AHC: Alternate Swiss Reformation

With no PoDs prior to 1531, how different can the Reformation in Switzerland in the short term? What I’m specifically wondering here is, can the theology of Double Predestination and Election be significantly reduced in influence during the 16th Century?

Suppose, for example, that Zwingli wasn’t killed in the Battle of Kappel? Would it, for example, be enough for John Calvin to be spightly less successful in Geneva (even if he still writes his 1536 book)? Or is Calvin’s role in pushing predestination overstated? And if something like this is possible, what are the reverberations on the Reformation over the next century?
 
With no PoDs prior to 1531, how different can the Reformation in Switzerland in the short term? What I’m specifically wondering here is, can the theology of Double Predestination and Election be significantly reduced in influence during the 16th Century?

Suppose, for example, that Zwingli wasn’t killed in the Battle of Kappel? Would it, for example, be enough for John Calvin to be spightly less successful in Geneva (even if he still writes his 1536 book)? Or is Calvin’s role in pushing predestination overstated? And if something like this is possible, what are the reverberations on the Reformation over the next century?

I'm not sure about doctrine, but how about this? If Zwingli lives beyond 1531 the Bible is translated, either by him or under his influence, into a Swiss-German dialect, most probably that of Zurich. The Reformed Churches in other cantons adopt this Bible in preference to Luther's, and tracts and other religious works are written in the language. Gradually canton by canton adopts this as the language of administration, even, eventually the Catholic cantons out of practical necessity. Finally by the 'Age of Enlightenment' secular writers are using it to write poems and novels, so that by say, 1750 Switzerland has its own 'national' language, 'Schwyzerisch', as different from standard High German as Dutch is.
 
Well, I'm Swiss Catholic, but I guess I'll try my best...

Honestly, the biggest impact of Zwingli surviving the Battle of Kappel, assuming he and his faction of cantons get their way, isn't even theological: it's political and military.

It's severely understated just how much of the Kappelkrieg and by extension the Swiss Reformation and Counter-Reformation was related to a cultural debate over the role of Swiss mercenaries. Zwingli in particular, being something of a "nationalist" (if you can really apply that concept at this point in history), railed against the mercenary system as a waste of young Swiss men's lives fighting for foreign wars that should have been of no concern to the Confederation. IIRC, there was also some moralistic justification, that going to war in foreign countries was something of a doorway to sin, but don't quote me on that. This was a message that had fairly strong support among the urban cantons that had more diversified economies, where the Reformation took root most of all, while the poorer Catholic cantons that depended on the system rejected that idea in particular, and that usually coincided with remaining Catholic and embracing the Counter-Reformation in opposition to Zwingli. It's not a one-to-one correlation, but it was certainly a tendency that's pretty easy to see in which cantons sided with the Reformation and which stayed behind the Church.

Zwingli gets free reign? You see a drastic downturn in Swiss mercenaries and a more inward-looking Confederation, at least for a time. That will have a whole host of effects on Europe beyond the Alps and also probably means Switzerland is probably relatively poorer. On the other hand, if Zwingli and his allies were able to decisively achieve their aims, you have a decent recipe for an early centralization movement in politics and culture. Sure, Bern and Zurich will still not want the other involved in their business and maintain some level of loose confederation between them, but the especially reticent rural and Catholic cantons would probably be under some form of military or puppet rule and forced to abide by the larger cantons' wishes more closely than in real history, much like Aargau was under Bern for most of Swiss history.

With no PoDs prior to 1531, how different can the Reformation in Switzerland in the short term? What I’m specifically wondering here is, can the theology of Double Predestination and Election be significantly reduced in influence during the 16th Century?

Suppose, for example, that Zwingli wasn’t killed in the Battle of Kappel? Would it, for example, be enough for John Calvin to be slightly less successful in Geneva (even if he still writes his 1536 book)? Or is Calvin’s role in pushing predestination overstated? And if something like this is possible, what are the reverberations on the Reformation over the next century?

As mentioned above, while I'm sure Zwingli definitely believed his interpretation of the Bible should spread beyond Switzerland's borders, he was ultimately a pretty Swiss-focused figure. His greatest praise for Luther was more for his independence and challenge against the Catholic Church, rather than his theological arguments, as an example. In addition, he notably made many writings advocating for a joining of Church and State, recognizing a "godly" City Council of Zurich as a legitimate engine of the word of God and saw aristocracy as the preferred form of government in comparison to monarchy and democracy. He's a uniquely Swiss figure that would probably not translate as well to wider contexts in that era, so I speculate you would probably see someone else in another region rise to the role of Calvin as a wider unity figure within that particular sect of Christianity.

With regards to Calvin, I'll say that as far as I can understand, Zwingli (or his successors) also held to Double Predestination, even before the Helvetic Confession established accords between the Calvinist and Zwinglist Churches in Switzerland. On the other hand, keep in mind that Calvin was actually kicked out of Geneva at least once, IIRC, after the city's conversion to Protestantism. Zwingli living might indeed neuter Calvin's specific program in the city, as a unitary figure for the Swiss Protestant Churches to hold to might have strengthened the resistance to Calvin's strain of Reformed Protestantism. That could cause its own ripples within the movement. In addition, the Helvetic Confession established by Bullinger and Calvin's followers was something of a blueprint to establish unity with other Reformed traditions, so absent that, you might have a more fractured and thus less popular or more localized set of Reformed Protestant Christian denominations.

I'm not sure about doctrine, but how about this? If Zwingli lives beyond 1531 the Bible is translated, either by him or under his influence, into a Swiss-German dialect, most probably that of Zurich. The Reformed Churches in other cantons adopt this Bible in preference to Luther's, and tracts and other religious works are written in the language. Gradually canton by canton adopts this as the language of administration, even, eventually the Catholic cantons out of practical necessity. Finally by the 'Age of Enlightenment' secular writers are using it to write poems and novels, so that by say, 1750 Switzerland has its own 'national' language, 'Schwyzerisch', as different from standard High German as Dutch is.
While I like the idea, I'll quickly point out that Schwiizertuutsch dialects are already mutually unintelligible from High German, with the latter being referred to as Schriifduutsch or "Writing German" in Switzerland itself. What you're proposing isn't the development of a language, merely a formalization and standardization of the common tongue. The only reason Swiss German isn't considered its own language in OTL is because it's got no standard written form and so doesn't have enough prestige to break out from the dialect title, though there is at least some literature in various local traditions that could have formed the basis of a Swiss German literary tradition.

To add to your POD here, by 1531, the Swiss are effectively independent from the Holy Roman Empire. A formalized language creates another early wedge of identity between the Swiss national identity and that of the wider German one, plus one that might extend into the other neighboring regions with a High Alemannic dialects like parts of Baden and Wurtemburg. Theoretically, it would also have knock-on effects in relations with the other linguistic regions within the Confederation. That could be positive, in which the local Swiss dialects of French and Italian are formalized, as I would love to see formalizations of Ticinese and Rhaet-Romansch as well (and if nothing else, maybe the damn French could use Septante, Huitante, and Nonante too due to Swiss influence instead of the absurd constructions of modern Standardized French for those numbers). On the other hand, tying the Swiss identity to a formalized Swiss German identity, as opposed to just saying "Everybody's from backwater mountain peoples and none of us really speak 'proper', no point getting upset about other languages in other cantons," could spell a cultural division that might lead to more ethnic or sectarian violence in the Confederation and potentially a smaller Switzerland.
 
As mentioned above, while I'm sure Zwingli definitely believed his interpretation of the Bible should spread beyond Switzerland's borders, he was ultimately a pretty Swiss-focused figure. His greatest praise for Luther was more for his independence and challenge against the Catholic Church, rather than his theological arguments, as an example. In addition, he notably made many writings advocating for a joining of Church and State, recognizing a "godly" City Council of Zurich as a legitimate engine of the word of God and saw aristocracy as the preferred form of government in comparison to monarchy and democracy. He's a uniquely Swiss figure that would probably not translate as well to wider contexts in that era, so I speculate you would probably see someone else in another region rise to the role of Calvin as a wider unity figure within that particular sect of Christianity.

With regards to Calvin, I'll say that as far as I can understand, Zwingli (or his successors) also held to Double Predestination, even before the Helvetic Confession established accords between the Calvinist and Zwinglist Churches in Switzerland. On the other hand, keep in mind that Calvin was actually kicked out of Geneva at least once, IIRC, after the city's conversion to Protestantism. Zwingli living might indeed neuter Calvin's specific program in the city, as a unitary figure for the Swiss Protestant Churches to hold to might have strengthened the resistance to Calvin's strain of Reformed Protestantism. That could cause its own ripples within the movement. In addition, the Helvetic Confession established by Bullinger and Calvin's followers was something of a blueprint to establish unity with other Reformed traditions, so absent that, you might have a more fractured and thus less popular or more localized set of Reformed Protestant Christian denominations.
Here’s what I was trying to get at with the OP - the first century of OTL’s Protest Reformation (not counting antecedents like Hussites and Lollards) are generally considered to be “Lutheranism” and “Calvinism”, though Martin Luther and John Calvin were really just the most noteworthy names in larger religious movements centered in North Germany and Switzerland respectively. Now “Calvinism” was, naturally enough, bigger than the question of Double Predestination; Luther wrote extensively on Irresistible Grace, and later “Calvinists” like the Arminians broke with the idea. And yet, the modern mainstream perspective seems to put this particular doctrine, and the related idea of the Elect, as being crucial to understanding the importance of Calvinism’s effect upon European history.

What I’m trying here is to imagine a Swiss (originating) Reformed Church, that in some of the also obvious ways resembles the tradition of OTL - the sacraments being, at best, allegorical, etc - while, at the very least, being less firmly associated with this particular doctrine... and, subsequently, significantly curbing the effect of the social and political ideology derived from the Elect upon TTL.
 
Here’s what I was trying to get at with the OP - the first century of OTL’s Protest Reformation (not counting antecedents like Hussites and Lollards) are generally considered to be “Lutheranism” and “Calvinism”, though Martin Luther and John Calvin were really just the most noteworthy names in larger religious movements centered in North Germany and Switzerland respectively. Now “Calvinism” was, naturally enough, bigger than the question of Double Predestination; Luther wrote extensively on Irresistible Grace, and later “Calvinists” like the Arminians broke with the idea. And yet, the modern mainstream perspective seems to put this particular doctrine, and the related idea of the Elect, as being crucial to understanding the importance of Calvinism’s effect upon European history.

What I’m trying here is to imagine a Swiss (originating) Reformed Church, that in some of the also obvious ways resembles the tradition of OTL - the sacraments being, at best, allegorical, etc - while, at the very least, being less firmly associated with this particular doctrine... and, subsequently, significantly curbing the effect of the social and political ideology derived from the Elect upon TTL.
In that case, your goal is pretty simple. While the Zwinglian Churches did and do hold to Predestination, it was of a far more libertarian bent as I understand it, in comparison to the rigid societal structure that Calvin built in Geneva. Having Calvin never able to return to Geneva after his first banishment for one reason or another removes that, and so Zwingli's relatively more moderate position probably wins out in that city before Calvin can enact his ideas or gain such a large soapbox, thus Calvin's interpretation does not have enough clout to be considered essential to understanding Reformed Protestantism.

By ideology of the Elect, I assume you are referring to the use of that doctrine to justify the contemporary power hierarchies and diminish support for the disadvantaged, and in turn, its use as basis for ideas like the Prosperity Gospel. Would that be correct?

If I am understanding you right, then my limited understanding of the topic makes me think that by simply cutting Calvin's initial powerbase down as described, the more diffuse movement originating from Switzerland and various other regional movements would allow Reformed congregations to spread with Calvin and his more unique ideas being considered just one of many initial reformers' interpretations to choose from. That would result in most of their theology being similar to OTL, but an initially weaker social position curbs over-identification of the religious Elect with the politically powerful.

Alternatively, I do not see a Helvetic Confession being created if Zwingli, rather than Bullinger is in control of the Swiss Church. Indeed, the most likely scenario is Zwingli putting Calvin in the same category as Luther, appreciating some ideas and independence, but ultimately unwilling to compromise with him. That would bring a larger and more definitive split within Reformed congregations, potentially leading to other differences in theology as a result of debates and rhetorical challenges between the two. I don't think I can speculate much on the finer details, though.

Again, I'm by no means an expert on Protestant theology, so feel free to ignore or argue with those scenarios.
 
Honestly, the biggest impact of Zwingli surviving the Battle of Kappel, assuming he and his faction of cantons get their way, isn't even theological: it's political and military.

It's severely understated just how much of the Kappelkrieg and by extension the Swiss Reformation and Counter-Reformation was related to a cultural debate over the role of Swiss mercenaries. Zwingli in particular, being something of a "nationalist" (if you can really apply that concept at this point in history), railed against the mercenary system as a waste of young Swiss men's lives fighting for foreign wars that should have been of no concern to the Confederation. IIRC, there was also some moralistic justification, that going to war in foreign countries was something of a doorway to sin, but don't quote me on that. This was a message that had fairly strong support among the urban cantons that had more diversified economies, where the Reformation took root most of all, while the poorer Catholic cantons that depended on the system rejected that idea in particular, and that usually coincided with remaining Catholic and embracing the Counter-Reformation in opposition to Zwingli. It's not a one-to-one correlation, but it was certainly a tendency that's pretty easy to see in which cantons sided with the Reformation and which stayed behind the Church.

Zwingli gets free reign? You see a drastic downturn in Swiss mercenaries and a more inward-looking Confederation, at least for a time. That will have a whole host of effects on Europe beyond the Alps and also probably means Switzerland is probably relatively poorer. On the other hand, if Zwingli and his allies were able to decisively achieve their aims, you have a decent recipe for an early centralization movement in politics and culture. Sure, Bern and Zurich will still not want the other involved in their business and maintain some level of loose confederation between them, but the especially reticent rural and Catholic cantons would probably be under some form of military or puppet rule and forced to abide by the larger cantons' wishes more closely than in real history, much like Aargau was under Bern for most of Swiss history.
In that case, your goal is pretty simple. While the Zwinglian Churches did and do hold to Predestination, it was of a far more libertarian bent as I understand it, in comparison to the rigid societal structure that Calvin built in Geneva. Having Calvin never able to return to Geneva after his first banishment for one reason or another removes that, and so Zwingli's relatively more moderate position probably wins out in that city before Calvin can enact his ideas or gain such a large soapbox, thus Calvin's interpretation does not have enough clout to be considered essential to understanding Reformed Protestantism.

By ideology of the Elect, I assume you are referring to the use of that doctrine to justify the contemporary power hierarchies and diminish support for the disadvantaged, and in turn, its use as basis for ideas like the Prosperity Gospel. Would that be correct?

If I am understanding you right, then my limited understanding of the topic makes me think that by simply cutting Calvin's initial powerbase down as described, the more diffuse movement originating from Switzerland and various other regional movements would allow Reformed congregations to spread with Calvin and his more unique ideas being considered just one of many initial reformers' interpretations to choose from. That would result in most of their theology being similar to OTL, but an initially weaker social position curbs over-identification of the religious Elect with the politically powerful.

Alternatively, I do not see a Helvetic Confession being created if Zwingli, rather than Bullinger is in control of the Swiss Church. Indeed, the most likely scenario is Zwingli putting Calvin in the same category as Luther, appreciating some ideas and independence, but ultimately unwilling to compromise with him. That would bring a larger and more definitive split within Reformed congregations, potentially leading to other differences in theology as a result of debates and rhetorical challenges between the two. I don't think I can speculate much on the finer details, though.
Okay, so it looks like we have a PoD here. The only thing left is to really look at what the medium term (as in first century, so up through the 1620's) effects this has on Europe as a whole.

To start with - do the Huguenots still become a massively important thing in French, eventually kicking off the Wars of Religion? Would the southern parts of the HRE (like Wuttenburg and Bavaria) now have, with Zwingli still alive, have a greater chance of becoming Protestant in the short term? And depending on how the success of TTL's Protestantism as a whole is changed, how is (if at all) is the Counter-Reformation altered? And what is the cumulative effect upon Europe (upon the Lowlands, upon the state of civil strife in Germany, what have you)?
 
Okay, so it looks like we have a PoD here. The only thing left is to really look at what the medium term (as in first century, so up through the 1620's) effects this has on Europe as a whole.

To start with - do the Huguenots still become a massively important thing in French, eventually kicking off the Wars of Religion? Would the southern parts of the HRE (like Wuttenburg and Bavaria) now have, with Zwingli still alive, have a greater chance of becoming Protestant in the short term? And depending on how the success of TTL's Protestantism as a whole is changed, how is (if at all) is the Counter-Reformation altered? And what is the cumulative effect upon Europe (upon the Lowlands, upon the state of civil strife in Germany, what have you)?
It depends on a lot of things, especially if Zwingli lives, if the Protestants win the Kappelkrieg in Switzerland and to what extent, and so on.

Let's assume that Zwingli lives and for one reason or another the Protestant cantons win an overwhelming victory. In the very short term there might be a sudden exodus of Catholic Swiss, especially former mercenaries, into neighboring nations either to escape the new Protestant order or just to ensure they can keep fighting for a good buck without potentially being hunted down by their former enemies. This might have a strengthening effect on some of the Catholic factions in Southern Germany for a time and I would say it probably draws Switzerland into the Thirty Years War in turn. That's a big shift to history. Instead of the peace of Switzerland acting as something of a spot of calm in the chaos, source of soldiers to all sides, and a precedent from which the Peace of Westphalia could draw from, it's an active participant in the chaos. That's not to say that an alt-Peace of Westphalia couldn't happen, just that in the medium term, Zwingli surviving and his faction achieving a total win might widen and worsen the conflict within Germany and Central Europe. In particular, I'd expect the Austrians to get involved in a big way, which could help formalize a different ethnic and linguistic identity in opposition to High German, but is also probably going to lead to a lot of dead people in the mean-time.

The Huguenots probably still come into existence. Farel and Calvin would still have been able to propagate their ideas in Geneva. Even if they don't make that city into the "Protestant Rome", they are still around in nearby areas. I don't know where Calvin went post-banishment, but IIRC Farel went to Neuchatel, so he'll still be publishing lots of Protestant literature into French on behalf of the Swiss Reformation, and was friendly enough with Zwingli despite their disagreements to get support from at least the Bernese government in that endeavor. Still, it's possible that a more moderate Reformation in Geneva leads to a slightly weaker outgrowth into France, but I think overall it'll still catch on with certain factions in France for the same reasons it did in OTL.

I don't know enough about the rise of Reformed Protestant churches in the Netherlands or Scotland to speculate on their developments. I can't imagine they'd be the same, however.
 
This might have a strengthening effect on some of the Catholic factions in Southern Germany for a time and I would say it probably draws Switzerland into the Thirty Years War in turn.
Would there still even be a Thirty Years War TTL? Or is that something that the success of German Protestantism in general basically made inevitable?
 
Would there still even be a Thirty Years War TTL? Or is that something that the success of German Protestantism in general basically made inevitable?
Honestly, while I think that some kind of massive conflict was inevitable in the HRE over the role of the Emperor and the individual autonomy of the states and principalities had to happen, I don't think it was Protestantism that made it inevitable. Much like it could be said that differing economies and politics were the basis upon which the Swiss Reformation was built as much as genuine religious thoughts, the same could be said for the German Reformation in a lot of ways. At the end of the day, the Hapsburg Emperors were forced to be closely aligned with the Catholic Church, as it was the biggest potential force for opposition within the HRE against their authority. As a result, rebelling against Rome also enabled many factions to do what they really wanted to do: take the fight to the Austrians. Add in the fact that northern Germany had a far more powerful emergent merchant class than the more feudal and aristocratic South, in my memory, and you had the perfect recipe for cultural and political division that in that era of history would have to be addressed in war.

As long as the Hapsburgs are Emperors, they will try to suborn the Catholic Church in the way the Spanish did, and as long as that's the case, those who aren't fond of towing the Emperor's line will be more susceptible to Luther and Zwingli's message.

Again, not to deny the genuine religious and ideological reasons behind conversion to the Protestant denominations, but they didn't happen in a vacuum. Normally, those preachers were considered rebels and dissidents against the powers that be and were allowed sanctuary in the first place frequently just to thumb noses at the higher powers in the Empire and Europe. Once given sanctuary, those preachers tended to make their presence felt real fast, but they needed the in.

What's absolutely not inevitable, though, are the results of the Thirty Years' War and the various wars of religion. Hell, push things in far enough of a direction and you might not even have the Counter Reformation as we know it. From what I recall, most observers of the Council of Trent were expecting some level of compromise with the ideals of Protestants, which we know didn't happen and instead lead to institutional but not as much doctrinal reform. I don't imagine the Catholic Church ever abolishing the Papacy or anything so radical, but we've seen in OTL an eventual acceptance that some parts of the Bible were potentially allegorical or metaphorical. A more moderate Reformed Church is less of a blatant threat to absolutely everything the Church stands and stood for, and you could see a set of minor concessions on smaller issues like Transubstantiation, not wholly embracing the Protestant ideal, but leaning more towards it than OTL. That would undercut the anti-Rome or Independent Reformation to some extent, but would further its cause in many other ways.
 
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