The Bretton Woods system, developed late in World War II, had the USA guaranteeing European and some other central banks could change their (US) dollars to gold at (IIRC) 35 an ounce. By the mid/late 60's it became patently unaffordable given the Vietnam war/Great Society, and was abandoned early in the Nixon administration.
While I don't think better US macroeconomic/strategic policy could have done more than delay the (probably) inevitable, could US allies have been persuaded to help underwrite Bretton Woods as a component in some sort of reform of the system? Might efforts to save it have resulted in closer economic integration in the 1st world?
While I don't think better US macroeconomic/strategic policy could have done more than delay the (probably) inevitable, could US allies have been persuaded to help underwrite Bretton Woods as a component in some sort of reform of the system? Might efforts to save it have resulted in closer economic integration in the 1st world?