AHC: Berlin by Christmas 1944

RousseauX

Donor
With a Pod of June 6, 1944, without resorting to something like operation Valkyrie succeeding and triggering a German civil war, how could the Soviets and the Western Allies take Berlin by Dec 25, 1944?
 
With a Pod of June 6, 1944, without resorting to something like operation Valkyrie succeeding and triggering a German civil war, how could the Soviets and the Western Allies take Berlin by Dec 25, 1944?
Soviets managed to get into Warsaw (or want to), Break to Dukla Pass with support of Slovak Army, which is holding at least Vah Valley, Romanians defect before they are beaten on the border and use their full force against Germans, Hungarian plans to defect work just perfectly too.
In West Market Garden goes by the plan. Germans are fucked even sooner then OTL. Maybe by Christmas 1944.
 
With a Pod of June 6, 1944, without resorting to something like operation Valkyrie succeeding and triggering a German civil war, how could the Soviets and the Western Allies take Berlin by Dec 25, 1944?

6th Panzer gets wrecked by 3rd Guards along the Aksay River, allowing the Soviets to encircle and destroy Army Group A and Army Group Don in addition to 6th Army. Without those forces, the Soviets will reach the Dnieper at Dnepropetrovsk by late February; general frontline along the Dnieper probably by the end of Spring, with Crimea cut off and Kiev exposed. Soviet over-extension and the arrival of II SS Panzer Corps will probably stabilize the situation for some time. You will have effectively moved up IOTL's time table of advance by six months by the Red Army.

EDIT: Missed the 1944 part, so this is a 1942 PoD.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Have the Wallies focus their strategic bombing on the German electrical grid and POL earlier, say 9-12 months earlier. Or do follow ups on the ball bearing factories and Moers dams.
 
Bigger effect than Market Garden getting a bridgehead over the Rhine would be some fundamental changes in Allied logistics August-October. Getting Antwerps port in operation a month earlier would be part of that. Perhaps better decisions or organization in the US Communications Zone command. Perhaps realizing a few weeks sooner of the potential of capturing the near intact south France port group & the trunk railway north through Belfort. The accumulated effect of all that might allow Eisenhowers armies a stronger October/November offensive that breaks the Siegfried line and bounces the Rhine at several locations. The German army has no breathing space in the autumn, morale collapses & the Allies encircle the Ruhr during December & January
 
With a Pod of June 6, 1944, without resorting to something like operation Valkyrie succeeding and triggering a German civil war, how could the Soviets and the Western Allies take Berlin by Dec 25, 1944?

Very difficult. OTL, Berlin fell on 2 May 1945, 330 days after 6 June 1944. 25 December 1944 is 129 days sooner.

I don't see how that much could be gained - bearing in mind that it took time not only to destroy the German army in battle, but to implement all the logistics arrangements required. The Western Allies did astoundingly well at this OTL, leaving very little room for improvement. (In Crusade In Europe, Eisenhower wrote that when he met Soviet officers at the end of war, the one thing they all wanted to know about was how the American and British forces had kept up supply to the leading elements during the great rush across France. It impressed them more than any feat of arms.) As for the Soviets, they did about as well as they could manage, given their own limitations.

Tasks such as getting Antwerp and Marseilles into full operation, or regauging hundreds of km of railroads in Poland, could not be "blitzed".

This is not to say that there was no room for improvement at all - but IMO, 15 February 1945 would be about the earliest possible date.

Maybe if the Slovak rising was more successful, and enabled the Soviets to break through into the Hungarian plain in September 1944...
 
Have the Wallies focus their strategic bombing on the German electrical grid and POL earlier, say 9-12 months earlier. Or do follow ups on the ball bearing factories and Moers dams.

Without a fundamental realization on the weakness of the German electrical grid and earlier escort fighters, I don't think this is possible; in particular, it was reasonably expected the Germans would resist fiercely any attacks on POL targets, which was later proven by the ball bearing raids.
 

RousseauX

Donor
Very difficult. OTL, Berlin fell on 2 May 1945, 330 days after 6 June 1944. 25 December 1944 is 129 days sooner.

I don't see how that much could be gained - bearing in mind that it took time not only to destroy the German army in battle, but to implement all the logistics arrangements required. The Western Allies did astoundingly well at this OTL, leaving very little room for improvement. (In Crusade In Europe, Eisenhower wrote that when he met Soviet officers at the end of war, the one thing they all wanted to know about was how the American and British forces had kept up supply to the leading elements during the great rush across France. It impressed them more than any feat of arms.) As for the Soviets, they did about as well as they could manage, given their own limitations.

Tasks such as getting Antwerp and Marseilles into full operation, or regauging hundreds of km of railroads in Poland, could not be "blitzed".

This is not to say that there was no room for improvement at all - but IMO, 15 February 1945 would be about the earliest possible date.

Maybe if the Slovak rising was more successful, and enabled the Soviets to break through into the Hungarian plain in September 1944...
What if we go back even earlier, with a PoD of say, January 1944 or so?
 

Deleted member 1487

Without a fundamental realization on the weakness of the German electrical grid and earlier escort fighters, I don't think this is possible; in particular, it was reasonably expected the Germans would resist fiercely any attacks on POL targets, which was later proven by the ball bearing raids.
Of course they'd resist hard, but strategic bombing was basically attrition warfare; the Allies used the resources IOTL to grind down the Luftwaffe by forcing them to fight to defend critical economic targets. Thing is if they pick better targets and follow up, the German economy could implode.
 
Of course they'd resist hard, but strategic bombing was basically attrition warfare; the Allies used the resources IOTL to grind down the Luftwaffe by forcing them to fight to defend critical economic targets. Thing is if they pick better targets and follow up, the German economy could implode.

They attempted to do just that with Ball Bearings, hitting first in August and then following up a few weeks later. End result was that, without escorts, the bombers getting slaughtered and the end of daylight strategic bombing over Germany for the most part until the following Spring when the Mustangs showed up.
 
The Soviets probably could have accelerated the Vistula-Oder offensive by approximately two months had they kept the weight of their logistical assets concentrated on the central axis instead of transferring major assets down to the Balkans. However, this still isn’t likely to reach Berlin by Christmas and the Soviets are likely to still pause on the Oder for a few months before making the final assault on Berlin. Such a move would also slow the Soviet advance in Hungary, which Stalin isn’t likely to sanction. Such a move might also convince Hitler to cancel the Ardennes Offensive and use those forces on the defense instead, which would further delay things. So not something that would end the war by Christmas, although it probably would end the war sooner.
 

Deleted member 1487

They attempted to do just that with Ball Bearings, hitting first in August and then following up a few weeks later. End result was that, without escorts, the bombers getting slaughtered and the end of daylight strategic bombing over Germany for the most part until the following Spring when the Mustangs showed up.
They didn't follow up quickly enough (2nd Schweinfurt was 2 months later and did some bad damage, but should have been done at least 1 month earlier) or hard enough; Speer was freaked out that they would follow up more and have caused a major crisis:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schweinfurt–Regensburg_mission#Results_and_losses
Albert Speer reported an immediate 34 percent loss of production,[26] but both the production shortfall and the actual loss of bearings were made up for by extensive surpluses found throughout Germany in the aftermath of the raid. The industry's infrastructure, while vulnerable to a sustained campaign, was not vulnerable to destruction by a single raid. Speer indicated that the two major flaws made by the USAAF in the August strike were first in dividing their force instead of all striking the ball-bearing plants, and second, failing to follow up the first strike with repeated attacks.[27][28][29]
Had they attacked again in September and/or focused more forces on it in the first place they could have done extremely serious economic damage.

Alternatively invading France in 1943, though likely to result in a lot worse casualties to the Wallies, would have resulted in a quicker end to the war.
 

TruthfulPanda

Gone Fishin'
What if we go back even earlier, with a PoD of say, January 1944 or so?
Maybe a May Normandy landing?
Cancelling Anzio?
Combined with leaving a holding force on the Winter Line and using units wasted in Italy for Dragon/Overlord - well, France.
As mentioned - capture of Scheldt Estuary and being able to use Antwerp several weeks sooner?
Plugging the gap at Falaise and destroying 5th PzArmy?

As mentioned - a 1943 landing would be best.
 
Well, if we're looking at an earlier war PoD there's a number of things that could do it. History Learner already mentioned a better Soviet performance at Stalingrad and Wiking a 1943 landing in France. As Wiking also mentioned, a better focused strategic bombing campaign in 1943 against the right targets could have done more damage to German industry sooner. Then we get the early-war PoDs like Germany doing poorer (or the Soviets better) in Barbarossa, France not falling, or a myriad of other things which could see the war end anywhere between 1942 and mid-1944 depending on the exact PoD and the details on what follows afterward.

Another possibility which occurred in the January-June 1944 time frame is thwarting the break out of Hube's 1st Panzer Army during the Kamenets-Podosly Operation. Historically, Zhukov and Konev believed that Hube would attempt his breakout to the south and organized their forces accordingly, even after the breakout had already begun. Had they recognized this error then they could have blocked the breakout attempt or at least chopped it up badly enough that 1st Panzer Army would have been incapable of any large-scale operations, offensive or defensive (as it was, it was only rendered unfit for large-scale offensive operations and thus was immediately re-utilized in a defensive role). That's 200,000 men that might have been wiped from Army Group South's OOB, which would have been impossible for the Germans to make-up in 1944. Whether it'd be enough for subsequent Soviet or WAllied advances to take Berlin is a bit more uncertain.
 
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Maybe a May Normandy landing?
Cancelling Anzio?
Combined with leaving a holding force on the Winter Line and using units wasted in Italy for Dragon/Overlord - well, France.
As mentioned - capture of Scheldt Estuary and being able to use Antwerp several weeks sooner?
Plugging the gap at Falaise and destroying 5th PzArmy?

As mentioned - a 1943 landing would be best.

No sane Allied commander would depend on the Channel being calm enough and weather co-operative enough for a launch in May. The later is especially important, as overwhelming air superiority over the region was a vital part of the planning in terms of preventing a potential German counter-attack while the beacheads were getting established and the logistics to supply the invasion force laid out.

Larger Dragoon is certainly in the cards, and politically viable to boot. Such a move would make the German position in Northern Italy increasingly untenable, liberate more of France, and prevent the Germans from staging a concentrated counter-attack in any one area.
 

nbcman

Donor
No sane Allied commander would depend on the Channel being calm enough and weather co-operative enough for a launch in May. The later is especially important, as overwhelming air superiority over the region was a vital part of the planning in terms of preventing a potential German counter-attack while the beacheads were getting established and the logistics to supply the invasion force laid out.

Larger Dragoon is certainly in the cards, and politically viable to boot. Such a move would make the German position in Northern Italy increasingly untenable, liberate more of France, and prevent the Germans from staging a concentrated counter-attack in any one area.

Couple that with non-stupid General Clark who cuts off significant portions of the German forces instead of taking a Roman holiday, the Allies could be in northern Italy by the late summer. The Italian distraction could weaken the German Western Front forces enough for the Allies to bounce over the Rhine and keep going - if they clear up the port of Antwerp to keep supplies moving. I still don't think there is enough time left in the year to get to Berlin, but it would bring the war to a conclusion faster.
 
No sane Allied commander would depend on the Channel being calm enough and weather co-operative enough for a launch in May.

I guess Morgan & his entire COSSAC staff were insane. The early OVERLORD plans were aimed at a spring invasion. When Eisenhower picked up the plans after his December appointment as commander he was satisfied with the early May target and reluctantly altered the plan in order to increase the size of the assault.
 
They didn't follow up quickly enough (2nd Schweinfurt was 2 months later and did some bad damage, but should have been done at least 1 month earlier) or hard enough; Speer was freaked out that they would follow up more and have caused a major crisis:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schweinfurt–Regensburg_mission#Results_and_losses

Had they attacked again in September and/or focused more forces on it in the first place they could have done extremely serious economic damage.

Given they lost 60 bombers the first try, the delay is entirely understandable. The following efforts in October resulted in the loss of 10% of all bombers and the damage rate, both minor and major, was 42%; completely unacceptable losses. My point was that no amount of follow up or increased numbers will make up for the fact that unescorted bombers in '43 are going to get slaughtered by German defenses.

Add in the fact the Germans had enough of a stockpile to handle the short term disruption, as well as the fact a September raid would've given them an extra month of being free from daylight raids as well as additional resources to restore production (Since the Americans will have given up other targets), and this whole strategy becomes a wash.
 

Deleted member 1487

Given they lost 60 bombers the first try, the delay is entirely understandable. The following efforts in October resulted in the loss of 10% of all bombers and the damage rate, both minor and major, was 42%; completely unacceptable losses. My point was that no amount of follow up or increased numbers will make up for the fact that unescorted bombers in '43 are going to get slaughtered by German defenses.

Add in the fact the Germans had enough of a stockpile to handle the short term disruption, as well as the fact a September raid would've given them an extra month of being free from daylight raids as well as additional resources to restore production (Since the Americans will have given up other targets), and this whole strategy becomes a wash.
A concentrated August raid with a focused September raid would have created huge problems for the Germans and not precluded other missions, just unescorted ones.

If the losses of such a raid would have been too much too quickly, focus on POL in range.
 
A concentrated August raid with a focused September raid would have created huge problems for the Germans and not precluded other missions, just unescorted ones. If the losses of such a raid would have been too much too quickly, focus on POL in range.

As noted, the Germans had stockpiles sufficient to meet the needs engendered by the disruption and the losses USAAF could expect would've resulted in a six month hiatus (September-February) of daylight bombing. As for escorts:

S3AiBhF.jpg


Vast majority of the Reich is free of bombing if they give up unescorted raids, and even the Ruhr is only available to some extent from August onwards. Incidentally, limiting raids to areas where escorts could be provided means the overwhelming majority of the Reich's POL is also free from attack.
 
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