AHC: A more balanced USN pre WW1?

In the decade or more prior to WW1 the USN built up a formidable battle fleet reasonably constantly, usually 2 battleships per year with some years more and other less or even none, but reasonably costly. In contrast the USN built 16 destroyers in 1899 then none until the 5 of 1908, in 1909 they built 10 but then 5, 5, 8, 6, 6, 6 and 6 per year to 1916, when they authorised 50 for 1917. Cruisers were even worse, after building 12 as a result of the Spanish American war, the last of which commissioned in 1908 (itself after a 7 year break) the USN didn't build any more cruisers until 1918 when they started a class of 10.

Is there any way this stop-start process could be smoothed out? The USN got a bunch of battleships and cruisers out of the S-A war but no destroyers, can that be changed? The USN was getting a handful of destroyers each year, could a light cruiser along the lines of the Chester class be included in those orders? Could the USN keep up the tempo of 10 destroyers of 1909 or the 8 of 1912?
 
Congress always figured they could build cruisers and destroyers if they needed them in a war, and the isolationists thought keeping the Navy from scattering light units all over the world would keep the US from becoming embroiled in small foreign wars.
 
the navy had plans for a balanced fleet before world war1 but the congress would never approve the number of hulls needed for a balanced fleet.
 
Congress always figured they could build cruisers and destroyers if they needed them in a war, and the isolationists thought keeping the Navy from scattering light units all over the world would keep the US from becoming embroiled in small foreign wars.

What you might need is a clever Navy Secretary or member of Congress who realizes a more consistent build schedule that is spread across many smaller shipyards means a lot more congressional districts get the benefit of naval spending.
 
Congress always figured they could build cruisers and destroyers if they needed them in a war, and the isolationists thought keeping the Navy from scattering light units all over the world would keep the US from becoming embroiled in small foreign wars.

They could to an extent but would be better off starting off with a few more in service.

the navy had plans for a balanced fleet before world war1 but the congress would never approve the number of hulls needed for a balanced fleet.

How can this be changed? Not much I don't think, just a few more light cruisers and a dozen or so destroyers would go a long way.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
If writing an ATL, I would look to see if you could get a naval ship building union setup. And this union is active in politics. So when combined with the lobbying power of private shipyard, it controls some key swing states. MA, NY or VA come to mind as possible key swing states.
 
No tl, just wondering how the US got so out of step with the rest of the world and had to do a crash programme that was too late.
 

Delta Force

Banned
No tl, just wondering how the US got so out of step with the rest of the world and had to do a crash programme that was too late.

The United States Navy was defensively oriented and had few overseas commitments. Its fleet structure was similar to that of the Scandinavian countries, although on a much larger scale (look at the list of cruisers and the list of coastal defense ships on Wikipedia) and with proper battleships instead of coastal defense ships.
 
No tl, just wondering how the US got so out of step with the rest of the world and had to do a crash programme that was too late.

I believe part of the reason was the large number of ships built during the Civil War, combined with Congressional penny pinching. I think another reason was a lack of a serious threat, combined with a country focused inward.
 
Congressional penny pinching

Congress wasn't tight with battleship cash, in 1900 the USN commissioned 4 battleships and from then on only 1905, 1909, 1913 and 1915 saw no battleships commissioned. In contrast in 1906 some 6 battleships were commissioned, 4 in 1907, 1910 and 1916 and 3 in 1908, it taking about 4 years to build a battleship at the time.

That's some 35 battleships compared with 54 destroyers and 12 cruisers in the same timeframe.
 
Congress wasn't tight with battleship cash, in 1900 the USN commissioned 4 battleships and from then on only 1905, 1909, 1913 and 1915 saw no battleships commissioned. In contrast in 1906 some 6 battleships were commissioned, 4 in 1907, 1910 and 1916 and 3 in 1908, it taking about 4 years to build a battleship at the time.

That's some 35 battleships compared with 54 destroyers and 12 cruisers in the same timeframe.
Congress was still tight with Battleship cash. A lot of the US battleships of the period had defects or suboptimal design choices because of Congressional unwillingness to spend money, and the navy had to fight hard to get those battleships. Getting a reasonable number of cruisers or destroyers would likely mean fewer or no battleships ordered in that particular year. Given that the battleship has the longer service life, takes longer to build, and requires specialist industry to build, it makes sense to order them at the expense of other types absent a pressing need if funds are limited
 
Congress was still tight with Battleship cash. A lot of the US battleships of the period had defects or suboptimal design choices because of Congressional unwillingness to spend money, and the navy had to fight hard to get those battleships.

Yes, Congress pushed for the Sth Carolinas to be 16,000t rather than 18,000t of foreign designs and what many in the USN wanted.

Getting a reasonable number of cruisers or destroyers would likely mean fewer or no battleships ordered in that particular year. Given that the battleship has the longer service life, takes longer to build, and requires specialist industry to build, it makes sense to order them at the expense of other types absent a pressing need if funds are limited

Yes to all that, building a battle fleet is a job for peacetime however given the imbalance of the USN I don't think it would hurt if they had for example 33 battleships rather than 35 to get another 5 or so cruisers and 20 or so destroyers, particularly if they used these as leverage to get the design limitations out of battleships. Saying to Congress in 1905 for example they would rather 3 x 18,000t battleships and some light cruisers and destroyers rather than 4 inferior 16,000t battleships for the same money.
 
Yes, Congress pushed for the Sth Carolinas to be 16,000t rather than 18,000t of foreign designs and what many in the USN wanted.

Yes to all that, building a battle fleet is a job for peacetime however given the imbalance of the USN I don't think it would hurt if they had for example 33 battleships rather than 35 to get another 5 or so cruisers and 20 or so destroyers, particularly if they used these as leverage to get the design limitations out of battleships. Saying to Congress in 1905 for example they would rather 3 x 18,000t battleships and some light cruisers and destroyers rather than 4 inferior 16,000t battleships for the same money.
Was more than just the South Carolina's, you had the retarded layout of the Virginia's 8" battery, issues with the Nevada's triples due to hull layout from cramped size, possibly the Mississippi's (I've heard the Navy was just trying to experiment with trying to get a modern equivalent of the 74, rather than congress being cheap, but heard that too), and the Navy not getting 16" BB in 1914 or 15 (the Navy essentially wanted the Colorado's ordered in 1914, and 1913 scheme #4 in 1915), there's more like this

The problem with asking for say 3x18,000t BB, 5 CL and 20DD instead of 4x 16,000t BB is congress of the era would likely just give you 3x16,000t BB and no CL/DD, because you gave them an opening by saying you only needed 3 BB. Congress was like that, they had a policy of just cutting in half whatever the army asked for as a rule frex. I'm sure being more closely acquainted with Congress of the era than we are they got the best they could get

Depends on butterflies, only 5 pre 1916 authorized US DD survived until WWII, whereas 12 BB did. You throw up butterfly nets and those CL/DD are all scrapped come WWII, and the US has a few older more rickety BB that are less likely to be repairable if caught at Pearl, and more likely to be sunk if attacked while serving on the gun line, which saw 7 pre 1916 BB damaged OTL

Really to get the US of the era a balanced fleet, you need the Navy to have enough political capital so that it can get its 2 BB a year as a given and can use remaining capital to fight over DD's and CL's. You could have some sort of US Navy League, that would help, or you could have the US burned a bit in the Spanish American war, or just have the US get into prolonged tensions with another great power
 
Was more than just the South Carolina's, you had the retarded layout of the Virginia's 8" battery, issues with the Nevada's triples due to hull layout from cramped size, possibly the Mississippi's (I've heard the Navy was just trying to experiment with trying to get a modern equivalent of the 74, rather than congress being cheap, but heard that too), and the Navy not getting 16" BB in 1914 or 15 (the Navy essentially wanted the Colorado's ordered in 1914, and 1913 scheme #4 in 1915), there's more like this

Concur on the South Carolinas and Virginias. However, while the USN did want the Colorados early, I thought that the guns weren't ready until 1917 (Due to changes made to the initial design), thus the Navy elected to get a class of 14" ships rather than have hulls waiting around on guns.
 
Concur on the South Carolinas and Virginias. However, while the USN did want the Colorados early, I thought that the guns weren't ready until 1917 (Due to changes made to the initial design), thus the Navy elected to get a class of 14" ships rather than have hulls waiting around on guns.
I meant authorized in that year, the New Mexico's were authorized in 1914 but the first unit was finished in December 1917, guns were approved for mass production in Jan 1917, after successful tests in May 1916. The Navy wanted the ships authorized in 1914 or 1915, ready for late 1917 or 1918, correctly expecting the guns would be ready in time
 

Driftless

Donor
What role did Mahan's theories play on what type of US ships got built? Or was this a Teddy Roosevelt kind of Big Stick Navy?

What was the comparative cost differential between the smaller pre-dreadnought US battleships and larger cruisers like the New York and later the Tennessee's? Any limited cost differential may have played a role too in which types got built.

Extensive experimentation with armament format (double-stacked turrets & secondary batteries) also probably limited the "bang for the buck" (pun intended)
 
I believe that by the early 1900s the US was fully on board with Mahan theories of sea power and the decisive battle between capital ships. That is fine but it appeared to lack the array of ships needed to discharge the roles in such a battle, such as cruisers for scouting and destroyers for torpedo attacks.
 
What role did Mahan's theories play on what type of US ships got built? Or was this a Teddy Roosevelt kind of Big Stick Navy?

What was the comparative cost differential between the smaller pre-dreadnought US battleships and larger cruisers like the New York and later the Tennessee's? Any limited cost differential may have played a role too in which types got built.

Extensive experimentation with armament format (double-stacked turrets & secondary batteries) also probably limited the "bang for the buck" (pun intended)
In terms of ship types, the US effectively ignored what Mahan had to say. They agreed with the sea power and strategic idea of a decisive battle, but not the tactical and operational means of carrying it out

Mahan was against the Armored cruiser as a ship type, preferring more small light cruisers. The US built 10 large armored cruisers and very few small ones. Mahan was against the Dreadnought style battleship, the US authorized two before Dreadnought was even laid down and 2 more before she entered commission. Mahan was an advocate of more smaller, less individually powerful battleships, outside of maybe the Mississippi class the USN always went for the strongest it could get past congress. About the only place where they agreed was in deemphasizing speed, arguing that speed took away tonnage that could be used for more guns and armor, and that by attacking the right target you could make a faster enemy come out to play on your terms, though there were other sound reasons for that as well

The Double stacking was intended as a way to get more bang for the buck, as the guns would be able to share hoists and traversing machinery. It did not work out in practice
 
I don't know if Mahan's expertise was in the realm of tactics and ship types as it was naval strategy on a broad scale. A lot of navies embraced his theories and built the sorts of ships he didn't like, Britain and Germany built armoured cruisers then went to light cruisers and battlecruisers and then Britain went to the Hawkins class of heavy cruisers. All of these ship classes found useful employment in WW1 and armoured cruisers were present at Jutland with the RN, so I don't place great emphasis on Mahan's personal preferences for ships any more than I do any other important naval personality of the era such as Fisher or Tirpitz, the important thing being fleet/geography and the decisive battle.
 
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