AHC: Austria and Russia switch sides

On the longer term this German-Russian axis probably only works if both sides realize a change in the mutual borders is unneeded. So no lebensraum-equivalent ideoligy in Germany (the Nazi's didn't really come up with it in the first place) and Russia shoud realize that the part of Poland they hold now is already trouble enough and wanting more is a real bad idea. Furthermore they'll need a common enemy for their alliance and after having taken care of Austria in a WWI equivalent I don't see which combination of countries remains.

So after ATL WWI with Russia and Germany against Austria, France and Britain a WWII await in which the Russian and German victors turn on each other?
 
The Russians only had to look back 50 years to see how France and Britain really felt about Russia moving in on the Ottoman Empire. It was Britain, not Germany, who was concerned about Russian control over the Dardanelles. Due to the Suez Canal, this would be actually even more the case in 1914 than in 1851.

And to Treaty of Berlin to see how Germany felt about it.

By 1900 Britain had Egypt firmly under her control and no longer needed to prop up the Ottomans against Russians.

Thus by 1900 Gladstone-era Britain was content with the idea of Russia gaining the Straits, provided that this was part of a wider geopolitical deal. Why? Because British leaders felt that the British position as a Great Power dependent upon the security of her Indian Empire. And according to pre-WW1 British estimations, only Russia could threaten it. As a result, Russia had to be either confronted or placated. And making a deal with her was much more beneficial for both sides.

Also, Russia's ambitions on the Balkan were not of great concern to Germany, who only became interested there because of their OTL alliance with A-H. A Bismarck like figure should actually encourage them here, as it would be a great way to piss away money and manpower. The only thing that might concern the Germans would be the German descended populations scattered over the Balkans, but since there were also German enclaves in the Baltics and along the Wolga already under Russian control without major issues, I don't see that leading to flashpoints.

Ottoman Empire and the Middle-East had been targets of firm and determined German policy of economic and diplomatic expansion for decades by 1900, and while in theory one could have the Baghdad-Berlin Railway running through a Russian-controlled Tsargrad, in reality Wilhelmine Germany wasn't willing to let Russia freely control a region where Germany wanted to expand economically herself.

As for nationalism: the Kaiserreich paid next to no political attention to the East European German population aside from the few pan-German fringe groups.

If France could fund Russian industry, there's no reason a richer Germany could not do the same. A more developed Russia would also function as an large (and nearby) market for German industrial products.

German industrialists were very eager to export to Russia, but the land-owning Junkers feared competition with cheap Russian wheat and firmly resisted such attempts - just like Russian industrialists felt (quite realistically) that they needed tariff protection from German goods at their domestic markets. This led to mutual tariff wars - German protectionism against Russian grain and Russian protectionism against German industrial goods - until the matter was solved by a trade agreement in 1894.

After that Germany pressed on for her advantage during the Russo-Japanese War and gained new economic concessions to the trade agreement of 1904, further alienating the pro-German parts of the Russian elite.

When one combines this to the state of finances of the German Empire at the beginning of the century, it seems impossible that they could suddenly change their economic policies and reform the structure of the Empire so substantially that they'd be able to replace the French funding for Russian economic development.

And why on Earth should they do it even if they could?

The French were willing to invest really heavily to Russian railroad construction and economic expansion because this way they to propped up their primary ally against Germany. Germany would see little need to develop the infrastructure of European Russia in the same manner, even if the German and Russian Empires would once again find one another diplomatically.

On the longer term this German-Russian axis probably only works if both sides realize a change in the mutual borders is unneeded. So no lebensraum-equivalent ideoligy in Germany (the Nazi's didn't really come up with it in the first place) and Russia shoud realize that the part of Poland they hold now is already trouble enough and wanting more is a real bad idea. Furthermore they'll need a common enemy for their alliance and after having taken care of Austria in a WWI equivalent I don't see which combination of countries remains.

Once again: The Russo-German antagonism and the way these states allied with other major powers had next to nothing to do with Russo-German relations. They were former allies, had a common interest in keeping the Poles under control, and a major part of the Russian elite really admired Germany. It's just that France and Britain could offer Russia so much and Germany so little, that from the Russian point of view it made no sense to tie themselves to Germany - especially because the Russian leadership could be quite convinced that Germany could never defeat the combined might of the Entente powers, rationally concluding that this arrangement would then eliminate the threat of war completely, or alternatively guarantee a Russian victory in a potential conflict.

Many German leaders would have preferred the return of the Three Emperor's League, and this arrangement was actually much more plausible diplomatic arrangement than the scenario presented in the OP.
 
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