Well if your line is everyone else but the glorious Americans are cowards then I suppose you can argue that.
If you're unable to debate on what's actually been said, perhaps it's best you refrain from further participation here. This is all for fun on a discussion forum, not a commentary on the particular characteristics of any people; you're losing sight of this.
The problem is that the Royal Navy has operated under conditions where the combined fleets of the enemy outnumber them before, it is part of the naval tradition.
The days of sail and Nelson are long over by 1914. The rather dramatic failure of the Imperial Japanese Navy in WWII shows what happens when you attempt to rely on "spirit" over the material.
They will risk forces to cover North America but in each case no they do not need parity as they are likely to be defending.
Then they have already lost the war. The Germans not only break the blockade, they can thus cut the English Channel traffic and bring Britain and France to their collective knees. In the Americas, the U.S. rapidly overruns Canada and will be set to do the same for the British and French colonial possessions. The fact of the matter is the Entente is in a situation where it can neither perform action nor inaction.
That means that either the US fleet will find itself operating close to Halifax or the Germans close to somewhere like Rosyth if they want to bring the battle to the British and either (in the case of the Americans) intercept supplies to Canada or break the blockade (in the German instance).
They do not, as you've already elucidated; the Royal Navy cannot simultaneously be on the defensive while maintaining a blockade or protecting convoys to Canada. As for the particular point of Canada, what convoys? The British just lost 20% of their imports to cite one example. Are they going to leave the BEF depleted to do this? If so, the Germans are in position to threaten the Bethune coal mines.
Further but yes I am pretty sure that the Royal Navy would risk a three capital ship margin at times in order to face the Americans if they thought they could bring them to battle on favourable terms.
You've lost sight of your own point, which was that the Royal Navy is on the defensive yet they're seeking a decisive battle? You can do one, but not both for rather obvious reasons. We're also back to what I said about needing a 2:1 margin, because if they do less against the Americans the Germans will know they have the margin to seek a decisive battle against the Grand Fleet. Further, for all the talk of tradition the last time I can recall the Royal Navy leaving the British Isles exposed to foreign attack was in
1779.
The US fleet being the weaker of the two enemy forces and defeat in detail being a thing. Likely though all three navies would avoid battle save under favourable terms meaning a lot of glaring but most action among the lighter units where once again the Royal Navy still have a significant margin.
An oddity to claim given the HSF repeatedly sortied despite the odds being against it. Once it becomes clear the British are dangerously exposed, the Germans will force the English into a battle, by breaking the blockade and threatening the Channel. As for the lighter units, they could also do what the Anglo-Americans feared they would do IOTL; sortie so much that the British are forced to empty their fuel supplies responding to such maneuvers.
As to the fall of Paris, it is not going to happen (or rather not in 1914), the Germans had outrun the extent of horse drawn supply by the time they reached the Marne let alone Paris. That rather than the exact situation on the ground is why Oberst-Leutnant Hentsch gave instructions for a withdrawal. This same situation had been foreseen by Schliffen himself but had been handwaved away by later adherents to his plan.
Oh it can definitely happen, given the French 5th Army was nearly encircled twice in August along with the BEF. Doing such was within German capabilities and would've meant the French had no means of countering the German advance on Paris.
Once again even with the US onboard trying hard to win a depression the war will not be over by Christmas 1914.
I've argued to the contrary.
Canada can be knocked out reasonably fast by cutting its rail connections, and the British will know the U.S. will be in position to do the same to the rest of their possessions in 1915 onward. London
could make an effort to reinforce Canada at the expense of the BEF, which could keep Canada in the war until sometime in the 1915 campaign season when U.S. numbers crush them. However, doing so probably means conceding everything north of the Somme and that
will knock France out of the war; she cannot continue on with 70% of her war industry gone. The Royal Navy, meanwhile, is overstretched and logistically exhausted. She might have avoided a battle with either her American or German competitors, but doing such means having surrendered the initiative to either or both.
In short, both London and Paris will know the game is up.
