AHC, best 1939-42 battleship

You know, the graphs and charts, with the exchange ratios expected and immune zone bars. Those
Naval War College tables; not the ones you just misinterpreted and misunderstood.. Please read those graphs and charts again, too, and read the plain text between where the preferred American ranges are spelled out and the charts and graphs are explained. This is not difficult to do. It is a short article. Does one have a problem with graph functions and interpretations?
I’ve looked at all the tables, and the text in between. Again. Still nothing supporting your assertion of short range as the US Navy’s preferred fighting range. Plenty supporting my assertion of medium range being decisive.
 
YMMV, but I do believe that one is incorrect. And it is not a matter of opinion. I referred to 10,000 meters or closer. Not FEET or yards.

See here:

While agree with the broader thesis of this post, the part about gun ranges doesn’t jive with what I’ve read on US Navy doctrine, shell, and ship design. For starters, what I’ve read is that the decisive US Navy range they wanted to achieve was not close range, especially not the 10,000-meter mark you’ve claimed, but medium range, i.e. a band from 17,000 - 21,000 yards - and this would be preceded by fire at extreme range, I.e. 27,000+ yards, to disrupt the enemy battle line and perhaps get a few golden BBs.

Further, the idea that super-heavy shells were designed for close range and flat trajectories simply doesn’t match their actual flight characteristics. For flat trajectories, you want high muzzle velocity, but the modern 16” guns fired at modest to low velocities. Super-heavy shells instead had steeper falls and retained energy better, characteristics better suited for attacking deck armor than belt, though by any measure the SHS shells were excellent belt-punchers. Essentially, SHS shells were intended to gain an advantage in the initial extreme-range phase while still retaining excellent capability to handle the decisive medium range combat, as well as handle all sorts Wild and crazy obliquities.

The armor schemes of the war-built battleships also reflect this doctrine, particularly the much-hyped decapping plates the Iowa and South Dakota classes possessed. They worked, but they weren’t thick enough to work at every obliquity; below 20 degrees obliquity, they become a fifty-fifty roll of the dice against 16” shells. Considering the Mark 5 guns on the Colorado class (the best comparison for foreign guns) only hit that striking angle at 23,000 yards, that suggests to me that the decapping plates were intended to get the ships through the dangerous long-range zone (21,000 - 27,000 yards) and then aid them in the medium-range slugging match. More importantly, they’d be essentially useless at the ranges you’re describing.

And what decapping plates? You mean the bomb detonating decks designed to keep the blast outside the float raft?

Read your own source material

11. During the engagement described above, SOUTH DAKOTA sustained at least 26 projectile hits. It is estimated that one hit was 5-inch, six were 6-inch, eighteen were 8-inch and one was 14-inch.

Skipped off the after turret, non-penetrating. So what? Those were estimates.

As for the British, I hold results oriented opinions. Holland was sunk and his flag with him. Apparently he did not know what he was doing. Could say the same about Tovey, and Phillips. Fraser? Eh.

Already explained about what SHW shells were supposed to do. Shock transmitted as well as drill.
 
YMMV, but I do believe that one is incorrect. And it is not a matter of opinion. I referred to 10,000 meters or closer. Not FEET or yards.

See here:



And what decapping plates? You mean the bomb detonating decks designed to keep the blast outside the float raft?
No, YMMV does not apply here. Nowhere does your article, in the body text or in the charts and tables, state that the US Navy wanted to close within 11,000 yards (a quick and dirty Imperial equivalence to 10,000 meters). Speaking of which, I have no idea why you're so insistent on that point. Every time I've mentioned the range you've asserted, it's been 10,000 meters.

To the second paragraph: no, I'm not referring to the bomb deck. That's horizontal armor. The decapping plate I'm referring to is the outer STS hull plating on both the South Dakota and Iowa classes. I think it was designed as a decapping plate, but whether it was designed as one or not it would act as one regardless.
 
I cannot find anything in your link that supports this assertion. It would be helpful if, when posting links like this, you were to specify exactly which part you think supports your argument. At the very least, it would make it easier for us to understand where you're going wrong.

Are you sure that you posted the correct link? I think it doesn't matter, because history doesn't support your assertion either. History shows that the RN preferred to close to decisive battle range (Bismarck, Scharnhorst) because they wanted a decisive result. While the ability of long-range fire to harass an enemy and score "lucky" hits was noted, it was subsidiary to a decisive engagement. Hence Hood and PoW closing rapidly at DS, then opening their arcs.
That was more Holland trying to get Hood into her immunity zone, than getting a decisive result. Prinz Eugen had torpedoes, and was preparing to fire them. If Holland had been simply doing it to get "a decisive result" he would've stood off further than he did before Hood went down.
Better examples are probably in the Med, when The British ships closed on Pola and beat her to bits
The Kirishima/Bismarck example is worthless.

  • Kirishima is tin foil compared to Bismarck or South Dakota. An 8" belt is honestly pathetic - it's even pathetic for a WW1 battleship! Claiming that was "armored to the best British understandings" is prima facie absurd.
  • Kirishima scored a single 14" hit against South Dakota, against the 17" barbette. So, yes, I guess 100% of 14" hits skipping off is a large percentage. It doesn't make it meaningful though.
  • Bismarck was well protected against close-range fire because of a) the turtledeck; b) a thick external belt and interestingly c) geometry. By which I mean that, given Bismarck's condition (slightly lower in the water from bow, stern and citadel flooding) and the sea conditions (Force 8), some flat trajectories that would result in a main-belt hit would be blocked by waves, causing the shell to ricochet, possibly into the superstructure.

Nevertheless, given how quickly Bismarck was disabled by these "ineffective" shells, I don't think the example quite makes the point that you would like it to do. ;)
Indeed, Kirishima being built as a battlecruiser , and still being a battlecruiser post rebuild (The Japanese can say what they want, but she's a battlecruiser) against one of the most heavily armoured battleships afloat, over 20 years more modern.
Bismarck's armour was excellent, if outdated, but the likes of electronics, fire control, and the delicacy of the latter meant that despite her thick armour, she was still very vulnerable to enemy fire.
So while the British ships weren't going to penetrate her armour at close range, which was specifically what it was designed to protect against, any major hots to the superstructure, or indeed the turrets, due to shock damage, could put Bismarck out of the fight very quickly.
Kirishima can pretty much take any large caliber shell and it could be fatal. However, quite like the likes or Tiger and Lion at Jutland , Kirishima took one hell of a beating.
South Dakota is a better comparison to Bismarck. Neither foe could punch through either ships belt, but still put them out of the fight by hitting the fire control/radar/electronics.
Because I don't like the Hood
Me and you going to fight in a field.
 

hipper

Banned
Skipped off the after turret, non-penetrating. So what? Those were estimates.

Already explained about what SHW shells were supposed to do. Shock transmitted as well as drill.

It’s Quite easy to tell if you’ve been hit by a 14inch Shell as any holes tend to be more than 14 inches, either way you can’t say anything about the Quality of Japanese 14” shells because we only have one data point! It’s not a valid sample.

The theory about shock effects against armour vanished with 15 inch Rhodmans during the ACW
Three things matter in Shell design
Velocity which gives you penetration
Explosive content which causes damage.
Pointyness of the Shell which determines its best angle of penetration

Heavy shells slow down less and are faster at long ranges

American Shells were Heavy and Blunt meaning they had there best effect at long range at high angles of inclination
German Shella were fast and pointy meaning they were optimised for short range
British shells were designed to explode.

So if the USN were designing their shells for effect at less than 10 km they made a very poor job of it. I think they were shooting for longer ranges.
 
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hipper

Banned
That was more Holland trying to get Hood into her immunity zone, than getting a decisive result. Prinz Eugen had torpedoes, and was preparing to fire them. If Holland had been simply doing it to get "a decisive result" he would've stood off further than he did before Hood went down.
Better examples are probably in the Med, when The British ships closed on Pola and beat her to bits

Indeed, Kirishima being built as a battlecruiser , and still being a battlecruiser post rebuild (The Japanese can say what they want, but she's a battlecruiser) against one of the most heavily armoured battleships afloat, over 20 years more modern.
Bismarck's armour was excellent, if outdated, but the likes of electronics, fire control, and the delicacy of the latter meant that despite her thick armour, she was still very vulnerable to enemy fire.
So while the British ships weren't going to penetrate her armour at close range, which was specifically what it was designed to protect against, any major hots to the superstructure, or indeed the turrets, due to shock damage, could put Bismarck out of the fight very quickly.
Kirishima can pretty much take any large caliber shell and it could be fatal. However, quite like the likes or Tiger and Lion at Jutland , Kirishima took one hell of a beating.
South Dakota is a better comparison to Bismarck. Neither foe could punch through either ships belt, but still put them out of the fight by hitting the fire control/radar/electronics.

Me and you going to fight in a field.

Fighting instruction said fight at less than 16000 yards which is the range Holland turned to open up his rear arcs
 
Just for everyone's information, the source for British decisive battle range being 12-16 k yards is ADM 1/9387 from 1935, so we can put to bed this crazy idea that the RN favoured long-range, plunging fire.

4. Decisive actions only occur when both sides either wish to fight or when one or other cannot avoid action, in which case “fighting power” and not speed is the ultimate requirement. The decision may well depend finally on the morale and striking power of our fleet at short range; a range should therefore be chose which gives morale the greatest opportunity, where the rate of hitting is high and the factor of luck low, where the enemy (through short time of flight and large danger space) is least able to avoid punishment, but where our own ships are not liable to destruction by magazine explosions – by the lucky hit.

5. When the battle reaches this stage, air spotting and the primary control positions, with many of the refinements of fire control, may well be out of action, having, it is to be hoped, contributed to gaining an ascendency during the earlier stages. Although air spotting can give effective hitting and perhaps even a decision, for the final destruction of the enemy we must be prepared to close to a range where direct spotting is possible in the confusion and smoke of battle, and where hits can be assured.

6. For these reasons, action ranges of 12,000 to 16,000 yards must be provided for in spite of the advance in air spotting and fire control, and the design of the modern and reconstructed ships permit them to fight at these approximate ranges against 14-inch fire.

This paper also explicitly makes reference to the concept of ranges at which the armour was expected to protect the vitals, demonstrating that the concept of shells vs. armour was meaningful and relevant to our understanding of WW2 battleship design and use.

Edit - Sorry Hipper, just noticed that you've already posted ADM 1/9387!
 
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Without wishing to resurrect the dead, can I also point out that the gunnery of HMS Duke of York, in the teeth of a Force 10 gale in the Arctic Night was exceptionally good. Her first salvo at 11,000 yards wrecked the forward turret of Scharnhorst, and the deciding salvo was fired at and hit at 18,000-21,500 yards, with Duke of York doing about 26-27 knots and Scharnhorst opening the range at 31 knots. It penetrated the starboard belt and wrecked the No.1 boiler room. Nonetheless, I would not consider this plunging fire in the conventional sense as the fall of shot would only have been roughly 18° above the horizontal.
 
Without wishing to resurrect the dead, can I also point out that the gunnery of HMS Duke of York, in the teeth of a Force 10 gale in the Arctic Night was exceptionally good. Her first salvo at 11,000 yards wrecked the forward turret of Scharnhorst, and the deciding salvo was fired at and hit at 18,000-21,500 yards, with Duke of York doing about 26-27 knots and Scharnhorst opening the range at 31 knots. It penetrated the starboard belt and wrecked the No.1 boiler room. Nonetheless, I would not consider this plunging fire in the conventional sense as the fall of shot would only have been roughly 18° above the horizontal.
IIRC Duke of York also had problems with her gun turrets, the gunnery officer eventually gave up the normal routine of firing and went to firing whatever tubes were ready. As soon as he had four or five ready he would shoot, thus we find that the guns of the twin B turret fired around seventy rounds apiece, they were the most reliable. To the Scharnhorst it made no difference, all they knew was that they were being regularly straddled and hit.
 
It penetrated the starboard belt and wrecked the No.1 boiler room. Nonetheless, I would not consider this plunging fire in the conventional sense as the fall of shot would only have been roughly 18° above the horizontal.

There's a lot of uncertainty about the critical damage to Scharnhorst. For example, some say that Scharnhorst's orientation at the time would have made it almost impossible for DoY to hit her belt, let alone penetrate it.

And yet, something happened. DoY claimed to have observed a hit aft on Scharnhorst just before she slowed, with survivors reported a considerable impact at that time. Others report a loss of steam to the turbines, without being clear as to why this happened. It may be that the hit aft exploded on the turtle deck, damaging boiler uptakes and forcing the shutdown of boilers and loss of speed similar to that inflict upon Cesare by Warspite, and/or caused steam lines to rupture via shock.
 
There's a lot of uncertainty about the critical damage to Scharnhorst. For example, some say that Scharnhorst's orientation at the time would have made it almost impossible for DoY to hit her belt, let alone penetrate it.

And yet, something happened. DoY claimed to have observed a hit aft on Scharnhorst just before she slowed, with survivors reported a considerable impact at that time. Others report a loss of steam to the turbines, without being clear as to why this happened. It may be that the hit aft exploded on the turtle deck, damaging boiler uptakes and forcing the shutdown of boilers and loss of speed similar to that inflict upon Cesare by Warspite, and/or caused steam lines to rupture via shock.

What I think can't be debated is that DoY's long-range salvo brought Scharnhorst down to about 8 knots, but then the damage control succeeded in repairing some damage to bring sufficient propulsion online to make over 20 knots. And of course, Warspite, 26,000 yards, BL 15-inch 42-calibre Mark I. That's hellishly good gunnery, but the hideous conditions of North Cape send shivers up the spine.
 
What I think can't be debated is that DoY's long-range salvo brought Scharnhorst down to about 8 knots, but then the damage control succeeded in repairing some damage to bring sufficient propulsion online to make over 20 knots. And of course, Warspite, 26,000 yards, BL 15-inch 42-calibre Mark I. That's hellishly good gunnery, but the hideous conditions of North Cape send shivers up the spine.

USS Richmond scoring at around 20,000 yards at the Battle of the Komandorski Islands is pretty impressive.
 
USS Richmond scoring at around 20,000 yards at the Battle of the Komandorski Islands is pretty impressive.

Daylight calm surface engagement without a carrier-fighter saturated environment precluding the operation of spotters... I suppose a 6" cruiser doing that is somewhat impressive, though Richmond straddled Nachi at that range with her 3rd salvo, her opponent had already straddled her with salvoes 2 and 3 at about the same range, and Salt Lake City straddled Nachi at about 21,000 yards. At North Cape, the same range, Arctic Night, no aviation at all possible due to Force 10 gale though...
 
IIRC it's really quite tricky to spot 6" fall of shot by 20k yards, so getting on target quickly at that range is a very respectable achievement. Did they have spotter planes though?
 
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