The team systematically analyzed the information available on the German electrical system to establish its value as a potential target. They found that there would be problems in attacking the system, such as destroying the hydroelectric dams, and hitting the small power and transformer stations. Countering these difficulties, however, was the vulnerability and scarcity of the electrical generating equipment. They believed that destroying 50 electrical power plants would eliminate approximately 40 percent of the German electric generating capacity.17 They were confident that despite the small size of the targets (calculated as 500 feet by 300 feet for the entire plant) they would be easy to find in daylight and that “about 17 hits in that area will guarantee destruction of the plant.”18 Because of their belief that electric power was so important to both industry and society, they named the number one priority in AWPD/1 the “disruption of a major portion of the Electric Power System of Germany.”19 Attacking this system would be second only to what the planners called the “intermediate objective of overriding importance”—gaining air superiority.20
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The target priorities and air strategy of this first air plan were reviewed one year later, in August 1942, when President Roosevelt directed the services to prepare a new plan for the production requirements of aircraft in order to achieve “Air Ascendancy” in 1943.23 In light of this new guidance, the new plan, called AWPD/42, revised the target priority list, displacing electrical power to fourth, preceded by the German air force, submarine construction, and transportation. While in AWPD/1 electric power was ranked second only to the German air force.24 With the shift away from attempting to defeat Germany through air power alone to the need for attaining air superiority in preparation for a land invasion, the new air strategy focused less on affecting civilian morale and war production, and more on the impact of bombing on the fielded military forces of Germany. This put less emphasis on hitting economic targets like electricity and more on traditional military targets such as the transportation system.25
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Even before the Casablanca conference, however, the targeting assumptions in AWPD/42 received intense scrutiny. The chief criticism of AWPD/42 was leveled by members of the Joint Intelligence Committee who objected to the assumptions involved in the target selection process.27 This questioning led to the creation of an Army Air Force headquarters organization whose sole purpose was to perform an independent analysis of Germany and make target recommendations.28 First known as the Bombing Advisory Committee and later as the Committee of Operations Analysts (COA), this committee was composed of civilian and military personnel instructed by Gen Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold, the commander of the Army Air Forces, to analyze the deterioration of the German economy through bombing and determine the “date when deterioration will have progressed to a point to permit a successful invasion of Western Europe.”29 This guidance marks an almost complete reversal from the objective of the initial air plan, which aimed at collapsing civilian morale, to an air strategy that focused on both ground and air forces.
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The net result was that, relative to other target systems, electric power did not appear to be a high priority, and in the formal COA report to General Arnold it was ranked thirteenth—eliminating it from any real consideration as a target.40 Arnold forwarded this list to Eighth Air Force headquarters in England and it became, in effect, the target priorities for the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) Plan.41
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There were two main factors that caused both the COA and the EOU to disagree with the ACTS instructors and early air planners that German electric power should be a key target. The belief that the interconnections within the German electrical system would allow power to be transferred and thus reduce the vulnerability of the system was the first element, but more important was the change in air strategy from one of affecting the will of the civilian population to one of support for a land invasion. As a result, the German power system was never systematically attacked during the war.