AHC: British strategic bomber

In An Illustrated Guide to Modern Fighters & Attack Aircraft by Bill Gunston 1980, it portrays the still-born FB-111H, an stretched version of the FB-111 double the range with 2 x GE F101 engines, the same used in the cancelled B-1A bomber.

Couldn't the Tornado be enlarged in the same way to give the R.A.F a so called "Strategic Bomber"?

Regards filers
The Tornado had already used up most of its' growth to get to the GR.1/F.3 versions - the original concept favoured by the F-104 replacement group was much smaller. An enlarged 'strategic' Tornado would probably amount to keeping the forward fuselage and designing an entirely new aeroplane around it.
 

Artaxerxes

Banned
After Suez relations between the US and UK become much more strained, leading to greater cooperation between UK and Europe, this leads to the development of several defence projects between France, Germany and Britain and the informal creation of a NATO sub-block.

British expertise helps develop a long range strategic bomber dubbed "Valkyrie" initially these are based mostly in Germany and other EU bases such as Cyprus. They are due for replacement in the early 80's and the adoption of ballistic missiles by the UK and a more versatile bomber by other countries.

However after the first Falklands war and the rapid deployment of the 'Vicious Vixen' (as dubbed by the Sun) to deal with Argentine defences and the excellent support it offered the UK chooses instead to purchase a newer bomber from the US in the 90's which is then kept operating, due for replacement by 2020.
 
Of course; like I said, I can't blame the Brits for thinking that it was going to work. Mostly, and to be fair this is nitpicking, you seemed to be stating it as a fact that only a few Polaris warheads would get through, when (assuming you trust the Soviet assessments of their own systems) it looks like virtually all of them would provided you discount failures in Polaris, i.e. causes presumably unrelated to the defense systems.

Also, and I just realized this, the Polaris might have been more like the Pershing 2 in this particular regard than like the "ballistic targets" they mention, but this still wouldn't affect the effectiveness of Polaris much.

Re the Soviet ABM system(s). I recall reading (publicly available) documents in the 1980's that credited the Soviet ABM system(s) with a reasonable degree of effectiveness. Amongst other nuggets, the concept of a small force (ie. a UK or French SSBN launching a retaliatory strike) simply avoiding targeting Moscow vs trying to overwhelm their ABM system was mooted.

In my view planners in the 1970's and 1980's had to take the Soviet ABM system reasonably seriously.
 
About all that is left of the original B-52s are the wing spars & basic air frame, and from what I have been told, the in flight toilet facilities. Every other part has been replaced multiple times, the avionics are ripped out and totally replaced every few years as tech advances. Even then, they are bomb trucks, not strategic platforms, they lost that role in the mid 1980s. They are, however, one hell of a good bomb truck and possibly the most intimidating platform the U.S. employs against ground troops, especially after the first attack.

Even with that, only 10% of the original force is still operational.


Three launch bodies.

Regarding dispersal fields...

Most open source discussions regarding Soviet nuclear war fighting assume a double strike on SAC bomber bases a 25mT airburst AND a 25mT ground burst. Assuming a force of 160 aircraft (the number necessary to match the max potential of "surged" RN SSBN assets of two SSBN, the patrol boat and the along-side, prepping for patrol boat, with full load of the UK's deterrent stockpile) that would be 40 sites receiving 50mT of attention. Considering the fall-out from a 25mT ground Burst and the weather patterns, is there enough territory IN the UK to absorb that level of hit and have any reasonable number of survivors just from the counterforce strike?

The U.S. has lots of open space to put major assets where heavy fall-out will mainly land on nothing in the case of a counterforce strike (a full strike is, of course, an entirely different matter).

I'm just curious how about how it takes 160 bomber air craft to match the effectiveness of two SSBN's ?

The reported number of warheads actually carried by the UK Tridents are a bit vague, but needing 160 bombers (each presumably carrying several nuclear weapons, I'd probably be inclined to assume each bomber could carry at least 4 nuclear weapons) to match two SSBN's seems a bit high to me.

Granted once you factor in the possibility of some bombers not taking off or getting shot down en route to their targets the effectiveness of the bomber force goes down, but if you factor in one of the two SSBN's potentially being sunk then the SSBN effectiveness goes down as well, and if you assign any probability of success to an ABM system the effectiveness of the SSBN force declines even more.
 
The reported number of warheads actually carried by the UK Tridents are a bit vague, but needing 160 bombers (each presumably carrying several nuclear weapons, I'd probably be inclined to assume each bomber could carry at least 4 nuclear weapons) to match two SSBN's seems a bit high to me.
Nothing vague about it: the Vanguard class submarines carry a maximum of 48 warheads. No technical reason they can't be uploaded to 192, apart from the fact that the UK doesn't actually have that many warheads, but downloading them is considered desirable for various military and political reasons. The total nuclear stockpile is 160 warheads.

OTL's V-bombers carried one nuclear weapon apiece, simply because when they were designed that's how big nuclear weapons were. The UK didn't have enough nuclear weapons to make it worth redesigning them to carry more until after they were being drawn down. So, 160 British nuclear devices need 160 bombers.

Now, you could reasonably say that the UK could have put a rotary launcher with 8 SRAMs or WE.177s in the Vulcan. In the early 1980s, there were six squadrons of eight aircraft, so a total of 384 weapons that could be carried. Plus, of course, another 300 or so for tactical use. And the government will want to retain the Polaris force for assured deterrence, that's another 96 warheads (3 boats could in theory be armed with 32 warheads apiece). Total is 800 nuclear weapons, give or take a few dozen.

At this point, though, the Atomic Energy Authority is pitching a fit over the amount of fissile material you're demanding, and the government is demanding answers as to what the Vulcans are for if the Polaris boats supply assured deterrence and the Buccaneers and Jaguars supply the tactical force.

As far as effectiveness of the Moscow ABM screen goes, I suspect that the Soviets understated it just as badly as the West overstated it. It's hard to get funding for updates if you're claiming the current system performs adequately well - and that cuts both ways.
 

WILDGEESE

Gone Fishin'
How about an enlarged version of BAe's "TARANIS" prototype.

It's not only very stealthy but can be fully automated without a pilot/pilots allowing aircraft to stay aloft for hours with refueling.

Hell, why not go the whole hog and make some TARANIS based tankers as well, GlobalHawks have re-fueled each other when fully automated.

Regards filers
 
Why not using a bomber version of the Concorde (Bombcorde) as the Soviets planned a military version of the Tu-144?:D
STA60082.jpg

The real question is how much all that extra money gets you over a V-bomber - both the US and UK seem to have independently come to the conclusion that the big step in capability came at Mach 3, not Mach 2.

Now, you could reasonably say that the UK could have put a rotary launcher with 8 SRAMs or WE.177s in the Vulcan. In the early 1980s, there were six squadrons of eight aircraft, so a total of 384 weapons that could be carried. Plus, of course, another 300 or so for tactical use. And the government will want to retain the Polaris force for assured deterrence, that's another 96 warheads (3 boats could in theory be armed with 32 warheads apiece). Total is 800 nuclear weapons, give or take a few dozen.

At this point, though, the Atomic Energy Authority is pitching a fit over the amount of fissile material you're demanding, and the government is demanding answers as to what the Vulcans are for if the Polaris boats supply assured deterrence and the Buccaneers and Jaguars supply the tactical force.
I think for this to actually happen you need the US not to be there providing an implied nuclear umbrella. If the US will be joining in shortly, the extra nuclear force doesn't buy the UK much. If they aren't, however, it makes a big difference and might well be funded.
 

Archibald

Banned
What about a bigger Mirage IVB design with 2 x Olympus 22R ?

That was nearly build instead of the Mirage IVA.
60 tons, 5000 km range unrefueled. J-75 engines (not Olympus).

It only lasted through summer 1959 and was cancelled long before the prototype was build.

De Gaulle reasonned it would be better to have U.S tankers (the C-135FR) rather than U.S engines (J-75s)

Having the tankers grounded per lack of spares wouldn't prevent Mirage IVA from flying, although not very far of course. J-75 engines may ground the bomber itself.

Personally I'm a fan of the Victor, and would like to see a B.3 variant flying today. Although a bomber Nimrod would be fine, too.
 
Nothing vague about it: the Vanguard class submarines carry a maximum of 48 warheads. No technical reason they can't be uploaded to 192, apart from the fact that the UK doesn't actually have that many warheads, but downloading them is considered desirable for various military and political reasons. The total nuclear stockpile is 160 warheads.

OTL's V-bombers carried one nuclear weapon apiece, simply because when they were designed that's how big nuclear weapons were. The UK didn't have enough nuclear weapons to make it worth redesigning them to carry more until after they were being drawn down. So, 160 British nuclear devices need 160 bombers.

Now, you could reasonably say that the UK could have put a rotary launcher with 8 SRAMs or WE.177s in the Vulcan. In the early 1980s, there were six squadrons of eight aircraft, so a total of 384 weapons that could be carried. Plus, of course, another 300 or so for tactical use. And the government will want to retain the Polaris force for assured deterrence, that's another 96 warheads (3 boats could in theory be armed with 32 warheads apiece). Total is 800 nuclear weapons, give or take a few dozen.

At this point, though, the Atomic Energy Authority is pitching a fit over the amount of fissile material you're demanding, and the government is demanding answers as to what the Vulcans are for if the Polaris boats supply assured deterrence and the Buccaneers and Jaguars supply the tactical force.

As far as effectiveness of the Moscow ABM screen goes, I suspect that the Soviets understated it just as badly as the West overstated it. It's hard to get funding for updates if you're claiming the current system performs adequately well - and that cuts both ways.

The thing is we (those of us in the general public) don't actually know how many warheads the Tridents actually carry. Amongst other things I've seen comments made along the lines of some missiles having various sub strategic load outs. I also question how viable re loading the missiles would be during a crisis.

I'm also inclined to believe that if British Strategic bombers were considered viable nuclear deterrent forces on par with SSBN's into the the 1980's and beyond that they would have made arrangements for each bomber to carry several nuclear weapons. It's also worth remembering that the UK had access to US nuclear weapons during the cold war era so they weren't entirely reliant on their own production capability for all their nuclear weapons needs. Presumably for a strategic deterrent role the UK would have wished to use their own weapons, but US weapons could have been ear marked for tactical roles for example.

I've seen seemingly credible accounts that credit the Tornadoes with each being able to carry more than one nuclear weapon on a single mission. I doubt a rotary launcher would have been needed by a UK strategic bomber but carriage for several gravity bombs doesn't seem un reasonable to me.
 
The thing is we (those of us in the general public) don't actually know how many warheads the Tridents actually carry. Amongst other things I've seen comments made along the lines of some missiles having various sub strategic load outs. I also question how viable re loading the missiles would be during a crisis.
The 48 warheads figure is a matter of public record - what we don't know is how they're distributed.
Presumably for a strategic deterrent role the UK would have wished to use their own weapons, but US weapons could have been ear marked for tactical roles for example.
The UK tried to avoid using American nuclear devices as far as possible, and certainly not for strategic purposes. Relying on them to the tune of 400 warheads would be seen as intolerable by both countries.
I've seen seemingly credible accounts that credit the Tornadoes with each being able to carry more than one nuclear weapon on a single mission. I doubt a rotary launcher would have been needed by a UK strategic bomber but carriage for several gravity bombs doesn't seem un reasonable to me.
The Tornado (and Buccaneer) being able to carry two WE.177 is, again, a matter of public record - as is the TSR.2 being designed to carry four for potential nuclear stick bombing! The V-bombers could easily have been fitted to carry two or more nuclear weapons if the desire existed; the rotary launcher is a realistic upper bound on what could be carried, depending on the target set. Remember that by the late '80s, a strategic bomber would probably be looking at fighting its' way in, so the gains from a rotary launcher are needed to offset the standoff missiles needed to do that.
 
Re the Soviet ABM system(s). I recall reading (publicly available) documents in the 1980's that credited the Soviet ABM system(s) with a reasonable degree of effectiveness. Amongst other nuggets, the concept of a small force (ie. a UK or French SSBN launching a retaliatory strike) simply avoiding targeting Moscow vs trying to overwhelm their ABM system was mooted.
Publicly available documents from the 1980s are, in this case, totally worthless. At best they're propaganda for some particular military point of view, at worst they're complete speculation. Anything that the West knew about the system would obviously be classified, and in any case based on indirect assessments of the system from reconnaissance satellites, radar data, etc. rather than the actual test performance information that the Soviets had access to.

In my view planners in the 1970's and 1980's had to take the Soviet ABM system reasonably seriously.
Doesn't anyone read what I write? I've said, twice now, that I don't blame the Brits for taking the ABM system seriously; my point is just that had the balloon gone up and they had fired off Polaris, it would have plastered Moscow, ABM or no.

As far as effectiveness of the Moscow ABM screen goes, I suspect that the Soviets understated it just as badly as the West overstated it. It's hard to get funding for updates if you're claiming the current system performs adequately well - and that cuts both ways.
It's also hard to get money for updates if you're claiming the current system is virtually worthless (even the dullest member of the Politburo had to realize that there was more than one missile pointed at Moscow) and your upgrades are going to do very little to improve the system's effectiveness, with the most advanced, twenty or thirty years out program only protecting against a dozen or so warheads. I see very little reason to suppose that the Soviets were understating the effectiveness of their system in this case, particularly when we compare to the similar (and more public) American Safeguard system, which was also not particularly effective.
 
The actual proposed stand off missile VC10 would have carried around 6 Blue Steel (or even two air launched Polaris) missiles. This meant a total fleet of around 45 was being envisaged and that includes crew trainers. That was under serious consideration as an alternative to the R class subs. Other options included a new Vulcan, the Avro 730, an enhanced Victor, and many others. Have a look at Tony Buttlers Project Cancelled series.
 
Publicly available documents from the 1980s are, in this case, totally worthless. At best they're propaganda for some particular military point of view, at worst they're complete speculation. Anything that the West knew about the system would obviously be classified, and in any case based on indirect assessments of the system from reconnaissance satellites, radar data, etc. rather than the actual test performance information that the Soviets had access to.

Actually I disagree. I believe these documents provide a reasonable degree of insight into the thought processes of the decision makers at the time. As such I believe they add value when debating what decisions might have been made in an alternate time line. All the best.
 
The 48 warheads figure is a matter of public record - what we don't know is how they're distributed.

The UK tried to avoid using American nuclear devices as far as possible, and certainly not for strategic purposes. Relying on them to the tune of 400 warheads would be seen as intolerable by both countries.

The Tornado (and Buccaneer) being able to carry two WE.177 is, again, a matter of public record - as is the TSR.2 being designed to carry four for potential nuclear stick bombing! The V-bombers could easily have been fitted to carry two or more nuclear weapons if the desire existed; the rotary launcher is a realistic upper bound on what could be carried, depending on the target set. Remember that by the late '80s, a strategic bomber would probably be looking at fighting its' way in, so the gains from a rotary launcher are needed to offset the standoff missiles needed to do that.

Thanks good info. I've never had the energy / motivation to look up the original source documents re the post cold war UK SSBN force so I tend to qualify my comments in threads such as this. I do seem to recall seeing a lower warhead number mentioned for the UK Trident in recent years but again I've not been motivated enough to look up the definitive data. I'll go with your figures :)
 
Doesn't anyone read what I write? I've said, twice now, that I don't blame the Brits for taking the ABM system seriously; my point is just that had the balloon gone up and they had fired off Polaris, it would have plastered Moscow, ABM or no.


It's also hard to get money for updates if you're claiming the current system is virtually worthless (even the dullest member of the Politburo had to realize that there was more than one missile pointed at Moscow) and your upgrades are going to do very little to improve the system's effectiveness, with the most advanced, twenty or thirty years out program only protecting against a dozen or so warheads. I see very little reason to suppose that the Soviets were understating the effectiveness of their system in this case, particularly when we compare to the similar (and more public) American Safeguard system, which was also not particularly effective.

Yep.. One way or another I expect the UK had a reasonable likelihood of holding Moscow and other key targets in the USSR at risk. Perhaps a use case of the Soviet ABM system was protecting Moscow against a limited attack by say a handful of Chinese missiles (perhaps after a counter force attack by the the USSR.) It also occurs to me that the USSR may have seen their ABM system as providing some value by protecting certain hardened targets in the general vicinity of Moscow as opposed to being expected to prevent any detonations over the city itself.

All the best.
 
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Would it be possible to get a "cheap" nuclear mini-ALCM by putting a WE177 warhead of some version into a Storm Shadow missile ?

I've seen a photo of a Nimrod MR2/4 with 4 of those missiles under the wings, so it might have had some sort of bomber role, if the project had been done right.


Regards,
Gerard
 
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