AHC: Best possible German performance in the Battle of the Atlantic

Functionally they weren't compromised in enough time to really matter for the bulk of the BotA, it was instead HuffDuff that enabled the Brits to figure out where Uboats were stationed and route around them.


Worse than that - KM officers complained that all naval radio transmissions were to be limited to 3 character messages as per prewar guidelines, but Donitz Wolf Pact tactics demanded constant communications of lengths far beyond 3 characters .RN studies showed sometimes these transmissions numbered over 100 per hour per boat. Why that persisted is beyond me. Furbringer [Donitz's colleague] sited this as main prewar criticism of Donitz Wolf Pact tactics. Furbringer recommended a multi dimensional attack on convoys to overwhelm the defences, with LW air attacks and surface raiders. If the LW component was just a fleet of long range MPA [ even CONDOR], they could broadcast convoy location thus eliminating the need for hundreds of U-Boat transmissions per attack.

Really- Donitz didn't want to command the U-Boat fleet at war, but Raeder seems to have cornered him into it . Perhaps if Donitz leveraged Dr Walther's "fish boat" U-Boat development , while Furbringer orchestrated the U-Boat war , they could have had the best of both worlds. Furbringer lead the TYPE-VII U-Boat development in the 1930s and trained most of their prewar crews, and himself championed a number of technologies, like rocket torpedo and sonar masking materials.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Worse than that - KM officers complained that all naval radio transmissions were to be limited to 3 character messages as per prewar guidelines, but Donitz Wolf Pact tactics demanded constant communications of lengths far beyond 3 characters .RN studies showed sometimes these transmissions numbered over 100 per hour per boat. Why that persisted is beyond me. Furbringer [Donitz's colleague] sited this as main prewar criticism of Donitz Wolf Pact tactics. Furbringer recommended a multi dimensional attack on convoys to overwhelm the defences, with LW air attacks and surface raiders. If the LW component was just a fleet of long range MPA [ even CONDOR], they could broadcast convoy location thus eliminating the need for hundreds of U-Boat transmissions per attack.

Really- Donitz didn't want to command the U-Boat fleet at war, but Raeder seems to have cornered him into it . Perhaps if Donitz leveraged Dr Walther's "fish boat" U-Boat development , while Furbringer orchestrated the U-Boat war , they could have had the best of both worlds. Furbringer lead the TYPE-VII U-Boat development in the 1930s and trained most of their prewar crews, and himself championed a number of technologies, like rocket torpedo and sonar masking materials.
Good luck getting Goering on board for the Luftwaffe component.

By the end of the war the Germans solved that issue with burst transmissions:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurier_system
 
With regards to tankers....they had more than enough even ignoring the Dithmarschen tankers and since prewar replenishment at sea was done during the civil war, they could have retrofitted the flex hoses to most tankers.

The construction of the six Dithmarschen tankers was a precious waste of resources /ship yards and funding. They should have built 6 more cruisers/PBS even if they have to steel guns engines and armor tonnage from the battleships and other programs.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=66&t=126299&p=2121303&hilit=oil+tankers#p2121303

copy and pasted from another site , not sure if this will work?

Code:
  World Tanker Fleet 1940-1944, 2,000+ GRT ships only, registered as of January 1st.

              1940             1941             1942             1943             1944
        Number    Tons   Number    Tons   Number    Tons    Number    Tons    Number    Tons

Japan     57    574,827    59    532,947    61    544,860    62    548,787    59    503,753
Germany   33    262,981    38    326,485    40    353,276    48    414,212    55    461,742
Italy     81    432,491    80    429,094    45    242,353    34    171,383    30    171,383*
US       383  2,824,160   379  2,824,128   389  2,931,193   366  2,901,748   556  4,784,954
UK       450  3,234,852   417  2,975,688   411  2,930,844   355  2,534,899   353  2,521,751
Norway   262  2,073,771   255  2,055,254   231  1,882,687   186  1,523,062   166  1,370,174
NL       107    544,462   101    514,512    97    482,956    80    389,442    77    374,090
Panama    64    555,734    71    588,323    77    630,426    72    551,694    76    539,783
France    56    385,117    46    328,980    43    318,497    16    305,158    29    209,430
USSR      17    113,050    17    113,050    16    106,493    16    106,126    24    154,563
Sweden    21    183,206    24    205,187    28    244,061    32    282,411    32    279,528
Others   106    555,522   102    517,100   112    575,127    96    500,826    99    518,409

* looks like a typo
 
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With regards to tankers....they had more than enough even ignoring the Dithmarschen tankers and since prewar replenishment at sea was done during the civil war, they could have retrofitted the flex hoses to most tankers.

The construction of the six Dithmarschen tankers was a precious waste of resources /ship yards and funding. They should have built 6 more cruisers/PBS even if they have to steel guns engines and armor tonnage from the battleships and other programs.

there possibly is something between Dithmarschen and aircraft carrier and seaplane tender that would have been effective?
 
there possibly is something between Dithmarschen and aircraft carrier and seaplane tender that would have been effective?

The hull was only 22m x 175m in length , so I'm not sure how effective it could make as a carrier. I thought the 187m hull length of the PBS SCHEER was not consider long enough for conversion , so plans were drawn up for a 10m extension involving > 2000t more work/displacement.
 
there possibly is something between Dithmarschen and aircraft carrier and seaplane tender that would have been effective?

The hull was only 22m x 175m in length , so I'm not sure how effective it could make as a carrier. I thought the 187m hull length of the PBS SCHEER was not consider long enough for conversion , so plans were drawn up for a 10m extension involving > 2000t more work/displacement.

was speaking to your point about Dithmarschen being a waste ... MY scenario would add capability to handle seaplanes (as they had experience doing that and the construction could be portrayed as commercial venture?)

but perhaps proper carrier could serve to resupply u-boats?
 
was speaking to your point about Dithmarschen being a waste ... MY scenario would add capability to handle seaplanes (as they had experience doing that and the construction could be portrayed as commercial venture?)

but perhaps proper carrier could serve to resupply u-boats?


All ideas are helpful, but for me the basic KM fleet needed dozens of surface raiders. Starting in 1934/5 with Dithmarschen ordered as raiders they would have to follow existing blueprints tweaked to allow acceptable building & time window. At best 3 in 1935-1937 followed by 3 more in 1937-1939.
 
Functionally they weren't compromised in enough time to really matter for the bulk of the BotA, it was instead HuffDuff that enabled the Brits to figure out where Uboats were stationed and route around them.

Apologies - I meant to go further an touch on radio discipline & Huff Duff. @PSL has done so above.
 
Postpone Barborssa until Britain is beaten, more resources

Good chance Barbarossa never happens then. Give the Soviets another year and the endemic problems from the purges are mostly out of the Army’s system, the T-34 and KV-1 are in wide service, the Air Force’s more modern designs are more common, etc.
 
Good chance Barbarossa never happens then. Give the Soviets another year and the endemic problems from the purges are mostly out of the Army’s system, the T-34 and KV-1 are in wide service, the Air Force’s more modern designs are more common, etc.

Except a year in war time is like 3-7 years in peace time. It usually takes decades to change a doctrine. It took the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht that long between wars.
 
Except a year in war time is like 3-7 years in peace time. It usually takes decades to change a doctrine. It took the Reichswehr/Wehrmacht that long between wars.

Everything I mentioned was already in process with the Soviets by late 1940, early 41. You delay Barbarossa a year or more and those processes are completed or nearly so.
 
Everything I mentioned was already in process with the Soviets by late 1940, early 41. You delay Barbarossa a year or more and those processes are completed or nearly so.


Seriously doubt it.

Soviet annual peace time tank production was >4000 units, with maybe 50-60% peace time survival rate [historical figures were maybe 1/3 until 1943/44]. 80% survival rate per annum would only be possible if training hours are cut by 2/3. That way it would take 4 years to reach something like 12,000 T-34/KV tanks. Historically basic training suffered for the first few years of the war in the east , with simple driving in line or line abreast and not leading a moving target when shooting, to say nothing of bore-sighting main gun etc.

The 1944 historical advances were order of magnitude more than the prewar war-games predicted in 1940. How many millions had ALREADY died in order to achieve those 1944 levels of capability?
 
Seriously doubt it.

Soviet annual peace time tank production was >4000 units, with maybe 50-60% peace time survival rate [historical figures were maybe 1/3 until 1943/44]. 80% survival rate per annum would only be possible if training hours are cut by 2/3. That way it would take 4 years to reach something like 12,000 T-34/KV tanks. Historically basic training suffered for the first few years of the war in the east , with simple driving in line or line abreast and not leading a moving target when shooting, to say nothing of bore-sighting main gun etc.

The 1944 historical advances were order of magnitude more than the prewar war-games predicted in 1940. How many millions had ALREADY died in order to achieve those 1944 levels of capability?

It wouldn’t take 12,000 T-34’s/KV-1’s to make Barbarossa unfeasible.

A Soviet Army that isn’t reeling for the purges with 4 to 6k more modern tanks to supplement their light tanks that were on par with German Pz III’s and able to handle Pz IV’s along with a more modern Air Force that can actually mix it up with the Luftwaffe and you make the German planned knockout blow basically impossible.

All the Soviets have to do is build an army that the German are pretty sure won’t fold like a house of cards as happened OTL and you get the Germans to start delaying more to build up, which leads to more Soviet build up, which leads to the Germans delaying to build up more, which leads to the Soviets building up...repeat ad nauseum until invading the Soviet Union becomes a “well one of these days...” operations.
 
It wouldn’t take 12,000 T-34’s/KV-1’s to make Barbarossa unfeasible.

A Soviet Army that isn’t reeling for the purges with 4 to 6k more modern tanks to supplement their light tanks that were on par with German Pz III’s and able to handle Pz IV’s along with a more modern Air Force that can actually mix it up with the Luftwaffe and you make the German planned knockout blow basically impossible.

All the Soviets have to do is build an army that the German are pretty sure won’t fold like a house of cards as happened OTL and you get the Germans to start delaying more to build up, which leads to more Soviet build up, which leads to the Germans delaying to build up more, which leads to the Soviets building up...repeat ad nauseum until invading the Soviet Union becomes a “well one of these days...” operations.

Sounds like a WALLIE phantasy or NATO nightmare. Wars are fought by soldiers officers and generals, More KV/T-34 just mean more bootie for the Wehrmacht to capture. The soviets still have the same myopic view of soldiers and warfare and will take a decade to recover from the purges and catch up with modern war .
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Might have been the reason for the 16 kn criterium for the german AMCs as mentioned by PSL ? ... to outpace at least such subs ?

AMC's tend to live by stealth. It is more important to look like many ships than have any particular performance measure such as speed. And high speed burns fuel faster, and resupply can be challenging for these ships. It is not that high cruising speed AMC would not work, it is that high speed AMCs would expected to be rare. But sure, one can probably find a few frozen meat type ship with high speeds that work well, but that will not be the typical pattern.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
You can't see anything from a submarine. You are too close to water level.

Cruisers and AMCs offer big stable hulls that are livable and workable in a variety of environmental conditions. Often a lot of cruiser work away from hot spots like the North Atlantic is mostly just being there. Look at the history HMAS Adelaide or Georgios Averof as examples the sort of work done.

  • Allied subs were of limited usage in anti-sub patrol, but they had the highest percentage success rate per voyage.
  • Subs are good at intercepting warships on predictable paths especially if there are choke points. Leaving a Norwegian anchorage or the Denmark straights are prime examples of such locations.
  • As to anti-AMC work for submarines, this is speculative since I am not aware of this tactic being used widely. Or at all. But if one assumes the victim of AMC gets a warning message out, and a submarine is in the area, a submarine would have good chance of interception. Not as good as a surface ship, but reasonable.
I believe the record disagrees with your position, and I believe the UK submarines under performed what could have been done.
 
  • Allied subs were of limited usage in anti-sub patrol, but they had the highest percentage success rate per voyage.
  • Subs are good at intercepting warships on predictable paths especially if there are choke points. Leaving a Norwegian anchorage or the Denmark straights are prime examples of such locations.
  • As to anti-AMC work for submarines, this is speculative since I am not aware of this tactic being used widely. Or at all. But if one assumes the victim of AMC gets a warning message out, and a submarine is in the area, a submarine would have good chance of interception. Not as good as a surface ship, but reasonable.
I believe the record disagrees with your position, and I believe the UK submarines under performed what could have been done.

I am not going to disagree that submarines had a good record at anti-sub work. But they are too slow to keep up with convoys and don't make good escorts.

Warships routinely got past picket lines in both world wars without much effort. Look at all the examples of U-Boats off Scarpa as an example. yeah there were some spectacular sinkings but also plenty of examples where the submarines didn't see anything. Choke points aren't as chokey as we sometimes imagine them.


Okay. I think we are talking about two different types of AMC work here. I was refering to AMC use by the Allies. Basically police work patroling the sea lanes.
Axis AMCs patrol the sea lanes looking innocuous and trying to sink stuff.
Electric Submarines CAN'T chase stuff down. Even operating on the surface they are simply too slow. They work by getting in front of a target and having a crack before the target speeds off. Picket lines like you are suggesting.

So, like you have noted they want choke points or well trodden routes. There are two problems. Choke points are obvious to both sides so the defenders can make the choke point too uncomfortable submarines via mines or patrols. Secondly they can simply reroute a convoy. Under normal circumstances individually routed ships take up a huge area making it easier to at least find a single ship and sink it. Convoys work by concentrating ships in a tiny location that is hard to find. Even an undefended convoy reduces losses because they simply don't get found.

This is why the problem for the Germans is more than just more U-Boats. They need to be able to direct those U-Boats to where they can be effective. So you need recon units (eg long range aircraft), then a way of directing the subs. In theory Wolf Packs do this. The subs form a picket line to detect the convoy, then tell Calais who then tell the rest of the subs were to mass. Unfortunately all of that radio traffic gives their position away so the convoy get rerouted. This happened a lot.

That is the challenge the Germans have to overcome.
 
Sounds like a WALLIE phantasy or NATO nightmare. Wars are fought by soldiers officers and generals, More KV/T-34 just mean more bootie for the Wehrmacht to capture. The soviets still have the same myopic view of soldiers and warfare and will take a decade to recover from the purges and catch up with modern war .

Seeing those tanks as easy booty to capture requires the Generals to believe that the Soviet Army is going to fold rather than fight.

That’s a reasonable belief when the Soviet Army is dealing with fallout from the purges. By 1942, that fallout is mostly gone. The Soviets has competent enough leaders to be able to stand and fight rather than break and run or surrender by then.
 
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