AHC: Berlin by Christmas 1944

Deleted member 1487

As noted, the Germans had stockpiles sufficient to meet the needs engendered by the disruption and the losses USAAF could expect would've resulted in a six month hiatus (September-February) of daylight bombing. As for escorts:
Right, so from August on they could have launched escorted raids throughout the Rheinland, Northwest Germany, and a pretty important part of the German tank industry:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germa...ocation_of_German_tank_manufacturing_industry
The tank manufacturing industry in Germany was not concentrated in any one geographic location. Major plants were located in Nurnberg, Kassel, Brunswick, Magdeburg, and Berlin. There was, however, some geographical concentration of tank component manufacturers, such as engines and gears in Friedrichshafen, hulls, turrets, and guns in the Ruhr, rubber treads in Hanover, and instruments in Berlin. These locations, if interdicted, represented a potential choke point to German tank manufacturing.
Nurnberg and Magdeburg were escortable in November, along with parts of Berlin.

And Uboats:
industries_chart.gif


Vast majority of the Reich is free of bombing if they give up unescorted raids, and even the Ruhr is only available to some extent from August onwards. Incidentally, limiting raids to areas where escorts could be provided means the overwhelming majority of the Reich's POL is also free from attack.
Right, because the majority of production was outside of Germany in Ploesti, Austria, and parts of Southern Poland. There were a large amount of refineries in and around the Ruhr area though:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_campaign_targets_of_World_War_II

Leuna can be reached with escort in late 1943 based on your chart.

Refineries
 
Possible from the West only if Market Garden went perfectly and the tank advance across the North German Plain got a lot of breaks. It's 320 miles from Arnhem to Berlin. It's certainly possible in theory to cover that distance in 3 months. The problems as I see them are you're going to see a lot of attacks on the flanks of such an attack and the capture of Berlin turned out to be an awfully bloody affair. Possible you get to the outskirts of Berlin but don't capture it. Or perhaps you capture a bombed out hulk after extensive strategic bombing but the Germans are still fighting in the south and east of Berlin, not yet defeated. Perhaps this leads to the Germans winding up actually fighting from an "Alpine Redoubt". The point is that a dash across the North German Plain into Berlin doesn't necessarily mean the Germans are quite defeated yet. It is as far from Berlin to Warsaw as it is from Arnhem to Berlin or Berlin to Munich, which leaves a lot of territory uncaptured. The German forces would have to collapse (possible for logistical reasons) or there would have to be a German decision to surrender (unlikely).
 
Right, so from August on they could have launched escorted raids throughout the Rheinland, Northwest Germany, and a pretty important part of the German tank industry:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germa...ocation_of_German_tank_manufacturing_industry

Nurnberg and Magdeburg were escortable in November, along with parts of Berlin.

Which means the overall majority of German war industry goes unmolested, and the Germans also get the added benefit of being able to focus their defenses into one area; that Hanover and Kassel are at the extreme limits of escort range means attacking them will rapidly become a bloodbath for the 8th.

And Uboats:

60% of the ship yards, 75% of the engines, all of the periscope, and 50% of the battery production remain out of range. I think I should also note at this point that the direct effect of strategic bombing with regards to German production was only about 2% even in 1944.

Right, because the majority of production was outside of Germany in Ploesti, Austria, and parts of Southern Poland. There were a large amount of refineries in and around the Ruhr area though:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_campaign_targets_of_World_War_II

Leuna can be reached with escort in late 1943 based on your chart.

Only about 20% of Germany's gasoline (Lubricants and Oil even less) needs were sourced from Germany itself and given escorted raids are fairly limited until the P-51s get on scene, overall impact is negligible, especially given the fact the Germans can begin shifting production in these affected regions elsewhere. On the whole, the Germans get increased war material in exchange for some slight disruptions to their POL output. A lack of Regensburg, for example, means a 1,000 extra fighters for 1944 and an earlier introduction of the Me-262.
 
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Possible strategy:

1. Fire Monty.
2. Cancel Dragoon.
3. Swap Clark with Patton in Italy.
4. Push on Bologna by 01 September 1944 (OTL was taken early 1945).
5. Cross the Po, send the Brazilians and 92nd west to take Milan and start hammering Southern France.
6. Paratroopers to take Brenner Pass *and hold it* along with every other major non-Swiss pass they can along the Alps.
7. Coordinate with the Russians then take Austria, Czech/Bohemia, and Saxony - this also cuts off Axis forces in the Balkans.
8. Leave Munich and Bavaria alone unless absolutely necessary and keep the bombs coming.
9. Russians should not delay at the Vistula, they *need* to keep pushing West.
10. Set up for taking Russians taking Berlin late in 1944, probably around Christmas if all goes largely well.
 
With a Pod of June 6, 1944, without resorting to something like operation Valkyrie succeeding and triggering a German civil war, how could the Soviets and the Western Allies take Berlin by Dec 25, 1944?

Use Bomber Command and 8th AF to support the manouver forces after the breakout from Normandy. Ie. bombers fly supplies to advancing forces. Whether gliders, parachuted supplies, just flying to captured airfields... Their supply capacity will be enough to make the advance even more dramatic than OTL.

Make a do-or-die effort to capture Antwerpen using land, airborne and ground approaches simultaneously.
 

Deleted member 1487

Which means the overall majority of German war industry goes unmolested, and the Germans also get the added benefit of being able to focus their defenses into one area; that Hanover and Kassel are at the extreme limits of escort range means attacking them will rapidly become a bloodbath for the 8th.
The majority of German war industry was already going unattacked in 1943 anyway, but what was being hit was causing problems and the RAF still needed to be defended against, while France and the Lowlands needed to be defended as well...which already absorbed 75% of German single engine fighters by May 1943.
Focusing resources was not really that possible for the Luftwaffe in mid-1943, while as it was the USAAF was not doing many unescorted missions deep into Germany anyway.

60% of the ship yards, 75% of the engines, all of the periscope, and 50% of the battery production remain out of range. I think I should also note at this point that the direct effect of strategic bombing with regards to German production was only about 2% even in 1944.
As of August, but by November the vast majority is in range. So until November focus on what can be hit except for say some major raids on ball bearings.

I think I should also note at this point that the direct effect of strategic bombing with regards to German production was only about 2% even in 1944.
Pardon? Where are you getting that number?

Only about 20% of Germany's gasoline (Lubricants and Oil even less) needs were sourced from Germany itself and given escorted raids are fairly limited until the P-51s get on scene, overall impact is negligible, especially given the fact the Germans can begin shifting production in these affected regions elsewhere. On the whole, the Germans get increased war material in exchange for some slight disruptions to their POL output. A lack of Regensburg, for example, means a 1,000 extra fighters for 1944 and an earlier introduction of the Me-262.
You mean of actual earth pumped oil? Ok, sure, but that can't include synthetic oil or refineries. There are many important refineries within range in mid-1943 and many more as of November. Of course that leaves out the really important bombing objective: the electrical grid, which for the Ruhr was in the Ruhr and escortable as of August 1943.
 
The majority of German war industry was already going unattacked in 1943 anyway, but what was being hit was causing problems

Here they are going even less damaged and its important to note production continued to increase into 1944.

and the RAF still needed to be defended against, while France and the Lowlands needed to be defended as well...which already absorbed 75% of German single engine fighters by May 1943. Focusing resources was not really that possible for the Luftwaffe in mid-1943, while as it was the USAAF was not doing many unescorted missions deep into Germany anyway.

Which the Germans were already adequately managing to do given they were able to force the bomber halt in October and it's not like the majority of their fighter force could be used for night ops anyway; concentrating elements of their fighters into the attack zone of the Americans is obvious and certainly well within their capabilities, given the area of attack is much smaller than the Reich as a whole and significant forces are freed up.

As of August, but by November the vast majority is in range. So until November focus on what can be hit except for say some major raids on ball bearings.

They only managed to conduct two raids before a nearly six month halt was ordered due to the fact the loss ratio they were suffering would've meant the need to replace the 8th roughly every three months. I also need to point out that Lightnings and P-51s will need time to get dispersed into units and in sufficient numbers to allow for such a wide ranging campaign.

Pardon? Where are you getting that number?

USSBS. Direct effects of bombing, damage and cleanup, only accounted for about 2-3% of lost production. Indirect effects were much higher, however.

You mean of actual earth pumped oil? Ok, sure, but that can't include synthetic oil or refineries. There are many important refineries within range in mid-1943 and many more as of November.

According to my source, the majority of the Reich's production of POL was outside the Reich itself (Presumably they mean 1937 borders):

cp8HViXf_o.png


Of course that leaves out the really important bombing objective: the electrical grid, which for the Ruhr was in the Ruhr and escortable as of August 1943.

Which only makes sense as a target with the benefit of hindsight. USSBS makes it clear they didn't realize how vulnerable the electrical system was until Post-War analysis and interviews revealed such, despite having cracked the German codes for sometime and having extensive aerial reconnaissance.
 
... Which only makes sense as a target with the benefit of hindsight. USSBS makes it clear they didn't realize how vulnerable the electrical system was until Post-War analysis and interviews revealed such, despite having cracked the German codes for sometime and having extensive aerial reconnaissance.

I wonder if the Germans realized the vulnerability.
 
They did; Speer was greatly concerned over the vulnerability and the Post-War interviews with him surprised the Allies given they had assumed the German electrical network was fairly robust.

Well yes Speer agreed with the USSBS, its part of the yes your are right, please don't hang me, strategy.

There really is not a magic bullet with 40s air power, like most other things in WW2 it is attritional. What the allies were hitting was transportation net in general terms ( which is one reason Portal was relaxed about targeting, he was unconvinced any specific target existed that could be permanently destroyed but just about any target selected damaged the transport net collaterally. The Germans would react creatively and concentrate defences which as a minimum would prevent accurate bombing.

Escort fighters are a bit of a distraction. The issue is the effect on the Luftwaffe of being forced to fight continually, it does not have the infrastructure to fight a sustained campaign even with non combat losses. By Jan 44 ( i.e. before lots of long range escorts) the LW fighter arm had a life expectancy of around 4-6 weeks over Germany. Add in the escorts and things just go from catastrophic to cataclysmic.
 
With a Pod of June 6, 1944, without resorting to something like operation Valkyrie succeeding and triggering a German civil war, how could the Soviets and the Western Allies take Berlin by Dec 25, 1944?

Getting back to the OP

Maybe a May Normandy landing?
Cancelling Anzio?
Combined with leaving a holding force on the Winter Line and using units wasted in Italy for Dragon/Overlord - well, France.
As mentioned - capture of Scheldt Estuary and being able to use Antwerp several weeks sooner?
Plugging the gap at Falaise and destroying 5th PzArmy?

Thinking this through further I'm less convinced its practical. Even a perfect storm of items like the above still does not get around fundamentals. While the Allies can improve their situation with this choice or that the culmative effect does not look like enough. To create a really favorable strategic situation in the second half of 1944 it looks like you have to reach back to at least 1943

Well, if we're looking at an earlier war PoD there's a number of things that could do it. History Learner already mentioned a better Soviet performance at Stalingrad and Wiking a 1943 landing in France. As Wiking also mentioned, a better focused strategic bombing campaign in 1943 against the right targets could have done more damage to German industry sooner. Then we get the early-war PoDs like Germany doing poorer (or the Soviets better) in Barbarossa, France not falling, or a myriad of other things which could see the war end anywhere between 1942 and mid-1944 depending on the exact PoD and the details on what follows afterward.

Another possibility which occurred in the January-June 1944 time frame is thwarting the break out of Hube's 1st Panzer Army during the Kamenets-Podosly Operation. Historically, Zhukov and Konev believed that Hube would attempt his breakout to the south and organized their forces accordingly, even after the breakout had already begun. Had they recognized this error then they could have blocked the breakout attempt or at least chopped it up badly enough that 1st Panzer Army would have been incapable of any large-scale operations, offensive or defensive (as it was, it was only rendered unfit for large-scale offensive operations and thus was immediately re-utilized in a defensive role). That's 200,000 men that might have been wiped from Army Group South's OOB, which would have been impossible for the Germans to make-up in 1944.
 
Forgive me as my memory is a bit vague on details but some thoughts come to mind, specific to the Western Front. It's hard to imagine the Western front moving much more quickly with Ike in charge, who favored a broad front. However, there might have been a few smaller PODs that could have led to a German collapse in the West.
  • More initial success on the first few days of Normandy, particularly by Monty. If they capture airfields right away, the allied effort would have had better recon and better combat air support.
  • I seem to recall there were a few notable battles where the Germans avoided having their lines broken either due to allied inability to press the attack or botched coordination with artillery/air support
  • While decisive, a more complete victory in the Falaise pocket
Also, although I cant imagine how this could ever play out, having Patton lead the charge on the North German plain (ie Market Garden) might have done this. A focused, faster, more decisive strike by someone like Patton with corresponding resources might have worked. Even beyond the issues with Monty, Eisenhower's preference for a broad front makes this unlikely and figuring in the rest of the logistical issues this seems comparable to landing on the Frisian Islands...

Again, thinking out loud from cloudy memory and all of these are long shots. But the idea is to find a series of events that causes the front to collapse, ie do to Germany in 1944 what Germany did to France in 1940. If this happens and the allies cross the Rhine in September, the Reich would have faced a difficult response as all as everyone preferred to avoid giving ground to the Soviets.

All that said, I am inclined to agree with the others that a landing in 1943 is a better alternative.
 

manav95

Banned
The July 20 plot succeeds and Germany breaks out into civil war between Nazi loyalists and the Reichswehr/non-Nazis. This weakens the Nazi war effort and enables the Allies/Soviets to take out the Germans much faster.
 

Deleted member 1487

According to my source, the majority of the Reich's production of POL was outside the Reich itself (Presumably they mean 1937 borders):

cp8HViXf_o.png
That is only for natural oil production and products, not synthetic production. Romania's output is a dead give away, as Germany never sourced more than 2-3 million tons per year from Romania, while Germany was producing over well over 3 million tons of synthetic oil by 1943 according to Allied reports.
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=78524
An additional 3.8 million barrels were imported overland from European sources (2.8 million barrels came from Romania alone), and another 3.8 million barrels were derived from domestic oil production. The remainder of the total, 9 million barrels, were produced synthetically.


Which only makes sense as a target with the benefit of hindsight. USSBS makes it clear they didn't realize how vulnerable the electrical system was until Post-War analysis and interviews revealed such, despite having cracked the German codes for sometime and having extensive aerial reconnaissance.
Right, but we talking about an alternate history where they recognize the vulnerability and strike it to end the war early.

Well yes Speer agreed with the USSBS, its part of the yes your are right, please don't hang me, strategy.
You have that backwards. The USSBS agreed with Speer's assessment. They didn't give him the report and ask him to agree with it, they were interviewing him before they wrote the report.
 
That is only for natural oil production and products, not synthetic production. Romania's output is a dead give away, as Germany never sourced more than 2-3 million tons per year from Romania, while Germany was producing over well over 3 million tons of synthetic oil by 1943 according to Allied reports.
https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=78524

That's Pre-War figures you're quoting. From further on in that source:

Even before the Russian prospects had come to naught, Romania had developed into Germany’s chief overland supplier of oil. From 2.8 million barrels in 1938, Romania’s exports to Germany increased to 13 million barrels by 1941, a level that was essentially maintained through 1942 and 1943.

I'll also note the top of the page I cited says refining capacity.

Right, but we talking about an alternate history where they recognize the vulnerability and strike it to end the war early.

Indeed, but my point is that there is no justification for such; despite having significant intelligence capacities and overflight recon abilities, they were never able to discern this weakness throughout the entirety of the conflict. I see no realistic means for them to figure this out in an ATL, without some sort of really weird Pre-War PoD as I doubt the NSDAP would be allowing people to inspect the German powergrid.
 

Deleted member 1487

That's Pre-War figures you're quoting. From further on in that source:
Sure, 7 barrels per metric ton, so 13 million barrels=1.8 million tons.

I'll also note the top of the page I cited says refining capacity.
European (i.e. all of Europe) refining output. Crude production and distribution to refineries are separate columns as well.

https://books.google.com/books?id=qCeg7fyWGWIC&pg=PA143&lpg=PA143&dq=1943+synthetic+oil+production&source=bl&ots=fS8nLO7LLJ&sig=po97B_DaWfLFF35XqS6CieBHwlg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwit9vTop9TaAhUSTawKHdiDAfQQ6AEImgEwDA#v=onepage&q=1943 synthetic oil production&f=false
https://panzerworld.com/german-fuel-statistics
Synthetic production is not listed in your chart, just natural oil production and refining.

Indeed, but my point is that there is no justification for such; despite having significant intelligence capacities and overflight recon abilities, they were never able to discern this weakness throughout the entirety of the conflict. I see no realistic means for them to figure this out in an ATL, without some sort of really weird Pre-War PoD as I doubt the NSDAP would be allowing people to inspect the German powergrid.
It seems like they dismissed them pre-war without even devoting significant intel efforts to the electrical grid according to the book "Brute Force".

According to this it was the prime target, but other priorities meant it ended up ignored:
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/29/2001861964/-1/-1/0/T_GRIFFITH_STRATEGIC_ATTACK.PDF
The team systematically analyzed the information available on the German electrical system to establish its value as a potential target. They found that there would be problems in attacking the system, such as destroying the hydroelectric dams, and hitting the small power and transformer stations. Countering these difficulties, however, was the vulnerability and scarcity of the electrical generating equipment. They believed that destroying 50 electrical power plants would eliminate approximately 40 percent of the German electric generating capacity.17 They were confident that despite the small size of the targets (calculated as 500 feet by 300 feet for the entire plant) they would be easy to find in daylight and that “about 17 hits in that area will guarantee destruction of the plant.”18 Because of their belief that electric power was so important to both industry and society, they named the number one priority in AWPD/1 the “disruption of a major portion of the Electric Power System of Germany.”19 Attacking this system would be second only to what the planners called the “intermediate objective of overriding importance”—gaining air superiority.20

......

The target priorities and air strategy of this first air plan were reviewed one year later, in August 1942, when President Roosevelt directed the services to prepare a new plan for the production requirements of aircraft in order to achieve “Air Ascendancy” in 1943.23 In light of this new guidance, the new plan, called AWPD/42, revised the target priority list, displacing electrical power to fourth, preceded by the German air force, submarine construction, and transportation. While in AWPD/1 electric power was ranked second only to the German air force.24 With the shift away from attempting to defeat Germany through air power alone to the need for attaining air superiority in preparation for a land invasion, the new air strategy focused less on affecting civilian morale and war production, and more on the impact of bombing on the fielded military forces of Germany. This put less emphasis on hitting economic targets like electricity and more on traditional military targets such as the transportation system.25

......

Even before the Casablanca conference, however, the targeting assumptions in AWPD/42 received intense scrutiny. The chief criticism of AWPD/42 was leveled by members of the Joint Intelligence Committee who objected to the assumptions involved in the target selection process.27 This questioning led to the creation of an Army Air Force headquarters organization whose sole purpose was to perform an independent analysis of Germany and make target recommendations.28 First known as the Bombing Advisory Committee and later as the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA), this committee was composed of civilian and military personnel instructed by Gen Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, the commander of the Army Air Forces, to analyze the deterioration of the German economy through bombing and determine the “date when deterioration will have progressed to a point to permit a successful invasion of Western Europe.”29 This guidance marks an almost complete reversal from the objective of the initial air plan, which aimed at collapsing civilian morale, to an air strategy that focused on both ground and air forces.

.....


The net result was that, relative to other target systems, electric power did not appear to be a high priority, and in the formal COA report to General Arnold it was ranked thirteenth—eliminating it from any real consideration as a target.40 Arnold forwarded this list to Eighth Air Force headquarters in England and it became, in effect, the target priorities for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) Plan.41

......


There were two main factors that caused both the COA and the EOU to disagree with the ACTS instructors and early air planners that German electric power should be a key target. The belief that the interconnections within the German electrical system would allow power to be transferred and thus reduce the vulnerability of the system was the first element, but more important was the change in air strategy from one of affecting the will of the civilian population to one of support for a land invasion. As a result, the German power system was never systematically attacked during the war.
 
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Sure, 7 barrels per metric ton, so 13 million barrels=1.8 million tons.

For Romanian sources, not including Hungary. As for domestic production:

Even with the addition of the Romanian deliveries, overland oil imports after 1939 could not make up for the loss of overseas shipments. In order to become less dependent on outside sources, the Germans undertook a sizable expansion program of their own meager domestic oil pumping. Before the annexation of Austria in 1938, oil fields in Germany were concentrated in northwestern Germany. After 1938, the Austrian oil fields were available also, and the expansion of crude oil output was chiefly effected there. Primarily as a result of this expansion, Germany’s domestic output of crude oil increased from approximately 3.8 million barrels in 1938 to almost 12 million barrels in 1944.10 Yet the production of domestic crude oil never equaled in any way the levels attained by Germany’s other major supplier of oil, the synthetic fuel plants.

1.8 Million tons of Romanian Oil plus 1.7 million tons by about 1943 = ~3.5 Million tons. Haven't seen an estimate for Hungarian production, so we'll just assume it combined with the Romanian output is 1.7 in 1943.

European (i.e. all of Europe) refining output. Crude production and distribution to refineries are separate columns as well.

https://books.google.com/books?id=qCeg7fyWGWIC&pg=PA143&lpg=PA143&dq=1943+synthetic+oil+production&source=bl&ots=fS8nLO7LLJ&sig=po97B_DaWfLFF35XqS6CieBHwlg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwit9vTop9TaAhUSTawKHdiDAfQQ6AEImgEwDA#v=onepage&q=1943 synthetic oil production&f=false
https://panzerworld.com/german-fuel-statistics
Synthetic production is not listed in your chart, just natural oil production and refining.

Synthetic production is 299,000 monthly, for 3.58 Million in 1943. This means domestic production centered in Austria and Romania/Hungary were essentially equal to synthetic output in 1943, meaning that at least 50% of German POL is outside escorted bomber range for most of 1943. Further, of the synthetic plants, only Schloven, Gelsenberg, and Bottrop are in range up until November, from what I can tell.

It seems like they dismissed them pre-war without even devoting significant intel efforts to the electrical grid according to the book "Brute Force".

Which is kinda what I'm getting at here; they had every reason to assume the German grid was like theirs and thus had no realistic expectations from attacking it.

According to this it was the prime target, but other priorities meant it ended up ignored:
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Dec/29/2001861964/-1/-1/0/T_GRIFFITH_STRATEGIC_ATTACK.PDF

Which adds a lot of confusion to this question, given what USSBS reported.
 
Something to note about the 1943 bombing campaign is that while American strategic bombers took terrible losses, so too did the German fighters who had to intercept them. According to Strategy For Defeat, German fighter losses jumped from hovering around 20% for the first six months of 1943 to 31.2% in July, 36% in August, and peaked at astonishing 41% in October before falling back down to 21% in November with the suspension of the major bombing campaign. Unlike the Americans, though, the Germans weren't able to make good their losses and that attrition "set them up" for the final death blow in early-1944. That raises the possibility that the 1943 Americans bomber forces might have been able to break the Luftwaffe before the Luftwaffe broke the American bomber forces had they kept up their tempos, but I haven't seen anyone sit down and crunch the numbers on that.

Well yes Speer agreed with the USSBS, its part of the yes your are right, please don't hang me, strategy.

While it is true that Speer tried to fluff his reputation with his interrogators, it would be wrong to claim that he always told his interrogators what they wanted to hear. He told the British he didn't consider their mass city bombing campaign effective after all.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Something to note about the 1943 bombing campaign is that while American strategic bombers took terrible losses, so too did the German fighters who had to intercept them. According to Strategy For Defeat, German fighter losses jumped from hovering around 20% for the first six months of 1943 to 31.2% in July, 36% in August, and peaked at astonishing 41% in October before falling back down to 21% in November with the suspension of the major bombing campaign. Unlike the Americans, though, the Germans weren't able to make good their losses and that attrition "set them up" for the final death blow in early-1944. That raises the possibility that the 1943 Americans bomber forces might have been able to break the Luftwaffe before the Luftwaffe broke the American bomber forces had they kept up their tempos, but I haven't seen anyone sit down and crunch the numbers on that.
The major factor was the addition of drop tanks which increased range enough to put most of Germany in range toward the end of 1943. Bombing wasn't suspended, just unescorted raids. Then the weather in the winter of 1943-44 limited air operations for months, which gave the Luftwaffe a stayed execution. I don't think a continuation of unescorted raids would have ground down the Luftwaffe from October 1943 on because of that, but the USAAF wouldn't have been defeated if it had continued without a pause. I think the pause was more for morale than material reasons.
 
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