AHC and WI: No March to, or Rape of, Nanking

This is something I don't think I knew -- apparently, even after winning the Battle of Shanghai, the Japanese High Command thought they could keep the conflict with China limited.

Wikipedia said:
After achieving victory in the Battle of Shanghai by mid-November 1937, Japan's Army General Staff, which was in charge of military operations, adopted a policy of non-expansion of hostilities with the aim of ending the war. [This is presumably referring to the initiation of all out hostilities in the Battle of Shanghai.] On November 7 its de facto leader Deputy Chief of Staff Hayao Tada laid down an "operation restriction line" preventing its forces from leaving the vicinity of Shanghai, or more specifically from going west of the Chinese cites of Suzhou and Jiaxing. The city of Nanking is located further inland 300 kilometers west of Shanghai.

However, a major rift of opinion existed between the Japanese government and the two field armies it had deployed in Shanghai, the Shanghai Expeditionary Army (SEA) led by General Iwane Matsui and the 10th Army led by Lieutenant General Heisuke Yanagawa, both of which were nominally under the control of the Central China Area Army also led by Matsui. Matsui had made clear to his superiors even before he had left for Shanghai that he wanted to march on Nanking. He was convinced that the conquest of the Chinese capital city of Nanking would provoke the fall of the entire Nationalist Government of China and thus hand Japan a quick and complete victory in its war on China. Yanagawa was likewise eager to conquer Nanking and both men chafed under the operation restriction line that had been imposed on them by the Army General Staff.

On November 19 Yanagawa ordered his 10th Army to pursue retreating Chinese forces across the operation restriction line to Nanking, a flagrant act of insubordination. When Tada discovered this the next day he ordered Yanagawa to stop immediately, but was ignored. Matsui made some effort to restrain Yanagawa, but also told him that he could send some advance units beyond the line. In fact, Matsui was highly sympathetic with Yanagawa's actions and a few days later on November 22 Matsui issued an urgent telegram to the Army General Staff insisting that "To resolve this crisis in a prompt manner we need to take advantage of the enemy's present declining fortunes and conquer Nanking... By staying behind the operation restriction line at this point we are not only letting our chance to advance slip by, but it is also having the effect of encouraging the enemy to replenish their fighting strength and recover their fighting spirit and there is a risk that it will become harder to completely break their will to make war."

Meanwhile, as more and more Japanese units continued to slip past the operation restriction line, Tada was also coming under pressure from within the Army General Staff. Many of Tada's colleagues and subordinates, including the powerful Chief of the General Staff Operations Division Sadamu Shimomura, had come around to Matsui's viewpoint and wanted Tada to approve an attack on Nanking. On November 24 Tada finally relented and abolished the operation restriction line "owing to circumstances beyond our control", and then several days later he reluctantly approved the operation to capture Nanking. Tada flew to Shanghai in person on December 1 to deliver the order, though by then his own armies in the field were already well on their way to Nanking.

My question -- could the Expedition, and subsequent Rape, of Nanking have been prevented in the aftermath of the Battle of Shanghai? More generally, could this escalation of hostilities have been avoided, at least for the time being? What would be the effect on the military situation between China and Japan? On Chiang's position? On Japanese policy? Would this impact the course of events outside China as well; if so, how is the course of the Second World War affected, if at all?
 
Does Chiang want to deal? He has put his best forces in defense of Nanking; he has already lost quite a bit of China by Japanese incursions--and each time, the previous incursions have only led to a subsequent violation and expansion.

OTOH, it is possible that Chiang is aware that the IJA will prevail against Nanking's garrisons. However, he's already got loyalty issues regarding making peace agreements with Japan from some of his own warlords.

Chiang had the opportunity to consider this move after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident itself and rejected it. It might be possible to swing his opinion, but I think it more likely that he follows his OTL course.

The IJA will find Chiang "unreasonable" and find Nanking heavily defended, a defiance that will anger the IJA, leading to the Nanking Massacre.
 
The IJA will find Chiang "unreasonable" and find Nanking heavily defended, a defiance that will anger the IJA, leading to the Nanking Massacre.

Right, but I'm not talking about Chiang's decision to defend Nanking, but the IJA's decision to march on and take it. It was not a done deal after Shanghai -- the de facto Deputy Chief of Staff, Tada, was against even permitting Japanese excursions past a certain distance from Shanghai, while General Iwane Matsui was pushing for an all out expedition to and conquest of the city, with the hopes of cursing the KMT once and for all. If the latter does not prevail and is reigned in, wouldn't that stop not only the Rape of Nanking, but any Japanese attempt at taking the city (at least for the time being)?
 

The Sandman

Banned
Have the Japanese direct hostilities elsewhere instead, in the form of pulling most of the troops from now-conquered Shanghai and using them to seize China's remaining ports. Make the isolation of China from all foreign contact a goal from the outset of the war.
 
Well, if the Rape of Nanjing didn't happen, the Chinese wouldn't have this event as a major basis for anti-Japanese sentiment...though there would have been other stuff TTL which might...
 
Okay, but if Chiang has no interest in a peace deal and does things like try to reinforce the area, wouldn't that ultimately force the IJA to attack?

Do you mean reinforcing Nanking (likely) or reinforcing positions outside Shanghai (less sure)?

Have the Japanese direct hostilities elsewhere instead, in the form of pulling most of the troops from now-conquered Shanghai and using them to seize China's remaining ports. Make the isolation of China from all foreign contact a goal from the outset of the war.

That would be a different strategy of escalation, but would still be escalation; again though, in the aftermath of Shanghai the Japanese Chiefs of Staff initially tried to restrict the new military presence in Japan around Shanghai. If they held off, in those following months, on any other military expeditions within China, would they still "decide" to escalate the war in this way?

Well, if the Rape of Nanjing didn't happen, the Chinese wouldn't have this event as a major basis for anti-Japanese sentiment...though there would have been other stuff TTL which might...

Anti-Japanese within China, or in global public opinion? Because the former was pretty well established by this point (though Nanking still made it worse), but the latter would prove crucial in the direction of the war in Asia.
 
Any delay in the Japanese advance will allow the Chinese to man the so-called "Chinese Hindenburg Line", the Wufu and Xicheng lines of fortifications. Since reinforcements are arriving, given time the Chinese can work out the problems that caused them to simply abandon the line IOTL. This would make any subsequent attack on Nanking harder for the Japanese.

Chiang is probably willing to play for time and enter negotiations, but at this time period he has to fight. Backing down once more is no longer politically viable. As others have mentioned, a static line at Shanghai does not stop the Japanese advancing in North China.

In terms of the larger political situation, there are only a few possible outcomes.

The most likely is that Chiang's refusal to accept Japanese demands means the war continues. The respite might mean the Chinese have a more successful defense at Nanking before they lose it. However, the additional Japanese casualties may impact the Battle of Wuhan later on. Whether there is any long term benefit is doubtful, but possible if Wuhan is held.

A less likely scenario is that the war enters a ceasefire, but Chiang de facto accepts the Japanese occupation of Shanghai and North China while keeping his force in the field. In public, Chiang keeps up the war rhetoric to hide the deal. The problem with this scenario is that Chiang cannot do that for long, as the Chinese public and his commanders will expect an attack at some point. The Japanese aren't dumb, and they'll soon figure out whether Chiang intends to betray any deal and attack them later. Given the insubordination of Japanese army generals, the idea that Japan won't attack again is a non-starter. The only difference from the first scenario is that China might gain a few more weeks or months of respite before hostilities commence.
 

Ah, now we're talking! So, Japan holds off on any offenses immediately after Shanghai; Chiang uses this time to build his defenses (around Nanking, at Wuhan, etc), so that when violence does break out again, Japanese forces do less well than OTL's 1938, likely meaning Wuhan is held. At this point, Chiang has done well enough that he can play for more time with negotiations. But as you say, this de-escalation won't last, from combined factors of the Chinese expecting another attack, the Japanese realizing the peace can't hold, and the army generals still slipping from their control. Do I have that about right?

Another element that should be kept in mind is that OTL's escalation to all out war with China precipitated the breakdown in trade relations with the US and other countries (starting 1938). If the early stages of said escalation aren't "success" followed by a year of pyrrhic victories, but a pyrrhic victory followed by defeat, might Japan be more disposed toward negotiation or slower escalation, to counter further isolation? Even the generals on the ground might be slower to act unilaterally if their initial efforts are less successful than OTL, I think.
 

Realpolitik

Banned
Probably no effect except more lives saved, insofar as the postwar world is concerned. The Japanese atrocities were not one big oopsie in Nanjing. Unit 731, the Sanko Sakusen...
 
I think what they meant by "limited conflict" was limiting conflict in the south - since the north is the actual invasion. So this time Nanking would happen elsewhere, maybe Tsingtao, maybe Wuhan.
 
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