What did the Soviets get in trade from the Germans that was useful in *land war* and *air war*, which they needed, rather than naval technology, which they did not?
I'm still interested in this question.
That said, I do agree that attacking would probably backfire badly and the Soviets would be better off making focusing their efforts on recieving a German attack rather then pre-emptying one.
Why do you think so? Is it just there being greater simplicity inherent in defensive operations, so the required performance level is more attainable? Or is it some political reason it would be better for the Soviet Union to defend than attack?
It's kind of interesting how the balance between offensive and defensive advantage shifts at different scales of human violence. At the level of the individual or small group of gunmen in society, the offensive has a massive advantage. Take a much bigger batch of guys and put them in uniform and a military organization and positions, then the defense usually has a tactical advantage. Nuclear and missile warfare - well that aids the first strike advantage.
It does not actually say Russia, it is possible that Stalin could think that Poland and the area in Eastern Europe Hitler had would be enough, also it is possible that few would realise how much Hitler would keep to it.
I think he said something about Russia being the only solution to the Lebensbraum problem.
However, I agree with your general point that we should not be too hard on people for not considering
Mein Kampf an unalterable script for Hitler's behavior.
In hindsight, it really was the outline he went with (except when reality, like Britain's balance of power tendency, stubbornly would not go along with it). However, in the 1930s and 1940s it was only one data point among many about Hitler's and the whole Nazi regime's intentions.
I could see, without the benefit of hindsight, reasonable sounding arguments that Hitler might not invade the Soviet Union, especially on an accelerated schedule.
For example - he did write
Mein Kampf in the 1920s when the Soviet Union was far weaker from its war, civil war and revolution. Alot had changed in the USSR since then.
He lied about alot of things and usually they went bad for the people he was lying to, but with all his tactical flexibility one might think at least some of his written intentions about the USSR might be lies to serve an alternative purpose. After all, before 1941 the Soviets had heard from a whole wide spectrum of people around the world
ad nauseam that the "USSR must be destroyed". There were realpolitik reasons to not invade, and the Soviets did not see indicators they expected like bulk purchases of sheepskin coats for the winter. When your enemy is doing something long run stupid, it is easier for him to surprise you.
And alot depends on what even somebody who read and re-read
Mein Kampf would regard as the most important part. On the one hand there is the idea that only Russia had the "living space" Germany needed.
On the other hand, Hitler emphasized in the book the need to be aligned with either England or Russia, and not be against both.
Plus the writings of other Nazi theorists or people who might have been interpreted as examples of regime thought, published and ventured differing opinions. For example, Karl Haushofer who was very much into the land-based, heartland,
lebensbraum paradigm, favored staying aligned with the USSR, not conquering it.
I guess my bottom-line on the questions here is:
With clairvoyant foreknowledge, I think the right move for Stalin would have involved attacking Hitler before Hitler would attack. However, that requires an ASB or other magic, which is why I discussed a similar question in that forum.
Without actual foreknowledge, and without ruling out the risk that attacking Hitler was one way to guarantee a war that otherwise probably wouldn't happen, then the best solutions that great intuition and analysis could support would probably involve improved defense, but not preemptive attack.