AHC: Best possible German performance in the Battle of the Atlantic

Deleted member 1487

That’s a reasonable belief when the Soviet Army is dealing with fallout from the purges. By 1942, that fallout is mostly gone. The Soviets has competent enough leaders to be able to stand and fight rather than break and run or surrender by then.
I'd look into the history of the fighting in Kerch, 2nd Kharkov, and the breakthrough parts of Case Blue. The Soviets had made considerable improvements by 1942, but they still had a long way to go.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Kerch_Peninsula
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue
 
Seeing those tanks as easy booty to capture requires the Generals to believe that the Soviet Army is going to fold rather than fight.

That’s a reasonable belief when the Soviet Army is dealing with fallout from the purges. By 1942, that fallout is mostly gone. The Soviets has competent enough leaders to be able to stand and fight rather than break and run or surrender by then.


That may be true after 12-18 months of actual war time, that the SU would experience losing thousands of square miles of vital land /factories etc and millions of soldiers plus tens of thousands of tanks and planes. In this context they have no war experience to judge by and would have to undergo something like 5-10 years of peace time to get that same level of competence /experience.
 
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I am not going to disagree that submarines had a good record at anti-sub work. But they are too slow to keep up with convoys and don't make good escorts.

Warships routinely got past picket lines in both world wars without much effort. Look at all the examples of U-Boats off Scarpa as an example. yeah there were some spectacular sinkings but also plenty of examples where the submarines didn't see anything. Choke points aren't as chokey as we sometimes imagine them.


Okay. I think we are talking about two different types of AMC work here. I was refering to AMC use by the Allies. Basically police work patroling the sea lanes.
Axis AMCs patrol the sea lanes looking innocuous and trying to sink stuff.
Electric Submarines CAN'T chase stuff down. Even operating on the surface they are simply too slow. They work by getting in front of a target and having a crack before the target speeds off. Picket lines like you are suggesting.

So, like you have noted they want choke points or well trodden routes. There are two problems. Choke points are obvious to both sides so the defenders can make the choke point too uncomfortable submarines via mines or patrols. Secondly they can simply reroute a convoy. Under normal circumstances individually routed ships take up a huge area making it easier to at least find a single ship and sink it. Convoys work by concentrating ships in a tiny location that is hard to find. Even an undefended convoy reduces losses because they simply don't get found.

This is why the problem for the Germans is more than just more U-Boats. They need to be able to direct those U-Boats to where they can be effective. So you need recon units (eg long range aircraft), then a way of directing the subs. In theory Wolf Packs do this. The subs form a picket line to detect the convoy, then tell Calais who then tell the rest of the subs were to mass. Unfortunately all of that radio traffic gives their position away so the convoy get rerouted. This happened a lot.

That is the challenge the Germans have to overcome.

I consider WW2 Submarines to be a mobile smart mine - in that they can move about but really require the target to effectively run them over as most surface ships are faster than them submerged
 
I'd look into the history of the fighting in Kerch, 2nd Kharkov, and the breakthrough parts of Case Blue. The Soviets had made considerable improvements by 1942, but they still had a long way to go.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Kerch_Peninsula
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case_Blue

I think if the invasion was postponed till 42 then the Germans would have more experiences like the the Ambush of 4th Panzer on the road to Mtsensk (6th Oct 41) which gutted that unit
 
On the Dithmarschen tankers, couldn't those be raiders in their own right if you wanted them to be. I like the sea plane handling idea would make a ton of sense. Maybe even the ability to drop a small torpedo boat in the water (like the raider Michael). Then they could be stand off raiders and refuelers while lowering the risk of detection.

As far as not building they were built in the pre 1939 naval treaty period, so you just can't covert them to raiding cruisers while following the treaty, but are a pretty good force multiplier for the few ships they can build.

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As far as the not attacking the Soviet Union in 1941 that certainly mean the Germans don't have to transfer Uboats to the med (assuming there are extra aircraft there instead), SBoats used in the Baltic and Black Sea could be kept in the channel. But they were pretty much building uboats to capacity by then anyway, and didn't have the aircraft types that early to really raid out far anyway.

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If Hitler never attacks the Soviet Union, not even in 1942 combined with not messing up the HE177 with dive bombing requirements and having them ones operationally deployed to the Atlantic in late 1942 would be really helpful.
 

Deleted member 1487

I think if the invasion was postponed till 42 then the Germans would have more experiences like the the Ambush of 4th Panzer on the road to Mtsensk (6th Oct 41) which gutted that unit
That didn't gut the unit at all and the Germans came out way ahead in terms of the casualty exchange. There is a detailed account using Soviet first person sources, as well as German sources, in the book "T-34: the mythical weapon". The Soviets did much better in earlier fighting, like the ambush at Soltsy, the initial fighting during the Staraya Russa offensive, some of the fighting around Yelnya, etc. Certainly later during the Soviet winter counteroffensive their encirclement and near wipe out of one of Guderian's corps was a FAR greater Soviet victory.

As to main point about the Soviets fighting better in 1942, that is a given. Materially the Soviets would be better off, but might well still have serious problems. Without question it is unlikely that the Germans would have gotten nearly as far as they did IOTL in 1941.
 
On the Dithmarschen tankers, couldn't those be raiders in their own right if you wanted them to be. I like the sea plane handling idea would make a ton of sense. Maybe even the ability to drop a small torpedo boat in the water (like the raider Michael). Then they could be stand off raiders and refuelers while lowering the risk of detection.

As far as not building they were built in the pre 1939 naval treaty period, so you just can't covert them to raiding cruisers while following the treaty, but are a pretty good force multiplier for the few ships they can build.

If Hitler never attacks the Soviet Union, not even in 1942 combined with not messing up the HE177 with dive bombing requirements and having them ones operationally deployed to the Atlantic in late 1942 would be really helpful.

my understanding they considered the Dithmarschen too valuable to use as raiders? my idea has always been to use them as "mothership" for u-boats and converted AMCs especially once the AGNA signed and construction of Panzerschiffe a provocation?

MY speculative fleet would be Admiral Hipper-class armed with 11" guns and destroyers for German version of French Force de Raid (and they would need the relatively high speed tankers to support that too)

possibly the light cruisers could have been rebuilt? subtracting some of their overbuilt superstructure to allow for more stability? and they could have been sent into the Atlantic also?
 
The Dithmarschen tankers were considered too vulnerable to be HSK, with all that fuel in the hull.
 

perfectgeneral

Donor
Monthly Donor
The Dithmarschen tankers were considered too vulnerable to be HSK, with all that fuel in the hull.
They could be MACs in a self defence role. Early warning of RN activity with something to offer a bloody nose to those too inquisitive. A place of refuge while replenishing.
 
They could be MACs in a self defence role. Early warning of RN activity with something to offer a bloody nose to those too inquisitive. A place of refuge while replenishing.


Oh yeah- but MAC had only 4-6 fighters- like the Swordfish. So for the KM that's maybe FI-167 . If the entire deck of the Dithmarschen was remodeled with hanger maybe 1/2 the length then maybe we could think in terms of a dozen STUKA .I'm not even sure ANGLO-GERMAN treaty would allow the KM to have 1/2 dozen MAC/AOE.
 
The Dithmarschen tankers were considered too vulnerable to be HSK, with all that fuel in the hull.
and far too valuable. Besides, you'd have them well off the trade routes:
PiEPm1M.png


They are your mobile base network as one stop shops for replenishment, maintenance, sickbay etc.
 
They could be MACs in a self defence role. Early warning of RN activity with something to offer a bloody nose to those too inquisitive. A place of refuge while replenishing.
Their best defence is to look innocuous. Another point to consider with raiders is that they were the best crews with the most resourceful commanders. Their lives depended on deception. Consider them elite, ie. you only have the top 10% of your force fit this criteria so for a KM of 68,000 personnel you can expect 6,800 for crews suitable for raiders.
 

perfectgeneral

Donor
Monthly Donor
Their best defence is to look innocuous. Another point to consider with raiders is that they were the best crews with the most resourceful commanders. Their lives depended on deception. Consider them elite, ie. you only have the top 10% of your force fit this criteria so for a KM of 68,000 personnel you can expect 6,800 for crews suitable for raiders.
Would it be possible to disguise a MAC converted from an oiler to look like a cargo liner? Canvas superstructure over the deck. Bolt on gunnels around the sides. Crates over the deck aaa. A disguise as an oiler might be even easier. The key being a vertical plate around the flight deck edge.
Oh yeah- but MAC had only 4-6 fighters- like the Swordfish. So for the KM that's maybe FI-167 . If the entire deck of the Dithmarschen was remodeled with hanger maybe 1/2 the length then maybe we could think in terms of a dozen STUKA .I'm not even sure ANGLO-GERMAN treaty would allow the KM to have 1/2 dozen MAC/AOE.
MACs were converted quickly from oilers and grainers at the outbreak of war. All treaties are void then. Conversion kits can be prepared ahead of time.
 
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Would it be possible to disguise a MAC converted from an oiler to look like a cargo liner? Canvas superstructure over the deck. Bolt on gunnels around the sides. Crates over the deck aaa. A disguise as an oiler might be even easier. The key being a vertical plate around the flight deck edge.
Probably not as there would be alot of stowing away and stuffing around to carry out flight ops. Your pilots still need to maintain proficiency aswell. Most raiders carried aircraft. Merchant captains weren't always the sharpest, one seaplane flew over a ship and dropped a message to go to a map reference. The captain obliged and the ship was captured. The plane even had German markings on it!
 

BlondieBC

Banned
I consider WW2 Submarines to be a mobile smart mine - in that they can move about but really require the target to effectively run them over as most surface ships are faster than them submerged

The smart mine part is correct. Submarines lived on the surface except for the final attacks and evading ASW forces. It is better to compare the cruising surface speeds of subs to the cruising speeds of ships. And here is where we see a big part of the reason submarines are much better at finding merchant ships that might well be moving at 10 knots or so compared to warships that are probably going closer to twice that speed.
 

Ian_W

Banned
The smart mine part is correct. Submarines lived on the surface except for the final attacks and evading ASW forces. It is better to compare the cruising surface speeds of subs to the cruising speeds of ships. And here is where we see a big part of the reason submarines are much better at finding merchant ships that might well be moving at 10 knots or so compared to warships that are probably going closer to twice that speed.

You also see a big part of the counter to pack tactics, as if aircraft are around the submarines are submerged and not finding merchant ships.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Worse than that - KM officers complained that all naval radio transmissions were to be limited to 3 character messages as per prewar guidelines, but Donitz Wolf Pact tactics demanded constant communications of lengths far beyond 3 characters .RN studies showed sometimes these transmissions numbered over 100 per hour per boat. Why that persisted is beyond me. Furbringer [Donitz's colleague] sited this as main prewar criticism of Donitz Wolf Pact tactics. Furbringer recommended a multi dimensional attack on convoys to overwhelm the defences, with LW air attacks and surface raiders. If the LW component was just a fleet of long range MPA [ even CONDOR], they could broadcast convoy location thus eliminating the need for hundreds of U-Boat transmissions per attack.

Really- Donitz didn't want to command the U-Boat fleet at war, but Raeder seems to have cornered him into it . Perhaps if Donitz leveraged Dr Walther's "fish boat" U-Boat development , while Furbringer orchestrated the U-Boat war , they could have had the best of both worlds. Furbringer lead the TYPE-VII U-Boat development in the 1930s and trained most of their prewar crews, and himself championed a number of technologies, like rocket torpedo and sonar masking materials.

They why is easy. It is a combination of human males desire to over control combined with how it often takes years of negative feedback to learn combine with preformed ideas. You could just as easily ask why the British were so slow in moving planes from bomber command to ASW duties. Same answer. Or a hundred other changes.

And this is why is is so easy to boost anyone performance in almost any war. To move up some new tactic or improvement a few years, one has to just have someone learn the 10th time he could have, not the 30th time as OTL.

Or you can just get lucky. And to give a relevant example, in WW1, the Germans just lucked out in having U-boats able to do merchant warfare. The doctrine of the day was that U-boats were "daytime torpedo boats", and to meet this requirement only need 250 miles range and almost no speed. Some thought you needed a hundred mile range. There were discussions of fleet submarines to fight with fleets, but no one had the solution of range, speed, and other characteristics needed. The most popular idea was submarine carriers. Surface ships that had the speed and range to keep up with the fleet, with say 8 submarines that could be quickly lowered to the water to fight as the mother ship ran behind the friendly fleet. But there was a problem with the daytime torpedo boats. They were using lighter fuels in the range of kerosene to gasoline. And these fuels have fumes, and these ships tended to be death traps. So they fixed the problem by putting in diesel engines cause diesel does not go boom as easily as gasoline. And diesel gives you longer range. It appears to be an accident that the Imperial Germans had the ship they needed.

So what we often miss in these threads is we get too tied up to individuals and POD. Yes, in a ATL where I am improving Germany in WW2 and I decide to keep these two officers, then yes this discussion is highly relevant. But in a world of 'all possible POD', it is really quite simplist to move German naval doctrine 1943 to 1939. Or parts of it. It just involves a few people making different decisions, a few people promoted in a different order, or just luck. Luck is really huge in all wars. The hard part is changing hard physical constraints such as ship yards. Or developing entirely new doctrines never used IOTL or from decades in the future.
 
You also see a big part of the counter to pack tactics, as if aircraft are around the submarines are submerged and not finding merchant ships.

This is the major issue that the strategy of more U Boats suffers from - by 1941 there was only a relatively small part of the North Atlantic called "The Black Gap" that was free from ASW air patrols and had Coastal command gotten their hands on more than a dozen or so VLR Liberators and had the US deployed theirs accordingly rather than everywhere the u boats were not then the losses suffered in 42 and early 43 would have been a lot less than OTL.

In such places where aircraft were operating (which would often be where the convoys were) submarines could only stay on the surface at night or in very bad weather

It was far easier for the allies to increase the number of LRMPA available for ASW patrols than it was for Germany to increase the number of U boats.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Good luck getting Goering on board for the Luftwaffe component.

By the end of the war the Germans solved that issue with burst transmissions:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurier_system

While I largely agree on Goering lack of flexibility, I don't really see it as a hard POD. Hitler could be quite mercurial and Hitler seems highly influenced by his early inner circle. Either adding/removing someone from Hitler inner circle would be enough. Or Hitler just having some odd idea he implement. If I was trying to write this ATL, and looking for an easy POD, I would use Hitlers tendency to have competing commands. Goering pisses off Hitler a little more one day, Hitler so Hitler spins out of little of the air force and puts under a naval commander. More precisely, a few future squadrons will be under naval command. Maybe around the time Plan Z is approved, the squadrons for the aircraft carriers are authorized. Plus a few land based naval aviation units for the North Sea Coast. Plus the scout planes. An authorized strength of 200-300 planes that is built up to size over 3-6 years would do the trick. Then when France falls, you have both the command structure plus some at least marginally workable planes to allow a decision of rapid expand.

If you prefer something closer in the war, you just have Goering anger Hitler. And Hitler move a few squadrons permanently over to naval command.

I just don't see this as even a mildly challenging POD. Hitler let the SS have a second army. Hitler let Goering build his 3rd minor Army. Hitler deciding that he need a 2nd, 3rd, or even 4th air force is actually quite easy. It would actually be much harder to have the US Marine Corp folded under the US Army command by a wide, wide margin that the POD discussed. Or to take an OTL change, it is much less likely the USAF is split out of the US Army post WW2 than Hitler doing a naval air force.
 
While I largely agree on Goering lack of flexibility, I don't really see it as a hard POD. Hitler could be quite mercurial and Hitler seems highly influenced by his early inner circle. Either adding/removing someone from Hitler inner circle would be enough. Or Hitler just having some odd idea he implement. If I was trying to write this ATL, and looking for an easy POD, I would use Hitlers tendency to have competing commands. Goering pisses off Hitler a little more one day, Hitler so Hitler spins out of little of the air force and puts under a naval commander. More precisely, a few future squadrons will be under naval command. Maybe around the time Plan Z is approved, the squadrons for the aircraft carriers are authorized. Plus a few land based naval aviation units for the North Sea Coast. Plus the scout planes. An authorized strength of 200-300 planes that is built up to size over 3-6 years would do the trick. Then when France falls, you have both the command structure plus some at least marginally workable planes to allow a decision of rapid expand.

If you prefer something closer in the war, you just have Goering anger Hitler. And Hitler move a few squadrons permanently over to naval command.

I just don't see this as even a mildly challenging POD. Hitler let the SS have a second army. Hitler let Goering build his 3rd minor Army. Hitler deciding that he need a 2nd, 3rd, or even 4th air force is actually quite easy. It would actually be much harder to have the US Marine Corp folded under the US Army command by a wide, wide margin that the POD discussed. Or to take an OTL change, it is much less likely the USAF is split out of the US Army post WW2 than Hitler doing a naval air force.

Hitler did have previous form with regards to 'divide and conquer' regarding his subordinates roles and responsibilities so this is possible

It only has to be a Cadre in 1939 of say Long Range Amphibs and some Condors under Navy control and come late 1940 after Goering's failure during the BoB this Cadre gets expanded into an 'Atlantik force' under nominal command of the Navy with a role to locate and attack merchant shipping in the Atlantic and guide in Uboats and surface raiders

It won't be a perfect foil but better than OTL
 
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