AHC: An Anglo-German alliance - Wilhelm's dream

NoMommsen

Donor
Fisher's view was that the most important quality for a capital ship was that it be at the battle, and at the best place in the battle to achieve effect on the enemy. A slow ship, however well armed and armoured, couldn't guarantee that. So, speed - both tactical speed and strategic speed, the latter explaining his enthusiasm for oil fuel and later diesel engines - was foremost.

Second priority was destroying enemy ships. That meant hitting hardest, first. Which meant big guns and excellent gunnery.

Protection was last. He wasn't opposed to it exactly - the Incomparable concept was aimed at being protected against the heaviest shellfire - but generally felt that on a fixed size of ship other things had priority.

It's hard to say he was wrong, especially in the long run. The use of fast battleships in WW2 was fully in keeping with Fisher's concept of battlecruiser operations, and it's arguable that the ultimate battlecruiser is in fact the fleet aircraft carrier.
And I always thought, that the Battle of Jutland was the ultimate proof how wrong Fisher was ... and the reason why the RN stopped concepts like Furious and Courageous as artillery ships and NEVER came back to that.

For the fast battleships of WW II : they had capable speed (possible by technological development of the machines and the fact that hydrodynamic issues put a quite firm border to higher speed) and capable firepower and capable protection. Their trade off was a much smaller protected area.
 
And I always thought, that the Battle of Jutland was the ultimate proof how wrong Fisher was ... and the reason why the RN stopped concepts like Furious and Courageous as artillery ships and NEVER came back to that.
The Courageous class and Furious were conceived as light battle cruisers, and successors to the Invincible class. They weren't nearly as bad as they're made out to be, but didn't fit with anyone's doctrine but Fisher's.
For the fast battleships of WW II : they had capable speed (possible by technological development of the machines and the fact that hydrodynamic issues put a quite firm border to higher speed) and capable firepower and capable protection. Their trade off was a much smaller protected area.
They were also a lot larger than WWI ships. Hood wasn't that far off a WWII fast battleship in terms of capability, and was of similar size.
 
You're not catching what I'm thowing, but my PC is broken so I'm on the PS4 which limits my responses.


I am aware that if Germany wanted an alliance with Britain it would have to make concessions, however given the value of such an alliance would those concessions be too great? Germany wanted a big navy, they could afford to pay for a big navy and during it's construction the Army was artificially kept small to keep middle class officers out. It is no coincidnece that the year the navy abandoned the so called naval race was the same year the Army expanded by some 135,000 men, the resources allocated for defence went to Army expansion rather than navy expansion. Why should Germany lose this big navy in order to enter into an alliance with Britain?


You keep saying Britain didn't choose a side, well from 1902 after the alliance with Japan the RN started redeploying squadrons back to Europe, so the threat had been identified. By 1906 Britain had chosen a side, the Germans didn't call the British King 'Eddie the Encircler' for nothing. By the start of WW1 Britain only had a single plan, deploy the Army on the French right flank, this is well and truly chooing a side.


As for spuer power, most of the countries that were great powers in the 1800s hadn't become weaker, but the goalposts had moved and it was possible to accumulate much greater power from vast territories. Frane and Britain were limited in their expansion however Germany was already much bigger than both and had on its borders subject countries and peoples who could just as easily add to the wealth and power of Germany than to their current overlords Russia and AH if Germany could get hold of them. WHat's more this is a much more secure way of gaining resources than overseas colonies which as both wars showed were hideously vulnerable to uboats.

Well to court the UK, Germany would effectively have to convince the UK that British interests would be best served by supporting Germany in a conflict, so lets see what early 20th century Britain wants: First of all the desperately need to keep naval supremacy, as the disadvantage to being a heavily populated island is that you are incredibly vulnerable to blockade (indeed in the 1920's British defense planners estimated that if a larger enemy fleet arrived offshore the UK would be forced to surrender in a matter of days). That's one bargaining chip the Germans could have; offering the deal they did in OTL much earlier, before they had effectively lost the anglo-german naval race and the issue had essentially already been played out(because unlike the UK they need to put a lot of resources into building up a big army, as you said). The other issue is the British don't want one absolute power dominating the continent. Germany is already the strongest continental power so to get British support it would need to lay out exactly what territorial expansions it would demand in a victorious war with France and Russia and these gains would likely have to be limited. Some politicians like Bismark understood this and managed the British quite well during international crisis in Europe (the Franco-Prussian war being a great example) as well as diplomatically isolating France. If the Kaiser tries to immediate Napoleon and just grab huge swaths of Europe (arguably OTL) then the UK will move against him because one country dominating all of Europe is an intolerable existential threat to the UK.

Also I am not saying the UK never chose a side, eventually it did as it sided with France and Russia, however it was quite late to joining such an alliance and even when there it did not immediately come to the defense of either county at the outset of WW1 (using the violation of Belgian neutrality as an excuse). My point here is that unlike France, and to a degree Russia, Great Britain is not irredeemably set as an enemy of Germany. Unlike most other Great Powers in Europe (with the notable exception of Italy) Britain isn't automatically in one camp or another and when war breaks out isn't directly and immediately threatened. By 1914, it is true that the UK had firmly fallen into France's camp, but it didn't have to be this way, if Germany had taken a different diplomatic approach to courting Britain in the late 19th and early 20th century. There were certainly fault lines between the UK and France that could have been exploited by Germany (eg. the Fashoda incident).

You are right that France and Britain of the early 20th century aren't head and shoulders above everyone else like they were in the early 18th century. A now fully unified Germany has certainly caught and surpassed both in terms of home population and industrial capacity (especially France), however you are incorrect about expansion. The UK expanded by settling overseas (in this age Australia and Canada were the popular destinations) and there were huge waves of emigrants heading out to the empire and the "White Dominions" in particular. France's colonization was more limited (and it also had a much smaller population) but ethnic French people were also settling North Africa. Germany was a very densely populated country (ie. Germany as "a people without space") and had few colonies and essentially could only expand by warring against its neighbors on the continent to acquire more territory, the less populated territory to the east was especially enticing (as it would remain so into the 1940s ie. the "lebensraum"). Indeed one of the big targets of German emigration at this time was the US, which today actually has more people who are ethnically have German heritage than English heritage. The dense population and heavy industrialization of Germany meant it also had to import significant amounts of resources and materials to keep its economy running and to feed itself, and in war times, if the sea-lanes were closed Germany would be forced to seize resources from its neighbors in order to make up the gap (ie. this is why the blockade of Germany was very effective in the later years of WW1). As to the submarine threat: in WW1 the treat is less, due to Germany not having the bases in Northern France to operate its subs out of that they would have in WW2, greatly limiting Germany's ability to raid convoys to the UK. It is true that Britain is immensely vulnerable to blockade (it is much more reliant on imports than Germany or any other country for that matter), but even in WW2 the U-boats were never able to cut transatlantic traffic to significant levels, although there were times when Germany was sinking merchant ships faster than they could be rebuilt and the threat was definitely looming. However it is famous knowledge that in the UK during WW2 bread was never rationed until after the war, when it was being sent to feed West-Germany (and to be fair the wheat crop in the UK in 1946 failed).
 
Thing is, Germany had just 3 more dreadnoughts than France-Russia combined.

You can't cut a whole lot without risking the French not even needing Britain to blockade Germany during a war.


That said, A-H desintegrating or Russia not all-but falling apart during the Russo-Japanese war would probably work out fine for this alliance. If Germany is all alone against France-Russia (or France-Russia looks likely to stomp all over Germany & allies) both Britain and Germany develop a much stronger interest in allying.

When, Russia entered ww1 with 7 dreadnoughts under construction but none actually in service. 7 ships with no guns bigger than 12 inch guns and 3 of them locked in the black sea. The Russian Japanese war showed the inability of the Russians to diplomatically escape the black sea.

The French had 7 dreadnoughts in service with 5 under construction.

The Germans on the other hand had 15 dreadnoughts in service and 6 more under construction. The germans also had 4 battlecruisers in service and 3 more under construction.

The Germans also had something of a qualitative advantage over the French and Russians. The Germans were also allied to Austria Hungary and Italy (who may have stayed loyal to Germany in the case of British neutrality).

The Italians had at the start of ww1 4 battleships in service and 2 more building while the Austrians had 3 battleships in service and 1 more building.

Germany has a clear advantage over France and Russia combined st any stage. It just becomes more pronounced when you consider that Germany may have allies and Russia has a fleet trapped in the black sea. If you count german BB and BC in service at the start of ww1 you have as many as France and Russia have in service or on the slips at the time including the Black sea fleet.

In the case of war between Germany and either or both AH and Italy against France and Russia the French navy's first priority is to escort armies in Algeria to mainland France. Should Austria or Italy sortie even a losing battle will harm the French fleet.

If the Germans cut their Battlescruiser fleet entirely they would still have an advantage and british nerves would relax.
 
What about the human factor?
If Kaiser Wilhelm had a different nature or if had been an alternate Kaiser,and he had wanted a strong agreement with the United Kingdom,he could succeed?
Or everything he could do a clash between Germany and UK was inevitable?
 

BooNZ

Banned
What about the human factor?
If Kaiser Wilhelm had a different nature or if had been an alternate Kaiser,and he had wanted a strong agreement with the United Kingdom,he could succeed?
Or everything he could do a clash between Germany and UK was inevitable?

I think the human factor is huge, but Wilhelm's responsibility for the deterioration of Anglo-German relations is overstated - more often than not, Willy would have been absolutely thrilled with an Anglo-German alliance. The personal prejudices of the foreign policy professionals in both Germany and Britain played a greater role in the deterioration of relations. Similarly, personal agendas in their respective naval departments further poisoned the well.
 
Sorry Matteo, I am afraid you are the one in fairy land. The key reason German diplomacy of the period appears so clumsy was that Germany could not conceive that Britain could reconcile with either of its traditional and hated foes (France and Russia). The Germans had concluded an Anglo-German alliance was Britain's only option and were determined to extract a 'fair' price for German participation.

As Rast has mentioned, there were a small minority of well placed German-phobic Brits (incl Crowe, Churchill, Grey) who were determined not to align with Germany - no matter the cost. That was not representative of British public opinion, which had no love of either the French or Russians. Notwithstanding the above, something resembling an Anglo-German alliance was probably still on the table as late as 1902.
Hate to necro but why do you think an alliance is still on the table in 1902? With Edward the VII on the throne, there was simply no way, the man hated Wilhelm and Germany.
 
I see the Versailles war guilt clause and the horror of the holocaust come out in these discussion , particularly in the idea that it is not a legitimate course of action for Germany to build a powerful navy. Would it be legitimate to suggest Britain drastically reduce the size of its army during the haldane reforms of 1908 because the only reason to have a reserve of 640,000 trained troops is to wage war on the continent and threaten Germany ?

Was Haldanes reforms designed to 'increase' troop numbers per se?

I always thought it was simply to properly organise the Regular forces and simplify the existing reserve forces (which was eclectic in nature and had a mismatch of weapons and incomplete ToEs) and to ensure a common doctrine with dominion forces - this in the light of the Boer war and to some extent the result of the Tangier Crisis which allowed the Liberal government into power allowing Haldane to make those changes.

And lets be honest here - its 6 Regular Divisions and then after some months 14 Territorial Divisions - if that threatens Germany.....well!
 
Also, where there any key pro-German British politicians in power? Chamberlain and Castle's offers for an alliance were obviously ploys but were there any genuine offers?
 
Just needs to be a bigger and scarier Russia. No Russo-Japanese War, Russia cements itself in Manchuria. In 1911 Russia annexes the Mongols after the Mongolian Revolution. Makes moves towards Tibet. Britain flips its lid and all that latent Russophobia boils back t the surface and now Germany doesn't look so bad.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Hate to necro but why do you think an alliance is still on the table in 1902? With Edward the VII on the throne, there was simply no way, the man hated Wilhelm and Germany.
From my reading of Dreadnaught by Massie, Wilhelm was well behaved at his grandmother's funeral in 1902(?) and the British extended tentative feelers, but Wilhelm was counseled to ignore any such approaches. With the benefit of hindsight, to suggest an alliance was on the table was an exaggeration, but there was certainly an opportunity for an Anglo-German understanding.
 
From my reading of Dreadnaught by Massie, Wilhelm was well behaved at his grandmother's funeral in 1902(?) and the British extended tentative feelers, but Wilhelm was counseled to ignore any such approaches. With the benefit of hindsight, to suggest an alliance was on the table was an exaggeration, but there was certainly an opportunity for an Anglo-German understanding.

That sounds familiar. I think the ideas was that Germany thought Britain was vulnerable and that Germany was the only possible ally, so they should hold out for a better deal?

But my memory also suggests that the British felt quite vulnerable around that time, around Fashoda and the Boer War, fearful of a continental alliance ganging up on them. So they decided to abandon isolationism and engage more with the continent.

Germany thought that they were the only option. But instead the British resolved diplomatic sores and strategic concerns with the powers that concerned them most - reconciliation with France re. colonies and with Russia re. the threat to India.

This left Germany sitting there unengaged, because there wasn't nearly as much to talk to Germany about. So relations with France and Russia improved, while those with Germany didn't.
 
Was Haldanes reforms designed to 'increase' troop numbers per se?

I always thought it was simply to properly organise the Regular forces and simplify the existing reserve forces (which was eclectic in nature and had a mismatch of weapons and incomplete ToEs) and to ensure a common doctrine with dominion forces - this in the light of the Boer war and to some extent the result of the Tangier Crisis which allowed the Liberal government into power allowing Haldane to make those changes.

And lets be honest here - its 6 Regular Divisions and then after some months 14 Territorial Divisions - if that threatens Germany.....well!

It was, but in the process created an expeditionary force.

My line of reasoning is that it is not legitimate for Germany to build up whatever size navy she wants then it is not legitimate for Britain to build whatever size army she wants, let alone develop an expeditionary force.
 

BooNZ

Banned
That sounds familiar. I think the ideas was that Germany thought Britain was vulnerable and that Germany was the only possible ally, so they should hold out for a better deal?

But my memory also suggests that the British felt quite vulnerable around that time, around Fashoda and the Boer War, fearful of a continental alliance ganging up on them. So they decided to abandon isolationism and engage more with the continent.

Germany thought that they were the only option. But instead the British resolved diplomatic sores and strategic concerns with the powers that concerned them most - reconciliation with France re. colonies and with Russia re. the threat to India.

This left Germany sitting there unengaged, because there wasn't nearly as much to talk to Germany about. So relations with France and Russia improved, while those with Germany didn't.

I agree with the gist of what you are saying, but Germany was better placed to reach an understanding with Britain, and France only really got an opportunity to make a move after Germany dropped the ball. An Anglo-German alignment or understanding would have made far more sense for both Germany and Britain, but personal prejudices and agendas prevailed on both sides.
 
It was, but in the process created an expeditionary force.

My line of reasoning is that it is not legitimate for Germany to build up whatever size navy she wants then it is not legitimate for Britain to build whatever size army she wants, let alone develop an expeditionary force.

Britain always had an expeditionary force and a large pool of reservists - its simply that the Continental army model was superior and the Haldane reforms sought to match it and in doing so align training and equipment across the various Regualr, Reserve and Colonial forces.

Britain was the worlds only Superpower at the time - it ought to have a modern army - but it didn't really have one in 1899 and it was shown up!

The Empire sent half a million troops to South Africa - 350,000 British Regulars - drawn from the British Army and the various reserve forces - and about 150,000 Colonial troops and the conflict saw a number of failings that Haldane sought to resolve.

So its not like Britian had 12 bobbys armed with trunchions and a dry wit in 1906 and then suddenly in 1908 a fully modern army capable of marching on Berlin!

I am sure that Germany was more concerned with the French Army and the Russian army at the time

Also the relative strength of the rapidly growing German Navy compared to the RN was a lot closer than that contemptable little army compared to the German Army
 
I agree with the gist of what you are saying, but Germany was better placed to reach an understanding with Britain, and France only really got an opportunity to make a move after Germany dropped the ball. An Anglo-German alignment or understanding would have made far more sense for both Germany and Britain, but personal prejudices and agendas prevailed on both sides.

Initially, yes, Germany was better placed, in the context of not having Russia or France's strategic concerns with Britain. But I think opportunities and desire matter more than initial position, as it's these factors that allow progress.

AIUI Britain wanted to reduce tensions with continental powers, and the only route to this lay through reconciliation with France and Russia. These powers, feeling threatened by the growing power of Germany, were very happy to engage with Britain - hence mutual desire for improved relations. This allowed the previous strategic hotpoints of Africa and Asia to become opportunities for reconciliation.

I think Germany blew its chance because they misunderstood Britain's motivations and desires. Germany seemed to expect that Britain would have to turn to them, but this seems borne from a belief that Britain had no interest in reducing tension with Russia and France. But obviously Britain did want to reduce these tensions, as it was these that had forced her to abandon her European isolationism, and demonstrated this by reconciling with those powers.
 
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