AHC Austria wins the Franco-Austrian War

Is there any realistic way the Hapsburgs could have won the 1859 was with Napoleon III?

They of course could have beaten Sardinia (or Piedmont or Savoy) if France had stayed out. And if Prussia had joined Austria then France probably would have lost, as was explored in another thread.

But could Austria have prevailed against France on its own? I get the impression that historically the Hapsburgs fielded a competent but mediocre military establishment. The only war where they did the bulk of the fighting against France (this excludes 1813-5) that they won was the War of the Spanish Succession,where they had their one really good military commander and the British to help them. They even lost the portion of the War of Austrian Succession fought against the French -they lost the Austrian Netherlands and got it back on the peace table.
 

Redbeard

Banned
In general I think the Habsburg Empire is grossly underestimated, mainly because they for almost 100 years haven't had any historians/writers to advocate their "national" cause. Before that they lost the battle over the German soul to the Prussians in mid 19th century, a process in which not at least Prussian historians had an obvious interest in ignoring or minimising any Habsburg contribution. For all the enthusiastic (and nationalistic) scholars of the 19th century the Austrians represented the old anti-nationalistic world which couldn't be attributed any recognition or even less admiration.

I haven't especially studied the Franco-Austrian War, but you get very different impressions of the Austrian contribution to say the Leipzig Campaign of 1813 if you study accounts from before or after 1850. Our present day English language accounts are mainly based on late 19th century (Prussian) accounts.

In other words I'm very sceptical towards the image of the Habsburg military of being mediocre or lacklustre. On the contrary the Austrians for centuries raised armies to be where the going was most tough. Where other "nations" could survive on being a nation, the Habsburg couldn't however - they were not a nation and didn't want to become one. Instead they had to count on the army as the spine of the Empire - as long as the army was largely intact the Empire was too. That actually was so until October 1918, when the army disgracefully vaporised as the generals first left their posts and the soldiers followed. The Empire went down the drain shortly afterwards.

But back to the Franco-Austrian war I think there might be a PoD if the Austrians instead of waiting 3 days for a Sardinian answer to their ultimatum attack immediately and defeat the Sardinians before the French can arrive and help them. That might be the drop that has the German Union (formally Austrian allies/subjects) approach the Austrian cause enough to force the French to detach considerable forces on the border to Germany. I believe the Austrians had hoped for the Union and the Prussians joining the war. If that happens the French will be in trouble but by 1859 the Prussians probably had no interest in promoting any Austrian cause.

BTW as a little curious extra, one of my old friends had a forefather who fought as a volunteer in the Austrian army in the campaign (as an Ulan/Lancer officer). He of course died long before any of us were born, but his accounts in letters or as told through the generations were nothing short of enthusiastic about the Habsburg Empire and its army. He actually saw the Empire as a cause in contrast to the prevailing nationalism and as a way to have nations/cultures live peacefully together - under the just rule of the Emperor (he wasn't much of a democrat). Such a single account of course doesn't paint an entire image, but to me it was initially a surprise that the "imperial model" had such eloquent and enthusiastic advocates then.
 
@Redbeard very interesting account!
Sorry if I am being toon forward, but maybe you could post some excerpts of your forefathers letters here (or in the Chat/Writer sections so they remain more private). Some have already done ithe with similar accounts from veterans in theIreland families and have found a very interested audience here.

As to the war, the best way is not to play, it is possible that Sardinia could have become desperate and attacked first (Garibaldi seems a reasonable culprit for this) thus jeopardising the French alliance.

Absent that, a quicker and more decisive attack on the Sardinia army staging grounds could have had devastating effects. You need to replace Gyulai with someone more competent, but who could be? Austria needed a Schwarzenberg or at least a Radetzky for that campaign...
 
Whoever I can agree with the general sentiment that Austrians decline is overstated, it was, nonetheless, a decline: from the 30 Years War onwards, and especially after the 7 Years War, Austria strikes me as fighting a futile rear guard action to reclaim what had been lost, rather than innovating and reinvigorating what she had lwft. Moreover her annexation of Venice following the Congress of Vienna and the Metternich reaction in general can only be derided as counterproductive and futile, not to mention contrary to our ideals of equality and self determination; had the Habsburgs possessed the vision to split their empire Charles the V style they could have created a Habsburg Mittleuropa, yet she attempted to maintain her chimeric state beyond their ability to hold together. Austrias ejection from Germany is ultimately her own doing; the Nationalists did in fact offer her the crown, yet she refused, out of fear for her non German territories....

I would not write off the Italians, in any case. Even if unification is not inevitable (and it most certainly is not) Austria will need to undergo sweeping reforms to fend off the tide of nationalism, and neither France nor the Italians are going to give up after a single defeat- after all, 1848 did not render Italian unification impossible, now did it?
 

Redbeard

Banned
@Redbeard very interesting account!
Sorry if I am being toon forward, but maybe you could post some excerpts of your forefathers letters here (or in the Chat/Writer sections so they remain more private). Some have already done ithe with similar accounts from veterans in theIreland families and have found a very interested audience here.

As to the war, the best way is not to play, it is possible that Sardinia could have become desperate and attacked first (Garibaldi seems a reasonable culprit for this) thus jeopardising the French alliance.

Absent that, a quicker and more decisive attack on the Sardinia army staging grounds could have had devastating effects. You need to replace Gyulai with someone more competent, but who could be? Austria needed a Schwarzenberg or at least a Radetzky for that campaign...

It wasn't my forefather, but that of a friend. I can of course ask him if he is willing to share/publish letters etc., but AFAIK he might only have some. It is a very big family and only part of it live her in Denmark, but anyway I recall we had some very interesting conversations (15 years ago now) about the subject when he heard about my keen interest in the Habsburg Empire.
 

Redbeard

Banned
Whoever I can agree with the general sentiment that Austrians decline is overstated, it was, nonetheless, a decline: from the 30 Years War onwards, and especially after the 7 Years War, Austria strikes me as fighting a futile rear guard action to reclaim what had been lost, rather than innovating and reinvigorating what she had lwft. Moreover her annexation of Venice following the Congress of Vienna and the Metternich reaction in general can only be derided as counterproductive and futile, not to mention contrary to our ideals of equality and self determination; had the Habsburgs possessed the vision to split their empire Charles the V style they could have created a Habsburg Mittleuropa, yet she attempted to maintain her chimeric state beyond their ability to hold together. Austrias ejection from Germany is ultimately her own doing; the Nationalists did in fact offer her the crown, yet she refused, out of fear for her non German territories....

I would not write off the Italians, in any case. Even if unification is not inevitable (and it most certainly is not) Austria will need to undergo sweeping reforms to fend off the tide of nationalism, and neither France nor the Italians are going to give up after a single defeat- after all, 1848 did not render Italian unification impossible, now did it?

I agree. The Habsburgs "climaxed" at about the 30 Years Wars and seen from today it was a futile job to stem the tide (flood) of 19th century nationalism. But I'm still impressed about how long they remained in the saddle, that Empire had a resilience very rarely seen and very little recognised today.

BTW I often can't help seeing the EU as the Habsburgs of today, they fight nationalism/nations - apparently as much in vain, but for much shorter, than the Habsburgs.
 
Meh, that's overstating the EU in my opinion. it's too opaque and undemocratic, as if the Europeans want to have their cake (economic integration to compete as peers with The US, China, India etc.) and eat it (sovereignty). witness the German reaction to the Greek crisis for instance; much like the IMF the EU wants to override democratic particularism in exchange for offering loans, ie creating economic dependence without a corresponding political and social bond, which is the sort of crap that spawns fascist and socialist parties. What we really need is a global federation, where the social contract gives each have nation a fair say in the global economy, but if even Europe can't get its act together I have no hope for e.g. China or the US chaining themselves like that.
 
If the Austrians attack before the French expeditionary corps has arrived, it can be a problem (but not necessarily a disaster: French mobilization was effective and quick, and the use of railways to bring troops to the Piedmont border was very innovative for the times). It would also necessitate a much, much better C-i-C than Giulay (who was obviously well above his level of competence): problem is that there were no suitable candidates, and anyway the top-slots were awarded by seniority and social status (an arch-duke will always trump anyone else for example). Crossing the Ticino and attacking sounds very easy but it is a bit more difficult to put in practice; there is also the non-irrelevant matter of where to attack: in the north, towards Vercelli and Novara where the Sardinian army was grouping or in the south, towards Alessandria where it could be anticipated the French would concentrate (as it happened, Giulay dithered among the two options and in the end decided to follow the suggestion of his subordinates and wait on the eastern side of Ticino)? Certainly a Napoleon (or even a Massena) would not have hesitated, but Giulay was not on that league (incidentally, it is interesting to note that the lack of "outstanding" generals was not a weakness of the Austrians only: the period between Waterloo and Solferino had been substantially peaceful, with the only real wars being Crimea - where non of the generals involved can be accused of brilliance -, the 1st Schleswig war - do.- and the brief campaign of 1848 in Northern Italy where Radetzky victory was heavily favored by the lack of coordination of his opponents and the reliance on the secure basis of the Quadrilateral. The armies preparation for wars had been reduced by lack of money, no improvement in doctrine and an officer corps who became older and older but had spent too many years rotting in garrisons or carrying out relatively minor police actions. Even the famed Prussian army had degraded a lot, and if the defeat in the 1st Schleswig war had been the first warning bell to start some reforms, these reforms in 1859 were still very much a work-in-progress).
The tactics employed in 1859 were practically the same as in the Napoleonic wars, with only minor improvements in small-arms (Austrian army) and in the use of artillery (French army, with a doctrine of fire by batteries and not individual guns): however the main infantry tactic was still the shock column with bayonets; the Austrians never evolved a better doctrine for infantry to fit their improved small-arms, and did not learn anything even after 1859 (in 1866 the Prussian infantry tactics were much evolved, with emphasis on individual squad action, learnt from the reports of Solferino and tested in the 2nd Schleswig war; the Austrians were still stuck with shock attacks, and the only improvement was the adoption of battery fire).

I would believe that the possible intervention of Prussia and the other German Confederation states as game-changer in 1859 is overestimated by an order of magnitude at least. First of all, the armies of the minor states in Germany were not very large (Austria was certainly not in favor of any of these states fielding large armies, and anyway there was always the problem of funding armies which were not expected to be used), and coordination between these armies under the umbrella of the German Confederation was minimal (the same problem happened in the war of 1866, where the Prussians felt entitled to run significant risks in their campaign in western Germany because they had correctly evaluated the lack of effectiveness of their German opponents). Prussia had certainly a much larger army (which however was still being reformed), but did not have any particular urge to save the Austrian bacon (the humiliation of the Punctuation of Olmutz and the consequent dissolution of the Union of Erfurt was still very galling for Prussia): in any case the Prussians made an attempt to mobilize, as requested by the articles of confederation, but between the lack of a strong political will and the half-baked status of the reforms the mobilization was very slow and chaotic.
In particular the biggest blunders happened with the use of railways to move troops toward the Rhein. In a way it was a lucky failure: the General Staff (under Moltke the Elder, who in 1859 was not in the strong position he would be in 1866, much less in 1870) concentrated in the post-mortem on the reasons for the failure of the mobilization. Once again, 1864 was the test for the new arrangement and 1866 was the demonstration that the Prussian General Staff had been able to debug this issue.
In 1859, however, the first Prussian troops started to drift along the Rhein in August, when the war in Italy was already over.
 
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