Not very likely, Halifax was too closely associated with Chamberlain and appeasement, Parliament wanted a PM who would prosecute the war more vigorously, which rules out Halifax. And honestly I'm not seeing any new ideas here, just the same suggestions that come up every time this gets discussed.
Not necessarily. He's a member of the Lords, and has to get support of the commons. He might get that as there was a Conservative majority in the commons, but he could never lead a government of national unity. This would greatly weaken the talent pool in government and - more importantly - risk alienating the working classes who have to do most of the heavy lifting at the front and in the factories during a war [1].
I read in one of the Panama Canal threads that ships were inspected before being allowed near the place. Not sure how strict the port authorities were for New York, Boston, Savannah, etc.
Each step could be helpful, though extremely unlikely to be a war winner on its own, but the major barrier is that the German economy in the 1930s was already flat out building weapons, aircraft and pocket battleships, training vast numbers of troops from its cadre of 100,000, building Autobahnen etc.
It's more likely a spot check than a full inspection, but that spot check could be full inspection of a small number of vessels or a limited inspection of most vessels.
In 1940 Labour were willing to serve under Halifax. Also it would have been easy to pass a quick law allowing him to at least speak in the Commons.
Britannica.com and other credible sources have Halifax declining Chamberlain's nomination as next prime minister, because he doubted his abilities as a war leader and his ability to lead from the Lords.
The problem is getting close enough for the bomb to do damage. The depth quickly goes from 70 feet deep to 20 feet. A sub couldn't stay submerged and get close to Brooklyn, much less Manhattan.
Here's the damage radius for at 20kt surface blast at the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge.
Appreciate very much the courtesy of a response. I am not sure it is as slam dunk as presented by you.
The primary source of German oil (as well as foodstuffs) is Romania. The Romanians have no replacement customers if it did not export to Germany, and Danube barge traffic is relatively secure. I do not envy the position of the Romanians in the OTL. They were indispensable to the German war effort and were rewarded by Hitler with having a quarter of her territory stripped and given to Hungary, whose contribution to the Axis was far less. Russian supply of oil was considerably less in 1939-40, but still important. The Germans will quickly capture the oil fields in Eastern Poland, and if the Red Army pulls back as you postulate, in Western Ukraine.
The best the British and French managed in the breathing down the neck department was the Phony War. Army Group C is quite capable of handling that. There is no evidence the Western Allies in 1940 had any offensive plans other than advancing to meet any German invasion of Belgium.
Not sure this is specific enough to comment. As far as total manpower, the Germans are better off - casualties in Norway, France, and Balkans have not been sustained; the occupation requirements do not exist; and there is no Afrika Korps commitment. On the other hand the amount of trained and experienced manpower is significantly less.
I am not sure the campaigns in the West are the right kind of experience for combat in Russia. The quality of intelligence available to the Germans was much higher, road networks, storage facilities for petrol and other supplies were well-known, and were calculated into sustaining a high tempo of operations. The USSR proved to be a much different and more difficult battlefield.
In the OTL, Stalin adopted the tactic of trading space for operational and tactical advantage only after being forced to by German successes. I believe the initial Soviet response will be to launch heavy counterattacks to eject the invaders from Mother Russia. Moreover, in the OTL, hundreds of thousands of Russian troops surrendered under the very mistaken belief that living in German captivity was preferable to fighting for Communism. I doubt the Soviet conscript in May 1940 would act much differently until educated in the same manner by the Nazis.
True, it is far better that Chamberlain resigns than Churchill. While Chamberlain was ill, he did not fully know it. He accepted the post of Lord President of Council and was one of the five member War Cabinet after his resignation. He presided over each meeting until laid low in July 1940 when bowell cancer was diagnosed, but returned in August for about a month before resigning on 22 September 1940, seven weeks before dying. On this OTL basis, if he were still PM, negotiating peace is his dying hurrah.
He probably escapes blame for the same reason he did OTL, because everyone in parliament bent over backwards to avoid blaming him. If you read up on the Norway debate even when Churchill tried to take a share of the blame MPs, on both sides of the floor, basically refused to let him. Norway was a disaster, but it can be spun as the consequence of Chamberlain being too timid rather than Churchill being too bold if one was so inclined to let Churchill off the hook.
About half the Panzers in 1940 were Panzer 2, so not great in Russia, though probably good enough AT capability for the BT and T26. OTL something like 80,000 vehicles were captured from the British, and others captured from France, plus a whole load of weapons and guns. To balance this, there would have been fewer combat losses. It would be interesting to know the net gain from Battle of France (captured - lost in combat).
Yeah the Nazis were only able to make the Wehrmacht remotely competitive by a ruinous level of military spending and Hitler was so determined to go to war in 1939 because he was acutely aware that at some point in 1940 British and French rearmament would overtake Germany's despite those nations spending a much lower fraction of GDP on the military. I think people tend to overestimate the size and capability of German industry in the 1930s and 40s based on its post-war performance.
I don't think we can handwave Romanian participation in the Axis though. King Carol II was seeking a neutral foreign policy in 1940 and came to an understanding with the Allies. He was only forced to reorient after the collapse of the French in 1940 and the withdrawal of the British from the continent. With an Allied bloc remaining intact, I can see Romania maintaining neutrality and sovereign control over the oil supply. Which means the Germans will have to purchase it conditionally rather than appropriating almost all surplus for their war effort. The Germans also then cannot afford to seize it because that means war with the western powers which means defeat. Either way, lose untapped control of Ploesti as well as the advantageous border positions that the Romanians offered for Barbarossa.
That is fair, but I would counter by saying that I also don't think we can just assume that the Phony War would be a general phenomenon. It was produced by the specific anxieties and context of 1939-1940. After Poland fell, the full weight of the German Army was available to put to new operations. British and French commanders did not have an ally to 'relieve' and so felt safe in letting the Germans throw themselves against the fortifications. If we assume an Allied intervention in an East First scenario, I think we could see a more offensive minded plan. Especially as the war can start on Allied terms and is formulated specifically as a way to relieve the Soviet Union. Allied intelligence can study the war in the east and develop doctrine accordingly as well. We also should not discount the diplomatic plays being made for nations like Norway and Sweden here. The German control over Swedish iron ore could be considerably weakened should the Allies press the issue. Yugoslavia could also sign on with the Allies, especially if tensions with Hungary flare up. Even the Italians could be presented the chance to go with the Allies, which I believe would be tempting. Diplomatically, going east in 1940 would be disastrous and set them up for failure in my opinion.
Surely this is true, but I'm failing to see how a more methodical approach is supposed to help the Germans here. 1941 was a smashing success for the Wehrmacht exactly because it applied the doctrines from the western campaigns eastwards. Multiple massive encirclements and a feverish pace drove the USSR back on its heels. I agree with you that ultimately it led to unrealizable goals (A-A line was impossible in 1941) and fatal overconfidence, but ultimately a go-slow strategy is not an option. The German bloc could not win a slugging match with the USSR, and the entire premise of Barbarossa was that "the whole rotten structure would collapse". If it wasn't eliminated in a year, there was going to be serious trouble.
Soviet strategy will absolutely be immediate counterattacks. And I'm willing to bet some Soviet conscripts would act very much in the same manner. The thing is though that Soviet counterattacks and low morale were not the primary reason for the encirclements, it was the German pace and combat efficacy. If we take a much slower German pace with less resources and less combat experience, not to mention weaker starting positions because they can't use Bessarabia, then I am just not seeing how we still can even replicate OTL's success, let alone a Soviet collapse. If the Germans go slow and methodical, it will be their death. The Soviets can mobilize in an orderly fashion, move even more industry east in time, and learn from the front without such a rapid pace that caused the OTL paralysis. Lacking the trucks looted from France is also very decisive, and will stall German logistics very quickly. This topic has been discussed on this forum before, and it elaborates more on what I'm arguing here - especially in terms of resources. @ObssesedNuker sums it up quite well. It just is not feasible.
