AHC: Better prepared Australia in WW 2

Inspired by this thread, and with a much later POD.

With a POD after March 1942, what could Australia conceivably do to improve its war in the Pacific?

This includes military effectiveness in the field, reducing casualties, improving infrastructure / logistical networks, economics PODs.

What could be done?
 
Have Curtin resign, become incapacitated, be removed from the leadership or die. Worst PM ever.
 
Have Curtin resign, become incapacitated, be removed from the leadership or die. Worst PM ever.

I'm intrigued by this, as most of the books I have read lionise the man.

Although my caveat is that I haven't really closely looked at his leadership, concentrating more on the exploits of the Australian soldier or sailor at the front.

As we have discussed before, I think CAF AVM Jones and AOC RAAF Command AVM Bostock needed to have their heads bashed together or be plunked into a boxing ring with one another.

Then they might be able to work together...
 
David Horner did a lecture about this a while ago. Curtin was entralled by MacArthur and surrendered a lot of sovereignty to him. As late as 1945, after being opposition leader for the first 20 months of the war and PM for four years of the war, publicly stated that he was an amateur at war. Wtf, hadn't he learned anything in 6 years of war leadership? !?!
 
With a POD after March 1942, what could Australia conceivably do to improve its war in the Pacific?
The title and the opening remarks seem contradictory to me. Can we reasonably ask Australia to be better prepared in WW2 but not have the country begin until no earlier than 3 months and 20 days (April 1, 1942) after the Pacific war has begun? The very nature of preparing is to take action before it is needed.

IMO, the question is really, after March 1942, what can Australia do to react to what's happened the last three months in order to fight on with better success for the next 3 years, 4 months until VJ Day?
 
Did not the Australian Government prevent the 'Militia' divisions (initially 1st through 5th Divisions) from serving overseas and for a period of time (after Dec 7th) prevented 'Militia' troops from joining the 2nd AIF - Maybe a couple of additional Australian Divisions might have made a difference in Burma for example?

Ditch the Sentinel and Thunderbolt tank projects and instead build Valentines like the Canadians did - these were far simpler in that they could leverage existing techniques and skill sets found at the New South Wales Railway Company and compared to the Japanese tanks of the day superior in most measures

Use a twinned Cadillac V8 (220 HP) as the powerplant as this is available in Australia and units in Burma and elsewhere in the Pacific get a decent infantry tank in numbers before US production can start providing them with hundreds of tanks.

Forget building 6 of the 8 Tribal class DDs as these proved to be far too complex for the Australian shipbuilding industry (they would only commission 2 OTL in 1942 and a 3rd in mid 45) - don't lay down the 3rd unit in 1942 and cancel the other 5 in 1942 (they would not be laid down anyway) - instead build Corvettes - perhaps spam out more Bathursts?

Rejig the SMLE No 1 mk iii rifle production line to the No 4 standard as it was a better weapon and easier to mass produce (my understanding is that the Factory did not upgrade in order to prevent disruption)

Stand up Owens SMG production much earlier and produce it in larger numbers
 
Tell Churchill to get stuffed and bring the RAAF squadrons and men attached to the RAF in Europe and the Middle East home?
 
Tell Churchill to get stuffed and bring the RAAF squadrons and men attached to the RAF in Europe and the Middle East home?
Why? By the end of Spring 1942 there is no Japanese threat to Australia beyond some nuisance raids on the north coast bases. Maybe bring a few back home to bolster the reaction and deterrence.
 
Australia was very short of the means to strike back. Just the squadrons attached to bomber command would have been a big help. If the fighter squadron were brought back then Australia wouldn't have had to bother with the Boomerang, or use the Wirraway as an operational aircraft.
 
My thoughts were similar to Cryhavoc above, and revolved around a better allocation of Australian's smaller industrial base.

Firstly, to improve the training regime for the 'Militia' divisions prior to being deployed during the New Guinea campaign.

Expanding the armaments production facilities and to ensure that the Owen SMG reaches the front far earlier.

If possible, Liberty ships & corvettes for the SLOCs.

Personally, I also thought that the Valentine was good enough for the Pacific theatre.
 
Tell Churchill to get stuffed and bring the RAAF squadrons and men attached to the RAF in Europe and the Middle East home?

In WW2 - RAAF and RNZAF Squadrons in ETO were Australian or New Zealand in name only and in the mass majority of the time the Pilots were more than 50% RAF and the Ground crews generally more so - not to mention the logistics required to support them

While the administrative side did try to keep those Squadrons 'populated' with Australians and New Zealanders due to the way in which pilots would have been shifted around for RnR and training etc as well as losses it made more sense to simply pull replacements from a single large pool of men.

And of course the Aircraft were largely British
 
Order 8 Tribal class DD to be built in UK 1939.

Build some LCT or LST in Australia.

Build Valentine tank as soon as possible, engines & transmission from USA, fit Sentinel 25pdr turret to Valentine chassis, switch to Sentinel when design ready.

Build P36 fighters in Australia with same P&W engine as Beaufort, P40's latter with imported Merlin's.
 
Order 8 Tribal class DD to be built in UK 1939.

Build some LCT or LST in Australia.

Build Valentine tank as soon as possible, engines & transmission from USA, fit Sentinel 25pdr turret to Valentine chassis, switch to Sentinel when design ready.

Build P36 fighters in Australia with same P&W engine as Beaufort, P40's latter with imported Merlin's.

Yes, build P-36s instead of developing the Boomerang which was essentially a P-36 that did not appear until 1943.
 
In WW2 - RAAF and RNZAF Squadrons in ETO were Australian or New Zealand in name only and in the mass majority of the time the Pilots were more than 50% RAF and the Ground crews generally more so - not to mention the logistics required to support them

While the administrative side did try to keep those Squadrons 'populated' with Australians and New Zealanders due to the way in which pilots would have been shifted around for RnR and training etc as well as losses it made more sense to simply pull replacements from a single large pool of men.

And of course the Aircraft were largely British

There are more than enough RAAF attached to RAF squadrons to replace non Australians in RAAF squadrons, the only issue I see is where there are mixed aircraft crews. Do you break up existing crews or leave them as is. As for the aircraft themselves if the RAAF doesn't actually own them already they can buy them. Pulling the Australian squadrons from bomber command shouldn't have too much of an impact either. They were losing squadrons worth of aircraft every night for very little being actually achieved.
 
One thing the RAF could and perhaps should have done is insist that when prototypes are handed over for testing at least two of each type are delivered. That way promising types aren't eliminated if the sole example is damaged or destroyed in some accident.
 
Did not the Australian Government prevent the 'Militia' divisions (initially 1st through 5th Divisions) from serving overseas and for a period of time (after Dec 7th) prevented 'Militia' troops from joining the 2nd AIF - Maybe a couple of additional Australian Divisions might have made a difference in Burma for example?

The CMF became a conscript force that was not liable for service outside of Australia, which included the German Mandate Territory of Papua, until the government changed the legislation tom make the CMF liable for service in a 'defence zone' to the north of Australia in 1943. That certainly is one thing that could be changed earlier. Another is the insistence that Australian units be involved in the war rather than sitting idle in Australia for over a year in the case of some divisions, even if that does mean offering a Corps to the British in Burma.

Curtin could and should have kept MacArthur in check and promoted Australia's interests and advanced Australian officers during the war rather than slavishly doing what Mac said.
 
Great find and a fairly balanced critique of Curtin's leadership.

Although no fan of Blamey, I always felt that he was in a fairly difficult position and that presentation seems to confirm it.
 
Great find and a fairly balanced critique of Curtin's leadership.

Although no fan of Blamey, I always felt that he was in a fairly difficult position and that presentation seems to confirm it.

It also neatly answers your OP questions, just change some or most of the decisions that Curtin is criticised for. Simply not being under the spell of Macarthur would go a long war, assuming that meant he listened to Australians and acted on their advice more.
 
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