Get a significant amount of American Soldiers fighting on the Eastern front in World War II. They have to be fighting the Nazi's. Other than that it doesn't matter.
AHC: American Soldiers on the Eastern Front in WWII
- Thread starter Mister Abbadon
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Nietzsche
Banned
Unlike the volunteer fighter pilots and the like in SE Asia and the UK, or even the 'Abraham Lincoln Brigades' in the Spanish Civil War, manpower(and technical expertise) was never a problem for the Soviets.
The only way this could happen is if there is a sudden collapse in the Soviet front. Stalin briefly considered asking for British troops in the Middle East to move north and hold the lines in the Caucasus during the worst period of Case Blue, but quickly retreated from that when it became obvious that the Soviet lines would hold.
We need to generate a major disaster sometime in 1942 which may involve a POD in 1941. Either Stalin interferes more with his generals and leads to an even greater disaster, or Hitler realizes the Soviet Union won't collapse by October 1941 and makes sure his lines aren't overextended. Germany then withstands the Moscow Counteroffensive much easier and doesn't lose as many men or territory with Soviet losses being higher. Then when Case Blue opens, the Soviets are less prepared to handle it and experience a major defeat. The reserves they used IOTL for Uranus and Saturn are instead needed to just hold the line. British troops move into the Caucasus to protect the oil fields at Baku. There is never a huge Soviet victory at Stalingrad, and therefore no victory at Kursk. Germany retains the Donets and maybe has Leningrad and is much closer to Moscow still.
As American forces build in 1943, some divisions are sent into the Caucasus to relieve the British and perhaps coordinate with the Red Army for an offensive to retake Stalingrad that year or in 1944. American forces on the Eastern Front will be very limited since they are still mostly needed for Overlord. When the June 1944 landings happen, the Eastern Front is more to the East then IOTL.
We need to generate a major disaster sometime in 1942 which may involve a POD in 1941. Either Stalin interferes more with his generals and leads to an even greater disaster, or Hitler realizes the Soviet Union won't collapse by October 1941 and makes sure his lines aren't overextended. Germany then withstands the Moscow Counteroffensive much easier and doesn't lose as many men or territory with Soviet losses being higher. Then when Case Blue opens, the Soviets are less prepared to handle it and experience a major defeat. The reserves they used IOTL for Uranus and Saturn are instead needed to just hold the line. British troops move into the Caucasus to protect the oil fields at Baku. There is never a huge Soviet victory at Stalingrad, and therefore no victory at Kursk. Germany retains the Donets and maybe has Leningrad and is much closer to Moscow still.
As American forces build in 1943, some divisions are sent into the Caucasus to relieve the British and perhaps coordinate with the Red Army for an offensive to retake Stalingrad that year or in 1944. American forces on the Eastern Front will be very limited since they are still mostly needed for Overlord. When the June 1944 landings happen, the Eastern Front is more to the East then IOTL.
The Red Army has to be on the brink of collapse for Stalin to invite outsiders into his hermit Kingdom. Read about the Arctic convoys and the restrictions the KGB placed on British merchant seaman leaving their ships to get an idea of how opposed Stalin was to anyone entering the country on anything but the most controlled circumstances.
Stalin ceasing to run things, and possible to breathe some time before December 1941 would might have helped
Stalin asked Churchill to send a corps or two (I forget the exact demand) in September 1941 through Murmansk to reinforce Lenibgrad and Karelia. Churchill thought the idea was ridiculous and denied Stalin's request. It was as much due to the logistics of the matter than anything else; trying to supply a British (Or American) corps would be impossible because their requirements are very different from a Soviet formation of similar size. Supply problems, both in producing and transporting, meant that most Soviet armies were well below their required fill of ammunition, food, equipment, etc even in early 1942 (The kinks weren't really worked out until 1943). It's an obstacle that can't be overcome in 1941 or 42, and after that Soviet victory seemed assured.
Here's a silly but imaginable scenario which Hitler himself might have entertained during his final days:
Hitler refuses to delay Barbarossa and never diverts significant forces to Greece. With the benefit of an early start, the invasion of the Soviet Union is a glorious triumph. The Soviets are routed, Moscow is captured, Stalin is eaten by wombats, etc. A resistance movement slowly consolidates in northern Russia. Meanwhile the Western Allies sweep the Italians out of Greece and embark on a "backdoor strategy", gradually working their way up the Black Sea coast. By the time Anglo-American forces have reached Odessa, the Russian resistance movement has emerged from the taiga to recapture Leningrad and the charred ruins of Moscow. The Russians proceed to invade the Reich from the northeast, via the Baltic, while the Western Allies invade from the southeast, via Ukraine and Poland. They meet in Poland, somewhere around Warsaw, and pose for photographs.
Hitler refuses to delay Barbarossa and never diverts significant forces to Greece. With the benefit of an early start, the invasion of the Soviet Union is a glorious triumph. The Soviets are routed, Moscow is captured, Stalin is eaten by wombats, etc. A resistance movement slowly consolidates in northern Russia. Meanwhile the Western Allies sweep the Italians out of Greece and embark on a "backdoor strategy", gradually working their way up the Black Sea coast. By the time Anglo-American forces have reached Odessa, the Russian resistance movement has emerged from the taiga to recapture Leningrad and the charred ruins of Moscow. The Russians proceed to invade the Reich from the northeast, via the Baltic, while the Western Allies invade from the southeast, via Ukraine and Poland. They meet in Poland, somewhere around Warsaw, and pose for photographs.
Nietzsche
Banned
...
The adventure in Greece probably helped the German army more than hampered. It allowed them to refine their tactics and gain some valuable knowledge on the capabilities of their newer equipment. Second, if memory serves, it was uncharacteristically wet during the initial proposed start of Barbarossa.
This idea has been a windmill I've tilted at for the last six months.
Sure Stalin wanted to keep it a hermit kingdom where he could bluff and bluster to his heart's content w/o anyone Soviet or Western having anything close to the full picture.
However, if Barbarossa and other German offiensives were uncomfortably close to succeeding, offers for Western forces to come to Sovet soil were on the table.
Say Beria, Malenkov, or other moderates come to power and get substantial Anglo-American forces on the ground 250,000+ on the Eastern Front.
They'll be hammering at the front door against the best German officers and gear and tactics they could muster. Of course, if the USAAC and RAF could base medium and LR bombers in the USSR from 1942 on, Ploesti is toast a lot quicker and frankly, I see the Germans getting shredded a lot quicker and harder. YMMV
It will be nightmarishly bloody, but I think it butterflies the Cold War for several reasons.
One: Hundreds of thousands of Americans see firsthand the nightmarish brutality and insanity of the SS and German/Axis allied troops and auxiliaries on that front for two to three years of ever-escalating horror.
It was shocking OTL for the WAllied troops that liberated the camps in 1945.
Two: The Soviets see American and British troops fighting and dying like flies (and earning their dues as full Allies) in the giants' dance that was the Eastern Front. Every village from the Caucasus to the Dniepr has a cemetery where US and UK and other Allied troops died defending the Motherland.
Three: Without Stalin's regime keeping the Soviets paranoid and isolated from the larger world, it's easier for the Americans and Soviets to completely trust each other as fire-forged friends.
Also, I believe the US would be obscenely generous with helping the USSR recover from the ravages of WWII in money, gear, expertise, etc.
Imagine what some Iowa farm boys could do with the Ukraine if they were allowed to homestead after WWII under some NEP program?
Think of what Soviet agronomists and Norman Borlaug could do making the Green Revolution happen much faster?
Postwar- the Morgenthau Plan is rejected b/c it's insufficiently harsh.
Any idea of restoring Germany as an anti-Communist bulwark gets binned.
Sure Stalin wanted to keep it a hermit kingdom where he could bluff and bluster to his heart's content w/o anyone Soviet or Western having anything close to the full picture.
However, if Barbarossa and other German offiensives were uncomfortably close to succeeding, offers for Western forces to come to Sovet soil were on the table.
Say Beria, Malenkov, or other moderates come to power and get substantial Anglo-American forces on the ground 250,000+ on the Eastern Front.
They'll be hammering at the front door against the best German officers and gear and tactics they could muster. Of course, if the USAAC and RAF could base medium and LR bombers in the USSR from 1942 on, Ploesti is toast a lot quicker and frankly, I see the Germans getting shredded a lot quicker and harder. YMMV
It will be nightmarishly bloody, but I think it butterflies the Cold War for several reasons.
One: Hundreds of thousands of Americans see firsthand the nightmarish brutality and insanity of the SS and German/Axis allied troops and auxiliaries on that front for two to three years of ever-escalating horror.
It was shocking OTL for the WAllied troops that liberated the camps in 1945.
Two: The Soviets see American and British troops fighting and dying like flies (and earning their dues as full Allies) in the giants' dance that was the Eastern Front. Every village from the Caucasus to the Dniepr has a cemetery where US and UK and other Allied troops died defending the Motherland.
Three: Without Stalin's regime keeping the Soviets paranoid and isolated from the larger world, it's easier for the Americans and Soviets to completely trust each other as fire-forged friends.
Also, I believe the US would be obscenely generous with helping the USSR recover from the ravages of WWII in money, gear, expertise, etc.
Imagine what some Iowa farm boys could do with the Ukraine if they were allowed to homestead after WWII under some NEP program?
Think of what Soviet agronomists and Norman Borlaug could do making the Green Revolution happen much faster?
Postwar- the Morgenthau Plan is rejected b/c it's insufficiently harsh.
Any idea of restoring Germany as an anti-Communist bulwark gets binned.
i dont see anything but difficulties in sending British or US combat fomations. It is vastly more efficient to send the specific material items the Red Army needs.
I can see some value in sending a very large contingent of US Army officers in 1941/42 as observers, to learn first hand from the Red Army what it was like to fight the Germans. This would leave the US Army a little short on training cadre and organizational managment during he critical mobilization period, but it might purge some of the sillier doctrines sooner.
I can see some value in sending a very large contingent of US Army officers in 1941/42 as observers, to learn first hand from the Red Army what it was like to fight the Germans. This would leave the US Army a little short on training cadre and organizational managment during he critical mobilization period, but it might purge some of the sillier doctrines sooner.
@ Carl
From a pragmatic POV, it WAS far cheaper in lives and $$$ for the US to send the USSR materiel instead of troops AND materiel. They had a war to win and did so.
Thoughts about the peace were somewhat fuzzy since FDR died and Truman wasn't kept enough in the loop to really have the full picture until he swore in.
I think your point about US army officers observing the Eastern Front in much greater numbers in 41/42 would've been an eye-opener. Whether the brass hats do anything with the knowledge gained is another thing entirely.
Soviet officers coming to Ft. Knox or Aberdeen Proving Grounds or US officers attending the Frunze Academy and modeling Deep Battle and other tactics might be interesting. YMMDV on that but for it to stick, I think a few years in the trenches together might give Soviets and Americans more perspective on each other and mutual respect.
From a pragmatic POV, it WAS far cheaper in lives and $$$ for the US to send the USSR materiel instead of troops AND materiel. They had a war to win and did so.
Thoughts about the peace were somewhat fuzzy since FDR died and Truman wasn't kept enough in the loop to really have the full picture until he swore in.
I think your point about US army officers observing the Eastern Front in much greater numbers in 41/42 would've been an eye-opener. Whether the brass hats do anything with the knowledge gained is another thing entirely.
Soviet officers coming to Ft. Knox or Aberdeen Proving Grounds or US officers attending the Frunze Academy and modeling Deep Battle and other tactics might be interesting. YMMDV on that but for it to stick, I think a few years in the trenches together might give Soviets and Americans more perspective on each other and mutual respect.
Nietzsche
Banned
And as I stated previously, they gained invaluable experience with their new tactics, and got a clearer idea of the limitations of new equipment.
Indeed, logistics are the heart of the matter. The Red Army in 1941-42, and to a lesser degree until the end of the war, suffered vast shortages of food and ammunition. Soldiers were expected to survive on less than 3,500, even 3,000, calories a day. Ammunition rarely was at 100% fill and had to be scavenged and conserved, especially artillery ammunition. The Ref Army soldier was expected to scavenge for his food, taking anything he could find (Which incidentally explains the Red Army's looting in Poland, Germany, etc; soldiers considered it an acceptable fact of life). Luxury was considered to be a good piece of bread, cooked meat, and some sugar. German accounts often remark in the hardiness of the Soviet soldier, who underwent extreme deprivation and lived partially off the land.
In contrast, no western army would accept such conditions. As the Red Army couldn't pick up the slack due to shortages, Britain and the US would be supplying their armies directly, over an already stretched Soviet rail network. The difficulties involved would be extraordinary. The Allies would have to form their own rail repair services, logistics corps, etc; a bureaucratic nightmare. Plus strategic coordination would be quite the challenge.
In contrast, no western army would accept such conditions. As the Red Army couldn't pick up the slack due to shortages, Britain and the US would be supplying their armies directly, over an already stretched Soviet rail network. The difficulties involved would be extraordinary. The Allies would have to form their own rail repair services, logistics corps, etc; a bureaucratic nightmare. Plus strategic coordination would be quite the challenge.
I read a story once where in June of 1941 the FBI rounds up all the communists in America and offers them the chance to fight the fascists by volunteering for an AEF of sorts to fight in the Soviet Union.
The idea is that this force - led by George Patton and some US officer volunteers - will give the US officer corps experience fighting the Germans (Patton and the other US officers weren't communists themselves) and a chance to test US equipment.
Eventually a corps-sized AEF makes to the USSR just in time to participate in the opening stages of the German attack in October against Moscow. The US commie forces are motorized, and help blunt a German attack.
When Japan attacks in Dec of 1941, Patton and the other officers leave for the regular US Army, and the AEF fights on under American Communist leaders, increasingly equipped by the Soviet Union. By the end of the war, the Corps has been whittled down to a division and the men serving in have a whole new appreciation for the United States ...
Mike Turcotte
The idea is that this force - led by George Patton and some US officer volunteers - will give the US officer corps experience fighting the Germans (Patton and the other US officers weren't communists themselves) and a chance to test US equipment.
Eventually a corps-sized AEF makes to the USSR just in time to participate in the opening stages of the German attack in October against Moscow. The US commie forces are motorized, and help blunt a German attack.
When Japan attacks in Dec of 1941, Patton and the other officers leave for the regular US Army, and the AEF fights on under American Communist leaders, increasingly equipped by the Soviet Union. By the end of the war, the Corps has been whittled down to a division and the men serving in have a whole new appreciation for the United States ...
Mike Turcotte
Myabe an unexpected German breakthrough that threatens the lend lease port of Murmansk? The arctic was not mechanized country, so a U.S. force would be at less risk of being enveloped by German forces in a pocket. Also, the arctic was not a mass numbers front, so a large U.S. division could make a big difference there.
As a side note, Tunisia and Libya did the same with their Islamacists - accept a free plane ticket to fight as a Jihader in Afghanistan (vs Soviets) or Iraq (vs USA) or stay home and go to jail. Of course, the authorities were hoping that most of the local islamacists who accepted the offer would be killed in the jihad thus solving any security concerns. I think Tunisia even banned the survivors from returning home so they became stateless drifters moving from jihad area to jihad area.
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