AHC: ADF Tiger ARH is deployed on operations.

AHC have the ADF deploy their Tiger ARH to Afghanistan. How does the orphan fleet perform and how many could the ADF deploy at one time?
 
None, because the pilots don't trust it, cost too many man hours to keep up in the air, and it has only just made FOC! And that was without testing it at altitude. It's another great ADF purchasing disaster. THe US could sell us 20+ near new Apache/Super Corbra today and they will be deployable in 18 months.
 
So in the general scheme of things where would the ARH lie in between say the Canadians suoerdoopa new ASW helicopter, the RANs SH2s and (at random) the RAH66?
 
My question would be why is the Australian one apparently so much worse as the other nations have deployed other versions to Afghanistan, do they not work as well and simply have they just been forced to make do or is it just the ARH that doesn't?

I have to also ask if this is a case of AUS copying the UKs standard way to muck up perfectly good US aircraft by specifying a different engine?
 
I have to also ask if this is a case of AUS copying the UKs standard way to muck up perfectly good US aircraft by specifying a different engine?

To be fair only the Phantom really suffered performance penalties from specifying a different engine. The British Apache's RTM322 engines allowed it to continue to carry the Longbow radar in Afghanistan when US Army examples had to have the radar removed.

To go back to the OP, for some reason the ADF seems to have repeated issues when it comes to procuring helicopters. I'm not quite sure why Australia bought the Tiger rather than the Apache or Super Cobra/Viper.
 

Archibald

Banned
It looks like the ARH Tigers replaced UH-1s and OH-58 Kiowas. And their successors might be OH-6s.

http://australianaviation.com.au/20...ght-helicopter-for-special-forces-on-the-way/

Well, all three choppers - UH-1, OH-58 and OH-6 - are armed helicopters, since all three derive from civilian machines: MD-500, Bell 205 and Bell 206.
By contrast the Tiger is a full blown combat helicopter right from the drawing board. It is no insult to the Tiger, nor to the ADF, to note that a combat helicopter is probably far more complex than an armed civilian chopper.
and surely enough, France replaced Gazelles with Tigers, yet armed Gazelles are still used in Africa because they are dirt cheap to fly, deploy, maintain...
Also armed Mi-8s vs Mi-24s.

Apache is expensive and a maintenance hog. Super Cobra is cheap, but it is small and light (even with massive evolutions, it remains the first combat chopper ever designed, 55 years ago). The Tiger is somewhere in the middle.
 
It looks like the ARH Tigers replaced UH-1s and OH-58 Kiowas. And their successors might be OH-6s.

http://australianaviation.com.au/20...ght-helicopter-for-special-forces-on-the-way/

Well, all three choppers - UH-1, OH-58 and OH-6 - are armed helicopters, since all three derive from civilian machines: MD-500, Bell 205 and Bell 206.
By contrast the Tiger is a full blown combat helicopter right from the drawing board. It is no insult to the Tiger, nor to the ADF, to note that a combat helicopter is probably far more complex than an armed civilian chopper.
and surely enough, France replaced Gazelles with Tigers, yet armed Gazelles are still used in Africa because they are dirt cheap to fly, deploy, maintain...
Also armed Mi-8s vs Mi-24s.

Apache is expensive and a maintenance hog. Super Cobra is cheap, but it is small and light (even with massive evolutions, it remains the first combat chopper ever designed, 55 years ago). The Tiger is somewhere in the middle.

More than likely the Tiger will be replaced by SuperCobra, as they all already marinised and can operate of the fat-ships (Canberra and Adelaide). While Apache would be nice, they need to support Amphibious operations, and AH-1Z fits the bill
SOCOM are currently using the old Blackhawks, they want something new and sexy and they usually get what they want. Ideally they want MH-60, similar to what the US Army 160 Regt operate (think Blackhawk down). Whether they get them or Little Birds, it depends on how money they get allocated.
 
Keep the helicopters in the RAAF and it would be flying in Afghanistan, the Army just doesn't seem to get operating sophisticated aircraft is a fundamentaly different game to driving M113s.

As for why, Thales was going to close operations in Australia if there was not a critical mass of business. Buying American would have given us a helicopter that the Army still couldn't deal with and cost us local manufacture of an array of other Defence equipment and ammo in particular.
 
Keep the helicopters in the RAAF and it would be flying in Afghanistan, the Army just doesn't seem to get operating sophisticated aircraft is a fundamentaly different game to driving M113s.

As for why, Thales was going to close operations in Australia if there was not a critical mass of business. Buying American would have given us a helicopter that the Army still couldn't deal with and cost us local manufacture of an array of other Defence equipment and ammo in particular.

Work has been horrific lately, hence the late reply.

For the RAAF to retain rotary winged capability IMO requires a 1960s POD to ensure that 1ATF has a better operational experience with integrating RAAF air. My understanding is that the restrictions that were initially placed on the use of 9 Squadron helicopters were due to the senior RAAF personnel, so that should be a relatively easy butterfly to make, particularly noting the close cooperation between the RAAF and Army in WW 2. Surely, there would still be a 'not so old and bold' chap to coordinate the use of RAAF helicopters. Fundamentally, with such a small helicopter fleet, it would make sense from a sustainment perspective for the RAAF to maintain control of rotary winged assets.

The larger alternative would be that in the lead up to the transfer of rotary winged assets from RAAF to Army control, that the Army spends the time and effort to understand how to integrate and sustain organic air power. A great discussion piece would be liaising with the RAN FAA and, could even be starting with something as simple as retaining Squadrons in lieu of Aviation Regiments. Since leaving defence, I've specialised in acquiring or divesting business lines for Companies and, the onboarding or divestment process is incredibly lengthy and detailed, however it is usually done successfully by most entities where I have been involved. IMO I think the latter option is possible, but the first POD is easier.
 
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