By not invading. The Thatcher government was going to do a deal with the Argentinian government about a power share and eventual transfer of sovereignty.
This leads to the problem for the Junta that they can't use the Malvinas as a rallying point to divert attention from the crappy economy. They get overthrown and suffer 9mm lead poisoning.
This leads to the problem for the Junta that they can't use the Malvinas as a rallying point to divert attention from the crappy economy. They get overthrown and suffer 9mm lead poisoning.
It would require Mrs Thatcher to lose power through a vote of no confidence and a successor unwilling to fight. Unlikely, but not impossible.
thatsbunkers
Banned
If Thatcher didn't even try to retake the islands Michael Foot would beat her over the head with it until he won the election.
Riain
Banned
In military terms they did a hell of a lot wrong, the main thing in my mind is not using the islands themselves more as a forward base for air and naval forces. I would have based the submarines at Stanley and possibly other naval forces up to gun destroyer in size. Similarly I would have used the Port Stanley airstrip for 'shuttle' missions by fast jets; fly out from the mainland with full fuel, do a CAP or bombing mission, land light at Stanley, rapid refuel, fly home without bombs for proper turnaround. It was a method used very successfully by the British when Sid's Strip became operational.
While military prosecutors did ask for death penalty against Galtieri for the crime of "incompetence in conducting a war" (yes, a real crime, part of the early 20th century Argentine military code which was based on the old 19th Prussian code or something), the sentence ended up as ten years in jail. The rest of the members of the Juntas were put on trial under the regular criminal code and that didn't allow for death penalty, which was outlawed in Argentina (except for the military code) with the 1921 criminal code.
I agree with "not invading". Assuming a military invasion anyway I think the problem is that, even if Argentina wins the aeronaval battle, nothing stops the UK from coming again the next year, using submarines to blockade the islands and/or asking the USA and France for assistance in the form of their more powerful carrier battlegroups.
In other words, tactically, victory for Argentina means to mission-kill the British carriers. Hard, but with a bit of luck, doable. But that doesn't mean the British will to fight would be broken.
if the USA supported Argentina (the aggressor) over their NATO ally the UK, it would have been a politically damaging and could have seen the collapse of NATO.
I wouldn't be so fast to discount at least tacit support for Argentina. For example, during when Guatemala was getting uppity about Belize, the US tried to mediate between the UK and Guatemala. America's proposal greatly favored Guatemala which caused the UK to reject it. And apparently the US Secretary of State tried the same exact thing with proposal that favored Argentina, Here's a nice article on the matter:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303816504577313852502105454
Reagan wanted to be more neutral and opposed military force as a resolution. The US Ambassador to the UN tilted towards the UK. I would say that something would have to happen to get reagan to lean towards Argentina and that would be difficult. As the article notes, the US had much to fear about a failure on the Junta's side. After all, the US was supporting the Junta's rule because communism. The UK would hardly become the "United Soviet Kingdom Of Socialist Great Britain and The People's Northern Ireland" over the whole affair no matter the outcome.
Would he? My understanding is that most people, even some within the cabinet, didn't think that retaking the islands immediately was a good idea. As has been said, the counter attack was a surprise to many when it happened, so I don't think that many people, other than the hardliners in the Tory Party, would blame Thatcher for not sending in the troops if she decided. not to do so.
Besides, I doubt Foot would be to keen to use the issue for political advantage. He didn't make hay out of the Argentine invasion IOTL, and his party was anything but united on the issue. And Foot wasn't really much of a political opportunist. If anything the opposite was true. The issue he talked about most during the 1983 campaign, nuclear disarmament, was probably one of Labour's weakest issues. That said, the Alliance were a greater threat to the Tories at this point, and I could see David Owen hammering Thatcher for her weakness on the issue if the UK did end up caving.
Invade while some Doveish gouvernment is in charge. Immediately afterwards offer negotiations, ask UN to mediate the dispute, claim to seek a compromise, beat the anti-colonialist drum etc etc anything to delay a military response and letting British Useful Idiots claim that things can be resolved without fighting while never saying outright, that yes of course they can but only by ultimately leaving the Falklands in Argentine hands.
With every day that passes without a British response, the invasion gets legitimized bit by bit.
By the time the next elections run around or there's a party-internal coup against the PM it'll be a fait accomplit.
With every day that passes without a British response, the invasion gets legitimized bit by bit.
By the time the next elections run around or there's a party-internal coup against the PM it'll be a fait accomplit.
Argentina is useful, but compared to the United Kingdom? The USA should throw Argentina under the GODSAVETHEQUEEN Bus and walk away whistling.
It's possible they could win the first round, but then they'd have to find a diplomatic solution to avoid further retaliation. The consequences of accepting the invasion (or liberation, whichever the perspective) would be disastrous for the UK and its chain of alliances.
Galtieri has to go and then the next government, which will have to be perceived as civilian and legitimate, could perhaps strike a deal.
Two difficulties with that:
Galtieri has to go and then the next government, which will have to be perceived as civilian and legitimate, could perhaps strike a deal.
Two difficulties with that:
- Why would the junta fall during its finest hour?
- How could Britain accept this as fait accompli without losing face?
hipper
Banned
Michael Foot had a reputation for opposing Fascism, His speech in the commons was fairly bellicose, though stopping short of open support for military action.
however he was planning to use the situation for political advantage suggesting that forces should have been deployed earlier to deter the Argentinians
hipper
Banned
They tried the same thing in 1977 while Labour was in power, Callahan sent a small task force down south before the argentines did anything stupid. Thatcher reacted with Force while Tony Blair involved the British in more wars than Churchill.
This video should provide some insight, but the gist of it is Argentina got really careless with a military campaign they could have won, with many endemic issues in the junta and services that contributed to its defeat. Their basic assumption was that Britain would not try to counter their invasion by force, and as a result, failed to plan for a possible counterattack. This led to a whole series of problems, such as planting ill-adapted northern conscripts in the cold islands as a garrison where better-acclimatized Patagonian troops could have been deployed (though, those would probably still be needed at the Chilean border at the time). Timing of the invasion was also ridiculous, failing to use the worsening climate and ongoing downsizing of the Royal Navy to their advantage by invading so early in the year, they've basically offered the British ample time and resources to mount a counteroffensive. Then, there's the interservice rivalry...
Yea, it's like a step by step guide on how to lose a very winnable war.
hipper
Banned
if Argentina could have solved the issues that lead to their Defeat (they needed a properly organised and legitimate Government who could exert authority over the armed forces ) then there would have been no need for the Invasion
regards
Last edited:
For the Argentinians to win is not hard. The British had a very fragile supply line supplied and fought by ships that could not take the cold weather. All the Argentiniantinian troops had to do was hold the British off till the winter came and the British ships would have to withdraw. So all you need to make a POD where the Argentinians ground forces more effective. say they trained more with the US.
Well, Argentine troops were training with the USA in that age. The question is, why would the US care about training Argentine conscripts (with a one year service) for fighting a conventional war against a peer/near-peer in winter/tundra conditions? So they can be more effective in invading Chile?