AHC: better Soviet army during WWII, fewer executions for 'cowardice'

Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Tony Judt, Penguin Press, 2005, page 165:

https://books.google.com/books?id=xE1hBBF37kwC&pg=PT187&lpg=PT187&dq=%22its+soldiers+were+granted+no+leave+and,+if+they+hesitated,+no+quarter%22&source=bl&ots=iOUI835_jL&sig=G1cCdSZHc3SniG1R4MyU_3xElzM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjzqo_ZsfvLAhXJ74MKHf3cBh4Q6AEIHDAA#v=onepage&q=%22its%20soldiers%20were%20granted%20no%20leave%20and%2C%20if%20they%20hesitated%2C%20no%20quarter%22&f=false

" . . . The Red Army marched on foot and hauled its weapons and supplies on cart powered by draught animals; its soldiers were granted no leave and, if they hesitated, no quarter: 157,593 of them had been executed for 'cowardice' in 1941 and 1942 alone. But after a halting start, the USSR had out-produced and out-fought the Nazi colossus, ripping the heart from the magnificent German military machine. . . "
My first thought is, Holy Shit, that's a lot of people to lose to execution. And if it's a mere physical failing of running away from active battle or something of that sort, the person probably feels bad enough on their own and may do quite a bit better the second time. I'm thinking of the novel The Red Badge of Courage, but there's probably a number of examples of this.

And then, this is just one more big dark secret and one more reason people can't talk about things. Probably to the extent that if a manufacturing process is not working out too swell, people are afraid to speak up.

And so, if the Soviets had done things differently, the war may have gone even better. Fewer dark secrets, and maybe the thaw following Stalin's death would have been more substantial? Maybe.
 
Was... this supposed to be part of another thread? The OP reads like it was.

In any case, I best copy and paste what I posted last time a thread like this was brought up...

Hitler delays Barbarossa a year while deciding to try and focus on the Western Allies more but fails to make any headway against Britain before the US enters the war. Deciding that he best take out the Soviet Union in 1942 (and thinking he still can) before the US can bring its might to bear, he attacks in May 1942. Unfortunately for him, not only is the Red Army finished rearming, mostly finished reforming/reorganizing, much better trained, and sitting in a completed Molotov-Voroshilov line but Stalin is confident enough in said rebuilt Red Army that he believes the intelligence warnings.

As a result, Barbarossa bleeds to death short of the 1939 border with no major encirclements and is pushed out of the Soviet Union by steadily more skillful Soviet offensives by the end of 1942. Drawing upon it's experience from both the defensive operations and the initial counter-offensives, the USSR fixes the Red Army's remaining deficiencies and steamrolls Germany across Poland and the Balkans throughout 1943. Alarmed at the Soviet success, the Western Allies attempt a hasty and premature landing in France which fails. Red flag flies over Berlin either late-'43 or early-'44. Second Western Allied landing in France succeeds due to better planning and complete collapse of German resistance. They shake hands with the Soviets at the Ruhr.

Fresh from victory in Europe, the Soviets turn around and storm across the Japanese in Manchuria during the Summer of 1944. All of Korea is occupied and the Soviets push deep into China. The Soviets succeed in seizing south Sakhalin but fail at invading the Kuriles because the IJN is still too strong, which makes them decide to post-pone plans to invade Hokkaido. Japan is shaken by the Soviet declaration of war but decides to fight on, encourage by the failure of Soviet amphibious ops in the Kuriles. Unfortunately, the navy that so dutifully protected them there proceeds to finish getting itself sunk against the Americans. Second Soviet invasion of the Kuriles succeed in early-1945 followed by the invasion and occupation of Hokkaido in the summer which, following on the heels of the atom bomb, helps to convince Japan to surrender.

Pros:
* The Soviets are up a minimum of 20,000,000 lives (probably more) and 35,000 industrial facilities.
* Soviets have all of Germany and therefore are able to loot all of Germany. Subsequent benefits to Soviet nuclear, missile, space, jet, and other early-Cold War programs.
* More clear-and-cut Soviet crushing of German forces enhances prestige and diplomatic position of the Soviet Union even more then IOTL.
* Soviets still get access to lend-lease (if for a briefer amount of time) and thus are able to benefit from the influx of American tech.
* Less lost opportunities in economic development due to less time putting into the major war effort and less devastation to rebuild (see first point).
* Less loss of life (see first point) means no/less demographic implosion among male adults.
* Soviet nuclear program more advanced due to greater resources + more time getting major investment.
* Much larger buffer state = more secure Soviet Union = Soviet Union which does not feel like it has to spend quite as much on its conventional military in the long-run.

Cons:
* Stalin's ego and self-confidence is even more massive without the humbling experience from the disasters of OTL 1941-1942. Fortunately for the Soviets he might still croak from old age before he gets another chance at a mass purge. Unfortunately for the Soviets he might not.
* More powerful Communism = America develops greater McCarthyist siege mentality = greater possibility for Cold War to escalate.
* Maoist China will still be a pain once ideological differences and conflicting interests become too clear.
 
okay, I'll roll with a later Nazi invasion where the Soviets are better prepared.

Possibility 1: the U.S. and USSR are more equal in power. In addition, nuclear weapons have never been used, so there's not the strong norm against them, even though they're later coming on. The Cold War turns hot, not good.

Possibility 2: the United States and Soviet Union end up competing on who can do a better job at genuine economic development for third world country. Things go much better for the Third World than in OTL.
 
My first thought is, Holy Shit, that's a lot of people to lose to execution. And if it's a mere physical failing of running away from active battle or something of that sort, the person probably feels bad enough on their own and may do quite a bit better the second time. I'm thinking of the novel The Red Badge of Courage, but there's probably a number of examples of this.

This element of the Red Army's history in WWII is much exaggerated. There were substantial assets poured in to stop desertions, but blocking retreats and having the NKVD mowing down men who decided to fall back wholesale is mostly Cold War mythmaking.

http://sti.clemson.edu/publications-mainmenu-38/commentaries-mainmenu-211/cat_view/33-strom-thurmond-institute/153-sti-publications-by-subject-area/158-history
 
This element of the Red Army's history in WWII is much exaggerated. There were substantial assets poured in to stop desertions, but blocking retreats and having the NKVD mowing down men who decided to fall back wholesale is mostly Cold War mythmaking.

It's more a case of portraying the exceptions as the rule instead of outright mythmaking. There are confirmed instances of blocking detachments opening fire on soldiers retreating without orders. But they were actually rare occurrences. The overwhelming amount of the time the blocking detachments just stopped the soldiers who were retreating and had them join in a new defense line.
 
Okay, so some aspects of this have been much exaggerated.

But, is 157,000 executions in just two years reasonably accurate?
 
Well... yes. No matter how relatively infrequent the Red Army was in shooting its own men in absolute terms, there is no denying that it at least resorted to execution as a means of discipline more frequently then any other major combatant. Although its possible that the Germans and Japanese were beating them in that category by 1945.
 
How many served in the Soviet Army during 1941-42? Does anyone know?

Here you go.
bb6a981b6225.jpg
 
How many served in the Soviet Army during 1941-42? Does anyone know?

Almost 34.5 million for both the Red Army and NKVD combat troops, of which nearly 15 million were irrecoverable losses. Although 3 million of those were PoWs who survived the camps and returned at the end of the war. The first period of war (June 1941-November 1942) accounts for ~66% of Soviet irrecoverable losses.
 
Last edited:
from Dmitri Volkogonov's last book published posthumously:

https://books.google.com/books?id=S...eriod, on the Stalingrad front alone"&f=false

" . . . During this period, on the Stalingrad front alone 140 men were shot by blocking units, while for the whole of 1941 and 1942, for 'panic-mongering, cowardice and unauthorized abandonment of the field of battle', no fewer than 157,593 men — a full sixteen divisions — were sentenced to death by HQ army tribunals.[69] . . . "
Of course, Volkogonov was a Soviet general in the post-war period, and almost certainly, he had his own viewpoints.
 
Last edited:
It's more a case of portraying the exceptions as the rule instead of outright mythmaking. There are confirmed instances of blocking detachments opening fire on soldiers retreating without orders. But they were actually rare occurrences. The overwhelming amount of the time the blocking detachments just stopped the soldiers who were retreating and had them join in a new defense line.

Basically. Blocking detachments were there to prevent unauthorised retreats and redirect people back to the fighting, not help the Germans kill soldiers faster. Overwhelmingly they arrested rather than shot people.

Of course being arrested wasn't always a guaranteed you wouldn't get shot for desertion later, which happened a lot in the few months while the order was active.
 
from Dmitri Volkogonov's last book published posthumously:

Of course, Volkogonov was a Soviet general in the post-war period, and almost certainly, he had his own viewpoints.

He certainly had them. At the time when he was a Soviet general, his job was that of propaganda, and he was of course a staunch Marxist. Then he wrote a very critical book about Stalin, the reaction to which forced him to resign. This happened at the time of the glasnost. His viewpoints changed. The book you are quoting from was written just prior to his death.
 
Thanks to Bob the Barbarian and Obsessed Nuker for the data you guys provided!

So, the total strength at end of 1942 was 10,096,794 effectives + 826,288 in hospital = 10,923,082.
Total irrecoverable losses for the war were about 15,000,000, of which about 66% were suffered during 1941-42. That makes about about 9,900,000 irrecoverable losses during those two years.

Adding the irrecoverable losses 1941-42, to the 1942 end strength, should give us roughly the total number serving during those two years: 20,823,082.

Divide by 157,593 (the total allegedly shot for cowardice during those years).

We get one soldier shot for cowardice per every 132 soldiers serving.

Now, I know that's not a firm figure by any means, but I'd suppose that it is at least in the ballpark.

So, if the quoted number of shootings is roughly correct, it seems fair to say that most Soviet soldiers would've either personally known, or at least known of (a "friend of a friend" type thing) at least one soldier who had been shot for cowardice.

That's an astonishingly high level of coercion.
 
Thanks to Bob the Barbarian and Obsessed Nuker for the data you guys provided!

So, the total strength at end of 1942 was 10,096,794 effectives + 826,288 in hospital = 10,923,082.
Total irrecoverable losses for the war were about 15,000,000, of which about 66% were suffered during 1941-42. That makes about about 9,900,000 irrecoverable losses during those two years.

Adding the irrecoverable losses 1941-42, to the 1942 end strength, should give us roughly the total number serving during those two years: 20,823,082.

Divide by 157,593 (the total allegedly shot for cowardice during those years).

We get one soldier shot for cowardice per every 132 soldiers serving.

Now, I know that's not a firm figure by any means, but I'd suppose that it is at least in the ballpark.

So, if the quoted number of shootings is roughly correct, it seems fair to say that most Soviet soldiers would've either personally known, or at least known of (a "friend of a friend" type thing) at least one soldier who had been shot for cowardice.

That's an astonishingly high level of coercion.

It was a state of terror where Stalin's objective amounted to his army fearing him more then the enemy.

You would have to change Stalin's thinking about the world to change that and if that happens no Great Purges in the first place that scrambled the brain of the Red Army.
 
Well... yes. No matter how relatively infrequent the Red Army was in shooting its own men in absolute terms, there is no denying that it at least resorted to execution as a means of discipline more frequently then any other major combatant. Although its possible that the Germans and Japanese were beating them in that category by 1945.

Really?

I've seen estimates of German executions in the 10s of thousands, but in the 100s of thousands? Please supply some sources to back up your claim. Same for the Japanese.

As the 158,000 only covers until 1942. What about 1943-1945, or whenever Stalin decided to stop killing Russian soldiers for their perceived action(s) during the Great Patriotic War?

In addition I assume to 158,000 executed only refers to those granted a (show?)trail, and not anyone shot down by a blocking detachment, as they don't seem to have been in a position to confront any kind of authority. If you have any sources to the contrary please supply them.
 
As the 158,000 only covers until 1942. What about 1943-1945, or whenever Stalin decided to stop killing Russian soldiers for their perceived action(s) during the Great Patriotic War?

Don't forget the POWs that survived Nazi Camps, when to Siberia after the War.
Surrendering was against the rules.
In addition I assume to 158,000 executed only refers to those granted a (show?)trail, and not anyone shot down by a blocking detachment, as they don't seem to have been in a position to confront any kind of authority. If you have any sources to the contrary please supply them.

And 'sent back to to the Front' frequently meant in a punishment battalion,
where they would be cannon fodder.
Examples are clearing minefields by walking across them.
Another would be the Sturmovik rear gunner.

Doesn't sound too bad, till you realize that the Guy in Back didn't have the armor protection that the Pilot had.
 
I think its worth remembering that the Official (Politruk) reaction was all over the place during the war.

During the Winter War there were a lot of executions and the reaction was basically this is ridiculous there must be a better way.

then 41 and no massive formal set of executions until until Mid 42 with order 227.

At this point its worth remembering that the overwhelming majority of pre war officer corps up to say Lt Colonel is dead in the combat arms.
 
Top