AHC and WI: No (Unified) France

With no PoDs prior to Henry V's victory at Agnicourt (1415), how could the king(s) of England have held onto as much of France as possible (ideally including Brittany, Normandy, and Aquitaine), at least until 1515? Obviously, this means the King of France is now far weaker than OTL; what are the effects of this?
 
FWIU, the consolidation, centralization, and rise of the Kingdom of France played a crucial role in European monarchical power, the rise of absolutism, and the normalization of sovereignty (climaxing in 1648). So let's say England holds onto its French provinces and keeps the French kings from challenging their own monarch; stands to reason these trends would be seriously curbed, no?

If I am right, how seriously is European history changed?
 
FWIU, the consolidation, centralization, and rise of the Kingdom of France played a crucial role in European monarchical power, the rise of absolutism, and the normalization of sovereignty (climaxing in 1648). So let's say England holds onto its French provinces and keeps the French kings from challenging their own monarch; stands to reason these trends would be seriously curbed, no?

If I am right, how seriously is European history changed?

France in its medieval borders was 4 to 5 times as populated as England.

So England can't do it after 1214 when french royal power became too strong for any rival power to oppose it inside the borders of France.

Who ever knows the geography of northern France, especially Normandy, knows it is impossible to hold territory there. It is flat, flat, flat. Today, eastern Normandy basically is a suburbian area of the parisian Metropolis.

Geographical conditions are different in Aquitaine where there are far more hills and valleys.

So as fjihr said, France is basically a winner takes all territory. Holding it is not a matter of military superiority but of political legitimacy, i.e. the ability to have oneself actually being accepted as the legitimate king. Because otherwise at the first defeat, the military domination will crumble and with it the political domination will be wiped out.

Although Henry V was magnified in english memories, Henry V's strategy was a losing strategy. England lost the war of conquest of France although Henry V and his brother Bedford both were extremely competent as military leaders, extremely lucky (both Agincourt and Verneuil should have been english disasters if England had not had the luck to face extremely incompetent french military leadership), and had the incredibly favorable conditions of France being divided by a civil war opposing Armagnacs and Bourguignons.

It just took one french military victory for the french, at Patay, and It was game over for the english in France. The french reconquista took time only because Charles VII decided to take So much time. The english presence then rested but on the french taking time (whatever the reasons for taking time).

But concerning the Plantagenet/Lancaster claim of the french throne, It was so completely devoid of dynastic legitimacy and political or popular support, It left them no other option than the military conquest path and this path was a dead-end. The french nobility and the french urban elites had made It clear in the years 1316-1328 that they did not want to be ruled by a foreign king and they were able to have this demand prevail because France was by far the biggest, wealthier, most populated, most powerful kingdom of Europe and the one where the king's power were the strongest.

From 1214 on, it always was :

- either the king of England accepts the fact that he can't hold territories inside the kingdom of France at the Time when Europe was moving from the medieval ages of feudality to the modern ages of national kingdoms,

- or the king of England finds a way to be accepted by the part of the french population that mattered (the nobility and the urban elites that stood in the Estates General) as one of them and accepts either England being satellized or being handed over to a younger branch of the Plantagenet/Lancaster dynasty. That's what the Habsburgs did with Charles V concerning Spain and its empire (which was clearly acknowledged as the head of the dynasty as soon as the comuneros rebellion was handled), the burgundian low countries and Austria.

PS : edited to correct a slip about Normandy.
 
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the king of England accepts the fact that he can't hold territories inside the kingdom of France at the Time when Europe was moving from the medieval ages of feudality to the modern ages of national kingdoms
But not everyone was moving toward national kingdoms; the German princedoms were still the Holy Roman Empire, with the sovereignty issue not being resolved for another two centuries; Iberia was still divided, with the union of Spain being far from predetermined, and even after it was needed to be reformed as an centralized monarchy under Charles V; Italy was Italy; etc. In fact, prior to 1550, the only kingdoms that actually seemed to be acting like something we might call nation states were... France and England. France especially, as by 1515 it was the richest and most powerful kingdom in Europe, despite the HRE having more money within its borders, largely due to the power of its king; arguably, the reason Charles V was unable to dominate and unite Europe was more or less because France stood against him.

What really interests me about the PoD is whether this trend away from feudalism -- specifically into centralized kingdoms, and more specifically ones dividing Europe more or less along national lines -- is predetermined by 1415.
 
But not everyone was moving toward national kingdoms; the German princedoms were still the Holy Roman Empire, with the sovereignty issue not being resolved for another two centuries; Iberia was still divided, with the union of Spain being far from predetermined, and even after it was needed to be reformed as an centralized monarchy under Charles V; Italy was Italy; etc. In fact, prior to 1550, the only kingdoms that actually seemed to be acting like something we might call nation states were... France and England. France especially, as by 1515 it was the richest and most powerful kingdom in Europe, despite the HRE having more money within its borders, largely due to the power of its king; arguably, the reason Charles V was unable to dominate and unite Europe was more or less because France stood against him.

What really interests me about the PoD is whether this trend away from feudalism -- specifically into centralized kingdoms, and more specifically ones dividing Europe more or less along national lines -- is predetermined by 1415.
France was already on the path since the 1200s, with the growth of the Royal demesne and crown authority being recognized.

Another one, the Platagenets wouldn't be able to "keep the French king in check" because their plan was the become the King of France themselves. To abort the process of French unification you need a PoD by Philip II's reign or have he being succeed by a string of idiots.
 
France was already on the path since the 1200s, with the growth of the Royal demesne and crown authority being recognized...

To abort the process of French unification you need a PoD by Philip II's reign or have he being succeed by a string of idiots.
Okay, if moving the PoD back is what this takes: Say Pontiers rebels and the English win the Battle of Taillebourg, or Louis IX has a less successful reign in general? Between Phillip II and the start of the war with Edward III, he (along w Phillip the Fair) seem like the strongest of the French monarchs.
 
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Skallagrim

Banned
But not everyone was moving toward national kingdoms; the German princedoms were still the Holy Roman Empire, with the sovereignty issue not being resolved for another two centuries; Iberia was still divided, with the union of Spain being far from predetermined, and even after it was needed to be reformed as an centralized monarchy under Charles V; Italy was Italy; etc. In fact, prior to 1550, the only kingdoms that actually seemed to be acting like something we might call nation states were... France and England. France especially, as by 1515 it was the richest and most powerful kingdom in Europe, despite the HRE having more money within its borders, largely due to the power of its king; arguably, the reason Charles V was unable to dominate and unite Europe was more or less because France stood against him.

What really interests me about the PoD is whether this trend away from feudalism -- specifically into centralized kingdoms, and more specifically ones dividing Europe more or less along national lines -- is predetermined by 1415.

Nothing is predetermined, but the POD/timeframe you are looking at is relatively late to get the result you are looking for. It isn't easy for the English to hold onto France for a very much longer time. It isn't likely for them to make their French possessions culturally English, so these remain French lands. The very presence of English power will unite French powers outside the English realm in an attempt to kick out the foreign ruler(s). Old rivalries will be set aside.

The English would need a bizarre amount of luck. (Basically, they'd need to never have a single weak/incompetent monarch, because just one would allow the French to very likely kick the English off the continent.)

All this said... with an earlier POD, the French drive towards strong state centralisation can be prevented or curtailed. As @Monter wrote: France had been on this path for awhile. I'd argue that lots of affairs in the region, like the Albigensian Crusade, should properly be viewed in the context of the king trying to centralise his authority. (A development that ultimately reached it's monarchist peak with Louis XIV, and was institutionally finalised by the French revolution.)

I'd also argue that it was this French centralism that in many cases prompted (or even forced) potential rivals to adopt a similar course. If France had never been as centralised as it was, could Charles V even have gotten the support to make his own centralising reforms? I doubt it. And that's not even mentioning the fact that various later national unification movements were strongly inspired by the events of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic era. (The Netherlands were turned from a congederation into a unitary state by the Frenxh and were never changed back; pan-German nationalism was primarily a reaction to the French threat; Italian unification also had its roots in the upheaval of the old order of small states... an upheaval caused by France. And then there's the fact that Napoleon opened the way for a true split between Germany and Austria-Hungary, by abolishing the HRE and this severing the ancient imperial Habsburg claim over all of Germany.)

So if there's an earlier POD that truly keeps France from unifying - and that would have to be one close to 1200, and preferably before 1200 - then we will probably see a Europe where the trend towards centralised kingdoms is very much reduced.

I do note, however, that to say that this trend was one 'dividing Europe more or less along national lines' is an anachronism. With such an early POD, nationality will hardly be a concept, and if bigger kingdoms are prevented, people will think of their smaller states as 'national'. Regional languages will become standard languages. For instance: there might be a 'Sicilian nation-state', a 'Roman nation-state', a 'Venetian nation-state', and the idea that 'Italian' is a nationality rather than a group of related nations might never arise. (Put in another way: the trend you are attempting to prevent is the very thing that ultimately merged various smaller ethnic groups into single countries, slowly turning them into single nationalities. If they retain separate countries, their nationalities will also be separate. A Bavarian will consider a Prussian the way a German considers s Swede in OTL: a fellow Germanic person, yes, but not one of the same nation.)
 
I'd also argue that it was this French centralism that in many cases prompted (or even forced) potential rivals to adopt a similar course. If France had never been as centralised as it was, could Charles V even have gotten the support to make his own centralising reforms? I doubt it. And that's not even mentioning the fact that various later national unification movements were strongly inspired by the events of the French revolutionary and Napoleonic era. (The Netherlands were turned from a congederation into a unitary state by the Frenxh and were never changed back; pan-German nationalism was primarily a reaction to the French threat; Italian unification also had its roots in the upheaval of the old order of small states... an upheaval caused by France. And then there's the fact that Napoleon opened the way for a true split between Germany and Austria-Hungary, by abolishing the HRE and this severing the ancient imperial Habsburg claim over all of Germany.)
Agree wholeheartedly here; in fact, it's the chief inspiration for the question. In fact, I'd go even further and say the normalization of state/national sovereignty in Europe (with the Treaty of Westphalia) was a victory not only for French interests but of French "nationalist" norms.
 
You seems to forget that France inspired its centralization from English one. Philips Augustus reforms were copy paste from Henry II Plantagenet... England was the most centralized kingdom in the middle age... France become such gradually and later.
 
There was a strong, structural and multisecular trend towards centralization that started in the 11th century with a strong movement of demographic and economic growth, with urbanization and development of trade.

England of France were the first that loved on the path of centralization and did It further than any other european kingdom but there was such a trend in all Europe.

This happened with the spanish kingdoms whose number diminished in the 11th and 12th centuries.

This happened in Bohemia, Hungary, Sweden, Sicily-Napoli, in Poland, ... Etc.

The German and north italian parts that were the main parts of the HRE (I know Bohemia was part of it) are the exceptions that confirmed the rule. This exception is what I previously called (in other threads of this forum) "the plague of empire". The structure and fabric of the HRE was based on selling by pieces the foundations and resources of power to the lesser levels. It met the same fate as the Carolingian empire and It was doomed to do so.
 

Skallagrim

Banned
You seems to forget that France inspired its centralization from English one. Philips Augustus reforms were copy paste from Henry II Plantagenet... England was the most centralized kingdom in the middle age... France become such gradually and later.

This is true, but two things must be considered:

The first is that the reason British centralisation directly influenced (and even caused) French centralisation is... well, the way OTL went. British involvement in France led to that reaction, and is in fact an illustration of the cause-and-effect whereby one centralised country can threaten a less centralised one, and thus force that other one to centralise or be subjugated. This is also why the initial POD suggested would be too late to prevent this. But an earlier POD (if it's the right POD) can easily change this. British centralisation did not directly affect many other contental countries, and they did not centralise because Britain did. They hardly cared or took note.

The second thing hooks into that. It's the fact that a centralised Britain that doesn't actually threaten any powerful-but-decentralised European country will be far less likely to inspire centralisation there. France was a direct threat, often right next door, with a formidable land army. Simply put: centralising France terrified her neigbours, and gave them no choice but to centralise themselves... or be conquered. Britain, across the water, is (at least as far as perception goes) a less direct threat. If you get the right POD, you can make it so that French centralisation doesn't occur as in OTL, and Britain is not perceived as a threat by the various continental powers.

It was never said here that just any POD will sort that effect, but I am confident that it could be done, and would have the effects that @John Fredrick Parker is looking for.


There was a strong, structural and multisecular trend towards centralization that started in the 11th century with a strong movement of demographic and economic growth, with urbanization and development of trade.

England of France were the first that loved on the path of centralization and did It further than any other european kingdom but there was such a trend in all Europe.

This happened with the spanish kingdoms whose number diminished in the 11th and 12th centuries.

This happened in Bohemia, Hungary, Sweden, Sicily-Napoli, in Poland, ... Etc.

The German and north italian parts that were the main parts of the HRE (I know Bohemia was part of it) are the exceptions that confirmed the rule. This exception is what I previously called (in other threads of this forum) "the plague of empire". The structure and fabric of the HRE was based on selling by pieces the foundations and resources of power to the lesser levels. It met the same fate as the Carolingian empire and It was doomed to do so.

This view is a little too determinitic for my tastes. Depending on how one approaches history in general, one might indeed believe that the trend is the dominant factor, and that there are simply early and later examples. Personally, I tend more towards cause and effect: the 'early examples' cause the later examples.

In reality, both things are of course true to some extent. Demographic and economic growth, urbanisation and the development of trade certainly had their political ramifications, and would still have them in an ATL. But I do believe that you give too much weight to these developments as being the big and mostly inevitable cause of political centralisation. I maintain that England was considerably more centralised than all others (and that this was for a large part a result of the Norman conquest), and that the English interference in France caused France to also become more centralised as a direct result. And, of course, that the far more direct continental threat of centralising France led to centralisation among various rivals of France.

If this whole domino effect had been halted at the outset, the general trends of demographic and economic growth, urbanisation and the development of trade would (I think) have resulted in some modest (and more local) centralisations of various forms of political authority -- but not in the centralisation tendency of OTL. ecause, yes, there was some consolidation of the Spanish polities, certainly... but that development then halted, and only got back on track again when centralising France became the big bad rival next door. Some local Italian unification took place, but I don't see any serious options for a unified Italy before the Napoleonic (= French) disturbance forever shook thing up there...

Needless to say, this is my reading of historical effect. I think the direct causality of geopolitical powers threatening each other for several enturies as it happened in OTL, had more effect in this whole centralising development than more general demographic and economic effects in the 11th century. Which is why I believe that preventing this causal domino effect with an early POD would mostly (but indeed not entirely) cancel the whole centralising tendency within Europe. Someone who fundamentally disagrees with my approach to historical effect, and believes that socio-economic 'background drives' are far more important than I portray them (and/or that geopolitical pressures are less important) will obviously see this very differently.

In any case, I do agree that various economic, demographic, social, cultural etc. effects would of course lead to obvious political results (i.e. the formation of nation-states and bureaucratic government would occur and supplant feudalism), but I suspect that it would happen to a Europe consisting of many more, smaller nation-states. no Germany. No France. No Italy. Instead the nation states of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Savoy, Tuscany, Sicily, Champagne, Bourgogne etc. (and if nationalism becomes associated with more local identities, ultimately no Austria-Hungary or Spain, either. So many ethnostates replacing the Austrian Habsburg monarchy as per OTL, and independent Aragon and Castille, etc.)

Basically, if @John Fredrick Parker wants to prevent the end of feudalism, I don't think any POD in this vicinity is going to cut it. But if he wants to end up with a far less centralised Europe consisting of far more (and generally smaller) nation-states... I think he's looking for his POD in exactly the right place.
 
Interesting timespan

France during the desperate fighting of the early 15th century was indeed divided, with nominal vassals acting almost as, or completely as, independent nations - Burgundy is the obvious one here, but also look at Bourbon etc

England doesn't have to hold all of France, Henry V's policy there may indeed have been doomed to failure, though since the French crown relies on feudal support the more he wins, the more of that he gets, and the less is available to his Valois rivals.

Maybe if England focused on Normandy, Poitou, Anjou, Aquitaine and power in the South, as Edward III and the Black Prince has focused on, thiis would have been a better use of superior resources in the long-term.
 
Well, the point is that you are putting things in terms of "taste", which I can't argue about.
The demographic and economic and technological process which I mentioned were facts.

I never said that centralization was unavoidable. But the structural evolutions were so strong that It did not take extraordinary men and huge luck to have centralization happen.

And I never denied that England was the most advance kingdom in the political centralization process. This was a fact. It came from the Normans, and geographically It came from the duchy of Normandy. Normandy being a part of the kingdom of France and being neighbour to Paris, the capetian kings were indeed able to copycat parts of its centralized organization.
 
I'm not sure you can do this after 1415. You can have England hold parts of France, but they're still "parts of France" and there's more of a consciousness of them as "parts of France," even with France politically divided.

If you want to go back a few hundred years, though, you have plenty of years where the French crown is basically nominal. Plenty of opportunity there to fracture France.
 
If we go with the OP's (relatively modest) wishes for England to hold on to "as much of France as possible" until 1515 (but POD no earlier than 1415) ... I'd probably start with letting Henry V not swallow that dysentery-infected water or whatever it was that did him in after the Siege of Meaux.

If we discard any kind of divine intervention factors, and I think we should at least say that option out loud where this extraordinary girl is concerned, then just that change is probably enough to butterfly away Joan of Arc or at least get her killed in a vain attempt to do something. Maybe Charles VII has been killed earlier and thus deprives Joan of a reason for her mission, if there is no clear heir. Thus, Charles could decide himself either to flee (as he originally contemplated) or meet Henry on the battlefield over some strategic city like Orleans and get himself dead in the process. Little Louis IX is still born but as the English-Burgundian alliance is the only significant nexus of power, and the French are leaderless, he could be taken in custody 'for his protection' by some lord paid off by the English or simply flee himself helped by Yolande of Aragon or Rene Anjou.

Henry V dies either from 'old age' or battlewounds in the 1430s or early 1440s, but you could have John Bedford there (butterflied a little older) and certainly let either of them make it an absolute priority to hold on to the Burgundian alliance. If that happened into the 1440s and France is in disarray still I would wager that you have delayed the English expulsion from France for at least 30-50 years, and maybe they could still hold on to parts of Aquitaine in the early 16th century, depending on which way the butterflies fly. Admittedly, it's a pretty unspectacular result in the short run, but as butterflies accumulate down the centuries you might see major effects on the development, or at least timing of the development, of the French state, philosophy and ultimately revolution.

P.S: A dark horse is of course the trends that lead to the War of the Roses, but supposing the English are more succesful in France that disruption of England could also be pushed off at least 3 decades or more.
 
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Skallagrim

Banned
Well, the point is that you are putting things in terms of "taste", which I can't argue about.
The demographic and economic and technological process which I mentioned were facts.

I never said that centralization was unavoidable. But the structural evolutions were so strong that It did not take extraordinary men and huge luck to have centralization happen.

And I never denied that England was the most advance kingdom in the political centralization process. This was a fact. It came from the Normans, and geographically It came from the duchy of Normandy. Normandy being a part of the kingdom of France and being neighbour to Paris, the capetian kings were indeed able to copycat parts of its centralized organization.

Certainly; we are not in disagreement about concrete facts. My point is rather that people can and will disagree about how certain developments relate(d) to one abother; which causes were ultimately more fundamental etc. since history isn't a hard science. The facts are concrete, but a lot of our views just depend on which theories we find plausible. I do think that's far more than 'taste'. Perhaps I came across to critically. That was not my intention. Rather, I wanted to explain why I believe that things would develop in a certain way, while at the same time recognising that alternative views are - for purposes of alt history discussion - simply equally valid. We cannot see other worlds; we just cannot know for sure, so as long as we can explain our reasoning, I think there's plenty of room for different readings of historical effect and causation. :)
 
The centralisation do not start wit the French example/threatening.
Castile was also far more centralised than France for most of the middle age and start prior the French one.
Sicily during Frederick II was waaay more centralized than any other contemporary kingdom.
I beleive that one of the reason of it (among many others already mentioned) was the drive to exert dirrect power as the Roman emperors have once do.

Now... back to the aim of the thread (England holding French land up to 1515, orher than Calais) ... it could be done be a sequence of perfect storms and huge luck... however, those lands will still be part of France. it's not like CKII that after 100 years it start to become de jure part of other kingdom...
 
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