You are the Tsar Nicholas II and the day is March 7th of 1917, your mission is to remain in the throne until at least 1918. Bonus if you are able to do this the hard way with blood and steel.
You are the Tsar Nicholas II and the day is March 7th of 1917, your mission is to remain in the throne until at least 1918. Bonus if you are able to do this the hard way with blood and steel.
If you abdicate then you wouldn't be in the throne by 1918.Abdicate in favor of my brother, by now my credibility as a ruler is basically non existent...use everything left to convince him to accept the crown and the Duma to support him; pray a lot for the best
If you abdicate then you wouldn't be in the throne by 1918.
4. The side arrangement with Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria
It's not a great plan but it's all I've got. Russia needs a quick exit from the war and quick return to prosperity. The only way they can do it (outside the ASB forum anyway) is to cut a deal. I'm gambling Karl still wants peace badly enough to exchange one Slav population for another.And if Austria says no because they don't want to fall apart themselves as Germany screams bloody murder, their own government gets caught up in the succession confusion while still being at war with Italy (Who wants Tyrol, and London and Paris will be screaming bloody murder at YOU and declare that gurantee mud), ect?
It may become technically possible to remain at throne with PoD of 1st of January, and likely absolutely hopeless by 1st of February 1917. Possible actions for 1st of January 1917 PoD:What about a PoD on the 1st of January ?
And the relevant information was not available to Nicholas.Actually it was General Alexeev who called off the counterattacks. Alexeev and the rest of the Stavka (army headquarters) had originally wholeheartedly supported Nicholas' orders to crush the revolution. There were at least two reasons for Alexeev's change of mind:
(1) The assurance Alexeev got on March 1 from Rodzianko that the Duma leaders rather than the Soviet would form the new government. Alexeev trusted Rodzianko and had himself long been party to the "palace coup" plots of the Progressive Bloc. (The Duma Committee also played a crucial role by getting control of the railway network through with the counterrevolutionary troops were to travel.)
(2) By March 1 Alexeev was worried that if the army were used to attack Petrograd, it might become engulfed in a general mutiny, leading to Russia's defeat in the war. This was certainly a plausible fear. As Orlando Figes puts it, "Already on 1 March there were mutinies in several northern garrisons, and there was a real danger that they might soon spread to the units at the Front. He [Alexeev] preferred to isolate his front-line soldiers from Red Petrograd rather than send them there and run the risk of having them fall under its revolutionary influence." (*A People's Tragedy*, p. 341)
Well, you might say, couldn't Nicholas have countermanded Alexeev's orders? But Alexeev had the support of the rest of the Stavka, which really had no fundamental disagreements with the Duma Committee, and was more interested in winning the war than in saving the Tsar. As soon as they were assured that the power in Petrograd had been transferred to the liberals, that settled the matter. It is just not realistic to think that Nicholas could have fired the entire Army High Command in time of war. (Of course had the Stavka realized how helpless the Provisional Government would be before the Soviets, had they foreseen Order No. 1 which had such a devastating effect on military discipline, they would have taken a very different line.)