the possible explanations for Confederate defeat, the loss of will thesis suffers the most from its own particular fallacy of reversibility that of putting the cart before the horse. Defeat causes demoralization and loss of will; victory pumps up morale and the will to win." (pg 857-858)

Yes, and if the British had all fallen asleep in September, 1940, ZEELOWE could have ended with the Swastika flying over Big Ben. Pull the other one.:rolleyes:

I would add (though I really should not have to) that the recognition of this historical contingency is not, and must not be, the domain of Confederate apologists; any presumption to the contrary, that the rejection of historical determinism amounts to romanticizing the proposed alternative, is false. If such is repeated here, I will take the highest offense to it.

Go right ahead. Harumph!:cool:

Best,
 
Go right ahead. Harumph!:cool:

I have no quarrel if we simply disagree about the role of contingency and predetermined factors in discussing this conflict or in general; but if you are actually being this casual about libeling me as a Confederate sympathizer, then yes, I do take it personally. (If you're still wondering why I'm taking this so seriously, you can read this.)

Spain had to get to the Netherlands by sea; Switzerland is an alpine country and the Austrians always had one or several enemies on their other borders; "mighty Britain" was 3,000 miles away across the North Atlantic from the rebels of 1776, and North Vietnam had not one but two allies armed with nuclear weapons ... and it was 8,000 miles across the Pacific. Not exactly the geo-strategic situation of the rebels in 1861-65, are they?;)

It's fine if you contend the Dutch Revolt, American Revolution, and the Vietnam War were won by geography. I would contend they were won by they were won or lost by events leading the populations of the losing nations to wane in their support for continuing the conflict; oceans or no, any of these conflicts could have gone the other way if political commitment to their completion was infinite, as seems to be assumed by determinists when talking about the American Civil War.

Yep, and the US had three times as many "peoples" to start, and only added more as the loyalists - black and white - in the rebel states came across; the rebels had fewer white men under arms by 1865 than there were black men in blue uniforms...:)

By the end of the war, you had Confederates deserting in droves, while the Union forces had little issue replenishing their number (in the case of blacks, because the more territory they took, the easier it was for "contrabands" to escape to their lines) -- but both were because the Union was winning. Looking at the change in soldier ratios in the final months of the war, and concluding that the Confederate cause was doomed, is putting the cart before the horse.
 
"History is replete with examples of peoples who have won or defended their independence against greater odds [than the CSA faced]: the Netherlands against Spain of Phillip II; Switzerland against the Hapsburg Empire; the rebels of 1776 against mighty Britain; North Vietnam against the United States of 1970." (pg 855)

Spain had to get to the Netherlands by sea;

Sea--and quite frequently an elaborate land route that often required several occasional--and not so occasional--rivals to say "Okay--you can send troops here!"

And let's add that the Netherlands rebels still wound up holding a small portion of their original hoped for lands. Which is one reason we have Belgium. And why France has... well, a good deal of property in the area...
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The US had 22 million people from which to

Reponse to JF Parker:

The US had 22 million people from which to raise (multiple) armies which could walk, ride horseback, ride trains, ride steamboats, ride steamships, etc into the rebel territory.

The rebels had six million people from which to raise (a couple of) armies with which they could try and stop the above.

Good luck with that.:rolleyes:

At no time during the 1861-65 conflict did the US have any trouble taking territory of any significance away from the rebellion and hanging on to it.

As witness the history of West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri in 1861; Tennessee and much of Arkansas and Louisiana in 1862, and most of what was of significance in Mississippi in 1863. In 1864, Georgia. In 1865, Virginia and South Carolina.

I'm not seeing a lot of grey tide rising here.

Best,
 
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The US had 22 million people from which to raise (multiple) armies which could walk, ride horseback, ride trains, ride steamboats, ride steamships, etc into the rebel territory.

The rebels had six million people from which to raise (a couple of) armies with which they could try and stop the above.

Good luck with that.:rolleyes:

Nobody here's doubting the superior available resources or potential manpower of the northern states -- but these advantages are only determinate if they are paired with the corresponding willingness to use them. It is a testament to the racism of the United States as a whole during this time that the popular support for total commitment to the preservation of the Union was slow in coming, and even after the Emancipation Proclamation, was remained tenuous until the war's final months.

Which (hopefully) takes us back to the OP -- for those who would agree with me* that the United States could potentially lose the war as of May 1863, how (absent a Gettysburg victory) do you see it happening?

*This being AH.com, there shouldn't be a shortage.
 
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